1. “Whether the district court lacks Article III jurisdiction to enforce its Hearing Order investigating Petitioner’s compliance with standing orders when the cases have been dismissed and there is no evidence refuting the accuracy of Petitioners disclosures or Petitioner’s compliance with the standing orders?”
2. “Did the district court abuse its discretion in entering its Standing Order Regarding Third-Party Litigation Funding Arrangements and Standing Order Regarding Disclosures Statements Required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1 because the information sought by the standing orders is not relevant to any issue that the district court may consider?”
3. “Do the district court’s standing orders and Hearing Order contradict the Patent Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure by seeking to identify a “real party in interest” that Congress has deemed irrelevant?”
1. “Waverly argues that the district court clearly overstepped its authority when it entered the standing orders. But a direct challenge to those orders at this juncture is premature, as Waverly has not been found to violate those orders, and it will have alternative adequate means to raise such challenges if, and when, such violations are found to occur.”
2. “[T]he petition is premature. Given that the district court has taken no further action in these cases since its September 21 order, other than to grant Waverly’s motion for a stay, the court has not addressed Waverly’s argument that in light of the joint stipulated dismissals the court may not conduct the proposed inquiry into the accuracy of Waverly’s corporate disclosure statements and compliance with the court’s standing order on third-party litigation funding.”
3. “Notably, there is no absolute prohibition on a district court’s addressing collateral issues following a dismissal. Rather, ‘[i]t is well established that a federal court may consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending.’”
