Opinions

Late yesterday, the Federal Circuit released a nonprecedential order dismissing an appeal. This morning, the court released an en banc precedential opinion and two nonprecedential opinions. The en banc opinion addresses the law governing standing to file a bid protest in a government contract dispute. Judge Hughes authored the majority opinion on behalf of himself and six other judges. Notably, Judge Hughes authored a dissenting opinion that was joined by three other judges. The nonprecedential opinions come in two patent cases, one appealed from a district court and one from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. Here are the introductions to the opinions and link to the dismissal.

Percipient.ai, Inc. v. United States (Precedential)

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Hughes, in which Circuit Judges Dyk, Prost, Reyna, Chen, Cunningham, and Stark join.

This en banc proceeding asks us to resolve the question of who can be an “interested party” objecting to any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). Because we hold that an interested party is an actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract, regardless of the type of challenge brought, we affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of Percipient.ai’s protest for lack of standing. 

Stoll, Circuit Judge, with whom Moore, Chief Judge, and Lourie and Taranto, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting.

The question before the en banc court is simple: “Who can be ‘an interested party objecting to . . . any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement’” under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1)? Percipient.ai, Inc. v. United States, 121 F.4th 1311, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (omission in original). The majority holds that an “interested party” is limited to an actual or prospective bidder regardless of the subject matter of interest. Instead of considering who can be an interested party “objecting to . . . any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement,” the majority borrows a definition of interested party that Congress included in a different statute, the Competition in Contracting Act (“CICA”). But that statute does not even include the subject matter of interest at issue here. Given this difference in scope between CICA and the Tucker Act, it is not surprising that Congress did not adopt that definition when enacting the Tucker Act. Respectfully, ignoring statutory language and adopting a definition that Congress chose not to adopt cannot be the proper statutory analysis.

Google LLC v. Sonos, Inc. (Nonprecedential)

Sonos, Inc. appeals from the final judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California holding (1) claims 1, 2, 4, 6, and 8 of U.S. Patent 10,469,966 (“the ’966 patent”) invalid and the ’966 patent unenforceable; (2) claim 1 of U.S. Patent 10,848,885 (“the ’885 patent”) invalid and the ’885 patent unenforceable; and (3) claims 1, 2, 4, 9, 11–13, and 16 of U.S. Patent 10,779,033 (“the ’033 patent”) invalid.2  J.A. 107–08 (Amended Final Judgment). For the following reasons, we reverse-in-part and affirm-in-part.

Google LLC v. MindbaseHQ LLC (Nonprecedential)

Google LLC (“Google”) appeals from the final written decisions of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) determining that Google failed to prove several claims of patents owned by MindbaseHQ, LLC (“Mindbase”) are unpatentable.  Because the Board’s implicit claim construction was incorrect, and it further erred by not considering Google’s reply evidence and arguments, we vacate and remand for further proceedings with respect to these claims.  The Board also found that Google succeeded in proving other Mindbase claims were unpatentable and, as to these, Mindbase cross-appeals.  We find no error in the Board’s conclusion relating to these claims and, therefore, affirm with respect to Mindbase’s cross-appeal.

Dismissal