Late today, by a vote of 7-4, the Federal Circuit decided V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, the en banc case challenging President Trump’s tariffs. The Federal Circuit affirmed the holding of the Court of International Trade that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act “does not authorize the tariffs imposed by the Executive Orders.” The Federal Circuit, however, also vacated the lower court’s permanent universal injunction and remanded the case for the lower court “to reevaluate the propriety of granting injunctive relief and the proper scope of such relief.” The Federal Circuit explained its decision in a forty-five page per curiam opinion joined by Judges Lourie, Dyk, Reyna, Hughes, Stoll, Cunningham, and Stark. Judge Cunningham filed a separate opinion joined by Judges Lourie, Reyna, and Stark expressing additional views. Judge Taranto authored a dissenting opinion that was joined by Chief Judge Moore and Judges Prost and Chen. They “disagree[d] with the majority’s conclusion on the issue of the tariffs’ legality.” Notably, the court also released an en banc nonprecedential order withholding issuance of the mandate through October 14 to allow the government time to petition the Supreme Court. Here are the introductions to the opinion and order.
V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump (En Banc Precedential Opinion)
The Government appeals a decision of the Court of International Trade setting aside five Executive Orders that imposed tariffs of unlimited duration on nearly all goods from nearly every country in the world, holding that the tariffs were not authorized by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. Because we agree that IEEPA’s grant of presidential authority to “regulate” imports does not authorize the tariffs imposed by the Executive Orders, we affirm.
Cunningham, Circuit Judge, joined by Circuit Judges Lourie, Reyna, and Stark, additional views.
We join the majority opinion in full. While we agree with the majority that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq., does not grant the President authority to impose the type of tariffs imposed by the Executive Orders, Maj. Op. at 26–42, we write separately to state our view that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose any tariffs. In particular, we conclude that (1) the Government’s expansive interpretation of “regulate” is not supported by the plain text of IEEPA; (2) the Government’s reliance on the ratification of our predecessor court’s opinion in United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (CCPA 1975) (“Yoshida II”) does not overcome this plain meaning; and (3) the Government’s understanding of the scope of authority granted by IEEPA would render it an unconstitutional delegation.
Taranto, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom Chief Judge MOORE and Circuit Judges Prost and Chen join.
Before us on appeal is the decision of the Court of International Trade (CIT) in V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, 772 F. Supp. 3d 1350 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2025) (CIT Op.) in a pair of cases—one brought by five private businesses and the other brought by twelve States—in which all plaintiffs assert harm to their interests in imported goods. Id. at 1367, 1369. The CIT ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case and that at least one plaintiff in each group had constitutional standing. Id. at 1365–69. The CIT then granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding unlawful the asserted cause of the harm—namely, tariffs on imports of goods imposed by two groups of executive orders issued by the President. Id. at 1383. For authority to impose the tariffs in both the first group, which concerns what have been called the reciprocal tariffs, and the second group, which concerns what have been called the (drug-)trafficking tariffs, the President relied on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223, §§ 201–207, 91 Stat. 1625, 1626–28 (1977) (codified as slightly amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701– 1706). The CIT set aside the tariffs on the ground that they were not authorized by IEEPA, and it issued an injunction as a remedy. CIT Op. at 1370–84.
This court today affirms the holdings on jurisdiction, standing, and unlawfulness, while vacating the CIT’s injunction and remanding for reconsideration of the remedy. Maj. Op. at 24–25, 42–44. We agree with the majority’s decision on jurisdiction and standing and on the need for reconsideration of the remedy if the tariffs are unlawful. But we disagree with the majority’s conclusion on the issue of the tariffs’ legality. We conclude that plaintiffs have not justified summary judgment in their favor on either statutory or constitutional grounds.
Regarding statutory authority: Plaintiffs have not shown on summary judgment that either group of tariffs fails to meet the preconditions IEEPA sets for the exercise of the presidential authorities that IEEPA grants—requiring that measures adopted be imposed to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat, having foreign sources, to the national security or foreign policy or economy of the United States, the threat declared as a national emergency (lasting one year unless renewed). The majority does not disagree. Rather, the majority concludes that the particular tariffs at issue are not among the tools IEEPA makes available through the authorization to “regulate . . . importation” of goods, IEEPA § 203(a)(1)(B) [50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B)], even when all the required preconditions are met. Maj. Op. at 37–38. We think otherwise. IEEPA’s language, as confirmed by its history, authorizes tariffs to regulate importation—a conclusion that the majority does not squarely reject, but Judge Cunningham and those who join her opinion do. And IEEPA’s language does not contain the additional limits on which the majority opinion today relies as the sole basis for its illegality holding. Maj. Op. at 37–42. IEEPA embodies an eyes-open congressional grant of broad emergency authority in this foreign-affairs realm, which unsurprisingly extends beyond authorities available under non-emergency laws, and Congress confirmed the understood breadth by tying IEEPA’s authority to particularly demanding procedural requirements for keeping Congress informed. And, contrary to the CIT’s reason for invalidating the reciprocal tariffs, such emergency authority is not displaced by another statute (section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 1987–88, (1974) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2132)); nor does IEEPA contain the exclusion of using IEEPA authorities as leverage that the CIT articulated as the sole basis for holding the trafficking tariffs unlawful. Finally, the major questions doctrine does not call for a different statutory conclusion. Regarding constitutionality: We conclude that IEEPA’s authorization of presidential action in this realm is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority under the Supreme Court’s decisions, which have upheld broad grants of authority, including tariffing authority, in this foreign-affairs-related area.
For those reasons, on the present state of governing law, we would reverse the CIT’s summary judgment and remand for further proceedings on any issues concerning unlawfulness that plaintiffs have preserved. We therefore respectfully dissent.
V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump (En Banc Nonprecedential Order)
The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate through October 14, 2025, during which the parties may file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. If, within that period, any party notifies the Clerk in writing that it has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, the Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate pending (1) the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari or (2) a judgment of the Supreme Court if certiorari is granted. While the issuance of the mandate is withheld, the United States Court of International Trade shall take no further action in this case.