Last month, the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Loomis v. Collins, a pro se veterans case we have been tracking because the court appointed counsel as amicus curiae. In this case, Loomis appealed a decision of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. The case presents questions related to educational assistance benefits and the validity of a regulation issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs. In an opinion authored by Judge Arun Subramanian of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the panel affirmed the lower court’s judgment. This is our opinion summary.
Judge Subramanian began by outlining the relevant background:
Claimant-appellant Charles Loomis served in the Air Force from 1995 to 2015. Following his service, he joined General Atomics as a field service representative. Mr. Loomis wanted to become a sensor operator, but General Atomics required him to first earn a pilot certification.
To pay for the certification, Mr. Loomis applied for educational assistance benefits from the VA to cover his training course at MidCoast Aviation Services, LLC (MidCoast). In support of his application, Mr. Loomis submitted a certificate from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) authorizing MidCoast to operate a provisional pilot school with a private pilot course.
The VA denied Mr. Loomis’s application, and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the denial. The Board acknowledged that Mr. Loomis had a basic entitlement to educational assistance benefits. But because MidCoast was not recognized as an educational institution of higher learning (IHL) and Mr. Loomis was not taking the course in pursuit of a college degree, it concluded that the law did not permit Mr. Loomis to obtain benefits for the course.
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed. The majority held that Mr. Loomis was foreclosed from receiving benefits for the course because MidCoast was not affiliated with an IHL. The majority relied on 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(b), which prohibits the approval of a veteran’s enrollment in a flight training course “other than one given by an educational institution of higher learning for credit toward a standard college degree the eligible veteran is seeking.”
Judge Laurer dissented. He read the law to allow benefits to be used for FAA-approved flight training courses regardless of IHL affiliation. Judge Laurer relied on a different statute, 38 U.S.C. § 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii), which provides that “[a] flight training course approved by the Federal Aviation Administration that is offered by a certified pilot school that possesses a valid Federal Aviation Administration pilot school certificate” is “deemed . . . approved.”
Mr. Loomis appealed pro se.
Judge Subramanian described the question before the court as “how to reconcile” two statutory provisions governing veterans’ benefits. He began by outlining the parties’ arguments. Judge Subramanian explained that, under Loomis’s reading, “if a flight training course is approved by the FAA and offered by a certified pilot school . . . it doesn’t matter whether the course is given by an IHL for the pursuit of a college degree.” Judge Subramanian noted how the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, on the other hand, maintains the second statute “bars the approval of a veteran’s enrollment in any flight training unless it is given by an IHL and counts towards a veteran’s college degree” because the first statute “doesn’t ‘specifically provide[]’ otherwise,” as the second statute requires.
Judge Subramanian began his analysis “with the text of the statute.” Judge Subramanian explained how the first statute “doesn’t expressly set aside the IHL requirement, and it also doesn’t use the kind of language one would expect to see if it were an exception.” He also reasoned that “being ‘subject to’ a statute”—the first statute is “subject to” the second—“means being ‘subordinate to’ or ‘governed or affected by’ its provisions.” Thus, Judge Subramanian concluded, the second statute “provides additional requirements for eligibility,” including the IHL requirement.
Judge Subramanian also noted that “Loomis’s contrary argument—that [the first statute] independently authorizes the payment of benefits—conflicts with another statute.” He said the interaction between the three statutes “underscores that course approval under [the first statute] is the starting point, not the end, of the benefits determination.”
Judge Subramanian concluded his statutory analysis by explaining that, “taken together,” the first and second statutes indicate “a course must receive approval of the Secretary or the state in which the school sits.” “If it is determined that a flight training course is FAA-approved and provided at a certified pilot school,” he continued, ‘then it is ‘deemed . . . approved.” But, he said, “such a course still must be given by an IHL as part of a veteran’s college degree program.”
Because there was “no dispute that the MidCoast course fails the IHL requirement,” Judge Subramanian noted, the panel “agree with the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims that Mr. Loomis is ineligible for coverage.”
Judge Subramanian then turned to “two thoughtful counterarguments” offered by Loomis and the dissent filed at the lower court. First, Judge Subramanian considered whether the court’s “interpretation of the statutes renders [the second statute] superfluous.” He found that argument “appears to rest on the implicit assumption that FAA-approved pilot schools are never themselves IHLs.” Judge Subramanian indicated “that assumption is incorrect” because “the FAA licenses pilot schools that are part of IHLs.” He said, “even if most FAA-approved flight training courses are not offered directly by an IHL, [the second statute] might still be satisfied where an IHL contracts with a private pilot school.”
Judge Subramanian then addressed the second counterargument. Judge Subramanian said the court’s “interpretation does not render the ‘[e]xcept’ clause . . . superfluous” because another statute “‘specifically provides’ for an exception.”
As a result of Judge Subramanian’s analysis, the panel affirmed the lower court’s judgment.