Last week, the Federal Circuit heard oral argument in Barron v. United States, a case we have been following because it attracted an amicus brief. In this case, Barron appeals the dismissal of her takings claim by the Court of Federal Claims. This appeal presents questions related to railroad easements and the interpretation of condemnation decrees and deeds under Florida law. Judges Lourie, Stoll, and Stark heard the oral argument. This is our argument recap.
Mark Hearne argued on behalf of Barron. He began by arguing the term “right-of-way” is used “as almost a synonym for easement.” Judge Stoll, however, suggested the presence of “right-of-way” in a conveyance is “not dispositive under Florida law.” She asked whether, instead, one must “look at the intent of the parties as a whole.” Hearne responded by suggesting use of “right-of-way” “is very strongly indicative of what was intended.”
Another judge asked whether Barron raised on appeal the argument that, “to the extent that there was an ambiguity . . . the extrinsic evidence favored a ruling in [Barron’s] favor.” Hearne responded by saying Barron’s opening brief “refer[s] throughout to the circumstances in which . . . the conveyances were executed, the purpose for them, and the text of the conveyances themselves.”
Emily Polachek argued on behalf of the United States. She began by arguing that an earlier case, which “dealt with the same railroad line, . . . the same trail, . . . deeds that were conveyed around the same time, . . . [and] language that was very similar between the deeds, . . . explicitly rejects many of [Barron’s] arguments, especially with respect to the argument of voluntary grants.” Polachek maintained “there was consideration recited” in the grants at issue, both “cash amounts . . . and other valuable consideration.” Thus, according to Polachek, the grants at issue are not voluntary ones. Moreover, Polachek argued, the same earlier case “was very clear about the fact that ‘right-of-way’ . . . is not dispositive.” Indeed, Polachek contended, “the court must look to the deed as a whole instrument.”
One judge suggestd there are “indications . . . that . . . maybe only an easement is what was sought by the railroad.” Polachek responded by arguing “Florida law is very clear that what we look to is the grantor’s intent.” This, she maintained, was to grant an interest in fee simple. Moreover, Polachek argued, “the presumption [under the Florida statute] is that it would be a transfer in whole unless there is clear language to the contrary.” According to Polachek, “the language . . . does not rise to the level of clear limiting language or an intent to take only an easement.”
In rebuttal, Hearne contended the earlier case is distinguishable from this case. He argued “the term ‘right-of-way’ . . . was not at issue” in the previous case. Moreover, he said, “the deeds there were not voluntary conveyances.” Hearne then referred to the amicus brief filed in this case, which, he said, “notes that . . . the interest the railroad could acquire by condemnation is limited to only that which would be necessary to achieve the purpose for which they’ve been granted the power of eminent domain.” And, he said, “they can achieve that purpose with just an easement for a right-of-way across the land.”
We will continue monitoring this case and report on developments.