Here is an update on recent activity at the Supreme Court in cases decided by the Federal Circuit. With respect to granted cases, there is no new activity to report. With respect to petitions, one new petition was filed in a pro se case, new waivers of the right to respond were filed by the government in one takings case and three pro se cases, and one new reply in support of a petition was filed in a patent case raising a question regarding the relationship between patent term adjustment and obvious-type double patenting. Here are the details.
Granted Cases
There is no new activity to report.
Petition Cases
New Petition
In W.J. v. Becerra, a pro se case, the petitioner asked the Court to review the following question:
- “Whether the three-year tolling provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2501 applies to legally disabled petitioners who bring claims before the United States Court of Federal Claims under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10, et seq.”
Waivers of Right to Respond
The government waived its right to respond to petitions in one takings case and three pro se cases:
- Lemon Bay Cove, LLC v. United States
- Payne v. Merit Systems Protection Board
- Selby v. McDonough
- Tindall v. United States
New Reply
In Cellect, LLC v. Vidal, a patent case, Cellect filed its reply brief in support of its petition. The petition presented the following question:
- “Whether a patent procured in good faith can be invalidated on the ground that statutory Patent Term Adjustment, which requires lengthening a patent’s term to account for time lost to Patent and Trademark Office delays, can trigger a judge-made patent-invalidation doctrine.”
In her response brief, Vidal argued the Federal Circuit “correctly held” that the patent statute “does not preclude ordinary application of obviousness-type double-patenting doctrine.”
Now, in its reply, Cellect argues by “wrongly asserting that the rule against obviousness-type double-patenting (ODP) is statutory rather than judge-made . . . the Federal Circuit limits the statutory guarantee.” According to Cellect, “[b]y pretending that this case is about PTA displacing ODP—rather than about ODP displacing PTA—the government tacitly admits that the result . . . is indefensible.” Furthermore, Cellect asserts, 35 U.S.C. § “154’s terminal-disclaimer caveat and the ‘history’ and ‘context’ behind the PTA statute . . . cannot support the Federal Circuit’s massive and consequential rewrite of the statute.”