On April 28, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Soto v. United States, a veterans case. The Court granted review to consider whether a statutory provision governing Combat-Related Special Compensation, 10 U.S.C. § 1413a, provides a settlement mechanism that displaces the default procedures and limitations set forth in the Barring Act. According to the Federal Circuit, “the Barring Act applies to settlement claims” regarding Combat-Related Special Compensation. As for why, it indicated “the CRSC statute does not explicitly provide its own settlement mechanism.” It then held that “the six-year statute of limitations contained in the Barring Act applies to CRSC settlement claims.” Soto challenges these findings by arguing that the Barring Act does not apply to CRSC settlement claims. This is our argument preview.
In his opening merits brief, Soto makes two arguments. First, he argues the CRSC statute authorizes settlement of CRSC claims, and thus it is “another law” that displaces the Barring Act. Second, he argues, the test to displace the Barring Act that used by the Federal Circuit is incorrect, and should be rejected.
Soto’s first argument centers on the assertion that “[s]ettlement authority exists if a statute authorizes an agency to administratively determine the validity of a claim and the amount due.” According to Soto, “[i]n the U.S. Code, there are ‘many authorities available today to administratively settle claims against the federal government,’ by numerous federal agencies.” Soto contends that “it is unsurprising that the current Barring Act . . . is explicit that no agency has exclusive authority to settle claims against the United States,” but “at this point in the nation’s history, the Barring Act is no more than a ‘general background provision[]’ that is ‘inapplicable’ where any other statute authorizes claims settlement.”
Soto further asserts that “Subsection (a) [of the CRSC statute] grants the Secretary concerned ‘[a]uthority’ to administratively determine the validity of a claim for CRSC, in that it directs the Secretary concerned to pay CSRC only to an ‘eligible combat-related disabled uniformed services retiree who elects benefits under this section.'” He contends that “by directing the Secretary concerned to ‘consider’ whether an applicant is eligible for CRSC benefits—and to pay CRSC only to eligible applicants—the statute’s plain text authorizes the Secretary concerned to administratively determine the validity of each applicant’s claim to CRSC payments.” Soto argues that “Subsection (a) [also] states that the Secretary concerned shall pay ‘a monthly amount for the combat-related disability of the retiree determined under subsection (b).'” According to Soto, “[s]ubsection (b) in turn ‘provides instructions on the administrative calculation of the amount due to satisfy an eligible veteran’s claim.'” Soto contends that “the statute authorizes the Secretary to ‘determine[]’ the amount due to an eligible veteran—and directs how to make that determination.” Thus, he asserts, “the CRSC statute authorizes the Secretary concerned to settle claims for CRSC,” and the “CRSC statute is thus ‘another law’ that displaces the Barring Act.”
Soto’s second argument is that the Federal Circuit’s “two-part test disregards” the Supreme Court’s “definition of ‘settlement,’ imposes unjustified requirements on Congress, and otherwise lacks a basis in the law of statutory interpretation.” According to Soto, “[t]he Federal Circuit’s demand for ‘special language’ addressing settlement finds no support in statutory history or case law.” He asserts “no authority supports the notion that the word ‘settle’ must appear for a statute to confer settlement authority.” He further argues that, “[m]ore broadly, this Court has rejected an approach to statutory interpretation that requires ‘magic words’ in a statute, as the Federal Circuit’s test does.”
Soto also contends that “[t]o the extent the majority believed that another statute displaces the Barring Act only if the other statute has an express statute of limitations,” this also “finds no support in either the text of the Barring Act or precedent.” According to Soto, “if another statute provides for the settlement of claims, then the Barring Act does not apply—and, because the claim is not presented ‘under this section,’ the Barring Act’s statute of limitations does not apply either.” He asserts that, “[w]hether another statute that authorizes claims settlement also provides for a separate statute of limitations is . . . of no moment under the Barring Act.” And he says “[t]he Federal Circuit should not have read into the text a limitations requirement that it does not contain.” Finally, he argues, “the absence of a limitations period in the CRSC statute does not call into question whether that statute confers settlement authority,” because, as “the statute makes clear, CRSC is to be paid ‘for any month’ in which the claimant is eligible.”
In its response brief, the United States asserts that the CRSC statute “lacks the express language necessary to confer claim-settlement authority or to displace [the Barring Act’s] limitations period.” According to the government, “[r]egardless of the precise language used, Congress’s intent to grant an agency authority to accept, determine, adjust, and conclusively dispose of a request for appropriated funds must be clear,” and the CRSC statute “does not meet this standard.” The government contends that the CRSC statute “does not authorize any military department or official to ‘settle,’ ‘allow,’ or ‘dispose of ’ a retired service member’s request for unpaid compensation;” “does not use the word ‘claim;'” and “does not specify when such a request must be submitted.” It asserts that, while “the statute defines who is ‘eligible’ for CRSC,” “provides instructions on how to calculate the payment amounts,” and “authorizes the component Secretaries to make those payments,” these statutory provisions only “establish a veteran’s substantive right to CRSC and authorize its payment.” According to the government, “statutory provisions that address those subjects complement rather than displace the settlement authority conferred” by the Barring Act.
The government argues that, “[i]n all its applications,” the Barring Act “provides ‘only the procedural authority to settle claims administratively’—the ‘substantive criteria’ used to determine whether particular claims will be allowed or disallowed must come from another source.” And, it contends, while the CRSC statute supplies “the necessary substantive criteria,” “those provisions do not say anything about settlement authority.” According to the government, “if Congress had intended to confer on component Secretaries a distinct authority to conclusively allow or disallow CRSC claims, permitting those Secretaries to ‘consider[]’ a retiree to be ‘an eligible combat-related disabled uniformed services retiree’ would be a roundabout way to achieve that result.” It further argues that the CRSC statute is not “‘another law’ that displaces the six-year statute of limitations” in the Barring Act, because nothing in the statute “‘provide[s] a statute of limitations or any other timing requirement,” and the statute does not “contain rules regarding the ‘effective date’ of CRSC awards.”
The government points out that Soto “does not dispute” that the CRSC statute “lacks an express grant of settlement authority or an alternative limitations period for CRSC claims.” According to the government, Soto instead “argues that what ‘distinguish[es]’ the CRSC statute from other compensation statutes [that do not displace the Barring Act] is that the CRSC statute authorizes ‘the Secretary concerned to determine eligibility and amount due’ and ‘to pay CRSC claims.'” The government asserts, however, that “those are standard features of military-compensation statutes.” The government indicates that “[i]f these commonplace features created an independent settlement mechanism, the ‘another law’ exception . . . would virtually swallow” the Barring Act.
Three amicus briefs have been filed after the grant of certiorari, all supporting the petitioner:
- Military-Veterans Advocacy, Inc. and Disabled American Veterans filed an amicus brief. In this brief, they argue the CRSC program “is not cabined by any statute of limitations.” According to this brief, because the program “provides for the Secretary of the applicant’s military department to validate and settle combat-related claims with specific appropriated funds, it does not fall under the Barring Act’s default time bar.” The brief further asserts that “Congress intended to fully compensate these especially valiant military retirees for their sacrifices” and that the “CRSC statute—enacted to rectify an ‘unjust’ reduction in retirement pay for disability compensation—displaces the Barring Act’s six-year statute of limitations to ensure these veterans are made whole.
- Connecticut Veterans Legal Center also filed an amicus brief. In its brief, it asserts “the plain language of § 1413a is dispositive” because “the text of the CRSC statute makes clear that it is ‘another law’ that provides a mechanism to settle, or administratively determine the validity of, claims for CRSC.” It argues in particular that “the CRSC statute contains a more specific authorization of settlement authority compared to the Barring Act.” Moreover, according to the brief, “the history of the CRSC statute confirms that it provides a settlement mechanism for CRSC claims.” The brief further asserts that “the statutorily mandated procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense to evaluate CRSC claims demonstrate that the CRSC statute sets out an independent settlement mechanism.” It continues by arguing that “[t]hese procedures have all the hallmarks of a separate administrative system to determine the validity of CRSC claims.
- National Law School Veterans Clinic Consortium also filed an amicus brief. In this brief, it argues “Congress provided special compensation to combat-wounded veterans, recognizing their heightened claim to benefits above standard military retirement.” According to the brief, § 1413a explicitly states that “CRSC is distinctly ‘not retired pay.’” It further argues that, given the “multiple substantial barriers that combat-wounded retirees will uniquely face in navigating the CRSC system,” “it is unsurprising that the CRSC statute provides its own settlement mechanism apart from the strictures of the Barring Act.” The brief asserts that the “Federal Circuit’s ruling improperly deprives combat-wounded retirees of the full benefits that the CRSC statutory text permits them to receive.”
We will post a recap of the argument. As always, you can find all the relevant documents and all of our coverage of the case on our case page.