Late yesterday and this morning the Federal Circuit released four nonprecedential orders. Two deny writs of mandamus seeking to direct the District of Delaware to cancel hearings in patent cases concerning (1) disclosure of owners, members, and partners of nongovernmental entities that are parties before the district court and (2) disclosure of certain third-party funding arrangements in litigation before the district court. Two dismiss appeals. Here is text from the orders and links to the dismissals.
In re Waverly Licensing LLC (Nonprecedential Order)
Waverly Licensing LLC filed these suits in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. On September 21, 2022, the district court ordered Waverly’s managing member to attend a hearing on December 6, 2022, to determine whether Waverly complied with the court’s standing orders concerning (1) disclosure of owners, members, and partners of nongovernmental entities that are parties before the court and (2) disclosure of certain third-party funding arrangements in litigation before the court. Waverly petitions this court for a writ of mandamus that would direct the district court to cancel the hearing and end its “judicial inquisition.” Pet. at 4.
“As the writ [of mandamus] is one of the most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal, three conditions must be satisfied before it may issue”: the petitioner must show (1) there is “no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires,” (2) the “right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable,” and (3) “the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). That standard has not been met.
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Notably, there is no absolute prohibition on a district court’s addressing collateral issues following a dismissal. Rather, “[i]t is well established that a federal court may consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending,” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(b); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (a district court has authority to regulate practice before it). Waverly has not shown that the court acted so far outside of this authority to warrant the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
The petition is denied.
In re Creekview IP LLC (Nonprecedential Order)
Creekview IP LLC filed these suits in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. On September 12, 2022, the district court ordered Creekview’s managing member to attend a hearing to determine whether Creekview complied with the court’s standing orders concerning (1) disclosure of owners, members, and partners of nongovernmental entities that are parties before the court and (2) disclosure of certain third-party funding arrangements in litigation before the court. Creekview petitions this court for a writ of mandamus that would direct the district court to cancel the hearing and end its “judicial inquisition.” Pet. at 5.
“As the writ [of mandamus] is one of the most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal, three conditions must be satisfied before it may issue”: the petitioner must show (1) there is “no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires,” (2) the “right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable,” and (3) “the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). That standard has not been met.
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Notably, there is no absolute prohibition on a district court’s addressing collateral issues following a dismissal. Rather, “[i]t is well established that a federal court may consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending,” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(b); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (a district court has authority to regulate practice before it). Creekview has not shown that the court has taken any action in this case that is so far outside its authority to warrant the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
The petition is denied.