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Here is an update on recent activity at the Supreme Court in cases decided by the Federal Circuit. With respect to granted petitions, the petitioner filed his reply brief in Soto v. United States, a veterans case. With respect to pending petitions, one new petition was filed in a government contract case; a waiver of the right to respond was filed in a takings case; a brief in opposition was filed in a patent case; and an amicus brief was filed in the same takings case. In addition, the Court denied petitions in two patent cases and five pro se cases. Here are the details.

Granted Cases

In Soto v. United States, a veterans case, the petitioner filed his reply brief.

The Court granted review to consider whether a statutory provision governing Combat-Related Special Compensation, 10 U.S.C. § 1413a, provides a settlement mechanism that displaces the default procedures and limitations set forth in the Barring Act. According to the Federal Circuit, “the Barring Act applies to settlement claims” regarding Combat-Related Special Compensation. As for why, it indicated “the CRSC statute does not explicitly provide its own settlement mechanism.” It then held that “the six-year statute of limitations contained in the Barring Act applies to CRSC settlement claims.” Soto challenges these findings by arguing that the Barring Act does not apply to CRSC settlement claims.

In its response brief, the government asserted that the “well-established framework [of 31 U.S.C. § 3702] governs unless ‘another law’ provides a different settlement mechanism, or establishes a different limitations period, for a particular type of claim.” And, the government argued, “[w]hen Congress has intended to displace [§] 3702’s settlement mechanism in full or in part, it has done so expressly.” But, it argued, “Congress included no such express statements in [10 U.S.C. §] 1413a.” According to the government, moreover, the “[p]etitioner identifies no other form of military compensation for which unlimited retrospective awards are available.”

Now, in his reply, the petitioner argues the parties “agree on two key legal principles governing this case.” First, he says the parties agree the “word ‘settlement’ in connection with public transactions and accounts has been used from the beginning to describe administrative determination of the amount due.” Second, he continues, the parties agree “that there is no requirement that a statute use particular terms to grant settlement authority.” According to the petitioner, these “undisputed principles resolve the question presented.” He asserts the “CRSC statute authorizes the Secretary concerned to determine whether a veteran is eligible for CRSC and thus has a valid claim, and, if so, to determine the amount due.” The petitioner argues that, “even though the CRSC statute does not use the word ‘settle,'” it does confer settlement authority, and is therefore “‘another law’ that displaces the Barring Act.” Furthermore, the petitioner contends, although “the government draws the Court’s attention to dozens of other statutes involving military compensation,” it “fails to show that any of the statutes it cites has the features necessary for settlement authorization.”

Petition Cases

New Petition

In Servant Health, LLC v. United States, a government contract case, Servant Health asked the Court to review the following questions:

  1. “Whether an executive agency contracting officer may eliminate the requirement to exercise discretion by inserting contract language that nullifies the Federal Acquisition Regulation’s excusable delay protections in a commercial items contract.”
  2. “Whether a contracting officer’s refusal to consider delivery delays caused by the Suez Canal blockage— an archetypal common carrier delay—violates FAR 52.212-4(f) and exceeds the officer’s authority under 41 U.S.C. § 3307.”
  3. “Whether, under Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, courts must invalidate agency actions that amount to unauthorized legislative rulemaking, including when a contracting officer unilaterally rewrites procurement obligations established by Congress.”

Waiver of Right to Respond

A waiver of the right to respond was filed in Doyle v. United States, a takings case presenting the following questions:

  1. “Whether a regulatory takings claim against the United States is ripe when a property owner demonstrates ‘de facto finality.’”
  2. “Whether a property owner can show that his regulatory takings claim against the United States is ripe without obtaining the government’s denial of a complete application for administrative relief.”

Brief in Opposition

In Converter Manufacturing, LLC v. Tekni-Plex, Inc., a patent case, Tekni-Plex filed its brief in opposition to the petition. The petition presented the following questions:

  1. “Whether the patent challenger always has the burden of proving that the disclosures in an asserted prior art patent or printed publication are enabling of the claimed subject matter under Sections 102 and 103 of the Patent Act.”
  2. “Whether the standard for proving a prior art patent or printed publication enables claimed subject matter under Sections 102 and 103 of the Patent Act is the one set forth in this Court’s holding in Seymour v. Osbourn, 11 Wall. 516, 555 (1870).”
  3. “Whether this Court’s Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo decision prohibits the Federal Circuit from deferring to the USPTO’s interpretation of the law of prior art enablement by silently adopting that interpretation using Fed. R. App. P. 36.”

Now, in response, Tekni-Plex asserts that, contrary to Converter Manufacturing’s argument, “the Federal Circuit’s rebuttable presumption of prior art enablement does not conflict with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.” It further contends Converter Manufacturing “plainly forfeited” this argument by “never claim[ing] that the law establishing the rebuttable presumption should be changed” in the proceedings below. Tekni-Plex also asserts that “Loper Bright is irrelevant” because the presumption applied by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board “is the result of decisions by the Federal Circuit, not some regulatory interpretation by the PTAB,” and therefore the “Federal Circuit did not defer to an interpretation of the law by the PTAB.”

Amicus Brief

One new amicus brief in support of a petition was filed in Doyle v. United States, the takings case mentioned above.

Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF) filed the amicus brief. In it, MSLF asserts this “should be a straightforward case.” MSLF argues that the lower courts’ holding—that Doyle’s “claim is ‘unripe’ because he did not submit a prohibitively expensive incidental take permit application . . . that almost certainly would have been denied anyway”—”makes no sense.” According to MSLF, “the government has physically excluded Mr. Doyle from his own land for thirty years,” and “under this Court’s precedents . . . that gives rise to a takings claim.” MSLF argues the Supreme “Court should intervene to clarify that an owner’s takings claim is ripe when government actions make it clear that property cannot be developed or even accessed.”

Denials

Since our last update, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the following cases: