1. “Should the discovery rule, used for example in medical malpractice cases, see United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) and TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 27-28, 122 S.Ct. 441, 151 L.Ed.2d 339 (2001), apply to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2) so that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the claimant has knowledge or reason to know of the cause of her injury?” 2. “Should Brice v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 240 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001) be overruled to permit equitable tolling of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2)?” 3. “If equitable tolling is permitted, do the circumstances of this case support equitable tolling?”
1. “The statute of limitations begins to run on a specific statutory date: the date of occurrence of the first symptom or manifestation of onset of the vaccine-related injury recognized as such by the medical profession at large.” 2. “We therefore overrule Brice and hold that equitable tolling applies to the Vaccine Act.” 3. “We thus hold that equitable tolling under the Vaccine Act due to unawareness of a causal link between an injury and administration of a vaccine is unavailable.”
