Featured / Supreme Court Activity
on

Here is an update on recent activity at the Supreme Court in cases decided by the Federal Circuit. Since our last update, three response briefs have been filed by parties opposing President Trump’s tariffs along with two amicus briefs in favor of the Federal Circuit’s judgment. Three new petitions have also been filed: one comes in a trademark case, another comes in a case addressing claims under the Quiet Title Act, and the third comes in a military disability retirement benefits case. Two waivers of the right to respond to petitions were filed in the same patent case, along with two amicus briefs favoring review. Two reply briefs were filed in another patent case. Finally, the Supreme Court rejected three petitions, one in a patent case and two in pro se cases. Here are the details.

Granted Petitions

As a reminder, the only case pending at the Supreme Court that was decided by the Federal Circuit is Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc. Here are the questions presented:

  1. “Whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223, Tit. II, 91 Stat. 1626, authorizes the tariffs imposed by President Trump pursuant to the national emergencies declared or continued in Proclamation 10,886 and Executive Orders 14,157, 14,193, 14,194, 14,195, and 14,257, as amended.”
  2. “If IEEPA authorizes the tariffs, whether the statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to the President.”

Since our last update, three response briefs have been filed by parties opposing President Trump’s tariffs along with two amicus briefs in favor of the Federal Circuit’s judgment.

Response Briefs

Learning Resources filed a brief arguing IEEPA “does not give the President any taxing or tariffing power.” According to the brief, the Supreme Court “should not lightly assume that Congress abdicated its core taxing power to permit the President to tax Americans with virtually no limits.” Moreover, Learning Resources argues, “the President has no ‘inherent’ taxing authority—even in times of national emergency.” Learning Resources contends “the Government cannot find a single other example where Congress delegated taxing authority through the word ‘regulate.'” According to Learning Resources, the Supreme Court “should hold that IEEPA tariffs are unlawful.”

V.O.S. Selections also filed a brief contending “[t]he President has no independent constitutional authority to impose tariffs.” According to V.O.S. Selections, IEEPA “never mentions tariffs, and in 50 years no other president has used it for that purpose.” It argues the term “regulate” in IEEPA “does not ordinarily mean ‘tax.'” Furthermore, V.O.S. contends, “the Framers, [who] were well aware that tariffs had foreign policy implications, still vested the power in Congress.” V.O.S. Selections also suggests “IEEPA contains no clear grant of tariff powers.” It argues that, “if IEEPA were interpreted to convey such boundless authority to tax the American people, it would constitute the most plainly unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in a century.”

The State Respondents filed a brief arguing that “[t]he Framers assigned the tariff power to Congress, not the President.” According to the State Respondents, moreover, when “Congress has delegated authority to the President to adjust tariff rates . . . it always has done so explicitly and subject to intelligible principles that cabin the President’s authority.” Furthermore, they claim, “[c]ontext, history, and common sense all support a more modest understanding of that provision—one that leaves the President ample tools to address emergencies but does not delegate Congress’s tariffing power wholesale.” The State Respondents conclude that “Congress, not the President, decides whether and how much to tax Americans who import goods from abroad.”

Amicus Briefs

Crutchfield filed an amicus brief claiming it “seeks a reset to the status quo that existed from the IEEPA’s enactment in 1977 until early 2025 to prevent unpredictable and unexpected changes to the tariff rates unmoored from any express authority conferred by Congress.” According to Crutchfield, moreover, “the unprecedented assertion that the IEEPA grants the President unilateral and unreviewable authority to impose, increase, decrease, suspend, or alter tariffs on imports from virtually every country in the world cannot be derived from the plain language of the IEEPA or the U.S. Constitution.” Lastly, Crutchfield claims, the government’s “interpretation [of IEEPA] would violate the major questions doctrine and the nondelegation doctrine.”

George F. Allen and other constitutional scholars filed an amicus brief arguing “[t]he Constitution assigns tariff authority to Congress, not the President.” These scholars maintain “tariffs have been treated as taxes—duties and imposts—levied only by the people’s representatives.” According to the brief, “IEEPA’s text authorizes embargoes, asset freezes, and financial sanctions abroad—not taxation of Americans at home.” The scholars argue “IEEPA’s text and structure foreclose tariff authority: it never mentions duties; its verbs cover sanctions, not taxes.” Moreover, they argue, “IEEPA’s requirement of an ‘unusual and extraordinary’ threat cannot be read as a blank check for addressing chronic trade grievances or drug trafficking.” Lastly, the scholars contend, “foreign-affairs labels cannot expand executive power.” They implore the Court to “reaffirm the basic principle that Congress, not the President, holds the power to tax and to make major trade policy . . . [and that] [e]mergencies do not erase that principle.”

Pending Petitions

New Petitions

Since our last update, three petitions have been filed in cases decided by the Federal Circuit.

In Chinook Landing, LLC v. United States, Chinook Landing filed a petition presenting the following question:

  • “Is a Quiet Title Act claim timely if it is filed within twelve years of the government asserting an interest in plaintiff’s property, after government officials previously disavowed any interest in the same property?”

In Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., Rebecca Curtin filed a petition presenting the following question:

  • “Whether a party desiring to participate in an administrative agency proceeding, including a trademark opposition proceeding at the United States Patent and Trademark Office, must satisfy the zone-of-interests and proximate-causation tests set forth in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), for causes of action in federal court.”

In Champagne v. Collins, Julien P. Champagne filed a petition presenting the following question:

  • “Whether the VA must process a disability claim as a claim for both pension and compensation if the veteran has a possible entitlement to both benefits and award ‘the greater’ benefit available as provided by 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a), or whether the VA instead has discretion to disregard a potentially meritorious compensation claim and therefore afford the lesser benefit available to the veteran.”

Waiver of Right to Respond

Since our last update, Samsung Electronics and the Federal Party filed waivers of the right to respond in Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., a patent case presenting the following question:

  • “Whether patent applications that became publicly accessible only after the challenged patent’s critical date are ‘prior art . . . printed publications’ within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. §311(b).”

Reply Briefs

Since our last update, reply briefs were filed in related cases, Gesture Technology Partners, LLC v. Apple Inc. (“Gesture I“) and Gesture Technology Partners, LLC v. Unified Patents, LLC (“Gesture II“). Both reply briefs were filed by Gesture Technology Partners. In both cases, Gesture Technology Partners ask the Court to review the following question:

  • “Whether the PTO has the authority to conduct administrative adjudications regarding the validity of expired patents, and thereby extinguish private property rights through a non-Article III forum without a jury, even though the patent owner no longer possesses the right to exclude the public from its invention.”

In Gesture I, Gesture Technology Partners focuses on how it “retains a . . . right for damages from a handful of large infringers who profited from Dr. Pryor’s inventions during the patent term.” According to Gesture Technology Partners, it “possess[es] only backward-looking claims for money damages that it seeks to pursue in a court of law.” After making these clarifications, it maintains the “respondents and the government do everything possible to minimize the constitutional problem this case presents . . . [but] are wrong on each count.” It argues the “decision below damages individual property owners like Gesture and encroaches on the Article III judiciary that should be empowered to protect their rights.”

In Gesture II, Gesture Technology Partners explains that “this case presents the same question as Gesture I.” It argues the Supreme Court “should hold this petition pending its decision in Gesture I, so that it may then use its standard practice of granting certiorari, vacating the judgment below, and remanding the case for reconsideration in light of Gesture I.”

Amicus Briefs

Since our last update, two amicus briefs were filed in Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., the patent case discussed above that presents the following question:

  • “Whether patent applications that became publicly accessible only after the challenged patent’s critical date are ‘prior art . . . printed publications’ within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. §311(b).”

VLSI Technology LLC and Motion Offense LLC filed an amicus brief arguing the Supreme Court “should grant the petition to restore the balance that Congress struck when it created new Article I proceedings for challenging issued patents—property rights—outside the Article III jury system.” According to VLSI Technology and Motion Offense, the Federal Circuit’s “expanded the [printed publications] category of prior art . . . to encompass abandoned patent applications not public at the time of the challenged patent’s invention.” VLSI Technology and Motion Offense argue this “interpretation contradicts § 311(b)’s plain text.” According to the brief, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation “expands the universe of prior art documents in IPR by millions.” VLSI Technology and Motion Offense conclude that, “[b]ecause the Federal Circuit’s decision rewrites Congress’s express limits on IPR scope,” the Court “should grant the petition.”

Professor Timothy T. Hsieh submitted an amicus brief arguing that, “[a]lthough this case arises in a patent context, it is really about the Judiciary’s role in interpreting statutes and the limits of agency power.” Hsieh contends the Federal Circuit’s judgment in this case “endorses a U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (‘USPTO’) administrative policy that expands statutory meaning—a move that covertly reprises the deference Loper Bright repudiated.” According to Hsieh, “the Federal Circuit parroted an agency’s policy-driven interpretation of a statute instead of its settled judicial interpretation.” Hsieh argues this “approach flouts this Court’s precedents, upsets constitutional structure, and creates uncertainty for inventors.”

Denials

Since our last update, the Supreme Court denied three petitions in cases decided by the Federal Circuit: