Another case being argued next week involves X2Y Attenuators, LLC and Intel Corporation. This case presents the question of whether district court abused its discretion by dismissing two stayed cases for failure to prosecute.
X2Y argues in its opening brief that while the district court correctly identified the six factors required for dismissal, it did not carefully or correctly apply them. X2Y identifies five points of error. First, “the court found X2Y personally responsible for the delay in moving to reopen the cases, even though the sworn declarations of X2Y and its counsel established the opposite.” Second, “the court wholesale adopted Defendants’ unsupported claims of prejudice.” Third, “the court found no history of dilatoriness . . . and no willfulness or bad faith by X2Y or its counsel; yet the court failed to credit this in X2Y’s favor.” Fourth, the court disregarded its duty to look solely to the pleadings, which on their face establish that X2Y’s claims have merit.” Finally, “the district court failed to meaningfully consider alternative sanctions that could have been tailored to any specific risks of prejudice.”
Intel’s response brief argues that “the district court took a measured approach, evaluating the facts as alleged by X2Y and treating certain . . . factors neutrally even though all the factors weigh against X2Y and in favor of dismissal.” Further, Intel’s brief argues six main reasons for why the district court did not abuse its discretion. First, “X2Y bears personal responsibility for the undue delay.” Second, “Intel was prejudiced by X2Y’s unreasonable delay.” Third, “X2Y’s conduct shows a history of dilatoriness.” Fourth, “X2Y’s conduct shows bad faith and willfulness.” Fifth, “the meritoriousness factor . . . weighs against X2Y.” Finally, “the alternative sanctions that X2Y proposes . . . were never presented to the district court” and anyway “would not address Intel’s prejudice stemming from the delay.”
In reply, X2Y argues that it “was not within the district court’s discretion to adopt Intel’s claims of prejudice or its erroneous view of the law,” nor did the district court have “discretion to terminate the case when alternative sanctions were available and sufficient.”