This morning the Federal Circuit issued one precedential opinion in a patent case. The court also issued three nonprecedential opinions: two in patent cases and one in an appeal from the Merit Systems Protection Board. Finally, the court issued one precedential order granting a motion to substitute a successor-in-interest in a design patent case. Here are the introductions to the opinions and text from the order.

Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi (Precedential)

Amgen Inc., Amgen Manufacturing, Ltd., and Amgen USA, Inc. (collectively, “Amgen”) appeal from a decision of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware granting Judgment as a Matter of Law (“JMOL”) of lack of enablement of claims 19 and 29 of U.S. Patent 8,829,165 (the “’165 patent”) and claim 7 of U.S. Patent 8,859,741 (the “’741 patent”). See Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, No. CV 14-1317-RGA, 2019 WL 4058927, at *1–2, *13 (D. Del. Aug. 28, 2019) (“Decision”). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Apple Inc. (Nonprecedential)

Appellee, Apple Inc. (“Apple”), sought inter partes review (“IPR”) of claims 1–6, 14, 15, 17–20, 28, 29, 31–34, 40– 43, 51–54, 62–65, and 68 (collectively, “the Challenged Claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,535,890 (“the ’890 patent”), owned by Appellant, Uniloc 2017 LLC (“Uniloc”). The United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) issued a final written decision (“the Final Written Decision”), concluding that Petitioners had “establishe[d], by a preponderance of the evidence, that all [the C]hallenged [C]laims . . . are unpatentable.” Apple Inc. v. Uniloc USA, Inc., No. IPR2017- 00221, 2018 WL 4210334, at *21 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 2018).

Uniloc appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A). We affirm.

Oyster Optics, LLC v. Infinera Corp. (Nonprecedential)

This case presents a narrow question of contract interpretation. The parties dispute whether a license and release granted by Appellant to an entity and its “Affiliates” apply to Appellee, barring Appellant’s claims of patent infringement. We conclude that at least the license applies to Appellee, and, additionally, that the license is retroactive. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of Appellee.

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The Settlement and License Agreement between Oyster Optics, LLC (“Oyster”) and the three Coriant companies, in settlement of Oyster’s suit for patent infringement, did not also resolve, without Oyster’s intent, Oyster’s patent infringement suit against Infinera Corporation (“Infinera”). The Settlement and License Agreement between Oyster and Coriant cannot reasonably be interpreted as absolving Infinera of the liability asserted in Oyster’s concurrent infringement suit against Infinera. The district court’s ruling is contrary to the law of contracts and is contrary to the rules of integrity of commerce.

My colleagues’ affirmance of the district court decision is not only incorrect, but is also not ripe for review, for Oyster is now challenging the bona fides of the Coriant Settlement and License Agreement, in the district court and also in California State court.

I respectfully dissent.

Harty v. Office of Personnel Management (Nonprecedential)

Ms. Joanna Harty appeals from a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) upholding the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) decision denying her application for disability retirement benefits. Because Ms. Harty alleges only factual error in the Board’s decision, for which we are without jurisdiction to review, we dismiss this appeal.

Mojave Desert Holdings, LLC v. Crocs, Inc. (Precedential Order)

U.S.A. Dawgs, Inc. appeals from a United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) decision finding Crocs, Inc.’s design patent (No. D517,789) patentable. U.S.A. Dawgs and Mojave Desert Holdings, LLC move to substitute Mojave as U.S.A. Dawgs’s successor-in-interest. For the reasons stated below, we grant U.S.A. Dawgs and Mojave’s motion to substitute.


We therefore conclude that Mojave is the successor-in-interest to U.S.A. Dawgs, that it has standing to pursue this challenge to the ’789 patent, and that the Board erred in not substituting Mojave for U.S.A. Dawgs as the third-party requester during the inter partes reexamination.

Under these circumstances, we think that no useful purpose would be served by remanding to the Board to add Mojave as the requester and that the appropriate course is to grant the motion to substitute on appeal pursuant to Rule 43(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 417 (1952); see also Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 833–34 (1989) (reaffirming Mullaney); Carlton v. Baww, Inc., 751 F.2d 781, 789 (5th Cir. 1985) (permitting amendment to a pleading at the appellate court because “it appear[ed] plainly from [the] record that jurisdiction exists,” and as a result, “it best serve[d] the interests of justice to grant the motion for leave to amend [in the appellate court], without requiring a perfunctory remand for that purpose” (citations omitted)).



(1) The motion to substitute is granted.

(2) The revised official caption is reflected above.