Late yesterday, the Federal Circuit released a nonprecedential order dismissing an appeal. This morning, the Federal Circuit released one precedential opinion and two nonprecedential opinions. The precedential opinion comes in an appeal of a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board. One of the nonprecedential opinions also comes in an appeal of a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, while the other comes in a pro se appeal of a decision of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. Here are the introductions to the opinions and a link to the dismissal.
Reyes v. Merit Systems Protection Board (Precedential)
Miguel P. Reyes petitions from a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) dismissing his petition for enforcement (“PFE”) as untimely. Reyes v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., No. SF-0752-13-0153-C-1, 2024 WL 800254, at *1 (M.S.P.B. Feb. 26, 2024) (“Final Decision”) (adopting the initial decision, Reyes v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., No. SF-0752-13-0153-C-1, 2018 MSPB LEXIS 2116 (June 11, 2018) (“Initial Decision”), as the Board’s final decision). For the reasons below, we reverse and remand.
Senter v. Department of Energy (Nonprecedential)
Trent Senter was employed by the Department of Energy (“DOE”) as a Nuclear Material Courier (“NMC”) until his removal on June 10, 2020, for failure to meet a condition of employment. S’Appx 9-10. NMCs are required by DOE to pass semi-annual physical fitness examinations. S’Appx 9. Mr. Senter failed such an examination, as well as a subsequent re-examination, and was therefore removed from his position. S’Appx 9-10. Mr. Senter appealed his removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”), which ultimately affirmed the removal and rejected Mr. Senter’s affirmative defenses. S’Appx 2, 8. Mr. Senter now appeals to us. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Prewitt, Jr. v. Collins (Nonprecedential)
George D. Prewitt, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals from the final decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims denying his petition for extraordinary relief in the form of a writ of mandamus. To the extent that Mr. Prewitt raises a constitutional question within our limited jurisdiction, we affirm.