This morning the Federal Circuit released three precedential opinions. The first comes in a trade case appealed from the Court of International Trade; the second comes in a patent case on remand from the Supreme Court; and the third comes in another patent case appealed from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. The Federal Circuit also released three nonprecedential opinions. The first comes in another trade case appealed from the Court of International Trade; the second and third come from two veterans cases appealed from the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. Here are the introductions to the opinions.
Meyer Corp., U.S. v. United States (Precedential)
This appeal involves two issues related to duties assessed on cookware that Meyer Corporation, U.S. imported. First, Meyer sought duty-free treatment for cookware manufactured in Thailand. Thailand is a beneficiary developing country under the Generalized System of Preferences, so certain products manufactured there with 35% or more Thai inputs are eligible for duty-free treatment. Materials imported to Thailand from other countries must undergo a “double substantial transformation” in Thailand to count toward the 35%. The United States Court of International Trade ruled that Meyer’s pots and pans manufactured in Thailand are not eligible for duty free treatment because they were made of steel discs from China that underwent only one substantial transformation. The Court of International Trade did not clearly err in finding only one substantial transformation, so we affirm.
Second, Meyer sought to establish the dutiable value of its cookware using the “first-sale” price from affiliated manufacturers to affiliated distributors. Relying on language from our decision in Nissho Iwai American Corp. v. United States, 982 F.2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the Court of International Trade required Meyer to prove that these first sales were not only at arm’s length but were also unaffected by China’s status as a nonmarket economy. Finding that Meyer did not prove the absence of “nonmarket influences” for its cookware imported from China or produced with Chinese inputs, the trial court did not allow Meyer to rely on its first-sale prices. The trial court misinterpreted Nissho Iwai to impose a requirement beyond what the statute and regulations demand, so we vacate and remand for the trial court to reconsider whether Meyer may rely on its first-sale prices.
Hologic, Inc. v. Minerva Surgical, Inc. (Precedential)
This case comes to us on remand from the Supreme Court. The Court vacated our judgment affirming the district court’s summary judgment of no invalidity for claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 9,095,348 in favor of Hologic, Inc. and Cytyc Surgical Products, LLC (collectively, “Hologic”) based on the doctrine of assignor estoppel. The Supreme Court held that assignor estoppel remains a valid doctrine, but that it comes with limits. The Court remanded for us to consider whether assignor estoppel, as limited, precludes Minerva Surgical, Inc. from challenging the validity of claim 1. Specifically, we must determine whether claim 1 is “materially broader” than the claims assigned to Hologic such that assignor estoppel should not apply.
For the reasons below, we hold that claim 1 is not “materially broader” than the claims assigned to Hologic. Accordingly, Minerva is estopped from challenging the validity of claim 1 of the ’348 patent. We therefore affirm the district court’s summary judgment that claim 1 is not invalid. We also reinstate our earlier judgment in all other respects.
LSI Corp. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota (Precedential)
The Regents of the University of Minnesota (“UMN”) sued LSI Corporation and Avago Technologies U.S. Inc. (collectively, “LSI”) for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,859,601 (“’601 patent”) in the District of Minnesota. LSI petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) for inter partes review of the ’601 patent, and the Board instituted review on claims 13, 14, and 17 on anticipation theories based on two prior-art references, U.S. Patent Nos. 5,392,270 (“Okada”) and 5,731,768 (“Tsang”). The Board concluded that claim 13 was unpatentable in view of Okada and that claims 14 and 17 were not shown to be unpatentable in view of either reference. In finding that LSI failed to show unpatentability of claims 14 and 17, the Board held that LSI failed to timely raise its theory that Tables 8 and 9 of Okada anticipate claims 14 and 17 and that, in any event, Tables 8 and 9 did not anticipate. As to Tsang, the Board held that the reference was not prior art because it was not “by another” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). LSI appeals the Board’s decision as to claims 14 and 17. We affirm.
Hyundai Electric & Energy Systems v. United States (Nonprecedential)
This appeal is from the decision on the fourth administrative review of certain large power transformers manufactured in the Republic of Korea by Hyundai Electric & Energy Systems and other entities (“Hyundai”), respondents in this administrative review. Hitachi Energy USA, Inc. appeals the final decision of the Court of International Trade, setting a zero dumping margin.
Sale in the United States of imported products at less than fair value is called “dumping.” The Department of Commerce is authorized to impose duties measured as the difference between the sales price in the foreign market and in the United States. Dumping investigations may be commenced on petition by “an interested party.” 19 U.S.C. § 1671a (citing definition at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)). Parties to the administrative review may appeal to the Court of International Trade and then the Federal Circuit.
Keel v. McDonough (Nonprecedential)
David O. Keel appeals a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus. Because Mr. Keel obtained the relief sought in his petition, we dismiss.
Sullivan v. McDonough (Nonprecedential)
Ms. Mary Louise Sullivan et al., substituting for Mr. Daniel J. Williams, appeal the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) affirming a decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) denying service connection for Mr. Williams’s schizophrenia. Williams v. Willkie, No. 19-4168, 2020 WL 5792175, at *1 (Vet. App. Sept. 29, 2020). Appellants argue the Veterans Court legally erred by misconstruing the relationship between 38 U.S.C. § 1111 and 38 U.S.C. § 1153. Specifically, Appellants argue the Veterans Court erroneously “relied upon a legal standard that effectively placed the burden on the veteran to show that a preexisting condition had increased in severity while on active duty” and improperly conflated the “presumption of soundness” under § 1111 with the “presumption of aggravation” under § 1153. Appellants’ Br. 4, 11. Because the Veterans Court correctly interpreted the relevant statutes in accordance with the statutory language and our precedent, we affirm.