1. “Whether the lower courts’ orders allowing Respondent to take, possess and use Petitioner’s property for the public good without paying compensation for that use are manifestly unjust and are far departures from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, when the lower courts ignored the clear grant of subject matter jurisdiction found in 28 U.S.C. §1491(a)(l) that includes claims based on the U.S. Constitution and a contract with the United States, when they ignored this Court’s longstanding guidance on considering a motion to dismiss and when they improperly shifted the burden of proof for Respondent’s defenses to Petitioner?”
2. “Whether the Due Process and Takings Clause is self-executing (i.e., a cause of action arising directly under the U.S. Constitution) or requires a statute to justify its enforcement, when Respondent exercised its power of eminent domain and took possession of Petitioner’s property and the lower courts concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claim for compensation, despite Petitioner clearly raising the Due Process and Takings Clause issues in Petitioner’s complaint? Although the Supreme Court of the United States (‘this Court’) specifically identified this issue as not being addressed in Devillier, et al. v. Texas, 601 U.S. 293 (2024), the current dispute presents that issue with a very straightforward and clean set of facts, where Petitioner’s sole avenue for pursuing his compensation claims against Respondent is in federal court.”
3. “Whether the lower courts properly concluded that a vague and undefined ‘national security’ exception to the Takings Clause exists (despite the clear historical context of the Takings Clause being a direct response to Britain’s compelled use of private property owned by the colonials) sufficient to override Respondent’s constitutional obligation to pay just compensation for Respondent’s multi-year possession, control and use of Petitioner’s property to sanction Russia for its invasion of Ukraine (i.e., forcing Petitioner to bear that public burden which should be borne by the public as a whole)?”
4. “Whether the lower courts properly expanded the narrow ‘illegal possession’ exception to the Takings Clause to include Respondent’s illegal failure to pay for the taking and use of Petitioner’s property, when that expansion completely negates the Takings Clause, because every violation of the Takings Clause involves the failure to pay just compensation?”
5. “Whether the lower courts properly expanded the scope of the ‘mere silence’ defense to Petitioner’s breach of contract claim to include Respondent’s overt acts confirming Respondent’s acceptance despite the longstanding judicial precedents that overt acts indicate the acceptance of an offer, when Petitioner’s offer required acceptance by conduct, Petitioner’s offer was accepted by Respondent’s conduct and Respondent failed to remain ‘merely silent’ in the face of Petitioner’s offer?”
