1. “Whether the district court erred, as a matter of law, in dismissing Syngenta’s copyright claims, because the district court’s holding that FIFRA precludes copyright actions based on copying of pesticide labels by generic pesticide registrants is incorrect and contrary to the well-reasoned decision in FMC.”
2. “Whether the district court erred, as a matter of law, in entering judgment that Willowood did not infringe Syngenta’s ’138 Patent for three reasons. First, the district court construed 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) as requiring the product ‘made by a process patented in the United States’ to be made by a single entity, contrary to the statute’s plain language, Congress’ intent, and this Court’s guidance, en banc, in Zoltek. Second, the district court found that Willowood’s azoxystrobin technical was manufactured using the claimed process but left it to the jury to decide if the single-entity requirement was met. Third, even under the district court’s construction of § 271(g), the trial record established that either a single entity carried out the claimed steps, or Willowood directed and controlled the entities who carried out the claimed steps.”
3. “Whether the district court erred, as a matter of law, in entering judgment that W-Ltd did not infringe any of the asserted patents for three reasons. First, Willowood Limited sold 5 kg of azoxystrobin technical, covered by Syngenta’s Compound Patents, to Willowood USA located in the United States in 2013 before the Compound Patents expired. Second, Willowood Limited has since sold and shipped azoxystrobin technical, made by Syngenta’s ’761 Patent process, to Willowood USA in the United States, coordinates that shipping in the United States, and obtains title to the azoxystrobin technical upon delivery to the United States. Third, the jury returned a verdict that ‘Defendants,’ including W-Ltd, infringed Syngenta’s ’761 Patent, and the district court improperly nullified that verdict as to W-Ltd, contrary to the record.”
1. “We conclude that the district court did not provide an adequate analysis of the potential conflict between FIFRA and the Copyright Act for us to determine whether such a conflict truly exists. We also conclude that the district court erred by imposing a singleentity requirement on the performance of a patented process under § 271(g).”
2. & 3.”We agree with the district court in all other respects.”
“We therefore affirm-in-part, reverse-inpart, vacate-in-part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
