Here is an update on recent activity at the Supreme Court in cases decided by the Federal Circuit. With respect to granted petitions, oral argument in Soto v. United States will take place later this month. With respect to pending petitions, one new petition was filed in a patent case. The Court also received a waiver of the right to respond to the petition in that patent case, along with a reply brief in another patent case. Here are the details.
Granted Cases
On April 28, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Soto v. United States, a veterans case. The Court granted review to consider whether a statutory provision governing Combat-Related Special Compensation, 10 U.S.C. § 1413a, provides a settlement mechanism that displaces the default procedures and limitations set forth in the Barring Act. According to the Federal Circuit, “the Barring Act applies to settlement claims” regarding Combat-Related Special Compensation. As for why, it indicated “the CRSC statute does not explicitly provide its own settlement mechanism.” It then held that “the six-year statute of limitations contained in the Barring Act applies to CRSC settlement claims.” Soto challenges these findings by arguing that the Barring Act does not apply to CRSC settlement claims. Our argument preview is posted here.
Petition Cases
New Petition
In CloudofChange, LLC v. NCR Corporation, a patent case, CloudofChange, LLC asked the Court to review the following question:
- “Whether the same vicarious liability analysis for direct use infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) must be applied to both method and system claims.”
Waiver of Right to Respond
A waiver of the right to respond was filed in CloudofChange, LLC v. NCR Corporation, the patent case just mentioned.
New Reply
In Brumfield v. IBG LLC, another patent case, Brumfield filed his reply brief in support of his petition. The petition presented the following question:
- “Whether the lower courts abused their discretion by denying the meritorious Rule 60(b)(3) motion, and whether Rule 60(b)(3) requires a showing that a moving party was diligent in uncovering fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct to obtain relief from a judgment?”
- “Whether this Court’s three categorical judicial exceptions to patent eligibility that are further defined by the two-step Alice/Mayo test impose limitations on patent eligibility that are inconsistent with the text of 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the Patent Act of 1952?”
- “Whether this Court’s supervisory authority is needed to correct the Federal Circuit’s improper (1) application of Rule 56 to patent cases and (2) practice of deciding issues that were never argued or briefed on appeal?”
In its response, IBG argued that “both courts below found ‘no fraud by IBG,’” so Brumfield’s “first ‘question presented’ is not in fact presented” and is instead “a fact-bound appeal for error correction.” Also related to the first question presented, IBG asserted that “the court below did not deepen a circuit split on Rule 60(b)(3)’s application in fraud cases,” and, furthermore, that “alleged split is illusory.” According to IBG, Brumfield “ignores Rule 60(b)’s mandate that courts may grant relief from judgment, an extraordinary remedy, only ‘on just terms’ not present here.”
Regarding the second question, IBG contended that “the Court has repeatedly declined to review materially identical cases involving weak, ‘apply it with a computer’-style software patents,” and that “there is ‘no material distinction’ between the patents here and those invalidated in a related case” in which Brumfield unsuccessfully sought review.
IBG further asserted that “the notion that this case is a candidate for the Court to exercise its ‘supervisory authority’—the subject of [the] third question—is frivolous.” According to IBG, the “court below issued a unanimous, 57-page opinion thoroughly addressing the issues [and] applying the very standards that [Brumfield] asks this Court to reapply.”
Now, in his reply, Brumfield asserts that, regarding the first question, “IBG’s argument that there is no circuit split on whether Rule 60(b)(3) requires diligence in discovering fraud is undercut by the Federal Circuit’s Cap [Exp., LLC v. Zinus, Inc.], which details the split.” According to Brumfield, “every circuit is implicated in the split, with most of the circuits not requiring diligence in accordance with [the petitioner’s] approach and the Rule’s text,” while the “Ninth Circuit and the Federal Circuit . . . graft on a diligence requirement.” Furthermore, Brumfield asserts that “IBG does not dispute that comparing the text of Rule 60(b)(3) with Rule 60(b)(2) resolves the split.”
Regarding the second question, Brumfield contends that the “crux” of the petition “is that courts cannot add exceptions onto a statute’s plain text, such as [35 U.S.C.] § 101.” According to Brumfield, this Court “has never before considered whether it is proper to graft exceptions as defined by Alice/Mayo into § 101.”
Regarding the third question, Brumfield asserts that IBG’s argument that this Court “need not review this issue because it is a ‘fact-bound challenge’ . . . is wrong.” Brumfield contends that “the Federal Circuit’s pattern of departing from Rule 56 is not case-specific [and it] is a global issue affecting cases across the industry.”