1. “The en banc portion of Williamson held, in part, that ‘[w]hen a claim term lacks the word “means,” the presumption’ against means-plus-function treatment ‘can be overcome and § 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to “recite sufficiently definite structure” or else recites “function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.”’ 792 F.3d at 1349 (emphasis added) (quoting Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Under that standard:”
a. “May a claim term that connotes structure to one of skill in the art nonetheless require means-plus-function treatment because the structure it connotes is not sufficient for performing the functions the structure is recited as performing?”
b. “Must the proponent of means-plus-function treatment of a claim term that does not include the word ‘means’ adduce extrinsic or other evidence beyond the language of the claim itself, in order to meet its burden of production in rebutting the Williamson presumption—or may the proponent satisfy its burden by showing that on its face, the claim does not recite sufficient structure?”
2. “May the algorithmic-disclosure requirement that this Court has erected as a bulwark against purely functional claiming for computer-implemented inventions be evaded by reciting in a claim, rather than the specification, a generic ‘processor adapted to’ perform claimed functions?”
