This morning the Federal Circuit released two precedential opinions, two nonprecedential opinions, one Rule 36 judgment, and four nonprecedential orders. The first precedential opinion reverses a judgment of the District of Delaware in a patent case, while the second grants a petition for panel rehearing in a trade case appealed the Court of International Trade. The first nonprecedential opinion dismisses an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, while the second affirms a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board. All of the nonprecedential orders are dismissals. Here are the introductions to the opinions and links to the Rule 36 judgment and orders.
Allergan USA, Inc. v. MSN Laboratories Private Ltd. (Precedential)
Allergan USA, Inc., Allergan Holdings Unlimited Co., Allergan Pharmaceuticals International Ltd., Janssen Pharmaceutica NV (“Janssen”), and Eden Biodesign, LLC (collectively, “Allergan”) appeal from the final judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. Following a three-day bench trial, the district court determined that claim 40 of U.S. Patent 7,741,356 (“the ’356 patent”), asserted against Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited (“Sun”), is invalid under the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting. Allergan USA, Inc. v. MSN Lab’ys Priv. Ltd., 694 F. Supp. 3d 511, 541 (D. Del. 2023) (“Decision”). The district court also determined that the claims of U.S. Patents 11,007,179 (“the ’179 patent”), 11,090,291 (“the ’291 patent”), 11,160,792 (“the ’792 patent”), and 11,311,516 (“the ’516 patent”) asserted against Sun are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for lack of written description. Id. at 529.1
For the following reasons, we reverse the district court’s determination that asserted claim 40 of the ’356 patent is invalid for obviousness-type double patenting. We also reverse its determination that the asserted claims of the ’179, ’291, ’792, and ’516 patents lack written description.
Solar Energy Industries Association v. United States (Precedential)
Solar Energy Industries Association, Nextera Energy Inc., Invenergy Renewables LLC, and EDF Renewables, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees (collectively, “Solar”), filed a petition for rehearing. In the Petition, Solar argues that the full court should reevaluate and replace its precedential decision in Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1985), in which we explained we would only set aside presidential actions taken pursuant to Sections 201-03 of Title II of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53, if the statutory interpretation underlying such acts constitutes “a clear misconstruction of the governing statute, a significant procedural violation, or action outside delegated authority” (emphasis added). The panel previously issued an opinion reversing the Court of International Trade’s decision to enjoin the president from enforcing Proclamation 10101, which (among other things) removed the exclusion of bifacial solar panels from certain duties that had been imposed a few years earlier.1 See Solar Energy Indus. Ass’n v. United States, 86 F.4th 885 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“Panel Opinion”). In doing so, the Panel Opinion applied the Maple Leaf standard. See id. at 894-95.
Solar now argues that Maple Leaf conflicts with Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent. See, e.g., Pet. at 6-7 (citing Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667 (2018) (discussing presidential interpretation of Immigration and Nationality Act); id. at 8 (citing Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, 4 F.4th 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (reviewing presidential action under Section 232 of Trade Expansion Act of 1962). In its supplemental notice, Solar adds that Maple Leaf has now been overruled by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. ___, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024). Suppl. Notice (ECF No. 107) at 2. According to Solar, the panel’s adherence to the “clear misconstruction” standard of Maple Leaf led the court to “abdicate[] its constitutional role.” Pet. at 1; see also id. at 13 (“[T]he decision contravenes the constitutional design and binding precedent by giving the President largely unchecked power to determine the scope of his own delegated authority.”). In Solar’s view, we must instead review issues of statutory construction de novo, even when we are considering presidential interpretation of a statute governing a field of activity largely committed to the President’s authority. See Pet. at 9-10, 14; see also Suppl. Notice at 2 (“[The] panel’s view that it was not called upon to decide whether the government’s interpretation of the statute is correct [in trade cases] . . . cannot be reconciled with Loper Bright.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
The Petition is granted to the limited extent that the panel supplements the Original Opinion with the additional reasoning set out in this Supplemental Opinion. Specifically, we write to explain that whatever merit there may be to Solar’s contention that our Maple Leaf standard would benefit from review in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, this case does not present an appropriate vehicle for undertaking such a task. This is because, as we show below, the same conclusions result from application of de novo review that the Panel Opinion reached by application of Maple Leaf.
Murphy v. McDonough (Nonprecedential)
Curtis Murphy appeals the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirming the Board of Veteran’s Appeals’ denial of Mr. Murphy’s entitlement to an earlier effective date for his award of a total disability rating based on individual unemployability. Because there are factual predicates to the challenges Mr. Murphy raises in his appeal, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Long v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Nonprecedential)
The Supreme Court recently decided Harrow, holding that § 7703(b)(1)(A)’s deadline is non-jurisdictional but declining to decide whether it is nonetheless mandatory and therefore not subject to equitable tolling. See Harrow v. Dep’t of Def., 601 U.S. 480, 489–90 (2024). In the instant appeal, the government argues the deadline is not subject to equitable tolling and that, in any event, Ms. Long would not be entitled to equitable tolling. We do not reach these issues because we find that the Board did not err on the merits. Accordingly, for the reasons explained below, we affirm the Board’s final decision.