This morning the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s holding that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act did not authorize tariffs imposed by President Trump early in his administration. The Court decided the case by a vote of six to three, but it issued splintering opinions totaling 170 pages explaining various approaches to deciding the case. Chief Justice Roberts authored the opinion of the Court, which was joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson. In it, Chief Justice Roberts explains why the Court concluded that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. Other parts of the opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts invoke the major questions doctrine as another basis to affirm the Federal Circuit, but those parts were joined only by Justices Gorsuch and Barrett. Beyond the opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, every other Justice except for Justices Sotomayor and Alito issued their own opinions:
- Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion explaining why he joined in full the opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, paying particular attention to the major questions doctrine.
- Justice Barrett filed an opinion responding to criticism from Justice Gorsuch about her view of the major questions doctrine.
- Justice Kagan filed an opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson concluding that the Court need not address the major questions doctrine given the Court’s statutory interpretation.
- Justice Jackson filed an opinion invoking legislative history as another basis to support the Court’s statutory interpretation.
- Justice Thomas filed an opinion discussing his view that IEEPA is consistent with separation of powers.
- Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion joined by Justices Thomas and Alito dissenting from the holding of the Court. This was the primary dissent.
Here are introductions and relevant excerpts of the various opinions.
Opinion of the Court
We decide whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorizes the President to impose tariffs.
. . . .
Based on two words separated by 16 others in Section 1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA—“regulate” and “importation”—the President asserts the independent power to impose tariffs on imports from any country, of any product, at any rate, for any amount of time. Those words cannot bear such weight.
Opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Gorsuch and Barrett
The Government and the principal dissent attempt to avoid application of the major questions doctrine on several grounds. None is convincing.
Justice Gorsuch, concurring
The President claims that Congress delegated to him an extraordinary power in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)—the power to impose tariffs on practically any products he wants, from any countries he chooses, in any amounts he selects. Applying the major questions doctrine, the principal opinion rejects that argument. I join in full. The Constitution lodges the Nation’s lawmaking powers in Congress alone, and the major questions doctrine safeguards that assignment against executive encroachment. Under the doctrine’s terms, the President must identify clear statutory authority for the extraordinary delegated power he claims. And, as the principal opinion explains, that is a standard he cannot meet. Whatever else might be said about Congress’s work in IEEPA, it did not clearly surrender to the President the sweeping tariff power he seeks to wield.
Not everyone sees it this way. Past critics of the major questions doctrine do not object to its application in this case, and they even join much of today’s principal opinion. But, they insist, they can reach the same result by employing only routine tools of statutory interpretation. Post, at 1 (KAGAN, J., joined by SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Meanwhile, one colleague who joins the principal opinion in full suggests the major questions doctrine is nothing more than routine statutory interpretation. Post, at 1 (BARRETT, J., concurring). Still others who have joined major questions decisions in the past dissent from today’s application of the doctrine. Post, at 1 (KAVANAUGH, J., joined by THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., dissenting). Finally, seeking to sidestep the major questions doctrine altogether, one colleague submits that Congress may hand over to the President most of its powers, including the tariff power, without limit. Post, at 1–2 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). It is an interesting turn of events. Each camp warrants a visit.
Justice Barrett, concurring
As the principal opinion demonstrates, the most natural reading of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not encompass the power to impose tariffs. I write only to address JUSTICE GORSUCH’s concurrence regarding the major questions doctrine.
To the extent that JUSTICE GORSUCH attacks the view that “common sense” alone can explain all our major questions decisions, ante, at 18–22, he takes down a straw man. I have never espoused that view. Rather, as I explained in my concurrence in Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 507 (2023), the major questions doctrine “situates text in context” and is therefore best understood as an ordinary application of textualism. Id., at 511. Textualists—like all those who use language to communicate—do not interpret words in a vacuum. Instead, we use context, including “[b]ackground legal conventions,” “common sense,” and “constitutional structure,” to ascertain a text’s “most natural meaning.” Id., at 511–512, 515, 509.
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment
The Court holds today that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. I agree with that conclusion, as I do with the bulk of the principal opinion’s reasoning. But because I think the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation amply support today’s result, I do not join the part of that opinion invoking the so-called major-questions doctrine.
Justice Jackson, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment
I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not provide the President with the power to tariff. Three of my colleagues have reached this result via the major questions doctrine, see ante, at 7–13 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.)—a framing that asks, in essence, whether Congress “would likely have intended” to delegate the authority to tariff to the President through IEEPA. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 730 (2022) (emphasis added); see also id., at 722– 723. While probing Congress’s intent is the right inquiry, my colleagues speculate needlessly. In my view, the Court can, and should, consult a statute’s legislative history to determine what Congress actually intended the statute to do.
Justice Thomas, dissenting
I join JUSTICE KAVANAUGH’s principal dissent in full. As he explains, the Court’s decision today cannot be justified as a matter of statutory interpretation. Congress authorized the President to “regulate . . . importation.” 50 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1)(B). Throughout American history, the authority to “regulate importation” has been understood to include the authority to impose duties on imports. Post, at 9–13, 22–29 (KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting). The meaning of that phrase was beyond doubt by the time that Congress enacted this statute, shortly after President Nixon’s highly publicized duties on imports were upheld based on identical language. Post, at 14–22. The statute that the President relied on therefore authorized him to impose the duties on imports at issue in these cases. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH makes clear that the Court errs in concluding otherwise.
I write separately to explain why the statute at issue here is consistent with the separation of powers as an original matter. The Constitution’s separation of powers forbids Congress from delegating core legislative power to the President. This principle, known as the nondelegation doctrine, is rooted in the Constitution’s Legislative Vesting Clause and Due Process Clause. Art. I, §1; Amdt. 5. Both Clauses forbid Congress from delegating core legislative power, which is the power to make substantive rules setting the conditions for deprivations of life, liberty, or property. Neither Clause prohibits Congress from delegating other kinds of power. Because the Constitution assigns Congress many powers that do not implicate the nondelegation doctrine, Congress may delegate the exercise of many powers to the President. Congress has done so repeatedly since the founding, with this Court’s blessing.
The power to impose duties on imports can be delegated. At the founding, that power was regarded as one of many powers over foreign commerce that could be delegated to the President. Power over foreign commerce was not within the core legislative power, and engaging in foreign commerce was regarded as a privilege rather than a right. Early Congresses often delegated to the President power to regulate foreign commerce, including through duties on imports. As I suggested over a decade ago, the nondelegation doctrine does not apply to “a delegation of power to make rules governing private conduct in the area of foreign trade,” including rules imposing duties on imports. Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S. 43, 80–81, n. 5 (2015) (opinion concurring in judgment). Therefore, to the extent that the Court relies on “‘separation of powers principles’” to rule against the President, ante, at 8 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.), it is mistaken.
Justice Kavanaugh, with whom Justice Thomas and Justice Alito join, dissenting
Acting pursuant to his statutory authority to “regulate . . . importation” under the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, the President has imposed tariffs on imports of foreign goods from various countries. The tariffs have generated vigorous policy debates. Those policy debates are not for the Federal Judiciary to resolve. Rather, the Judiciary’s more limited role is to neutrally interpret and apply the law. The sole legal question here is whether, under IEEPA, tariffs are a means to “regulate . . . importation.” Statutory text, history, and precedent demonstrate that the answer is clearly yes: Like quotas and embargoes, tariffs are a traditional and common tool to regulate importation.
Since early in U. S. history, Congress has regularly authorized the President to impose tariffs on imports of foreign goods. Presidents have often used that authority to obtain leverage with foreign nations, help American manufacturers and workers compete on a more level playing field, and generate revenue for the United States. Numerous laws such as the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and the Trade Act of 1974 continue to authorize the President to place tariffs on foreign imports in a variety of circumstances, and Presidents have often done so. In recent years, Presidents George W. Bush, Obama, and Biden have all imposed tariffs on foreign imports under those statutory authorities.
President Trump has similarly imposed tariffs, and has done so here under IEEPA. During declared national emergencies, IEEPA broadly authorizes the President to regulate international economic transactions. Most relevant for this case, during those national emergencies, IEEPA grants the President the power to “regulate . . . importation” of foreign goods.
In early 2025, President Trump declared two national emergencies pursuant to the National Emergencies Act. See 50 U. S. C. §1621(a). One emergency concerned drug trafficking into the United States. The other emergency involved trade imbalances with foreign nations that have harmed American manufacturers and workers.
To help address those emergencies, the President drew upon his authority in IEEPA to “regulate . . . importation,” and he imposed tariffs on imports from various countries.
The plaintiffs argue and the Court concludes that the President lacks authority under IEEPA to impose tariffs. I disagree. In accord with Judge Taranto’s careful and persuasive opinion in the Federal Circuit, I would conclude that the President’s power under IEEPA to “regulate . . . importation” encompasses tariffs. As a matter of ordinary meaning, including dictionary definitions and historical usage, the broad power to “regulate . . . importation” includes the traditional and common means to do so—in particular, quotas, embargoes, and tariffs.
History and precedent confirm that conclusion. In 1971, President Nixon imposed 10 percent tariffs on almost all foreign imports. He levied the tariffs under IEEPA’s predecessor statute, the Trading with the Enemy Act, which similarly authorized the President to “regulate . . . importation.” The Nixon tariffs were upheld in court.
Moreover, in 1976, a year before IEEPA was enacted, this Court unanimously ruled that a similarly worded statute authorizing the President to “adjust the imports” permitted President Ford to impose monetary exactions on foreign oil imports. See Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548 (1976) (Algonquin).
For both the Nixon tariffs and the Ford tariffs upheld by this Court in Algonquin, the relevant statutory provisions did not specifically refer to “tariffs” or “duties,” but instead more broadly authorized the President to “regulate . . . importation” or to “adjust the imports.” Therefore, when IEEPA was enacted in 1977 in the wake of the Nixon and Ford tariffs and the Algonquin decision, Congress and the public plainly would have understood that the power to “regulate . . . importation” included tariffs. If Congress wanted to exclude tariffs from IEEPA, it surely would not have enacted the same broad “regulate . . . importation” language that had just been used to justify major American tariffs on foreign imports.
Importantly, IEEPA’s authorization for the President to impose tariffs did not grant the President any new substantive power. Since the Founding, numerous statutes have authorized—and still do authorize—the President to impose tariffs and other foreign import restrictions. IEEPA merely allows the President to impose tariffs somewhat more efficiently to deal with foreign threats during national emergencies.
Context and common sense buttress that interpretation of IEEPA. The plaintiffs and the Court acknowledge that IEEPA authorizes the President to impose quotas or embargoes on foreign imports—meaning that a President could completely block some or all imports. But they say that IEEPA does not authorize the President to employ the lesser power of tariffs, which simply condition imports on a payment. As they interpret the statute, the President could, for example, block all imports from China but cannot order even a $1 tariff on goods imported from China.
That approach does not make much sense. Properly read, IEEPA does not draw such an odd distinction between quotas and embargoes on the one hand and tariffs on the other. Rather, it empowers the President to regulate imports during national emergencies with the tools Presidents have traditionally and commonly used, including quotas, embargoes, and tariffs.
The Court today nonetheless concludes otherwise and holds that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs to deal with the declared drug trafficking and trade deficit emergencies. But the Court’s decision is splintered. In today’s six-Justice majority, three Justices (JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and JUSTICE JACKSON) interpret IEEPA not to authorize tariffs as a matter of ordinary statutory interpretation. I disagree for the reasons noted above and elaborated on at length in this opinion.
Three other Justices (THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE GORSUCH, and JUSTICE BARRETT) lean on the major questions canon of statutory interpretation to resolve this case. That important canon requires “clear congressional authorization” for an executive action of major economic and political significance, particularly when the Executive exercises an “unheralded” power. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 722–723 (2022) (quotation marks omitted).
In my view, as I will explain, the major questions canon does not control here for two alternative and independent reasons.
First, the statutory text, history, and precedent constitute “clear congressional authorization” for the President to impose tariffs under IEEPA. In particular, throughout American history, Presidents have commonly imposed tariffs as a means to “regulate . . . importation.” So tariffs were not an “unheralded” power when Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977 and authorized the President to “regulate . . . importation” of foreign goods. Therefore, the major questions doctrine is satisfied here. Cf. Biden v. Missouri, 595 U. S. 87 (2022) (per curiam).
Second, in any event, the Court has never before applied the major questions doctrine in the foreign affairs context, including foreign trade. Rather, as Justice Robert Jackson summarized and remains true, this Court has always recognized the “‘unwisdom of requiring Congress in this field of governmental power to lay down narrowly definite standards by which the President is to be governed.’” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 636, n. 2 (1952) (concurring opinion) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 321–322 (1936)). In foreign affairs cases, courts read the statute as written and do not employ the major questions doctrine as a thumb on the scale against the President.
Although I firmly disagree with the Court’s holding today, the decision might not substantially constrain a President’s ability to order tariffs going forward. That is because numerous other federal statutes authorize the President to impose tariffs and might justify most (if not all) of the tariffs at issue in this case—albeit perhaps with a few additional procedural steps that IEEPA, as an emergency statute, does not require. Those statutes include, for example, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232); the Trade Act of 1974 (Sections 122, 201, and 301); and the Tariff Act of 1930 (Section 338). In essence, the Court today concludes that the President checked the wrong statutory box by relying on IEEPA rather than another statute to impose these tariffs.
In the meantime, however, the interim effects of the Court’s decision could be substantial. The United States may be required to refund billions of dollars to importers who paid the IEEPA tariffs, even though some importers may have already passed on costs to consumers or others. As was acknowledged at oral argument, the refund process is likely to be a “mess.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 153–155. In addition, according to the Government, the IEEPA tariffs have helped facilitate trade deals worth trillions of dollars—including with foreign nations from China to the United Kingdom to Japan, and more. The Court’s decision could generate uncertainty regarding those trade arrangements.
In any event, the only issue before the Court today is one of law. In light of the statutory text, longstanding historical practice, and relevant Supreme Court precedents, I would conclude that IEEPA authorizes the President to “regulate . . . importation” by imposing tariffs on foreign imports during declared national emergencies. I therefore respectfully dissent.