“28 U.S.C. § 455 outlines the grounds for disqualification of judges and magistrates due to potential biases or conflicts of interest. This Honorable Court has previously highlighted the fact that: ‘We must first determine whether § 455(a) can be violated based on an appearance of partiality.’ Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 (1988). This Court has also highlighted the fact that ‘failure to consider objective standards requiring recusal is not consistent with the imperatives of due process.’ Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009).”
“This unique case raises three questions under that well-established framework:”
“1. Should the merits as to the question of recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) be decided first, before reaching the merits of any potential abuse of discretion in excluding evidence in the district court?”
“2. Is the failure to rule on the merits under § 455(a) a due process violation, especially when the spouse of the district court judge has accepted $700 Million in part from Google (which is a party to ongoing litigation), and has five publicly-announced strategic partnerships with Google?”
“3. Should federal judges be allowed to hold investments of $5 Million and as much as a $25 Million in hedge funds under 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)?”
