This morning the Federal Circuit issued two precedential opinions, one addressing pleading requirements in a patent infringement case and the other reversing a judgment of the United States Court of International Trade over a dissent by Judge Reyna. Additionally, the court issued four nonprecedential opinions in two patent cases and two cases dismissed by the Court of Federal Claims for lack of jurisdiction. The court also issued a nonprecedential order denying a petition for a writ of mandamus to order the Western District of Texas to transfer a patent case. Here are the introductions to the opinions and the order.

BOT M8 LLC v. Sony Corporation of America (Precedential)

Once more, we address the stringency of pleading requirements in cases alleging patent infringement. Once more, we explain that patentees need not prove their case at the pleading stage. See In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 529–30 (2011)); Nalco Co. v. Chem-Mod, LLC, 883 F.3d 1337, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018). And we, once more, explain that, while a patentee’s pleading obligations are not insurmountable, a patentee may subject its claims to early dismissal by pleading facts that are inconsistent with the requirements of its claims. See Nalco, 883 F.3d at 1348– 50.

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For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings regarding infringement of the ’988 and ’670 patents.

Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States (Precedential)

In section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87–794, 76 Stat. 872, 877, codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1862, Congress provided that if the President receives, and agrees with, a finding by a specified executive officer (now the Secretary of Commerce) that imports of an article threaten to impair national security, the President shall take action that the President deems necessary to alleviate the threat from those imports. See Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976) (addressing then-current version of § 1862 and holding that permitted action includes requiring licenses for im- ports and that provision raised no substantial issue of improper delegation of legislative power); American Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 806 F. App’x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (rejecting nondelegation challenge to the current ver- sion of the statute). In its present form, the statute includes provisions, added in 1988, that set forth process and timing standards applicable to the Secretary’s making of the predicate finding of threat, § 1862(b), and set forth certain timing standards applicable to the President’s follow-on decisions if the Secretary finds such a threat, § 1862(c). Of central importance here is § 1862(c)(1). It specifies one period within which the President is to concur or disagree with the Secretary’s finding and to determine the necessary action if the President concurs in the finding and another period within which the President is thereafter to implement the chosen action. § 1862(c)(1). This case involves a challenge to certain presidential action as taken too late under § 1862(c)(1).

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We reverse the Trade Court’s decision and remand the case for entry of judgment against Transpacific. On remand, the Trade Court may determine whether that judgment should include dismissal of the claim against the President.

REYNA, Circuit Judge dissenting.

John Adams warned that “Power must never be trusted without a Check.” The expression of caution from our Founding Father is as much true today as it was at the founding of our nation. It also has exact application to this appeal. The essential question posed by this appeal is whether Congress enacted § 232 to grant the President unchecked authority over the Tariff.

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The Constitution vests Congress with sole power over the Tariff. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. When Congress enacted § 232, it delegated to the President limited authority to act to ameliorate harm caused to the national security by sudden increases of imports of certain goods. Congress, however, in clear and plain words expressly limited its delegation of authority. Yet, the majority interprets § 232 in a manner that renders Congress’s express limitations meaningless. I fear that the majority effectively accomplishes what not even Congress can legitimately do, reassign to the President its Constitutionally vested power over the Tariff. I dissent.

Aftechmobile Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc. (Nonprecedential)

Aftechmobile appeals the dismissal of its complaint alleging infringement of Aftechmobile’s U.S. Patent Nos. 8,813,028 and No. 10,133,558 based on patent ineligibility. Because the district court did not err in its analysis of patent ineligibility, we affirm.

Level Sleep LLP v. Sleep Number Corporation (Nonprecedential)

Level Sleep LLC appeals the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement of Level Sleep’s U.S. Patent Nos. 6,807,698 and 7,036,172. Because we agree with the district court’s construction of “low body pressure,” and the parties agree that the accused products do not infringe under that construction, we affirm.

Perry v. United States (Nonprecedential)

Moshe Avram Perry appeals from the final decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims dismissing his complaint for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) and for failure to state a claim under RCFC 12(b)(6). For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

Schroeder v. United States (Nonprecedential)

Gene Allen Schroeder appeals a decision by the United States Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) dismissing his complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Schroeder v. United States, No. 19-1706, 2020 WL 865409 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 21, 2020). Because we agree that the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Schroeder’s claims, we affirm.

In re TCO AS (Nonprecedential Order)

NCS Multistage, Inc., a Canadian corporation, and NCS Multistage LLC, its Houston, Texas based subsidiary, sued TCO AS, a Norwegian company, for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. TCO moved to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The district court denied the motion on May 28, 2021, finding that TCO had failed to show the transferee venue was clearly more convenient. TCO now seeks a writ of mandamus directing transfer.

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The district court found that judicial-economy considerations weighed against transfer here because of an earlier-filed, pending action in the Western District of Texas against another defendant involving the same patent claims. It is true that “a clear abuse of discretion in balancing convenience against judicial economy under § 1404 is not outside the scope of correctible error on mandamus review.” In re Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010). But here, we cannot say that TCO has a clear and indisputable right to relief, particularly in light of the fact that several potential witnesses are located outside of the proposed transferee venue, including some in the Western District of Texas, and the fact that the only party headquartered in the proposed transferee venue elected to litigate this case in the Western District of Texas.


The petition is denied.