This morning the Federal Circuit released a nonprecedential opinion in a case appealed from the Merit Systems Protection Board, affirming the Board’s decision to dismiss a petition for enforcement of a settlement agreement. Notably, Judge Chen dissented. The Federal Circuit also released a nonprecedential order dismissing a petition for a writ of mandamus based on alleged lack of jurisdiction. Here is the introduction to the opinion and text from the order.
Brown v. General Services Administration (Nonprecedential)
Demetria Brown appeals from a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“the Board”) dismissing her petition for enforcement of a settlement agreement. See Brown v. GSA, No. DC-0752-19-0272-C-1, 2021 WL 779642 (M.S.P.B. Feb. 23, 2021) J.A. 1–17 (“Decision”). We affirm.
CHEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Because I believe that the plain language of the settlement agreement between Ms. Brown and the General Services Administration (GSA) required GSA to do something more than merely “tak[e] steps to initiate payment,” see Majority Op. 5, and because, even under the majority’s interpretation of “initiate,” GSA breached its duty to pay Ms. Brown in a reasonable time, I respectfully dissent.
In re Buckshaw (Nonprecedential Order)
John J. Buckshaw petitions for “writs of mandamus and prohibition directed [to] the United States District Courts over several states to compel rulings on motion[s] for a stay of state court proceedings against execution of anti competitive arrest warrants, motions to quash said arrest warrants, to prohibit denial of petitions for writs of habeas corpus,” “to prohibit remand of the removal of criminal prosecutions from the state courts to the federal courts,” and “to compel the district court to rule on the pre trail [sic] motions.” ECF No. 2 at 8.
The All Writs Act provides that the federal courts “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). As that statute makes clear, however, the Act is not itself a grant of jurisdiction. See Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 534–35 (1999). Mr. Buckshaw’s submission does not reference any specific agency or trial court action that could eventually be subject to this court’s jurisdiction on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1295 that would give us jurisdiction to consider a mandamus request. We therefore dismiss his petition.
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
The petition is dismissed.