This morning the Federal Circuit issued a nonprecedential opinion in a design patent case; a nonprecedential opinion in a trademark case; a nonprecedential opinion in an appeal from the Court of Veterans Appeals; a nonprecedential opinion in an appeal from the Merits Systems Protection Board; a nonprecedential order denying a motion to stay a final judgment of the Court of International Trade pending an appeal over a dissent by Judge Taranto; and two Rule 36 judgments. Here are the introductions to the opinions, text from the order; and a list of the Rule 36 judgments.
Plaintiff Super-Sparkly Safety Stuff, LLC (“SuperSparkly”) appeals a decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant Skyline USA, Inc. (“Skyline”), concluding that Skyline had not infringed Super-Sparkly’s design patent. We affirm.
Christopher Coles appeals from a decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) affirming the examining attorney’s final refusal to register Coles’ “BREW SCIENCE” mark because the mark is descriptive of the services identified in Coles’ trademark application. In re Coles, No. 87570785, 2019 WL 5290188 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 26, 2019). Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion, we affirm.
Derrel L. Thomas filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court). Arguing that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) was being dilatory in deciding various claims for benefits he had filed, Mr. Thomas asked for an order directing the relevant VA authorities to issue decisions on the matters that were before them. The Veterans Court denied the petition, concluding that, at least by the time of the Veterans Court’s decision, each matter at issue had in fact been decided by the VA authority before which it had been pending—thus mooting the mandamus request for relief. See Thomas v. Wilkie, No. 19-2017, 2019 WL 6121120 (Vet. App. Nov. 19, 2019). Mr. Thomas appeals. Because Mr. Thomas has raised no question that is within our limited jurisdiction, we dismiss his appeal.
Appellant Jennifer L. Miller was removed from her position as a licensed practical nurse (“LPN”) with the Department of Veterans Affairs (“DVA”) for failing to maintain her LPN license. She appealed her removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (“the Board”), which upheld her removal. We affirm.
The appellants move to stay the underlying judgment pending appeal.
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure authorizes this court to grant a stay pending appeal. Our determination is governed by four factors: (1) whether the movant has made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).
Based on the papers submitted, we conclude that the appellants have not established that a stay of the final judgment pending appeal is warranted here.
Taranto, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Defendants (collectively, the United States or the government) request, under Federal Circuit Rule 8, that we stay the judgment of the Court of International Trade (Trade Court) pending the appeal in this case. I read the request as seeking a stay of only the non-declaratory portion of the judgment, which orders “that United States Customs and Border Protection refund Plaintiff and PlaintiffIntervenors the difference between any tariffs collected on its imports of steel products pursuant to Proclamation No. 9772 and the 25% ad valorem tariff that would otherwise apply on these imports together with such costs and interest as provided by law.” S.A. 3–4. Plaintiff Transpacific Steel LLC and Plaintiff-Intervenors Borusan Mannesmann Boru Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S., Borusan Mannesmann Pipe U.S. Inc., and the Jordan International Company (collectively, plaintiffs)—who are importers (in some cases also producers or exporters) of Turkish steel—oppose the stay. I would grant the stay, without weighing the equities or assessing the likelihood of success on appeal, because the refund order at issue comes within a well-recognized “automatic stay” principle for monetary judgments that we should hold applicable to the Trade Court.