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1	THE MUTE INTERED CHANGES DISCHALLE COURT
1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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4	KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS NV., : CIVIL ACTION
5	: Plaintiff, :
6	vs.
7	:
8	TELIT WIRELESS SOLUTIONS, : INC.; TELIT COMMUNICATIONS, : PLC,, :
9	: Defendant. : NO. 20-1708 (CFC)
10	: KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS NV., : CIVIL ACTION
11	Plaintiff, :
12	:
13	vs. : :
14	TELIT WIRELESS SOLUTIONS, : INC.; TELIT COMMUNICATIONS, : PLC, CALAMP CORP., :
15	: Defendant. : NO. 20-1711-CFC
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18	Wilmington, Delaware
19	Friday, May 21, 2021 9:00 o'clock, a.m.
20	
21	BEFORE: HONORABLE COLM F. CONNOLLY, U.S.D.C.J.
22	
23	
24	Valerie J. Gunning
25	Official Court Reporter
-	APPX1

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1	APPEARANCES:	
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3	YOUNG, CONAWAY, STARGATT & TAYLOR LLP BY: ADAM W. POFF, ESQ. and	
4	ROBERT M. VRANA, ESQ.	
5	-and-	
6		
7	FOLEY & LARDNER BY: ELEY O. THOMPSON, ESQ. (Chicago, Illinois)	
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9	-and-	
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11	BY: KEVIN M. LITTMAN, ESQ. (Boston, Massachusetts)	
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13	Counsel for Plaintiff	
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15 16	MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP BY: JACK B. BLUMENFELD, ESQ.	
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18	-and-	
10	PEARL COHEN ZEDEK LATZER BARATZ LLP BY: DAVID LOWENSTEIN, ESQ.	
20	(New York, New York)	
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21	Telit Wireless Solutions, Inc. and Telit Communications PLC	
23		
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1	APPEARANCES (Continued):
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3		ORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP Y: BRIAN P. EGAN, ESQ.
4		
5		-and-
6	Δ.	XINN, VELTROP & HARKRIDER LLP
7		Y: PAUL ZEINEDDIN, ESQ. and MICHAEL KEELEY, ESQ.
8		(Washington, D.C.)
9		-and-
10		-and-
11		XINN, VELTROP & HARKRIDER LLP
12	.	Y: THOMAS HEDEMANN, ESQ. (Hartford, Connecticut)
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		APPX3

PROCEEDINGS

(Proceedings commenced in the courtroom, beginning at 9:00 a.m.)

THE COURT: All right. Good morning. Please be seated.

Just as a procedural matter, masks are not required in my courtroom. You're welcome to wear them. I'm going with the science. I have from the beginning. So I follow the CDC and everybody in my chambers has been vaccinated. But you should absolutely feel comfortable to wear a mask if you would like. The only exception to the rule I have is -- I don't know if this is going to be the case, I don't think so, but if we have witnesses testify, because I have to assess credibility, I'm going to require them to not wear a mask.

All right. So, welcome everybody. I see people. Mr. Poff?

MR. POFF: Good morning, Your Honor. Adam Poff from Young Conaway on behalf of plaintiff Philips, and with me from Foley & Lardner, Eley Thompson and Kevin Littman.

Also from my office, Rob Vrana.

THE COURT: Good morning, everybody.

25 Mr. Blumenfeld?

5 1 MR. BLUMENFELD: Good morning, Your Honor. 2 Blumenfeld from Morris Nichols for Telit Wireless, and with 3 me at counsel table is David Lowenstein from the Pearl Cohen 4 firm in New York. Thank you. 5 THE COURT: Thank you. 6 MR. EGAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Brian Egan 7 from Morris Nichols on behalf of Thales. 8 Joining me today from the Axinn law firm are 9 Paul Zeineddin, Thomas Hedemann and Michael Keeley.

THE COURT: All right. Did you discuss anything about how you would like to proceed this morning?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: We have not, Your Honor.

MR. THOMPSON: We have not. I do have a suggestion perhaps.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. THOMPSON: It seems to me for efficiency, it may work well if the movants present first and then we would respond. We're prepared to respond to both of them at one That way things don't get repeated. That was my thought.

> THE COURT: Okay.

MR. THOMPSON: We're flexible as far as how we do this.

THE COURT: Well, let's do this. For me, the real issue is the first question, which is irreparable harm.

I don't know that I even need to hear argument on anything else. I may.

You can have a seat. Let's do a couple things.

Let me ask you questions, get your respective positions

before we move forward.

All right. So a threshold question I have is, I don't know, Mr. Blumenfeld, this is 1708?

MR. BLUMENFELD: That's the Telit case, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, but -- oh, that's right. What I meant by the 1708, I meant as opposed to the 1711 and 1713.

MR. EGAN: 1709 and 1713.

THE COURT: Nine? Okay. First of all, I'd better make sure I have the numbers right. Well, I've got 1708 in my briefs, so all the briefs I have, so, for instance, here's the declaration of John Sebastian Borghetti and the two cases are the 1708 and the 1711. Maybe we should clear all of that up. I'm probably missing something really obvious here.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: That, Your Honor, is Telit.

There's one with the customer and one without. The one with the customer, the 1711, is four patents that mirror the ITC case.

THE COURT: Okay.

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7 1 MR. LOWENSTEIN: 11 is the six patents. 2 THE COURT: So who is handling the 1708 case? 3 MR. LOWENSTEIN: I am. 4 THE COURT: Why are we here for the 1708 case? 5 Are there any overlapping patents? 6 MR. LOWENSTEIN: In the six-patent case? 7 I'm just at a loss, like, why are we THE COURT: 8 Why are you moving for an injunction in the 1708 even here? 9 case when there are no patents in the ITC case? 10 MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, we thought the two issues 11 overlapped. You're right, that they're different patents, 12 but ultimately, we'd like to have a FRAND rate set here 1.3 which would encompass the entire portfolio, the six patents 14 into four patents. 15 But the patents that are asserted in THE COURT: the 1708 action aren't in the ITC action. 16 17 MR. LOWENSTEIN: That's true. 18 THE COURT: Am I right on that? 19 MR. LOWENSTEIN: Yes, you are. 20 THE COURT: So then how do I even have -- how do I have a ripe motion before me? I mean, how are you seeking 21 to preclude the ITC proceeding from going on patents that 22 23 they're not even asserted in your case? 24 MR. LOWENSTEIN: Let me try to address it like 25 The ITC action is related to four patents. If the this.

ITC excludes our product altogether, that is obviously going to affect the other patents. We won't be able to sell and there won't be any opportunity for the Court to determine a FRAND rate.

So it's kind of -- you're absolutely right, but it's kind of a package. If they exclude us in the ITC, we're stuck, we can't sell any product. Meanwhile, they are asking mere --

THE COURT: Just to make it clear, then, so you're admitting ahead of time that the patents, that the accused products in the 1708 case are covered by the four patents not asserted in that case, but that are asserted in the ITC proceeding?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: The answer is I don't know, but what I do know is that an exclusion order is going to prevent us from selling whether or not the patents cover those products or not.

We're going to be asked -- essentially out of business or close to it if there's an exclusion order.

Whether or not the six patents cover it or whether or not, you know, at least one claim of the four patents in the ITC has got to be infringed obviously for them to issue the exclusion. If we're excluded, it affects our sales, period, regardless of, you know, the six patents in the other case or the other hundreds of patents they have.

THE COURT: But just so I'm understanding it right --

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Sure.

THE COURT: -- they are not seeking, they, being the plaintiffs, are not seeking a FRAND rate in the 1708 case with respect to the four patents that are in the ITC proceeding?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: No. They're seeking a FRAND rate on all of their patents in both cases, 1708 and 1711.

The complaints are almost identical. I have it as part of my presentation as well. I have one of the complaints, but the complaints essentially are identical insofar as the FRAND rate is concerned.

THE COURT: Are the four asserted patents in the ITC proceeding mentioned in the 1708 complaint?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: No. Just 1711.

THE COURT: I'm probably -- again, I must be missing something. It just seems to me I don't get the connection between the 1708 action and the ITC action.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: At the risk of repeating myself, it's one big package. They want a portfolio license essentially on all of their FRAND patents, right, and so that is in both cases, the six-patent case and the four patent case.

If the ITC were to exclude us from selling --

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it's in our papers -- it would effectively, divest you of your jurisdiction to rule on the FRAND rates. So you can't -- we can't really split apart the four patents from the six patents. The ITC exclusion order is going to cover the entire -- well, the 3G and 4G products that Telit sells, and if that were to happen, then, you know, it doesn't really matter if we're talking about four patents or six patents in which case. It's going to fundamentally affect our business and, you know, our business is hundreds of customers as well.

So that's --

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THE COURT: All right. I'm not sure I'm there with you, but let's not dwell any more on this. You mentioned, you used the words divest me of jurisdiction.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Yes.

THE COURT: So that may be the answer to this question, which is, why do I have authority even to entertain an anti-suit injunction of an ITC proceeding?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, I mean, the argument was that, that I'm prepared to give was that it's an equitable issue. It's a fairness issue.

They've asked for you to set a FRAND rate. They filed a declaratory judgment action in this court saying that you and only you should set the FRAND rate, in fact, seeking an antitrust and anti-suit injunction against us

1	from	proceeding	anywhere	else
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So they are saying they're entitled to an anti-suit --

THE COURT: Who cares what they are saying?

I've got your motion in front of me.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Okay.

THE COURT: What do you think?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I will say that you're entitled to do it and other courts have done it. It's an anti-suit injunction directed at them. It's not directed at the ITC. It's not a per se rule and that's sort of the arguments they've made in their papers.

It's an injunction that's directed to a party to stop them from litigating where really they ought not to be litigating.

THE COURT: All right. We'll come back to that.

I will give you a chance to fully flesh that out.

All right. Do you think Federal Circuit law,
Third Circuit law, some other circuit law, what governs this
adjudication?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: That's a good question. It's kind of a hodgepodge. The Federal Circuit says Federal Circuit law should apply and we've got the four factors.

The Ninth Circuit I believe uses the preliminary injunction factors that don't take --

THE COURT: Wait. You think that Ninth Circuit law applies?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, there are preliminary injunction factors for parallel lawsuits. And --

THE COURT: Well, don't get there. I'm talking about what law should I apply?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I believe Federal Circuit law, and the cases that -- the TQ Delta case that Judge Andrews ruled on applied Third Circuit law, and apparently because the parties briefed on Third Circuit law even though it was after the pro tech case which set out the facts.

THE COURT: I don't understand the Protek case frankly. Basically, it's one sentence, right? It's one sense in the Protek case. The first sentence says we apply regional circuit law and then the second sentence says because what? It implicates jurisdiction of the district court for a patent infringement case and the ITC, we're going to apply Federal Circuit law? I mean, I don't understand why I'm applying Federal Circuit law.

I agree there's a sentence in general, Protek, whatever it's called, that seems to -- but let me ask you this before we get there and then I will hear from your colleagues really quickly on this threshold issue.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Sure.

THE COURT: Do you think it a matters whether I

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13 apply Third Circuit or Federal Circuit law? 1 2 MR. LOWENSTEIN: I don't, and I have the Third 3 Circuit factors here. 4 So bottom line, you don't think it THE COURT: 5 makes a difference? 6 MR. LOWENSTEIN: I don't think so. 7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 MR. LOWENSTEIN: Because -- hold on. 9 the Third Circuit really -- in those cases that we cited and 10 I guess they cited about Third Circuit precedent, the focus 11 of those cases was common, and those cases all addressed an 12 really an international dispute between the U.S. and a U.K. 1.3 That's not at issue here, so I don't know whether the 14 Third Circuit standard really comes into play here, but I 15 mean we did brief it. 16 Again, it's the same issue about protecting the 17 Court's jurisdiction. And --18 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to come back to 19 that. 20 MR. LOWENSTEIN: Okay. 21 THE COURT: When you say you briefed it, you 22 probably did. That doesn't mean I understood it. 23 MR. LOWENSTEIN: All right.

Sure.

THE COURT:

MR. LOWENSTEIN:

I will ask you questions.

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THE COURT: Not because I didn't read your briefs. I read your briefs pretty carefully and I got the best that I could what I could out of them.

Do you think it makes a difference whether or not it's Third Circuit or Federal Circuit law that applies?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Your Honor, thank you.

Actually, we think that Federal Circuit law applies.

THE COURT: Do you think it makes a difference?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: We do not believe it does.

THE COURT: Do you think it makes a difference whether I apply Federal Circuit or Third Circuit law?

MR. THOMPSON: Well, Your Honor, I think that there are two parts as to which Federal Circuit law would apply here. From a procedural standpoint, I think Third Circuit law. From a substantive patent law standard, I think it's Federal Circuit.

The claim that they've made is the breach of contract claim. Now, that's not a patent -- that doesn't come from the federal jurisdiction. Right? That's a breach of contract. I would suggest that that is Third Circuit law.

And does this make a difference? I think the

Third Circuit law is -- well, I think that the Federal

Circuit would try to follow Third Circuit law, so in theory,

they should be the same, right, if the Federal Circuit

follows it. But if you were looking for precedent, I think the controlling precedent would be the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

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THE COURT: And you think that with respect to contract law. What about with respect to preliminary injunction law or anti-suit injunction law?

MR. THOMPSON: The same in my view.

THE COURT: You don't think it makes a difference?

MR. THOMPSON: No. I think it should be Third Circuit law and the Federal Circuit should follow it, so they should be the same in everything.

THE COURT: So do you think whether I apply

Federal Circuit law or Third Circuit law makes a difference?

MR. THOMPSON: It can, yes. So, for example, if

it's standard coming out of the Ninth Circuit, which, of

course, is very commonly different. Right?

And so a Ninth Circuit case ends up in the Federal Circuit and they --

THE COURT: I'm only talking about this case, not in the abstract. We're not in California. I just meant in this case does it matter whether I apply Federal Circuit or Third Circuit law in your opinion?

MR. THOMPSON: It does if the Federal Circuit was applying Ninth Circuit procedural law.

1	THE COURT: Do you think Ninth Circuit
2	procedural law would be applicable in this case?
3	MR. THOMPSON: No. That's why it would make a
4	difference. So you asked me if I looked at a Federal
5	Circuit case, would that be different than if I looked at a
6	Third Circuit case. It wouldn't if the Federal Circuit were
7	applying Third Circuit procedural law, but if the Federal
8	Circuit were applying Ninth Circuit law, it could, and
9	indeed, the Ninth Circuit law, it is not the same.
10	THE COURT: Well, I agree with all of that. But
11	I am asking in this case, not the hypothetical out there
12	that potentially Federal Circuit law might differ from Third
13	Circuit law.
14	MR. THOMPSON: Oh.
15	THE COURT: I just meant as applied in this
16	case
17	MR. THOMPSON: Indeed, Your Honor.
18	THE COURT: In other words, if I go with what
19	Judge Lynn said is it General Protek? What is the name
20	of that case?
21	MR. LOWENSTEIN: General Protek.
22	THE COURT: General Protek. All right. And
23	they say Federal Circuit law applies.

APPX16

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes.

MR. THOMPSON: Yes.

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Circuit law applies to a preliminary injunction. But my point is, like, I just want to know, is it going to make a difference? MR. THOMPSON: Yes. My answer would be yes.

THE COURT: Although they also say Federal

THE COURT: All right.

MR. THOMPSON: And we actually cited it and I was just looking for the case cite to give you the citation.

The TQ -- it's in our brief and I'm doing this from memory. It's the TQ -- I will ask my colleague --

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Delta.

MR. THOMPSON: The TQ Delta case talks about the standard for anti-suit injunctions, particularly in the case which to a certain extent would not be applicable here. a foreign -- against a foreign action, the Third Circuit specifically rejected as too loose the Ninth Circuit standard.

THE COURT: I'm totally with you. I'm only asking whether the Third Circuit versus the Federal Circuit. That's all I care about.

MR. THOMPSON: Well, the Federal Circuit doesn't have its own law.

THE COURT: Well, it says it does. I mean, in General Protek, Judge Lynn explicitly says it does because he says we're going to apply Federal Circuit law as opposed

to Third Circuit law.

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MR. THOMPSON: Relative to substantive patent issues.

THE COURT: No, he didn't say that.

Here's what I'm going to do. You need to, throughout today, when you think it matters whether it's Federal Circuit or Third Circuit law, you need to tell me.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay.

THE COURT: Because they agree it doesn't make a difference. Well, maybe not now. Maybe we have a caveat.

MR. MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes, Your Honor. If I may, to clarify, because we are different parties. We have different circumstances even in the briefing, as we have noticed.

But I do want to address one thing and these are very great questions. It is on both. Whether you're looking at the anti-suit injunction or whether you're looking at the rate setting, the answer really relies on how the case arose.

For example, in the TCL case against us, the case that involved the rate setting action, that was appealed to the Federal Circuit. Also, in the Samsung/Huawei case, which involved Samsung obtaining from Judge Orrick, an anti-suit injunction against Huawei, a foreign company, for enforcing injunctions in China, that

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also was appealed to the Federal Circuit and it was heard by the Federal Circuit and the case settled before there was a decision.

On the other hand, in the Microsoft/Motorola case, where both issues arose, number one, the issue of an anti-suit injunction against — by Microsoft against Motorola in enjoining Motorola from enforcing the German injunction that it obtained against Microsoft, that went up to the Ninth Circuit. And also the rate setting action that was by Judge Robart up in Washington, Seattle, that also went up to the Ninth Circuit. And the reason for that was because the Microsoft case was based purely on a breach of contract.

Nonetheless, Your Honor, the two other cases, the Huawei Samsung case and the TCL case also involved breach of contract, but it was an auxiliary kind of question that came as a supplemental jurisdiction over the patent action as we have here while in the Microsoft/Motorola case, if you recall, what we call Microsoft/Motorola Number One. When the Ninth Circuit looked at it, the Court specifically addressed how there was diversity, the fact that these were two American companies and why there was jurisdiction there. That's totally independent of the patent action.

So this is where we -- where I think the law is, and obviously, it depends on the facts and how the case

arose.

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In this particular case, Philips filed two suits for each party, one suit with four patents that are also exactly the same in the ITC and another suit on six patents. All of these patents are allegedly, as far as Philips is concerned, considered standard essential patents and Philips has a lot more patents. And they filed infringement actions on those and they also filed an ITC, and an ITC, 337, actually, an infringement action, Your Honor, that goes to the Federal Circuit, and that's why we also have here the Federal Circuit talking about what happens when somebody wants to enjoin the ITC. And as we cited in our brief, the Federal Circuit told us what law applies, which is not looking at the ITC as a federal entity, a federal country, but actually we look at it as, you know, the four good old-fashioned traditional preliminary injunction factors.

The reason I said to Your Honor it does not matter, because in our specific case, whether you apply the Third Circuit TQ Delta case even though you shouldn't because the ITC is not a foreign company, based even on that analysis, given our specific facts, it wouldn't matter to us.

So I want to be very clear that I was not speaking behalf of Telit because they do have different situations. We do have -- we have actually followed the

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roadmap that Philips gave us and we ourselves mirror their claim of action, and we submitted an affidavit saying that all of the Telit entities will actually abide by this Court's rate determination for their entire portfolios including patents in the ITC here, foreign patents, U.S. patents not before you, and then because of that, whether, regardless of what happens, this case that you will decide here when you do the rate setting or the trier of fact when they do the rate setting will dispose of all suits now and later that would be brought because we would be licensed for the entirety of the portfolio and we would do that without a single judgment on infringement and validity on any of their patents.

That's our situation and we have actually put in an affidavit, sworn affidavit -- declaration, if I may -- it's not an affidavit, it's a declaration technically, saying that we would do that, and we would do it for ourselves and our customers that are using our products. My understanding is nobody else has done that. So I just wanted to clarify why I say in our case it doesn't make a difference.

I'm sorry if I want too long, but I wanted to make that distinction.

THE COURT: All right. Do you agree that the Federal Circuit law and the Third Circuit law are the same

1	with respect to the factors the Court must consider to
2	determine whether to impose a preliminary injunction?
3	MR. ZEINEDDIN: For the United States, yes. I
4	mean, there's the four factors likelihood of success on
5	the merits, irreparable harm, balance of harms in the
6	public.
7	THE COURT: So you think they're the same?
8	MR. ZEINEDDIN: That's my understanding, that in
9	the U.S
LO	THE COURT: I want to know.
L1	MR. ZEINEDDIN: And because the ITC
12	THE COURT: Well, hold up.
L3	MR. ZEINEDDIN: is not a foreign country.
L 4	THE COURT: Okay. You agree with the four
L5	factors for a preliminary injunction?
L 6	MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes.
L7	THE COURT: Do you agree?
L8	MR. LOWENSTEIN: Unfortunately, I have the three
L9	factors here and the Third Circuit has three factors. One
20	is comity.
21	THE COURT: Okay. Hold on. You're talking
22	about the anti-suit injunction factors?
23	MR. LOWENSTEIN: No, no. The Third Circuit
24	anti-suit injunction factors.

THE COURT: I'm only talking about the

23 1 preliminary injunction test. 2 MR. LOWENSTEIN: Okay. Sorry. 3 THE COURT: You think the Third Circuit and the 4 Federal Circuit differ? 5 MR. LOWENSTEIN: I don't believe so. 6 THE COURT: All right. Do you think they 7 differ? 8 MR. THOMPSON: No, Your Honor. They're the 9 same. 10 THE COURT: All right. Well, we'll at least 11 start with that. You all agree with that. Now, then we have to a decide do I apply those 12 1.3 four factors. Do you think I should apply those four 14 factors to make that determination here? 15 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: All right. Do you think I should 17 apply those four factors? 18 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Do you think I should apply those 20 four factors? 21 MR. LOWENSTEIN: Yes, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: You all agree. I mean, don't know that, in fact, Federal Circuit law and the Third Circuit law 23 24 line up with that on preliminary injunction factors, so 25 therefore I need to make sure I get clarity.

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I know for sure the Third Circuit treats the first two factors as "gateway factors" and that you have to establish each of those two factors if you're the movant for the Court to even consider the balancing of the third and fourth factors.

Do you agree that same gateway test applies in Federal Circuit law?

MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, I would say that it should apply under Federal Circuit law if the case is coming from the Third Circuit.

THE COURT: Do you agree?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Your Honor, I have the same understanding.

THE COURT: Do you agree, sir.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I have not studied the difference. I think what you are saying is likelihood of success, irreparable harm or gateway factors before you get into the balancing?

THE COURT: Correct.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ LOWENSTEIN: I would assume that they are the same.

THE COURT: Okay. Great. Right now I want to focus on the first gateway factor and I think you all agree for the movant to succeed, they have to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. All right. Good.

Now, which movant wants to go first and address that factor?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: May I, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Sure.

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: So, Your Honor, in the case of Thales --

THE COURT: You can come up if you want.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

In our case for Thales, Thales has asserted a number of counterclaims. There are two of them that without any need of discovery on their face, each one of them is sufficiently in its own right, separate and distinct from the other, is enough to satisfy that factor.

THE COURT: Well, let me just ask you this. What is the question before me? You have to establish likelihood of succeeding on the merits of what specific question?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Exactly. So on the one question is the likelihood of success on the merits that Philips has breached its brand commitment when Philips continued to pursue the ITC action after Thales has informed Philips that it will unequivocally guarantee that it will enter into a license for Philips' worldwide standard essential patent portfolio, including all the patents that are covered in the ITC, here and elsewhere, based on the neutral adjudication

as carried out by this Court, this very Court, the same 1 2 Court that Philips --3 THE COURT: You've got so many clauses. 4 MR. ZEINEDDIN: That's it. 5 THE COURT: I was --MR. ZEINEDDIN: If we enter into a license by 6 7 the terms set by this Court without any qualification. 8 THE COURT: All right. And the merits question 9 is based on a breach of the -- you called it FRAND 10 commitment. 11 MR. ZEINEDDIN: That is correct. 12 THE COURT: I want to make sure I understand. 1.3 And the FRAND commitment -- so are you alleging then you're 14 likely to succeed in establishing a breach of a contractual 15 obligation owed to you? Is that right? 16 MR. ZEINEDDIN: That is correct. 17 THE COURT: And it's owed to you by virtue of 18 your third-party beneficiary status to the ETIS contract? 19 Is that correct? 20 MR. ZEINEDDIN: ETSI. 21 THE COURT: ETSI contract? 22 MR. ZEINEDDIN: ETSI commitment.

THE COURT: All right. So it is a breach of contract claim that you need to establish likelihood of success on the merits.

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Do you agree on that?

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THE COURT: All right. And you say there's a

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second theory?

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: That is the one -- that is the one point that we could agree.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: That is correct, Your Honor.

And your second theory -- I'm going THE COURT: to come back and dwell on the first, but the second theory is?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Sure. So the second one is we have a counterclaim for declaratory judgment to set, for this Court to set the fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, FRAND terms, for the entirety of Philips' portfolio and for us to enter into a license based on that. And that is, as far we are concerned, once the Court pronounces that, we are happy -- and that's a very important point, because we need to know and we don't know now, we need to know what we're talking are the FRAND terms and conditions because we want an equal level playing field with everyone else because that's an essential part that we must have and they've claimed the same thing.

THE COURT: Well, so the breach of contract is, you're arguing that you have a contract with them. Right? Let's go back to prong one for a second.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes.

1	THE COURT: You brought a counterclaim for
2	breach of contract?
3	MR. ZEINEDDIN: So, Your Honor, we have the
4	defense and also a counterclaim for breach of contract.
5	THE COURT: I'm sorry. You have what?
6	MR. ZEINEDDIN: A defense and also a
7	counterclaim.
8	THE COURT: I know you have a defense. You have
9	to establish essentially a legal right to preclude them from
10	litigating in the ITC. Do you agree with that?
11	MR. ZEINEDDIN: I agree.
12	THE COURT: Okay. The source of the legal
13	right, number one, you're arguing, comes from the contract
14	that Philips entered with ETSI and to which the contract, to
15	which you are a third-party beneficiary. That's the basis
16	of the contract claim. Is that correct?
17	MR. ZEINEDDIN: That's correct.
18	THE COURT: And that contract was asserted, it
19	was actually asserted first by the plaintiffs, right,
20	because they're seeking a FRAND determination?
21	MR. ZEINEDDIN: Correct.
22	THE COURT: Right? And then you asserted as
23	well of that same contract as a defense, but you also
24	asserted as a counterclaim.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Correct.

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1	THE COURT: The counterclaim was filed after the
2	ITC proceeding was brought. Is that correct?
3	MR. ZEINEDDIN: That is correct.
4	THE COURT: Correct. Okay. And the defense was
5	actually asserted after the ITC proceeding was brought?
6	MR. ZEINEDDIN: Of course.
7	THE COURT: Because they brought the same, that
8	the claim and ITC were brought the same day?
	_
9	MR. ZEINEDDIN: Exactly.
10	THE COURT: Okay. All right. So your second
11	theory now, to expound on your second theory, you said
12	you brought a counterclaim. You're turning it or hinging
13	it on the assertion of a counterclaim. Is that correct?
14	MR. ZEINEDDIN: So they are both counterclaims.
15	The first one was a counterclaim for breach of contract.
16	This one is a counterclaim for declaratory judgment.
17	THE COURT: Okay.
18	MR. ZEINEDDIN: Asking this Court to set the
19	FRAND terms and conditions for the entirety of Philips'
20	standard essential patent portfolio and for us in turn to
21	license.
22	THE COURT: Right.
23	MR. ZEINEDDIN: And they have claimed the same
24	thing.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: So if Your Honor, if this Court proceeds with that, that's it, because regardless of what the result is, you will set those FRAND terms and we'll have a license and we would be free to practice, and we will know that that license is honest to God fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory based on all the evidence --

THE COURT: So what is your legal right under the second theory, to preclude the ITC -- not preclude the ITC, to preclude Philips from litigating the FRAND in the ITC? What's the legal right?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So the legal right is, because of their FRAND commitment because they gave up the right --

THE COURT: But now you're back to the first theory. How do the first theory and the second theory differ?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Well, the first theory and the second theory differ in the following way, if may. And thank you, Your Honor, for focusing me this way.

The truth is once this Court grants that license, we're free.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And as we have highlighted both in the statements that we made to the ITC and to Philips and also in this court, the concept of having somebody be ordered and obey to pay royalties, ongoing future royalties

and be enjoined at the same time is absolutely inconsistent and makes no sense.

They have said --

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THE COURT: Let's suppose I agree with you.

Okay?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes.

THE COURT: What's the legal right that you're asserting under the second theory to preclude Philips from pursuing its -- its, what it believes are its rights in the ITC? What's the legal right, the theory?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Actually, they would be abusing their patents in a way, right, because what they are doing, they're going to be collecting the money they are owed back with prejudgment, post-judgment interest.

THE COURT: Well, what's the legal theory?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: They are not entitled to it.

Why would they be entitled? It's an absolute defense actually, right, once somebody is licensed.

So the only difference here is the delay between when Your Honor, until this Court finds actual terms and we actually execute the license. Now, any money they're going to get is their money and if there is a delay in it between now until the judgment and the past, they'll get prejudgment interest and post-judgment interest and they'll be made whole. And they will get what they are entitled to, the

maximum that they are entitled to, right, because these are standard essential patents, these are patents -- practicing these patents is not even an act of infringement.

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THE COURT: So far everything you said it strikes me boils down to either you're resorting back to the first theory, which is that they are contractually precluded from pursuing the ITC proceeding, or just a policy that you think they shouldn't be allowed to pursue these two tracks.

I thought you might say the second theory was going to be that it's not a legal right you have, it's that because the case is before me, I should be able to act to protect this Court's jurisdiction and so -- and this is why I attribute on your colleagues' invocation of the divestiture of jurisdiction.

The second theory as I kind of see it is the anti-suit injunction theory, and as I understand the position of the movant, it's that -- I don't think it's explicitly stated in the briefs this way, but I think it's where you're getting at, what you are getting at, is that I should view this the way courts have viewed foreign proceedings in the anti-suit injunction context and I should view the ongoing ITC proceeding as essentially undermining the jurisdiction of this Court in divesting me of my powers to decide this case, and that public equity suggests that I

1 have authority under my anti-suit injunction power.

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: Absolutely without -- there's not a single word that you said that we disagree with.

THE COURT: All right. So is that your second theory?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes. And also because you have to exercise that discretion, the equitable consideration, the fact that we will have a license, they'll be made whole in all of the other equitable considerations, including the ITC would divest --

THE COURT: When you go back to you will be made whole, see, that's where I lose you. Okay?

So I get you have a legal right to be made whole through your contract, so you can assert that legal right.

What's the other legal right that you are asserting to say I ought to consider that you'll be made whole?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Right.

THE COURT: How does it differ from the first theory?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So it does go back to exactly what you were saying, Your Honor, which you eloquently stated. Ultimately, for you while you're deciding these licensing terms, for us to be enjoined and be taken off the market and effectively like the other cases, that's why -- that's why those courts enjoined the injunction. That's

1	what we're asking for here, for you to stop us to be
2	excluded from the market. It frustrates your ability to
3	actually adjudicate the claims that are brought before you.
4	THE COURT: Okay. I get that second theory.
5	All right. So then when you start talking about make
6	yourself whole, you'll agree at the end of the day what that
7	boils down to is your contractual right as a third-party
8	beneficiary to the ETSI contract?
9	MR. ZEINEDDIN: That first one, yes.
10	THE COURT: All right. I think I understand
11	your theory now.
12	MR. ZEINEDDIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
13	THE COURT: I want to make sure Telit
14	MR. LOWENSTEIN: We' Telit. He's Thales.
15	THE COURT: I'm sorry. You're?
16	MR. LOWENSTEIN: Telit. Telit. Telit and he's
17	Thales.
18	THE COURT: Oh, okay. So the "H" is silent?
19	MR. LOWENSTEIN: Yes.
20	THE COURT: Not silent, but
21	MR. LOWENSTEIN: That's the way I pronounced it.
22	THE COURT: Okay. Sorry. So Telit and Thales.
23	You're going to make this confusing.
24	MR. LOWENSTEIN: They're a French company. I

think the "H" is silent.

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THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: You originally asked about success on the merits. In listening to this discussion, you see that these factors sort of get merged together. I mean --

THE COURT: No, I don't think they get merged together actually.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: All right.

THE COURT: So I want to hear what you think.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: We raised two issues for success on the merits, and it depends what you call --

THE COURT: So what are your two issues?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: If the merits are should you

THE COURT: No. What do you think the merits

MR. LOWENSTEIN: You should decide. The merits are should you decide the FRAND license. They say you should and we say you should, so to the extent that's the merits of this dispute, we're in agreement, that this is an issue for you to decide.

THE COURT: All right. And so the first prong is the likelihood of success on the merits.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Correct.

THE COURT: And the question I have is: The

merits of what? All right?

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: Okay.

THE COURT: So what's your answer to that?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: So the answer is we have a breach of contract claim, too. We have not answered yet, but we submitted a declaration from Professor Stoffle-Munck, who said under French law you can't do what they have done.

THE COURT: All right. So your first theory, and I get -- this makes sense to me.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Okay.

THE COURT: Your first theory is to win prong one of the preliminary injunction test, you have to establish a likelihood of success of proving that Philips breached the ETSI contract?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Correct.

THE COURT: All right. Is there a second theory?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, I was trying to articulate it. Maybe I didn't do a good job.

Maybe you don't agree with it, but I think -- it depends what you talk about as the merits. If the breach of contract is the merits, we discussed that, but there's also sort of an underlying issue about whether or not this Court should decide the FRAND rate, and if that's the merits of this dispute, preliminary injunction or not, we are all in

agreement, everyone in this court thinks you should decide the FRAND rate. So that's it. You know, I think those are two prongs on the success on the merits.

So unless you have any other questions -
THE COURT: Do you have any theory besides
breach of contract?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, we --

THE COURT: Hold on.

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: Sorry.

THE COURT: Let me just finish the question.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Sure.

THE COURT: Do you have any theory other than a breach of contract theory that you want to put forward to establish a right, a legal right that you have, your client had, to preclude Philips from litigating in the ITC?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: We have not answered yet, but when we answer --

THE COURT: No. For the purpose of this motion?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Right now, no, we have not.

THE COURT: So the only legal right that you are asserting to preclude Philips from litigating in the ITC is based on the ETSI contract. Is that correct?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I think that is correct.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: But I would like to draw a

distinction between a legal right and equitable right. We think, again, this is bound together with the Court's equitable power to enjoin, and so I don't know, you know, where we cut -- draw the line on that.

THE COURT: So I think what I'm going to do is,
I mean, and I think I'm actually somewhat on the same page.
I'm in the same chapter you are.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Okay.

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THE COURT: But I don't like the way you articulate it.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Okay.

THE COURT: And here's how I'm going to articulate it. I think that you've conflated anti-suit injunction with preliminary injunction and I think you've conflated it I think because frankly under the law, it is sketchy.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: It's confusing.

THE COURT: So the way I look at it is there are really two issues before me. So the first issue is whether I ought to grant a preliminary injunction and that theory boils down to a determination in the first instance of whether or not Philips is precluded under its ETSI contractual obligations from proceeding in the ITC, and so that, to determine whether a preliminary injunction should issue or not, the first question I have to ask is whether or

not it's precluded by the ETSI contract before moving forward in the ITC.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Could I put a finer point on it?

THE COURT: You can.

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: I'm afraid that you're sort of going in their direction, which is that there's a per se rule about injunctions from the ETSI contract and we're not saying that there's a per se rule. We are not saying that the ETSI contract, if you read it, says no injunction ever. We're saying under our facts here, where in the Telit case, we were negotiating up until two weeks before they sued us.

THE COURT: But here's the thing. I don't even get there. That's my point. All of that, you still have to have a legal right.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I agree.

any context, you can't say, you know what, we don't like the way that party is treating us. They are just not being very nice to us. We think they should. Now we're in front of the Court and we want to preclude a party from going to an agency of the United States government to petition its -- you know, you've got to have a legal right.

Now, if you don't have a legal right, then

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you've got to have, there's another -- and if you want to call it equitable basis, that's fine. And I think it's a stretch probably, but we'll discuss it today, that courts have decided that they'll issue an anti-suit injunction if it protects some important public policy, and so far the only public policy I've seen where a Court is willing to do it in that context, is in order to be sure that the Court isn't divested effectively of some jurisdiction. All right?

So now if you want to articulate something else, I will hear you, but when you get to that, well, the particular facts of our case, you know, they were negotiating this contract and then they, you know -- all of that, unless it goes from my powers or unless it goes to a legal right that you have, you're going to have to tell me authority that exists to show that.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I mean, I'm going to fall back on the fairness argument. They've asked you for an anti-suit injunction against us and we're just saying we're entitled to one as well and here's why. Here are the factors that we've outlined.

THE COURT: Under what legal theory?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Under the Court's equitable
powers to --

THE COURT: Do you know of any case where a Court held that because the plaintiff asked for an anti-suit

41 1 injunction, that meant that the defendant was entitled to an 2 anti-suit injunction? 3 MR. LOWENSTEIN: No, but what I do know is they 4 can't say that they are asking you to cross some 5 constitutional threshold because --6 THE COURT: Well, why is that relevant? 7 don't you have to have a legal right to win? 8 MR. LOWENSTEIN: Sure. 9 THE COURT: What is it? 10 MR. LOWENSTEIN: I think we've articulated it, 11 that there's a breach of the agreement. 12 THE COURT: I'm with you on that. 13 MR. LOWENSTEIN: Okay. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. LOWENSTEIN: All right. THE COURT: So we're back to breach of contract. 16 17 MR. LOWENSTEIN: So then maybe I should just 18 stop talking. 19 THE COURT: Okay. We'd better figure out 20 whether there has been a breach of contract. 21 MR. LOWENSTEIN: All right. 22 THE COURT: All right. So again then I'm going 23 to finish where I started because you wanted to put a finer 24 point on it. I'm not sure what the finer point is. 25 What I am sure about right now is that I've got

a preliminary injunction in front of me and for the preliminary injunction purposes, for the movants to prevail, they've got to establish a likelihood of success that they would succeed. I'm going to strike all of that. It was just a mess.

For the purpose of the preliminary injunction, step one, the movants have to establish a likelihood of success in establishing that Philips breached it's ETSI obligations by filing the ITC proceeding. All right.

Then we get -- there is still a second argument being made as far as I can tell and I'm willing to entertain it today, which is that I should consider imposing an anti-suit injunction, because allowing the ITC proceeding to proceed effectively divests this Court of jurisdiction to determine the FRAND dispute that was put in front of me both by the claims that were filed by the plaintiff and by the defenses and the counterclaims asserted by the defendants.

All right. So that's how I'm going to address the argument.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Sure.

THE COURT: And I don't think anybody on the movant's side has established another basis that would justify in any way an injunction, and so to the extent there is any more, I'm just -- I've given you, I think, both a full opportunity to articulate what the theory would be.

You have not done it to my satisfaction. I'm not the brightest candle. I'm sure you might be able to persuade some other appellate judge that you have. I have not seen it and I'm going to deny any request for an injunction based on any theory under other than the two theories I've articulated.

All right. So now let's turn first to the breach of contract claim. All right?

Is it disputed -- let me hear briefly from the plaintiff. Do you dispute that the movants are third-party beneficiaries to the ETSI contract?

MR. THOMPSON: No.

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THE COURT: Okay. So then would you agree that they are entitled to allege here that Philips has breached the ETSI contract?

MR. THOMPSON: As long as we're talking about the same contract, because I think they have a vastly different view.

THE COURT: We'll get to all of that. The ETSI contract?

MR. THOMPSON: Right.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Do you agree that French law governs the ETSI contract?

APPX43

MR. THOMPSON: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. So let me go back now to

44 1 Who is going to speak to the breach of contract movants. 2 claim? You are? 3 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: All right. What law governs? 5 MR. ZEINEDDIN: So the fact that there is a contract is under French law, that the ETSI commitment is 6 7 played in France. ETSI is in France and it's subject to 8 French law. 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MR. ZEINEDDIN: And French law says the 11 contract, they call it contract for the benefit of -- it's a 12 promise for a third party. 1.3 THE COURT: I don't know that you have a dispute 14 about that. You agree French law governs, so whether it's a 15 contracts, it's governed by French law as well? MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes. 16 17 THE COURT: Okay. We're good there. 18 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes. 19 THE COURT: How under French law, can you 20 explain to me how you're going to establish a breach of 21 contract? 22 MR. ZEINEDDIN: So I think there's also no 23 dispute that French law says that this contract should be --24 should be governed by good-faith negotiation. 25 THE COURT: Okay. Let's hear from them. Do you

45 believe -- do you agree that there's an implied covenant of 1 2 good faith in every contract that is entered under French 3 law? 4 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, in an application where the 5 contract says that you will be willing to be prepared to 6 offer a FRAND license. 7 THE COURT: We'll get to the merits. 8 MR. THOMPSON: I just --9 THE COURT: I want to talk about the legal 10 principles first. You agree then French law and I think 11 it's a civil statute. Right? 12 MR. THOMPSON: Right. 1.3 THE COURT: Provides that just like Delaware 14 law, there's an implied covenant and good faith inherent in 15 every contract? 16 MR. THOMPSON: To be a willing licensor, yes. 17 THE COURT: I mean, I don't think the civil 18 statute says anything about licensor, does it? 19 MR. THOMPSON: Well, no. I mean in the context 20 of this particular situation. 21 THE COURT: Yes. We'll get to context. Let's 22 establish what we can agree on. 23 MR. THOMPSON: Okay. 24 Then we'll get to the application. THE COURT: 25 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Do you have any French cases? There was very little discussion. I mean, boy, you gave me long affidavits, both of you did, but in the briefing, maybe there's a page-and-a-half long of discussion of French law. So, but that's what I ought to apply. Right?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Well, so, Your Honor, what we believe and what we've said also is French law says this is a contract and it should be governed by good faith, covenant of good faith and fair dealing in carrying it out.

THE COURT: Do you have a French case? Do you have a holding of a French Court that says that ETSI is a contract?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: What I do have are American cases saying this is it and looking at good faith under U.S. law and French law is the same, citing a lot of French experts, too. And the people did not disagree on that.

There is not -- there is no French case that I know of that does that.

THE COURT: See, here's the problem that I feel like. You asked me to decide a question of French law.

Your expert cites what I think is undisputed is apparently a lower court or some inferior court. Right? Tribunal. Is that right?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So, Your Honor, we're asking for Thales. We did not put in --

47 THE COURT: You didn't have a French case cited. 1 2 MR. ZEINEDDIN: So basically what we said is 3 U.S. courts looking at the ETSI --4 THE COURT: We'll go back to that. Did you cite 5 any French case law? MR. ZEINEDDIN: No. 6 7 THE COURT: All right. I'm confusing you 8 with -- and I mixed it up. Telit or Thales? 9 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Thales, spelled --10 THE COURT: All right. And you're the "A" and 11 you're the "E." Okay. 12 So you are the one who cited the French Court. 13 Why don't just finish with --14 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: I'm sorry. What's your name, sir? 16 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Paul Zeineddin. 17 THE COURT: Zeineddin? 18 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Mr. Zeineddin, so do you cite -- I 20 just need to be clear then. You don't even cite a French 21 case for me to determine whether French law applies? 22 MR. ZEINEDDIN: We cite U.S. cases saying we're 23 applying the ETSI commitment, which is governed by French 24 law. We're looking at good faith, the faith, the same as in 25 France.

THE COURT: All right. Show me what those cases a say.

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: We cited a number of cases. So, Your Honor, on page 9 of our opening brief --

THE COURT: I'm looking at it.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: ETSI, that's E-T-S-I, that's the very same body we're talking about, the same kind of patents, which is governed by French law, and we have the TCL case versus Ericsson.

The Federal Circuit, by the way, Your Honor, heard that case and the only reversal they had is the issue that should have been decided by the jury as opposed to the judge himself. But they had no issue in looking at the fact that when we're looking at good faith, it was interpreted based on what Americans understood to be good faith to be, men American judges understood good faith to be.

The same thing was in HTC versus Ericsson and that's in Texas. The same thing in Apple versus Motorola, and that was in Wisconsin. That's also a case that Philips relies on.

And so, Your Honor, courts have heard -- I mean, we've heard of the smartphone wars. The smartphone wars are the same kind of patents. So we've seen those wars all over. We've seen them between Apple and Samsung in the ITC where the ITC actually granted an exclusion order in 2013

and then the U.S. trade representative came back and said we should not do that. That was based on French law, this very ETSI commitment, and it was basically adjudicated on what we Americans understand good faith to be, because all experts have always agreed that what French believed good faith is pretty much the same here. That was also the same issue on the cases that came up here. Specifically, the InterDigital cases, the series of them that Judge Andrews had heard between ZTE and Huawei.

All of those cases were based off standard essential patents from ETSI. Everything had to do with the ETSI commitment, and all the experts agreed, French law governs, and French law says good faith should apply, and that good faith is the same.

Your Honor does not need to go to French decisions to figure out what good faith in France is for these facts.

part ways with you. Okay. So I don't debate that any of the cases, or at least some of the cases you cited on page 9 of your brief say that ETSI is a contract or has a contract and it's interpreted under French law and that certain principles of interpreting contract under French law apply. I don't think Philips disputes that. Do you?

MR. THOMPSON: No, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Right. Now, do any of those cases say that under French law, a member of ETSI cannot seek an injunction?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So in these particular cases, in the TCL Ericsson case, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Okay. I've got it.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: TCL -- Ericsson had sued TCL in a multitude of jurisdictions, all foreign. Right?

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And in that particular case,
TCL moved to preclude Ericsson, and that Judge Selna, from
pursuing those cases in the foreign jurisdictions where each
single one of those cases, there were injunctions that were
being sought by Ericsson to exclude TCL the from market, and
in one place, I believe, I don't have it off the top of my
head, they did get a preliminary injunction doing so, and
then ultimately, the judge basically said that those cases
cannot go forward and that the FRAND determination in
California will proceed.

The other case, Your Honor, that --

THE COURT: I've got TCL in front of me.

Can you show me anywhere in TCL where the Court ruled that the ETSI contract precluded a member from seeking an injunction?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So, Your Honor, that was a

predicate.

THE COURT: Well, then that's part of the problem. Assuming, even assuming you're right, and that is an assumption, I'm not sure it is, but how is that helpful here then? I mean, if parties agreed to what you're trying to achieve here in another case, I don't think it's very helpful to me. I mean, you cited these cases to establish, as I understand it, that French law dictates the result you want here.

It was not disputed. Nobody had disputed --

Can you show me? I've got the case in front of me. Can you show me where Judge Selna opined that French law, that under French law, ETSI's contract precludes a member from seeking an injunction?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So, Your Honor, that was not disputed and I cannot show you that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And the same was, by the way, between Samsung and Ericsson. Nobody had disputed that.

THE COURT: Here's what I need you to do then.

I just want to make sure the record is clear.

You are not able to show me either a French case or a United States Court decision interpreting French law that states that a member of ETSI is precluded from seeking an injunction. Is that right?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: May I inquire one thing, Your

Honor?

note.

THE COURT: Yes. Your colleague just gave you a

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes. Is the issue, Your Honor, that you're having is that you want a French decision saying under the French law interpretation of good faith, they have heard a case relating to somebody who was seeking an injunction and they are saying French law prohibits that for ETSI? Is that what you are looking for?

THE COURT: I wouldn't say it's limited to the implied covenant of good faith. What I'm looking for, and I think it's your burden is whether a French Court has ruled that a member of ETSI situated the way Philips is is barred from seeking an injunction akin to what it's seeking in the ITC.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: What we do have is not that. What we do have is saying that French law requires good faith and so does the U.S. law and they both apply in the same way.

THE COURT: So that's what you have?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: That's what we have.

THE COURT: All right. So then under your theory what you have to show is that there's a breach of the implied covenant of good faith here under basically U.S. law. Is that right?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Which would be the same,

correct.

THE COURT: Well --

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: May I say --

instance, I know enough about Delaware contract law that if the issue that is in dispute is not addressed expressly in a contract, it would be the burden of the movant to show that had both parties negotiated the issue, the disputed issue, they would have agreed to what your interpretation of the contract is. That's pretty clear under Delaware law.

So that means you're going to have to show me if you are right that Philips would have agreed when it negotiated, or when it signed onto the ETSI that it would be precluded from seeking an injunction. So do you agree that's what you have to prove?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And, yes, absolutely.

THE COURT: You do believe it?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes. That's the point.

THE COURT: Okay. So what's your evidence that Philips agreed or would have agreed that it was barred from seeking an injunction in the ITC?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: I think Philips even today will say they will not and should not pursue an injunction in the ITC or anywhere against --

THE COURT: They filed an injunction --

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: Against a willing licensee.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. What?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Against a willing licensee, a licensee who is willing to take --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: -- a license on the entirety of their portfolio.

THE COURT: Right. Well, first of all, do you agree with that?

MR. THOMPSON: It's hard to even address it because Philips made a FRAND offer and they rejected it.

THE COURT: Right. It really boils down to you don't think they're willing, they think you're not willing.

Right? It's a factual issue in a way.

MR. THOMPSON: Right.

THE COURT: It's like they have different opinions.

MR. THOMPSON: Was there a breach? Did Philips not perform and make a FRAND offer available, and that's why we cited the Court the case that says that it was a FRAND offer.

THE COURT: Which is why maybe at the end of the day -- I mean, the way you guys are positioned right now in this room in the last 30 seconds, it sounds to me that for

the movant to win, I have to what? Discount, not believe Philips' assertion that you're not a willing licensee? Is that really what it boils down to?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So this is why I mentioned on the breach part. There is another breach that we're not basing this motion on and that is the breach that you have been talking about and that's the breach that they've talked about all along.

There are two different types of breach of contracts, French contract that we brought. One goes to the issue that you're talking about and one would require looking at their offer and looking at our offer and looking at evidence and figuring out were we objectively, subjectively justified in doing that -- you know, all of this. That would actually be part and parcel of the FRAND rate setting. And, as a matter of fact, you know, of course, you're almost there, you're almost there at setting the rate when you figure out if somebody breached because you've got to figure out what's FRAND and what's not FRAND to see if those offers are back and forth.

But there is a completely different question where courts all over, including in the U.K., Your Honor, there have not been cases brought, I don't know why, in France to talk about this. You would think they would all go there.

Well, everybody has said that when somebody is going to take a license, you don't enjoin them. It happened in the Ninth Circuit. It happened in the U.K.

THE COURT: When you say everybody had said -MR. ZEINEDDIN: But here's the question. The
one question here, it is not a fixed point in time where
everything stops once they filed their ITC complaint. They
filed their ITC complaint after a year-and-a-half of saying
nothing to us, and then as soon as they filed it, they filed
on December 17th, Your Honor.

On December 28th, a European company in France, we were able to get back to them on December 28th, a letter from Thales on Thales letterhead saying, we want to do this, let's go.

THE COURT: So --

MR. ZEINEDDIN: But here's the question. Then we became -- regardless of what happened before, Your Honor, we take issue that we've ever been unwilling. We've always been willing and we will prove that. And we did not come to you saying, let's look at all of these, take our side of the story and do this. We're saying we're going to do that.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: But aside from that --

THE COURT: But you are saying that you are going to do it like when you get to it and they are saying

57 1 we need to move this along, so they're going to the ITC. 2 MR. ZEINEDDIN: And we're saying let's move it 3 along. 4 THE COURT: Well, they are saying you've taken 5 forever. MR. ZEINEDDIN: 6 7 They are saying they offered you a THE COURT: 8 FRAND deal and you rejected it. So now we're in the merits 9 of the whole case. 10 MR. ZEINEDDIN: No. There's one more thing. 11 soon as we said we were going to do it, we became willing 12 and they could not do that again. They could not pursue the 1.3 ITC, and who said that? Many, many places have said that. 14 Microsoft/Motorola --15 THE COURT: Wait. So many, many. Let's go through the cases that have said that. Actually, no, I 16 17 don't want to do that. 18 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Okay. 19 THE COURT: You've got to actually persuade me 20 of cases that have said that under French law, that's what would happen. 21

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: Okay.

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THE COURT: All right.

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to a case. This is the Motorola/Apple European Commission.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So, Your Honor, I will take you

58 1 How about that? 2 THE COURT: Is it French law? 3 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Well, it's European law. 4 THE COURT: Okay. But is it French law? 5 MR. ZEINEDDIN: It's looking -- yes, it did look 6 at French law, because the French commitment, that's 7 regarding --8 THE COURT: Didn't it look at German law, too? 9 MR. ZEINEDDIN: No, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: No? 11 MR. ZEINEDDIN: The contract is the same, the 12 ETSI contract. That's the bedrock. 1.3 THE COURT: Show me in this decision where they 14 talk about French law. 15 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Well, about French law? THE COURT: Yes. 16 17 MR. ZEINEDDIN: I don't think they will 18 dispute --19 THE COURT: You go look for French law. 20 MR. ZEINEDDIN: But I don't think they will 21 dispute that the commitment in the Apple/Motorola case, those are cellular patents, is the ETSI commitment. 22 23 Motorola's ETSI commitment. 24 THE COURT: But I'm only interested whether 25 under French law they are precluded from going to the ITC.

1 That's all I care about. That's the issue before me.

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: Okay. So I'm trying to at least say on the record that basically, what's going on is that you had the European Commission looking at the ETSI commitment, which is subject to French law on the contract, and looked at good faith, the back and forth, what happened between Apple and Motorola.

And there's one more case that I have for you, which is --

THE COURT: So let me ask you this: That case, Apple/Motorola, was taking place, it was a European Commission. So where was the dispute filed, where was it adjudicated?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Where was the dispute filed between Apple and Motorola?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: All over the place.

THE COURT: Well, but the one that the Commission ruled upon.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: That was a Commission investigation, like the DOJ.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. What?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Like the Department of Justice.

It was the European Commission. And they found that Apple,
they found with Apple --

THE COURT: All right. So let me ask you this:

Did they express an opinion on whether -- well, had either

party -- I don't know which party was the plaintiff in that

case in that dispute. Who was the patentholder in that

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Motorola.

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dispute?

THE COURT: Okay. Had Motorola filed a proceeding in the ITC at that point?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: You know, I believe they may have.

THE COURT: And did the European Commission -
MR. ZEINEDDIN: Please, because I don't remember

off the top of my head.

But, so, Your Honor, in that case, and I misplaced where I have it, but in that particular case, what was examined was Apple's multiple stances. And this is something Philips keeps saying that once you become a willing licensee -- if you have been an unwilling licensee, which we take issue with, we never were, that's it, you forfeited, and now you ought to be punished.

And in that particular case, in that ITC -- in that European Commission, which is looking under French law, treated in Europe, they looked at the first Apple offer and said, no, you're unwilling. Second time? No, you're unwilling. Third time, no, you're unwilling. And then

finally, Apple became willing. They said to Motorola, you can't do it anymore, you can't enjoin it. Once you've done that, you can't enjoin them.

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So we have here a continuum of actions.

Assuming arguendo that they could have filed that ITC case, the day we told them we're done, we'll do whatever needs to be done and you'll get everything you're entitled to, they could not maintain it. That in itself is a breach. That in itself is a breach that does not require Your Honor to start looking at the back and forth offers because, as you said -- and if I may, because this is very crucial here.

We are dealing -- the reason we had these big smart wars, smartphone wars, is because this ETSI commitment, you have a lot of patent holders and you have a lot of bilateral secret licenses.

So when you have an implementer -- this is the plug, Your Honor. Everybody has to use it to put into that outlet. These are things that are designed to be processed by everybody, not to wait for people, for everybody to take the license. And there is no place that you can go, one or two places that you can go to take a license to everybody, and there are hundreds, if not over a thousand patent holders. Each one of them have their own opinion of how big their slice of the pie is.

So what happens here, the standard was put into

place and the FRAND policy was put into place -- and I'm sorry if I'm speaking too fast, forgive me.

What happened is, there is a balance. We want the widespread use of this standard, but we also want people to innovate and contribute their technology, which was chosen over other technology to get their fair, reasonable, nondiscriminatory royalty, and the non-discriminatory reasonable and the fair and reasonable is not only for them to get their money, it's for everybody to be on an equal level playing field because, Your Honor, this is a cost component for every implementer, and everybody should be on an equal playing field because those people that have the technology, they shouldn't just get in the backroom, design what the technology is going to be and then pull the strings dictating who is going --

THE COURT: Much of what you say sounds very reasonable, but when you say equal playing field, is there anything in ETSI that says that they have to be equal?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Level playing field. So I did not mean equal as in hundred percent equal. The idea is non-discriminatory. Right?

THE COURT: Nondiscriminatory.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: That's what the language says.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So what we have here is the idea

that whenever -- and we have said that in the United States and Europe has said that, that you don't get to exclude people.

What you're entitled to is this fair, reasonable, nondiscriminatory --

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THE COURT: What does a member do, a patentee do when it has got a manufacturer that says even in a declaration that it's willing, but it rejects every reasonable offer of a license made by the member?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Well, and the key here is the reasonable offer. Right?

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Right, Your Honor. That's what the case, for example, the cases that they -- they keep citing the Apple/Motorola here in the U.S. It talks about, you know, the fact that somebody can keep rejecting a super FRAND offer, a non-reasonable --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Offer.

So, but the key here is, is that --

THE COURT: And so and precisely because of that, why shouldn't a member who is facing that type of -- and I'm not suggesting it's your client, but let's suppose you had a really, really dishonest manufacturer that kept on, you know, teasing the member with promises of eagerness

to get involved in negotiations and the whole time was
really stonewalling, was actually being very disingenuous,
had no intention of entering a license.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Right.

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THE COURT: And years pass and they continue to infringe and profit from the intellectual property that the member has. So doesn't the member have a right at that point to seek an injunction?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So under those circumstances, it has been said, yes, absolutely.

THE COURT: Okay. So how am I to determine who is really willing here? Right? I've got to dive into the facts and that could take a lot of time, and that's an example of why, you know, protracted litigation can really prevent the member from ever benefit benefiting from its intellectual property unless it has a right to an injunction.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So, Your Honor, great question, and that's exactly what happened in Realtek, for example.

They waited until they had discovery and summary judgment to turn down.

But in that case they have what we have, and, again, the real answer to that lies in what I've just told you about the Microsoft/Motorola and the Commission. And I'm going to tell you one more thing that's even better, and

that is the Supreme Court of Europe, the European court of justice, specifically heard the interest between two companies called Huawei and ZTE.

Your Honor, none of this is here because we're basically relying on U.S. law, but if you want to talk about it, we're happy to talk about it.

It governs everything in Europe. It's the Supreme Court of Europe that basically said -- and this is here where the key is. Those are the issues of delay. You're exactly touching on the same issues, which really tells you it's all the same question, you can look at U.S. or there.

The key --

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THE COURT: Sorry to interrupt, but I'm looking at it as this is a really important policy decision to be made by somebody. Right? Maybe Congress. And one thing I know for sure is that Congress understood that there would be parallel ITC and district court proceedings. Right? And you agree with that, don't you?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: That's part of the statute, correct.

THE COURT: I mean, so if I want to know what Congress is thinking, I know that for sure, and I know that because, what is it, 1659, right, of Title 28, that Congress has provided explicitly for a mechanism for a stay

to be issued if it is sought within a certain amount of time
of the filing of either the ITC or the district court.

3 Right?

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So if Congress actually contemplates parallel proceedings and in one proceeding you can only get an injunction and you can't get a FRAND license.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: That's right.

THE COURT: Why should I be preventing somebody from affording themselves of that congressionally provided right?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Your Honor, you're asking very good questions. On page 17 of Philips' reply they listed all of these ITC cases talking about this. What they don't talk about is this. This is -- which, by the way, this is not something extra.

If you take a look at the first case they cite, which is the Samsung/Apple case in the ITC, where they say the ITC says it's okay to give exclusion orders on standard essential patents. Well, that wasn't the end of the story, the U.S.C.R.

The U.S.C.R. -- and this is, by the way, anybody who is looking for it on Westlaw --

THE COURT: You've got some paper in your hands.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes. If I may approach.

This is the U.S.C.R. letter to the ITC, and I

67 have it both in the letter format that it was sent as well 1 2 as -- well, it's also on Westlaw. If I may? 3 THE COURT: Yes, please. Do you have two copies 4 by any chance so I can give one to my clerk? 5 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Of course. Forgive me. And --6 THE COURT: Wait. Are these the same thing? 7 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes. And I just want to show 8 you this is not --9 You gave me two copies. THE COURT: 10 MR. ZEINEDDIN: One is a Westlaw. When you look 11 at that case, it just says subsequent history, that's what 12 This basically says to the ITC, you can't enforce, 13 you can't issue the whole commission. You can't issue an 14 exclusion order against a willing licensee. 15 Now, you know, I would have dropped a footnote 16 on page 17. And then every case after that --17 THE COURT: Hold on. 18 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes, Your Honor. 19 This is not in the brief, but this THE COURT: 20 is responding to their footnote on page 17. Is that your 21 point? 22 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Well, so, if you take a look at 23 Philips' opposition on page 17.

I'm looking at the briefing in which case?

THE COURT: All right. Hold up. All right.

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1 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What is the number of the case?

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: It's on page 17.

THE COURT: No, no. You can tell, right, you've given me two feet of paper. I need a little bit more precision. What number are we dealing with?

MR. KEELEY: 1713, Your Honor.

THE COURT: 1713. Which brief?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So this is Philips' opposition.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. On page 17.

Thank you.

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: On page 17.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So this is where they start talking about that and what you basically were referring to, the ITC has repeatedly recognized that exclusion orders can be granted for except.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Your Honor, we do have the statute which talks about patents in general, and up until that point, in the first case, the Apple, Apple/Samsung case, right?

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: The exclusion order issued. And then you have U.S.C.R. coming back and saying, no, not

69 1 against the willing licensee. 2 THE COURT: Was this in your reply brief? I 3 don't remember it. Was this letter in your reply brief? 4 MR. ZEINEDDIN: This letter, Your Honor, is not 5 in our reply brief. That's why I also -- I also gave the This is the subsequent history of the case they 6 Westlaw. 7 cited. 8 THE COURT: Okay. Which case is it the 9 subsequent history of? MR. ZEINEDDIN: It's the first one which, you 10 11 know, and ITC --12 THE COURT: It says in the manner of certain 13 electronic devices. 14 MR. ZEINEDDIN: 337. THE COURT: 15 That helps me out. Thank you. 16 MR. LOWENSTEIN: Your Honor, that letter is part 17 of our compendium in the reply brief and I think it's 18 Exhibit B. It's a U.S. Trade Representative letter, 19 August 3, 2013. 20 THE COURT: Okay. So it's in your brief? 21 MR. LOWENSTEIN: It's our compendium, correct. 22 THE COURT: Did you discuss it in the reply 23 brief? 24 MR. LOWENSTEIN: I believe we discussed it in 25 part --

THE COURT: So you did. I'm trying to digest all of these papers in a preliminary injunction. Help me out. It's in there. I will look for it.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Give me a second here.

THE COURT: This is a case where is the Obama administration came in and reversed the ITC.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And then also established a procedure from then on that you don't grant exclusion orders against willing licensees.

THE COURT: Yes. Okay.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And that they have to take evidence and then decide at the very end.

THE COURT: Right. Okay. So this is the opinion of an executive branch office, but it doesn't create a legal right and that is where I go back to. I mean, I appreciate you bringing up this, but we got a little bit on a tangent, because my point was just that you make very, very compelling policy arguments, but I'm a Court, and the issue before me is whether you have an entitlement, a legal entitlement to preclude Philips from seeking a remedy that Congress has expressly provided and that Congress has

impliedly but necessarily said by virtue of, I know this from 1659, that we can have parallel proceedings.

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So you're asking me to, you know, enjoin them.

So I go back to the right. I might fully agree with you as a policy matter, and if I were writing the law, I might say we shouldn't allow this to happen, but that's not what the standard is before me.

Now, when we get to the anti-suit injunction, a different issue. We'll talk about that. Are you effectively divesting me from my powers if I do that? I'm only on the preliminary injunction and whether you have a likelihood of success on the merits. I mean, all this letter tells me is if somebody went before the ITC again and they got an injunction order, depending on who is president, the executive branch might get involved and say, we're going to trump that. And, incidentally, under the law, right, the president is allowed to do that. Right? I mean, the statute explicitly provides, does it not, for the president to be able to come in and reverse the ITC? Isn't that right?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: That's right.

THE COURT: So that could happen here. Right?

You could go to the president and if I ruled against you and you lose in the ITC, you can go to the president and say, hey, overturn the ITC, so you have that remedy available to

you.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Except that the ITC then went and made the rules, their rules and modified it and it said every single time.

THE COURT: Well, then you're going to win in the ITC. All the more reason I shouldn't get involved.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Now we're going to prong two, the irreparable harm until then, and that's what specifically we complain of, the irreparable harm until then, and these are the affidavits that we filed.

We talk about the irreparable harm, not what's going to happen at the ITC at the end, which is on its face everybody knows what it is, but what happens, the uncertainty and that cloud hanging over our head from now until then.

And, Your Honor, really, this all kind of comes back at the end of the day to the very point that you yourself made at the very beginning. They came here.

THE COURT: They came here and went to the ITC. We'll get to that.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And we came here, too.

THE COURT: Right. I wondered, you know, first of all, there's no way to get a stay in the ITC.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: No.

THE COURT: Right? There's no statute?

73 1 MR. ZEINEDDIN: They have their mandate, they 2 have their timeline. 3 THE COURT: Right. So the answer is no. You 4 know the law way better than I do, so help me out. 5 Sometimes I ask you, they're very silly, but they are short questions that I think are yes or no. Is there a way, a 6 7 mechanism to get a stay within the ITC? 8 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Not based on my understanding, 9 Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Now, there is a statute 10 11 that specifically provides that you can seek a stay of the 12 ITC -- of what? What's 1659 under your interpretation? 1.3 seek a stay of these proceedings. Right? 14 MR. ZEINEDDIN: The defendant can come here and 15 say we don't want to move both in the district court and 16 They are going to stay the district court. ITC. 17 THE COURT: My point is it only applies, 1659 18 only allows you to stay this Court's proceedings? 19 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Right. That case is going very 20 fast. 21 THE COURT: Right. 22 MR. ZEINEDDIN: And they can only --23 THE COURT: Incidentally, one of the cases the 24 defendant did seek, it did get a stay? 25 MR. THOMPSON: That's right, Your Honor. The

74 Quantel case, that set of cases is stayed, and actually, one 1 2 of the defendants, I believe it's in the Thales case, also 3 stayed, so part of this case is stayed anyway. 4 THE COURT: Right. 5 MR. THOMPSON: They did exercise that right. 6 THE COURT: Yes. 7 MR. ZEINEDDIN: So, Your Honor, not only is it 8 going there full force, target date of final determination 9 next spring. 10 THE COURT: Let me ask you this: Why didn't you 11 seek expedited resolution of this case? 12 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Within ten days, with Christmas 1.3 break and weekends intervening, we told them, let's stop. And they said, no, no, you really don't mean -- you really 14 15 don't mean --16 THE COURT: No. What I'm getting at is why 17 isn't the solution to this problem, because it is a problem. 18 Right? It's a problem in every case where we have a FRAND 19 Isn't it always a problem or virtually always a 20 problem? 21 MR. ZEINEDDIN: The licensor always wants to get 22 their money as soon as possible. 23 THE COURT: Yes. The potential licensee might 24 delay --25 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Your Honor, we're happy to go as

fast as possible and resolve that issue first for the whole portfolio.

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THE COURT: Well, all right. I have reserved -- did they tell you how much time I reserved for this?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, but I did reserve a lot of time.

I think this is a very important case.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And what bothers me about it,
precisely because of that, I'm very reluctant to get engaged
in what I think is a very, very interesting and significant
policy issue and I go back to I think you've got to
establish a legal right again on the first test.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: May I inquire, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes. You go ahead.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: When you say legal rights, you encompass in that the equitable right or the equitable at least --

THE COURT: No. That's part of the problem. I mean, do you know of anywhere other than an anti-suit injunction, and we'll even talk about whether -- just keep that aside.

Do you know of any circumstances where a Court has imposed an injunction based on a -- just let me start over. An injunction is an equitable right.

1 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Exactly.

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THE COURT: That's what it is.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Exactly.

THE COURT: Okay. But it's founded on enforcing a legal right. When you are getting a mandatory injunction, it's because you have a legal entitlement to preclude them from doing something.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Right.

THE COURT: Right? It's not out of fairness.

Lots of things in the world are unfair. You can't come and get an injunction because of it. Okay?

My wife likes to eat dinner later than I do. I can't run to court and get an injunction and say, hey, you no know what, we've got to eat dinner by 6:30. It doesn't work that way. Do you agree with that?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: I agree with that.

THE COURT: So we go back to the legal right.

And on that you agree, there's no express provision in the

ETSI contract that would prevent Philips from seeking an
injunction. Correct?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: We believe that the ETSI commitment inherently precludes that.

THE COURT: We go back to this though. You agree, there's no express provision in the ETSI contract that precludes Philips from seeking an injunction?

77 1 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Against an unwilling licensee. 2 That's what we said. 3 THE COURT: All right. Do you want to show 4 me express language in the contract that precludes the 5 member from seeking an injunction if there's an unwilling 6 licensee? 7 MR. ZEINEDDIN: They are prepared to grant a 8 By definition, that means -license. 9 THE COURT: Where does it say expressly in 10 the ETSI agreement you are prevented from seeking an 11 injunction? 12 MR. ZEINEDDIN: It doesn't say those words. 1.3 THE COURT: Okay. You've been very credible, 14 but, you know, my question was: Don't you agree there's no 15 express provision in the ETSI contract that precludes them from seeking an injunction? I think the answer is that's 16 17 true. 18 MR. ZEINEDDIN: That is true. 19 THE COURT: Okay. So it all boils down to the 20 implied covenant of good faith. That's true. Right? 21 MR. ZEINEDDIN: That is true. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 23 MR. ZEINEDDIN: May I? 24 THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: It also -- the license itself

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78 and an injunction are absolutely diametrically opposed. 1 2 They are not consistent. They cannot cohabitate. 3 You cannot tell me that I'm renting and I pay 4 you rent and I sit there and then kick me out. You cannot 5 get a judgment against me to pay past rent and future rent 6 and kick me out. 7 THE COURT: Right. 8 MR. ZEINEDDIN: So that's what I meant by that, 9 Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Well, I get that, but then we get 11 back to willing. You know, willing doesn't lend itself to 12 irrefutable proof, you know, the way, the fact that you paid 1.3 rent is. You either have a check that was cashed or it 14 wasn't. 15 MR. ZEINEDDIN: That's right. 16 THE COURT: So we get back to this debate and 17 that's why we have this big policy problem, because it's 18 willing, willingness. 19 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Right. 20 THE COURT: By definition --21 MR. ZEINEDDIN: And we both agree. 22 THE COURT: Yes. 23 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Philips and Thales agree. 24 THE COURT: All right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Correct.

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THE COURT: So there's nothing express. Then we go back to the implied covenant of good faith.

And then I've asked you, well, what does French law say about implied covenant and good faith? And what you say is, and you point me to some Court decisions that suggest that certain principles of contract law under French law are the same as U.S. decisions. You don't point me to anything that says how I ought to interpret the implied covenant of good faith under French law, do you?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: No. What we said, Your Honor, and I think what everybody has said so far that I know of, is that French law requires good faith.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: And then that's it. So at the end of the day -- I mean, these are contracts, this contract. This is to grant a worldwide license between somebody in China and somebody in Korea.

THE COURT: See, but, wait. Hold on. I want to make sure I get what you are saying. I mean, when you say it requires good faith, that's it, which is what you said. It seems to me what you're saying in effect then is that as long as there is a statement from the potential licensee that that licensee is willing to engage in FRAND negotiations or be subject to a FRAND license, that by itself precludes the member from seeking an injunction.

Right? Is that what your position boils down to?

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: No. The position is actually there's a spectrum of behavior. There's a spectrum of behavior, and depending on, you know, and part of it is a lot of it is the trier of fact. Right?

But the spectrum of behavior. What we do submit that where we are, we're all the way over here, smack in the middle of the safe harbor, willing, because we have surrendered to the Court to determine what's fair and reasonable, nondiscriminatory, because we couldn't have done it ourselves, because we couldn't look at the under like secret bilateral agreement.

And here, this Court --

THE COURT: Hold on, hold on. I want to think about something. I want to flesh this out a little bit because what I hear you saying is that the current record that you've put in, which is like the back and forth that you all have engaged in, shows a likelihood of succeeding on your breach of contract claim. All right? If I accept that as true, the problem is I still circle back to, so what's your right to preclude them from going forward in the ITC? Like, even if you were right, right, what's your entitlement at that point to preclude them from seeking an injunction?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Because they had given that up.

They gave up -- we both agree, Your Honor, I don't think Philips can stand up.

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THE COURT: But then I'm back now to square one, which is, where did they give that right up? Didn't it just go back to the contract?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So, Your Honor, we have -- the Ninth Circuit has said that. We had even the Federal Circuit say you're not entitled to an injunction. Now we start talking about the per se. They say injunctions are not per se prohibited.

And then even in the Apple/Motorola, that Federal Circuit case, and we can go to it and you can read this paragraph, and it says --

THE COURT: Wait. The Apple/Motorola, you're back in the ITC case?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: We're back in the Federal Circuit.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Right? And the Federal Circuit basically says, you know, there is no per se rule prohibiting injunctions.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: In FRAND cases.

THE COURT: They say that.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: That doesn't mean that it's

82 always allowed. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Okay. 4 But where do they say that you have THE COURT: 5 a legal right to preclude somebody from seeking an 6 injunction in that case? 7 MR. ZEINEDDIN: I beg your indulgence. 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. ZEINEDDIN: I'm going to read it because 10 that's the best way to do it. So it's Apple/Motorola. 11 THE COURT: What's the cite? 12 MR. ZEINEDDIN: So this is --1.3 This is the Wisconsin case? THE COURT: 14 case is this? This is the Federal Circuit case? 15 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes, Your Honor. This is the Federal Circuit coming out of Judge Posner's decision. 16 17 There are many cases between Apple and Motorola. And the 18 cite is 757 F3d., 1286. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. ZEINEDDIN: And the page is --21 THE COURT: And we're printing a copy. Do you 22 have a copy for me? If not, we're printing one. 23 MR. ZEINEDDIN: I do not, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: That's okay. 25 MR. ZEINEDDIN: I apologize. So the cite is

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THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: A patentee subject to FRAND commitment may have difficulty establishing irreparable harm. On the other hand, an injunction may be justified where an infringer unilaterally refuses a FRAND royalty or unreasonably delays negotiations to the same effect. And they have cited that.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: It doesn't stop there.

THE COURT: I can see why they cited that.

Exactly.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: It doesn't stop there.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: To be clear, this does not mean that an alleged infringer's refusal to accept any license offer necessarily justifies issuing an injunction. For example, the license offered may not be on FRAND terms. In addition, the public has an interest in encouraging participation in standard setting organizations, but also in ensuring that SEPs are not overvalued.

While these are important concerns --

THE COURT: Hold on a second. Now I think I do remember this case. In this case the plaintiff sought the injunction, not the patentee sought the injunction. Is that

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right?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: In Microsoft/Motorola?

THE COURT: In the case you're reading.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: In Apple/Motorola? So Motorola's request for injunction.

THE COURT: Is it the patentee?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: The patent owner, yes.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: The patent owner, that they went to get an injunction to exclude them from the market.

THE COURT: Right. You argue that in front of the ITC. I am talking about in front of me. Why does that help you in front of me?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So this is the issue. The issue is you had asked why is it that a patent owner is not allowed to get an injunction or should not get an injunction on a standard essential patent as part of the ETSI and this here is talking about that. It's saying, that while a regular patent, you may get it.

THE COURT: But nothing you've read so far says that a patentee is precluded from getting an injunction in a standard setting context, does it? I didn't hear anything you said that says that and I actually did read the case now that I think about it, but why I got mixed up was because it's the opposite. That case is when the patentee is

seeking the injunction.

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: They're the patentee here. They are seeking an injunction in the ITC.

THE COURT: You're seeking the injunction to prevent them from going to the ITC.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: I'm asking Your Honor to stop them from excluding us from the market. It's the same injunction here and there.

THE COURT: That you can argue in front of the ITC.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So now -- so the reason I went into this, Your Honor, because I understood the parameters that you had set first, which is we're not going to talk about the anti-suit injunction, we're talking about the actual injunction. But on both sides, Your Honor.

The reason we're here before you is because by the time we get to the ITC, by the time we get to the ITC, we have irreparable harm, and that's why we came to you, because we both -- both parties came to you --

THE COURT: I'm not talking about irreparable harm. I'm talking about likelihood of success on the merits. That's the problem. That's where we are.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Right. We came to you, Your Honor, to say they're going to get everything. We both requested the same thing. We both asked Your Honor to

set the FRAND rate and terms and conditions, and once you agree to do that, that's at this time. We're happy.

We're done.

We succeed, A, and --

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THE COURT: So I go back to -- you know, you're back on the policy? Right? I mean, look, if you want my view on how this unfolds, right, the fairest way for this to unfold is Philips brought its lawsuit. You said, Judge, we need to have an expeditious schedule. We have to have this decided right away because if we don't, we're going to go to the ITC. But nobody did that.

What you did was you said -- you waited and then you said, hey, I want you to prevent them from going to the ITC. So that's a different story and that's the issue that's before me. Right?

And you've got to have a right to get there.

That's what we'll keep talking about. So the contract doesn't expressly provide for it. We're back to it implies it in your view, and it implies it because you say it's inconsistent to allow a member to seek an injunction if you read the ETSI contract in its totality and so you've got to flesh that out. You've got to prove that, that you are going to prevail as a matter of law.

And you say -- as I understand it, you can correct me if I'm wrong, you say you don't have any French

cases that tell me how the French interpret the covenant, but it's the same way that states interpret implied covenant.

I don't know how every state interprets implied covenant. I know how Delaware interprets it. Delaware interprets the implied covenant this way. If you don't have a provision that expressly addresses the issue, then you need to step back and say what would the parties have agreed to during the negotiations of the contract had the issue been raised? And so under that test, you're going to have to persuade me that Philips would have agreed when it negotiated or, you know, entered the ETSI, that it would never seek an injunction.

That's a hard climb for you to make. We'll hear Philips, but I'm pretty sure Philips will say we never agreed to that because we're going to be subject to a licensee who just isn't going to move until they get some really reduced license rate.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: To be clear, Your Honor, we're not making any such absolute statements.

THE COURT: I know you want to get there.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: No, no. We're talking about our situation where we have surrendered ourselves to the Court.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And there have been many courts,

88 including a bunch that we have cited, where they basically 1 2 have said, those that have agreed to take the FRAND, the 3 rates that are set by the Court are willing licensees. So I 4 mean, it happened --5 THE COURT: So it's only because you had a declaration before this Court that said you're going to do 6 7 whatever I want to do? 8 That's right. MR. ZEINEDDIN: 9 THE COURT: Whatever I decide. 10 MR. ZEINEDDIN: That alone is enough. 11 Absolutely. 12 THE COURT: Okay. 1.3 MR. ZEINEDDIN: That is absolutely right. 14 THE COURT: All right. 15 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Because --THE COURT: I look at that more on the anti-suit 16 17 injunction part of it, but, okay. 18 MR. ZEINEDDIN: But to us, because, Your Honor, 19 on every level you look at it, that is our success. what we claimed and that's what we want. 20 21 THE COURT: All right. Let's talk about the 22 definitiveness of that. So I need to give you a chance to 23 be heard as well. You'll get your day, your hour. 24 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: So your record to establish that

Thales, the record for that is what?

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: So we have our exhibit to the complaint, which is our declaration saying that we'll abide by this Court's decision. And, Your Honor, it's -- I don't think that is before you in the papers.

THE COURT: Well, it's attached. It's an exhibit to the complaint.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: That is right.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: But, in any event, Your Honor, so what we have is the first declaration of Robert Antonitsch.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And in that declaration he says,

I'm authorized to declare and commit for the benefit of

Thales and its parent and sister corporations that Thales

will execute and abide by a worldwide license to Philips'

SEPs -- that's short for standard essential patents -- to

make and sell the Thales modules whether sold separately or

incorporated into the products of Thales customers on such

final FRAND terms and conditions as determined by this

Court, unequivocally.

Now --

THE COURT: All right. Now, Philips. Are you concerned about wiggle room there?

1 MR. THOMPSON: Definitely, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. THOMPSON: I'm happy to go through it.

THE COURT: Sure. Let's talk a little bit about the wiggle room in that and then we'll move on.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay.

THE COURT: I only want to address that issue.

Then we're going to come back here. Yes. Let's talk about the wiggle room in that.

MR. THOMPSON: I can do it from here since he's all set up.

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

MR. THOMPSON: If you would like.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. THOMPSON: I can take the podium if you would like.

THE COURT: Actually, how much stuff do you have? Incidentally, does anybody need a break? Do you all want a break? I think we will set a break.

And then on the movant's side, look, what I want you to think about is, because the manner in which the argument is conducted is actually helpful to me and that's really what matters in the end. Right? But I don't want to prejudice Telit, and you should feel free to stand up, and you have, but you should continue to do that, and if you

also want to talk on the defense side between yourselves
about how to divvy up, you can.

I'm going to let Philips have its time to respond to any arguments that have been made. You know, I've allocated the full day -- not the full day, but certainly until mid to late afternoon and I think it's a very important case, so that's why I dedicated the time I did.

Let's take a -- I will give you a ten-minute break and we'll come back at about five of.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Short recess taken.)

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(Proceedings resumed after the short recess.)

THE COURT: Actually, before you come up here, let me just finish with your friend. I forgot to ask you. You said you agreed to expedite.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Just trying to think about the schedule here. Now, presumably, if you want to expedite, you agree not to challenge the patents on the validity. I set the license rate first and then what? Then you could thereafter decide to challenge validity.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: That's a very good question,

Your Honor. So here's the thing. The patents can stay, can wait, and we can move on rate setting, and once Your Honor tells us the rate and the injunction, that's the third injunction, forcing us to enter into it, all of us, we're licensed, we're done.

So --

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THE COURT: So I set the rate. I just want to make sure you're good with I set the rate first, no consideration whatsoever. The patents are valid. You set the rate. You're on the hook. Right?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So I would love to address that specifically.

THE COURT: I asked you if you would get to it.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes, exactly. And this is how these things have worked in court, and actually, that's how they work also in negotiations, because ultimately, what we're talking about here, just like in a damages case on infringement goes on one patent, we're talking about what an arm's length transaction --

THE COURT: Right. So how about -- I told you what I shouldn't have because then you know I'm going to give you the day, so this is a really quick answer.

You would are willing, I just want to hear it, you would be willing for me to, we would set the rate first.

We wouldn't do anything else. We would just --

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Terms and conditions. Rate terms and conditions, meaning the scope. You know, worldwide.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Right.

THE COURT: Something like that. And no contesting validity and you would agree to be bound by that rate?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: On the contesting validity, for a second here.

So, Your Honor, I want to present to you and to the trier of fact, if it's the bench, which is fine, or if they want a jury for the past part, the Federal Circuit said the past part could be the jury.

I want to present evidence to tell you this. We believe these patents -- we believe this is what they're entitled to because these patents, A, that's their share of the patents. B, a lot of these patents are declared and they turn out not to be essential or not valid, but a lot of them are.

So here's the thing. I don't want you to rule on it. That's not what I'm asking. What I'm not doing, and we're not -- what we don't want to do, we don't want to go through the ringer patent by patent, prove validity, infringement. No. I want to present -- because what you

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are assessing as the trier of fact in this court would be assessing the value of this --

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THE COURT: The short answer is -- hold on. The short answer is you're not willing to forego arguing that the license should be low because the patents are, some of the patents at least are invalid?

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: We want to present that.

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They'll present their view.

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THE COURT: In other words, when you say you are willing to license the patents, it's only, one, if you get to prove to the fact-finder that some of the patents are invalid. But what you are saying you're willing to do is forego a definitive ruling about the validity of the patents, that the only consideration of validity that would

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patents, that the only consideration of validity that would be given is in setting the FRAND rate?

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: Assessing the value.

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Absolutely.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: That's exactly it, Your Honor.

And the --

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THE COURT: In terms of that, jurisdiction or not. You want me to basically try the case twice. If I set the FRAND rate, I'm going to have to necessarily address the validity of the patents and then --

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: No.

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Case: 21-2106 Document: 15 Page: 153 Filed: 08/30/2021

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THE COURT: -- we deal with that?

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: No.

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THE COURT: No?

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: What we want is the trier of fact, if that happens to be the bench, that's great, too, is take that into account, because Your Honor may be convinced by them that all of their stuff really is invalid and infringed and you just hear us. The problem is if I concede it, you can't hear me anymore because I've already agreed everything is valid and infringed.

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you one other step.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: You tell us what the value is.

THE COURT: One other question. Is there anything in the ETSI contract that says anything about challenging or not challenging validity of patents?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: In the ETSI contract, no. The European Court of Justice in the Huawei/ZTE case, in addressing what a willing licensee had, said, at no point they should be precluded, the implementer, from challenging the essentiality.

But to be clear here, Your Honor, what we're not saying, and I want to be very clear about this and also I'm hoping that's going to be clear for Philips, that as part of what the ruling or setting the rate on FRAND terms and

conditions, you have to actually render judgment on validity or essentiality or infringement.

We just want you to take it into account, because we're going to say, we believe some of this stuff is good, some of is not as good, because part of what we're looking at, Your Honor, are licenses that are granted to others, because this is a pie and they have a slice of that pie. Right? And the pie is worth X. And the question is, how much is theirs.

THE COURT: I get it, that the validity -MR. ZEINEDDIN: Once you do that, we take a
license, we're done.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: We're done.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And I'm grateful for the opportunity to make that clear because people can read it and misconstrue our intent. Our intent is to get there and for the trier of fact to take those things into account as they come up with a magic formula for the number and then we're done. Then we are not in the business of taking them through the ringer once we're done.

We want to keep going. We want to sell products that were licensed and we want to know that's fair, reasonable, nondiscriminatory royalties taking all the

97 evidence that you heard. Half it is ours, half of it is 1 2 theirs, and then we're done. 3 THE COURT: All right. 4 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Thank you, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: So do you want to address wiggle room? 6 7 MR. THOMPSON: I'm happy to, Your Honor, and as 8 well I can talk about the first prong we spent this morning 9 talking about too. 10 THE COURT: What's your name, sir? 11 MR. LOWENSTEIN: David Lowenstein, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Lowenstein? 1.3 MR. LOWENSTEIN: Yes. 14 THE COURT: I want to give Mr. Lowenstein his 15 opportunity to argue that first prong. Then I will hear 16 you. 17 MR. THOMPSON: Okay. 18 THE COURT: If he wants that. Maybe he doesn't. 19 MR. LOWENSTEIN: I would like to address the 20 French law issue because we did submit a declaration. 21 I read it and you're happy to THE COURT: 22 summarize it for me. I forget how many pages. 23 benefit from a summary. All right. Go ahead. 24 MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, on the question of 25 wiggle room, we actually had some slides and there's a

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le. If I can hand up --

THE COURT: First of all, anybody is free to use any PowerPoints. If you prepared them, put them up.

MR. THOMPSON: I was going to suggest this particular part of the discussion is well suited to that and I have a printout.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. THOMPSON: I would be happy to hand it up to the bench.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. THOMPSON: Thank you.

So, Your Honor, relative to wiggle room and positions that have been taken, the first observation I would make is that they say that they'll throw themselves to the Court. Right? But then they reserve every argument. Right? That's not quite the same thing. Right?

I'm going to make every argument and resist in every way I possibly can, but at the end of the day, the Court can make its finding. And I think that in particular, the courts have seen this before, these sorts of contention offers contingent on being able to raise every defense I, you know, come up with.

But at the end of the day, if I lose, well,

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yeah, I want the license. I certainly don't want to, you know -- I guess it's more or less saying if I'm an adjudged infringer, I will pay, you know. And that's not at all I would submit what ETSI had in mind and the contract and I won't divert to that, but I can give you specific citations where that contract is in our record.

So I would refer -- I guess we're talking about Thales first. I think it's fair to talk about them because they were the one who was presenting. Slide 35 has a summary, which I'm going to talk about.

The first thing I think that is really important is that the obligation under the contract only exists for patents that are essential. If they're not essential, you're outside, you're outside the ETSI agreement. And, indeed, they've taken the position that the patents in this case, in the case that overlays exactly is that they are not essential. It's a defense that they raised in the context of noninfringement in the ITC.

If they succeed on that, those patents are no longer part of the ETSI agreement by definition. So right there is a situation where you wouldn't even have a connection between the DJs that they have presented and the breach of contract and the patents because they would no longer be essentially subject to the contract, wouldn't be subject to the DJ. It wouldn't be part of it. It would

just be a straight infringement case.

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So I think that's the last point, by the way, on this chart, the essential point.

The other thing is that they have said -- and this is part of we reserve our rights and how difficult it is to get these parties to actually be clear about what it is they're saying, because it moves around all the time.

And I will make one observation Your Honor may find useful. Judge Crabb, Barbara Crabb, a famous patent judge out of the Western District of Wisconsin had the Apple v. Motorola case. In that case there was a similar simple sort of dynamic going on.

On the Friday before a Monday trial, Apple said that's not what I meant when I said before that we would agree to it. What I meant was that we would take into account your rate. She had to end the trial and then ended up dismissing the case, and it's because there is uncertainty in all of these, I'm willing. Well, what does that mean? Right?

So here's one. They say they're willing, but then embedded at the top is that they will not -- they didn't agree to pay for the patent and it's in their brief.

I'm sure every point I make, by the way, every point I make they're going to come up and say we'll agree to that, and that's because they are going to try to make

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it seem like they're not -- these are not wiggle points.

But this is what was in their brief. So this citation is given there. It's not only in the declaration, but it's in their opening brief, that they'll enter into a forward looking.

They are not entering into paying for the past on a portfolio that covers actions and uses not only in the U.S., but Australia, Asia, Europe. There are -- there are a number of subsidiary companies that are using this technology, but not paying for it, and, of course, using that over the last five years to their advantage, right, because the FRAND license that we attached that was offered to them they could accept today. By the way, we could stop this hearing right now if they would just accept that license, but they won't. Right? And that has been pending with them for five years. So that's one, not willing to pay for the past.

Now, again, I hate to say it twice, but it's really important to me to know that with respect to things like this, you have to tease it out of them. They don't just come and tell you what they have up their sleeve like happened before Judge Crabb. Right?

Another one is they say that they'll pay on the portfolio. Well, the portfolio, if you look at the license that was offered, it's for the portfolio, which includes a

102 GSM, UMTS, 2G, 3G and 4G. 1 2 Well, they are not willing to pay on 2G. 3 yeah, I will do it, but only a slice of what is your 4 portfolio. Right? 5 And then --6 THE COURT: Just so you know, I do think the 7 come back -- how do you pronounce your name? 8 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Zeineddin, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Zeineddin. 10 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Thank you. 11 THE COURT: Thank you. Sorry. 12 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Not at all. 1.3 THE COURT: Mr. Zeineddin, here's what I predict 14 the response is, right, they'll agree if I find it at this 15 time. 16 MR. THOMPSON: And they'll argue the whole way 17 through. Right. 18 THE COURT: I agree. Mr. Zeineddin, that's 19 Right? In other words, do you have a picture of 20 this slide, 35, in front of you? 21 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to guess, 23 you're going to say what to all of these things? You'll 24 agree to them if I find against you. Right?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So the thing is we will have a

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103 Just like in the TCL, the past relates to cover 1 license. 2 Then there will be forward. So they're going to the prior. 3 get everything. 4 THE COURT: All right. 5 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Based on what you said. THE COURT: But it's based on what I said. 6 7 Right. 8 MR. ZEINEDDIN: It's based on the rates and the 9 terms. 10 THE COURT: Right. But you're going to argue 11 It's just you are going to argue against some of these 12 things and then I will decide. 1.3 The point is when you say you're willing, what 14 you are saying is, you're willing to be bound by whatever 15 decision I make? 16 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Absolutely. 17 THE COURT: Right. 18 MR. ZEINEDDIN: And what we are going to say is, 19 they want us to already say every single one of their 20 patents deserves a hundred percent. 21 THE COURT: Of course. 22 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Right? And they're the best 23 patents ever. 24 THE COURT: Right. 25 MR. ZEINEDDIN: And we say, you can say that and

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you can put your expert on. We're going to say, we think 30 percent or 40.

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: And we're going to present that. And then, Your Honor, or if they insist on a jury for the past, like the Federal Circuit said in TCL, they will hear it. And then whatever happens, happens, but what we know at the end of the day, you've seen everything. You've seen the secret stuff and you've seen everything and you've heard what we have to say as to the whole -- the whole box of apples, not just the top part that we're looking at. then we know we're getting a fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory deal, which is going to put us on a level playing field in the industry and it's going to be a guidepost for this industry, this industry of the IOT devices. Unlike the cellphone, it has been around for a Now there are going to be a lot of those all long time. over the place.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: That's what we want.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. THOMPSON: So another one.

THE COURT: And I think this is a helpful chart, but I don't want to spend tons of time on this because I hear your point loud and clear.

1 MR. THOMPSON:

THE COURT: And this is why I used the word wiggle room. I mean, really, by the end of the day it boils down what is willing, who gets to decide, who is willing and who is not willing. I mean, really, that is where the rubber hits the road.

Okay.

MR. THOMPSON: And I think that there's an element to that, right, because the obligation is to be willing to offer the license. Right? So that's why we attached the license and a decision that said that it was FRAND. So that's pending today to both of them.

And so there has been no breach and this whole thing about, well, we want this, you know, we say we're willing to have a decision made which would be advisory, then -- and every defense they want to raise in the meantime, it's just -- it's no reason to take a Court that has jurisdiction under Title 35 as granted by Congress.

That's this Court. And then another Court in the U.S. that Congress gave jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction under Title 19 and say this Court, to go into that other Court and say, stop your proceedings.

THE COURT: Right. Okay. This has been good.

Let me hear from Mr. Lowenstein on irreparable harm -- not
the irreparable harm. On the likelihood of success.

Forgive me.

1	MR. LOWENSTEIN: So this is a few issues ago and
2	I actually made some notes about some of your questions.
3	But we did submit a declaration from a French law professor,
4	and to the extent there were cases, he would have cited
5	them.
6	THE COURT: There's only one case. Right?
7	MR. LOWENSTEIN: But he cited a slew of civil
8	statutes, civil lawsuits.
9	THE COURT: I will get there. I will give you
10	this opportunity. You know, besides the one French case,
11	what can you tell me about that Court? And actually, what
12	can you tell me I don't know anything about the French
13	Court. Is there a Supreme Court in France?
14	MR. LOWENSTEIN: Yes. The Court of Cassation.
15	THE COURT: Do you speak French? It sounds like
16	you do.
17	MR. LOWENSTEIN: Not enough to
18	THE COURT: All right. I don't speak it.
19	So this is the Supreme Court of France. Is the
20	Supreme Court of France, or whatever the name of it is
21	MR. LOWENSTEIN: Court of Cassation. It's a
22	Supreme Court.
23	THE COURT: Does it function like our Supreme
24	Court? They take the law of the land for all courts?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I may be getting ahead of

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myself. The way I understand it, and it would be obviously better if you got it from somebody who actually knew what they were talking about, but they have a Supreme Court like we do who sets something like precedent.

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The lower courts are not obligated to accept it, but they are supposed to, and if they don't, they'll get reversed. And the way he explained it was that the Court of Cassion can change its mind, which I think Courts in this country do periodically, too. So I'm not entirely sure what the difference is. But they don't have a strict star decisis view and they rely on civil statutes and I think you saw Mr. Borghetti do that, too.

So I don't think you can say from the absence of any cases that, you know, we're wrong. First of all, they just may not exist.

THE COURT: And you know what, just so you know,
I didn't say you were wrong. You're the movant. You have
the burden. You have to persuade me that under French law,
that contract precludes Philips from going to the ITC.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: That's another point I want to make. That contract doesn't say you can or you cannot. It doesn't deal -- but I think that the trap that we're falling into here is this per se argument.

We're not seeking a per se rule. We're not saying a FRAND, an SEP owner can never get an injunction.

There are circumstances where they can. This doesn't happen to be one of them. Right?

We had a negotiation with them. They say we're acting in bad faith. We disagree. You are not going to break that tie.

THE COURT: Actually, hold up. I need to think about what you just said.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Okay.

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THE COURT: Hold on. You just said, as I understand it, that you are not taking the position that the contract precludes them from seeking an injunction per se.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Per se, correct.

THE COURT: But that a contract precludes them from seeking an injunction under the facts of this case.

Now, it cannot be -- and, again, I don't have your French skills or anybody's Latin skills, but it can't be that they make a sui generis, whatever, decision here. You've got to be able to establish that there is some legal right that precludes them from seeking an injunction and I think that is a starting point.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I agree, and I think the starting point, and we hope the ending point was a declaration from a French law professor who analyzed the various contractual obligations, the various guides that

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interpreted those obligations, the French civil statute, a few cases like the European Commission decision, it presented it and discussed that are not binding precedent on French courts but are influential in their decision.

So if the European Commission publishes an opinion that says it's an abuse of an SEP's owner right to seek an injunction, well, then, a French Court would consider that, and I think that was what Professor Stoffel-Munck said here.

So I can't embellish on French law. All I can say that is in his opinion, and he's a professor at the Sorbonne. He says under our facts, you can't come to a U.S. Court, you, and say, please enter a FRAND rate and then seek an injunction trying to throw us out of business all at the same time.

And so you may be entitled to an injunction if the proposed licensee is really recalcitrant. So if you call him up and say we'd like to discuss license and hang up the phone on you and you call them again and they hang up the phone on you again, well, that's an unwilling party.

So in our case we provided them two weeks before they sued you a lengthy explanation of how it is we came up with our rate. It's not that we were unwilling. We just didn't agree to the number. That doesn't make a party unwilling, that just makes a party not agree to a number,

and presumably, if there's enough time for negotiation, they would agree. But we're, you know, fairly far apart. I will agree with that.

THE COURT: Again, under your definition of willingness, as long as you just say you don't agree to the number, you're not unwilling.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well --

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THE COURT: We get back to they don't think you're willing, you think you are willing.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Right. And I know you can't break the tie and I understand that. But the question is what do you in that circumstance where the parties are apart? Do you go ahead and try to throw them out of business or do they come to you, which is what they did, and say please set a rate, which we're agreeable to. Right?

Just because we can't agree to a number doesn't say, well, I'm going to get out a sledgehammer and I'm going to beat you into submission and then you're going to agree. That's precisely what an injunction is not for and that's what they are doing here.

They're going to the ITC which doesn't consider irreparable harm, and keeping in mind they don't have a competitive product on the market. Their market shares aren't going to increase. Their profits aren't going to increase if we get an injunction.

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THE COURT: Actually, does it matter that the ITC doesn't seek, doesn't consider irreparable harm?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Does it matter?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I think it matters a whole lot.

THE COURT: Does it matter to the determination of likelihood of success on the merits?

In the preliminary injunction MR. LOWENSTEIN: motion, I understand your point, I think, and the answer is probably it doesn't.

THE COURT: So, in other words, as a French professor, does it matter if the ITC doesn't --

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Under French law? think so, no.

> THE COURT: All right.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: But what he said after, you know, fairly extensive analysis of ETSI agreements and the French civil code was that under these circumstances you are in breach if you ask a U.S. Court to set a license and at the same time try to throw the implementers out of business. Those two things are incompatible. You can't do them both at the same time.

If all they did was come That's why we're here. to you and say we want a license and an injunction, obviously, we wouldn't be here.

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Right? We don't think that they have a right to an injunction in your court either, but that's not an issue for today. We just think you cannot do both things at the same time. You can't have your cake and eat it, too.

THE COURT: Well, you get your cake and eat it, too. You get to challenge validity. You get to slow them down and challenge these patents in protracted litigation and raise every validity defense you can think of.

Why do you get to have your cake and eat it, too?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I don't see that we're getting our cake. They brought a suit here and we would just litigate here as any other litigant would.

THE COURT: The fact that you get to challenge the validity of the patent.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I mean, that's our right. I don't understand why that would be a problem.

THE COURT: Where do you have that right?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I mean it's just the right of patent defendants.

THE COURT: Is it in the ETSI?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: No.

THE COURT: The ETSI is silent on it. Right?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Correct.

THE COURT: All right. So is the ETSI silent on

1 injunction?

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So they have that right.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Again, we're talking about, what, the per se rule that they have a right to an injunction.

The answer is ETSI does not specifically say that you do or you do not have a right to an injunction.

But, again, on our facts here, the question is can they do it? And to address your point that, you know, we would drag it out indefinitely, I don't think you would allow that to happen.

But to the extent there's a FRAND decision at some point whatever, two years down the rode, there are mechanisms to account for the time value of money. They get prejudgment interest, they'll get post-judgment interest and they would be made whole.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. LOWENSTEIN: They don't make any --

THE COURT: How about for the same reason you argue you're a small company that would suffer irreparable harm, they say, yes, they're a small company that is not going to be able to fit the bill if you have a judgment three years from now?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, we could put money in

escrow if that's the issue. It's not something as far as I know that we've raised, but we can put some money in escrow.

But I think this is sort of the thrust of our argument and I understand that, you know, you may disagree, but, you know, if you win --

THE COURT: Incidentally, I think this might be the seventh time you suggest you know how I'm going to rule and I have not said anything.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: All right.

THE COURT: For what it's worth. I mean, you said it a number of times.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: All right. I apologize.

THE COURT: No, you don't have to apologize.

You might just want to focus on the power of your argument.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I don't think it's fair for them to try to get a remedy that has enormous repercussions not just from Telit, but on our customers downstream, people that are using these IOT devices. We've mentioned some in our brief. And you weigh that against money damages.

They'll be made whole in this court with a FRAND license and we will suffer irreparable harm if the ITC enters an exclusion order that we can't recover from very well. Once their customers are gone, they may not come back. We may be out of the U.S. market altogether.

THE COURT: So what your argument now boils down

to is you have a legal right under the facts of this case to preclude them from getting an injunction.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: We say that we have a legal right under French law because that is the opinion of Professor Stoffel-Munck.

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THE COURT: Then his discussion -- I don't know how you say it's not per se. You think his affidavit is limited to the facts of this case?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: That's what he said, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. The peculiar negotiations in this case. He's not giving an opinion beyond that?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Correct. He's not saying that an SEP owner can never get an injunction. He's saying on the facts of this case where there was ongoing negotiations up to two weeks before the suit, they sued here, asked for a license. Three days later they said let's continue the license negotiations.

Why would you ask to continue a negotiation with an unwilling licensee? They obviously know we weren't unwilling or the existence of the injunction threat from the ITC switched us from being unwilling to being willing.

So either way --

THE COURT: I mean, what bothers me about that position, because I realize he discussed the facts of the case and I realize he did express an opinion as applied, but

I have to say I didn't interpret it that narrowly. I also inferred from his affidavit that he was saying, he was expressing an opinion of law and, in fact, that's why I thought his affidavit is permissible under the rules of evidence as an expert, because he's giving an opinion of law. And what's the rule? 412 or something? It's not 412. What is the rule? It's a civil rule. It's not the rules of evidence.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: 44.1.

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THE COURT: Don't ask me why I was thinking of 41.2.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Are you thinking of 44.1, the notice on foreign law?

THE COURT: Hold on a second. Okay. So, yes.

So there was Rule 44.1, determining foreign law. And it says, a party that raises an issue about a foreign country's motion must give notice by pleading or writing.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: We both did that.

THE COURT: You both did. Right?

The reason why I bring this up is because I remember when I first got this, it was new to me. I saw the declarations and I thought to myself, how are you able to submit an opinion of law? I mean, that's clearly generally precluded by the rules of evidence. And so I learned for the first time there was this other rule and it does provide that you

can submit expert testimony whether or not submitted or admissible under the rules of evidence to determine foreign law. Right?

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And then it says, and this is the important point. "The Court's determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law." In other words, it's not law as applied to facts. It's a question of law. And therefore when I read the affidavit, even though it is definitely a lot of discussion or, you know, of the specifics of the case, the facts, ultimately, I think for it to be admissible, I'm supposed to treat it as a question of law, which is like, incidentally -- and this is why you used the words per se, but that's what law is.

I mean, law really is -- I mean, to a certain extent, right, it's per se in that we don't have a law that applies only to the sui generis situation, the case, the facts of this case and only this case. That's not law.

That's law applied to the circumstances of the case.

And so that's why I want to go back and get clarity here. I mean, I think that the way you just described the opinion of Borghetti. What's the name?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Their guy is Borghetti. Ours is Stoffel-Munck.

THE COURT: I won't do justice to the pronunciation to your expert. I can only consider that as a

question of law, and if it is limited, as you seem to suggest, to the application of general principles of French law to the particular facts of this case, then I can't even consider it.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I guess I'm not following why --

THE COURT: In other words, you keep saying,

Judge, we are not saying it's the per se rule here. We're
not saying the ETSI contract per se precludes Philips from
going to the ITC. We are not saying that. We're saying
under the particular facts of this case, given the way the
negotiations went, the back and forth between the parties,
the particular things said to the parties, we're saying that
that is prohibited by French law or creates a prohibition of
French law from Philips pursuing the ITC proceeding. That's
applying general laws to the facts of this case and that's
all it is.

And I don't think you're -- if that's what -- if that's the confines of what your expert says, then I don't know how it's admissible under Rule 44.1 or, more importantly, and I guess this is the dispositive thing, I'm only permitted to consider the material or source that you submit pursuant to 44.1 to make a determination as a ruling on a question of law. That's it.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: And --

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THE COURT: It sounds to me like he's not ruling on a question of law, he is applying law to facts.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: He's telling you what the law in France is according to the facts of this case. I think that's the same thing Mr. Borghetti is doing.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, I don't think there's a need for Mr. Borghetti to respond to your situation. I mean, you've got the burden. I've got to consider what you say.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, I mean --

THE COURT: You've got to prove it.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I'm not sure what the distinction is. If you ask a French law professor to tell you what the law is under these certain facts, I mean, why is that --

THE COURT: No. That's what I'm getting at.

You asked a French law professor. You are supposed to say,

tell me. Does this contract -- interpretation of contract

is a question of law.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Right.

THE COURT: Does it preclude the party from doing X? That is a question of law. That I can entertain and make a determination on.

What you are essentially doing as I think about it is you're having your expert act as a judge. He's

interpreting the law as he sees fit and he's applying it to the facts of this case and coming out with essentially a judge opinion. He did it without the benefit of a hearing, without the benefit of cross-examination. He made basically a decision on the merits.

I didn't think coming into the hearing that's the way you were presenting him. I did think he was saying that the ETSI contract precludes them from seeking an injunction when you have a willing party and, you know, and then he offered an opinion as well. You have a willing party here. But --

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, that's the thing. If you start getting into willing, unwilling, the issue comes back to what you said earlier. You know, how do you break that tie here? It's a fact question.

So the answer was, I think based on the undisputed facts, we had a discussion up until two weeks before they sued us. Then they sued you us. Then three days later they wanted to continue the discussion. All at the same time they are trying to shut us down in the ITC, and as a matter of French law, interpreting the ETSI contract, he says that that is improper.

It's a breach of contract. You've asked us what the support was for the French law, the breach of contract claim, and so I thought this was the support. I mean, you

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can't -- well, I don't think in the abstract you can determine that somebody has breached a contract or not. I mean, isn't it always some factual specific background? You can't just say as a matter of law these guys have breached a contract without knowing the factual basis.

I mean, I don't think on a clean slate you can say breach or no breach. You have to say, what happened here? What are the facts? What do the two parties do?

And in that circumstance, is it a breach or is it not a breach?

I understand your point, but I don't think you can --

THE COURT: I'm just thinking if I carried your position to its logical extreme, any time anybody wanted to seek an injunction in Federal Court based on a purported violation of a foreign law, they would win and they would be allowed to just submit as evidence of it a law professor from another country who offered an opinion that the contract in question violated the foreign law. I'm just thinking that can't be the case.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I don't think it is and that addresses the first issue. Right? That addresses success on the merits.

So let's suppose he says that and you accept what he says. That's one of, whatever, four issues. Then

1 you have to weigh the other issues, too.

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So I don't think it's carte blanche that, you know --

THE COURT: I don't think it's carte blanche as a matter of law that he establishes the first. It gets rid of what the role of the Court is supposed to play. He's supposed to give an opinion about what French law is. But anyway, I will have to think about it.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: All right. You also asked about what Congress contemplated. It's true they set up the ITC, but that doesn't mean every dispute belongs in the ITC. And, again, we submit in this case it doesn't for the reasons I've just stated.

In the --

THE COURT: But can you point to anything where Congress indicated its view by a statute or a legislative history that this case shouldn't be in front of the ITC?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: No. It just hasn't come up.

I suppose when that statute was written, FRAND really
wasn't an issue. Maybe some day they will address it.

But, you know, again, we're playing with the cards we have
here and those are there's a FRAND license. They've agreed
to license it to us. There's no dispute about that.

They say they're prepared to grant a license. They have
agreed.

want.

THE COURT: They said they're agreed to grant
a license on a FRAND term and they have given you an example
of a rate that was approved. Right? Was it adjudicated?

MR. THOMPSON: It was adjudicated in the Arcos case.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. THOMPSON: And we submitted the case.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I'm happy to address it if you

THE COURT: You can address it.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Yes. As I understand it, and we have not taken any discovery in really the ITC either, but Arcos, and I have slide which I've taken out, sells cellphones and laptop or tablet computers that cost, you know, 500 or a thousand dollars, whatever they cost.

We sell these little wireless modules that on average are 20, 25 bucks. So for a 75 cent royalty to be adequate or a FRAND reasonable for somebody that sells a \$500,000 product, that may be true, but that doesn't apply to us. We can't sell these things profitably.

The background issue is it's not just Philips that has these SEPs. Right? There are others. If we give each one of them 75 cents, we're out of business. We can't turn a profit.

THE COURT: I get it. Like I said, I'm not the

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policy maker that may review it. Do you know how I think I may benefit? Maybe you should all do your presentations because I think you came in prepared to do that understandably, and I don't want to shortchange you or short shrift you, whatever the right word is. So you should feel free, because you mentioned your slides. You should feel free to put your slides up either now or I will give you a chance to do a formal presentation.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: The only thing that I really wanted to point out was the complaint and they made repeated statements. I mean, I can put it up if you would like that this Court has jurisdiction and that there's an immediate issue.

THE COURT: They are not disputing I have jurisdiction.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: But what they are saying, they're saying not only can we not go somewhere else because they want an anti-suit injunction, but they can. They can go somewhere else. They can go to the ITC.

They say you've got the jurisdiction, you should resolve the FRAND rate. There's an immediate issue to establish declaratory judgment jurisdiction, but then they say you should stay the case and let's forget about it.

Let's just go ahead and litigate in the ITC.

THE COURT: Wait, wait. Actually, they should

1 stay the case?

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: In their papers they said that we're not suffering irreparable harm because we could have stayed the case.

THE COURT: Oh, but they didn't seek a stay in the case?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: No.

THE COURT: I just want to make sure I didn't miss anything.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: No. We have not sought a stay either. The reason is because we think you should decide the FRAND rate. We've all said it.

If you decide the FRAND rate, the ITC case goes away, there's no injunctive relief, there's money damages that's sufficient and everybody goes on their way.

So I mean I'm not quite sure what -- you know, back to the success on the merits, what more we could have said other than to, you know, try to get a declaration from a French law expert to say this is the -- this is my opinion. This is the conclusion a French Court would reach. It doesn't mean that the other issues are, the other preliminary injunction or anti-suit injunction factors are off the table. You still need to consider them. But this one thing is we believe we have a likelihood of success. They disagree. But --

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THE COURT: I will tell you where I am. I read the two affidavits. I don't know what a French Court would conclude. That's where I am. So where does that leave you?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, I mean, I can address what Mr. Borghetti said. Among other things, he said the only thing the ETSI requirement established was an obligation to negotiate in good faith, but both experts say, well, that has been part of French law for 200 years. It's a Napoleonic code. If that's true, why would ETSI establish a rule that's already existing in French law? In fact, Mr. Borghetti said, it doesn't make sense to have a contractual provision that simply echoes existing law. It's redundant and it would not be correct. So we get into a fight about whose intentions should govern and frankly I'm not sure it matters. Right?

Stoffel-Munck, our expert, says, well, you can't really figure out ETSI's intention. What you need to do is look at it from the perspective of a reasonable person.

And their expert says, no, no, no. You can figure out ETSI's intention and he goes through a litany of argument about why it is you can discern their intention.

And if you think --

THE COURT: You understand, right, your co-defendant says that I should apply the principle that we use in the United States to determine whether the implied

covenant of good faith applies and what the scope of it is. You don't dispute that?

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: I don't dispute it.

THE COURT: How do you respond to that, that

Delaware law, which governs a lot of contracts in this

country. Right? And Delaware law says if the contracts are

silent, then the Court is supposed to put itself in the seat

or seats of the parties during this contract negotiation and

figure out what the parties would have agreed to. Right?

And if I do that, I don't think Philips would have agreed to

preclude itself from seeking an injunction generally or

under the circumstances of this case.

So what do I do with that? If that's where I am, it sounds like I almost have to rule in their favor.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, I don't think ETSI would have allowed them to sue for a license at the same time they would sue for an injunction. I mean, we can speculate on what ETSI would have done and what Philips would have done.

If you come back to a reasonable person standard, why would somebody agree to allow you to sue for a license and sue and throw the other person out of business all at the same time?

THE COURT: Well, when you phrase it like that,

I think a reasonable question would be, well, why would you

agree to let a manufacturer continue to use a product even

though it was telling the other side it was actually in good faith, never actually consider the license in good faith and fully negotiate and dillydally and get to use the property that's otherwise protected by the patent. Right?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: There's --

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THE COURT: It's how you view it, isn't it?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, I agree, but there's a remedy for that, and the remedy is come to you and say set a FRAND rate. We have no problem with that.

THE COURT: No, you do, though. That's the point. You do, because you want to challenge the patent validity and you want to argue, you want to make every possible argument you can to exert leverage on Philips to lower its demand for a license.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I suppose the opposite is true, too.

THE COURT: It is. That's the point. I fully agree with that. Put that on the record. Mark that line.

That's exactly the point. The opposite is true. It depends on your perspective.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I don't think we want to dillydally. I don't think you would allow us to dillydally, but we do want a fair rate and 75 cents for the reasons I said is not a fair rate for us. And they may have licenses that they're going to talk about and this goes into the

confidentiality issue and I don't know how you want to deal with that.

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But for Telit, it's not a fair rate. It doesn't seem to be a fair rate for Thales. It doesn't same to be a fair rate to reflect Telit or three of the customers. So the idea that we're all being unreasonable and we're all dilly-dallying and we're all acting improperly and the only party in this lawsuit is Philips -- I mean, it's possible, but it seems unlikely.

So, you know, can I make one suggestion here?

Is this the kind of thing you would consider sending to a special master to figure out what the proper rate is, because it is fact-intensive and we have no interest in litigating the validity or infringement of a thousand patents. I don't think they do either. But we do need to explain to somebody that 75 cents is improper and one of the reasons that, one of the ways we do that is to say, you know, some sample of these patents are invalid, some sample is not.

THE COURT: Well, I don't think you have to do a special master. I can do something like that. I mean, that's not the issue.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Okay. But, you know, we need a mechanism to show you that the licenses that they have granted are not in our view fair or reasonable.

THE COURT: Right. I get that.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: And the easiest way for me to point out is this Arcos license. And then the case --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: -- the case that does not actually stand for what the -- that that is a proper license. Apparently, there's a fair of proof. Arcos was not able to prove that 75 cent was unreasonable and I

THE COURT: All right. What's your name, sir?

MR. THOMPSON: Eley Thompson.

suppose they settled after that. But, you know --

THE COURT: Thompson. Mr. Thompson, let me hear from you for a couple of minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Lowenstein.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Thompson, let me tell you what bothers me and it bothers me a lot. It bothers me that Philips sued in our court, brought this lawsuit the same day it brought the ITC proceeding.

If you had brought the ITC proceeding first, you know, I could understand that, but for you to bring the case here at the same time you're bringing the ITC case troubles me that our case is -- that you're really not asking us to exercise our powers or you're undermining the Court's ability to fully and properly adjudicate the very claims

131 1 you've brought before us. 2 How do you address that? 3 MR. THOMPSON: Well, Your Honor, first off, I 4 would say that it's very common practice. Let me just 5 start, which is a bigger picture. THE COURT: Really? It's common practice? 6 7 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, indeed, to file an ITC case 8 at the same time as a district court case, and there are 9 different statutes, of course, Title 35 and Title 19. And 10 the ITC -- the statute relative to the ITC includes a number 11 of provisions that indicate that it is the preferred 12 proceeding to go forward. 1.3 THE COURT: Right. Why didn't you go there 14 first? 15 MR. THOMPSON: I thought I answered that. 16 because the common practice to file it --17 THE COURT: Was it a FRAND case? 18 MR. THOMPSON: I'm sorry? 19 THE COURT: Is it a common practice in a FRAND 20 case? 21 MR. THOMPSON: In all cases to my knowledge, 22 yes. 23 THE COURT: Wait. I've got to make sure. 24 you practice patents? 25 That's all I've done for MR. THOMPSON: Yes.

the last 30 years, is practice IP law.

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THE COURT: I have over 300 patent cases.

MR. THOMPSON: Well, not every patent case has an ITC case.

THE COURT: I'm just trying to think about how many have an ITC case. That's what I'm getting at.

MR. THOMPSON: You have a domestic industry to appear before the ITC, which means you've shown a domestic industry in the U.S. that needs to be protected, and so if you can make that showing, only then can you go to the ITC because that's the nature of the statute.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. THOMPSON: But not everybody can do it.

Right? If you don't have --

THE COURT: I do know people do it. The idea of common practice the same day you file a lawsuit in Delaware, you're filing an ITC proceeding? Well, that's news to me.

MR. THOMPSON: I mean that in the context of when you can file. When are filing an ITC case -- maybe I should switch this around a little bit.

When you are filing an ITC case, it's common practice to file a district court case as well at the same time and then, of course, the statute, as you pointed out earlier, says that the defendant stays the district court case.

1 2

The other thing is that the primary statute under Title 19 is 1337, and it provides that the proceedings, of course, as you mentioned before are to be resolved at the earliest practical time. That's 337(b)(1).

It also says, you know, as you mentioned, the 1659 about the stay. Right? This is the congressional mandate for how the system is supposed to work, how this Court gets jurisdiction under Title 35 and how the ITC has jurisdiction under Title 19. It says, and this is, I think, important, because we hear a lot about irreparable harm and, you know, the ITC doesn't do this.

may be presented in all cases. Okay. All legal, all equitable defenses, full due process, and only then a ruling. A ruling by a Court that gives you full due process is not irreparable harm, and I would lay on top of that that if you had any issue with that --

THE COURT: Well, wait. I thought they even cited authority for that, that irreparable harm is not considered in the ITC. No?

MR. THOMPSON: No. They are trying to say that the eBay factors that's used for irreparable harm for injunction in a district court case is different than what is ITC does. And the ITC, of course, has its own statute, including domestic industry, a requirement of slowing

domestic industry and all of its procedures and burdens of proof that a plaintiff like Philips has to show. So they are not the same proceeding.

I think that --

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THE COURT: Is it your position that the ITC proceeding will give due regard to the harm that they will suffer? That's your position?

MR. THOMPSON: Absolutely, absolutely. Every legal and equitable defense they can raise. As a matter of fact, I think they cited to you some letter that was a policy letter that showed an instance where the defense was raised and it was successful in that case. It's not successful in every case. Right?

That was a policy under -- President Obama decided that the Court's judgment should not be enforced.

That's a policy of the administration that changes whatever the administration changes and, of course, we're in the midst of a whole change now in the administration.

So it's unclear what any policy will be. It's not law though. And I wanted to make that point because I do think that ultimately, that is a really helpful thing to bear in mind, is that when it comes to deciding what is a breach or not in these cases, there has been so much argument about policy and with the suggestion that that should be law.

I wanted to give Your Honor just a citation.

That has actually come up before in the Federal Circuit.

They made this statement in the Unwired Planet v. Google case which is cited on page 5 of our slide. They say general policy statements are not legally binding, and then the case goes into what it takes to make a policy of whoever it may be -- the DOJ, the antitrust division, whoever it may be in an administration says something, and there's lots of papers in all of these submissions because we had to answer what they were saying. And also Europe, the EC, or whatever, implying competitive law. None of that is law like you were saying. It's not a legal right.

And so when we look at the, going back to the ITC, I was referring to the differences. One case that we cited is In re Carpenter, which is a Third Circuit case, which goes into all of the various differences that are between the ITC and district courts. In that case, by the way, the question was whether a district court in this circuit should enjoin the ITC and they declined, right, and it goes through all the reasons why.

Now, some of the defenses, just to remind you, Exhibit 8 in DI 17. We submitted one of their public interest statements where they said, they raised this defense. I will just repeat it. Complainants's license demand in Delaware is antithetical to the relief sought

here, that's in the IT, namely, injunctive remedies. They pursued that. Telit has a fifth defense.

THE COURT: Your quote is from what they told the ITC?

MR. THOMPSON: Right. I'm saying they are raising the defense of due process.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. THOMPSON: The fifth, the fifth defense in their answer in the ITC is that they, that plaintiffs are barred from obtaining any relief in this investigation on the basis of an implied or express license.

Then there's another one. Breach of contract defense, which is exactly what you've heard. I won't bother repeating that.

Thales has the same sort of thing, and in DI 37, Exhibit N, we submitted their, one of their submissions that raises the exact same points I just made a second ago.

So there's another thing that I don't know has been highlighted so far, which is that there is sort of an illustration in the statute itself for the ITC. It's 1337(c), which contemplates that counterclaims can be brought in the ITC and what happens procedurally in those instances is that the counterclaim gets referred to a district court.

Right? So you file a counterclaim in the ITC.

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Whatever it may be, equitable remedy or whatever, it goes to the district court. And then the statute, Congress' mandate says this, and I will quote it: "Action on such counterclaims shall not delay or affect the proceeding under this section." That's a pretty clear mandate about what Congress thought was the relationship between the district -- of course, that's just one on top of the 1659 about how the district court case should be stayed. Right?

So those are some of the differences between -
THE COURT: But why do you file a district court

case?

MR. THOMPSON: Because at one point in time there may be a determination of damages.

THE COURT: Why don't you wait and file it? Why do you file it at the same time you file the ITC?

MR. THOMPSON: You know, I think that aside from practice, I think it's plaintiff's choice of venue would be one reason. You know, finding the proper Court that you will want -- like, I mean, for example, we filed the case, Philips filed a case, all of the cases here in Delaware. There's obviously an economy for that.

If we would not have -- we might have seen cases coming up all over the place, right, and then we would be into multidistrict litigation. We'd have all of that complication to try to deal with it.

1 THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. THOMPSON: I mean, that's one particular reason why it makes sense in this instance.

THE COURT: Why don't you move to stay these cases?

MR. THOMPSON: Well, because it's not our -- I mean, we could move under the discretion of the Court.

THE COURT: Doesn't 1659 apply to your party?

MR. THOMPSON: Oh, no, no. It applies to

defendant.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. THOMPSON: Right. So I wanted to speak for a moment, if I could, about which I think is -- when I was working through this to come and present, I was thinking I think a lot along the lines you're saying. What's the right? You know, how do we resolve this? How do we write an opinion on this?

And so in the beginning slides, for example, slide 3 --

THE COURT: Why don't you put them up.

MR. THOMPSON: Sure. Oh, sorry. Okay. Excuse
me. I've been told that I misstated the case. It's not In
re Carpenter. That was the way I remembered it.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. THOMPSON: It's In re Convertible Rowing.

139 1 THE COURT: Convertible Rowing? 2 MR. THOMPSON: Yes. It's cited in our papers. 3 It's --4 THE COURT: Give me the cite. 5 MR. THOMPSON: Yes. It's 616 F. Supplement, 1134. 6 7 THE COURT: Wait. It's not a Third Circuit 8 case? 9 MR. THOMPSON: No. Delaware. 10 That's not a Third Circuit case. THE COURT: 11 MR. THOMPSON: I mean a court in the circuit. 12 I'm sorry. 1.3 THE COURT: No, no. I'm not faulting you, but 14 just so you'll know, when you say Third Circuit, I'm 15 thinking the Third Circuit. That's precedent. When you 16 say any court in the Third Circuit, district courts, that's 17 not precedent. But I'm not saying I wouldn't want to see 18 it. 19 MR. THOMPSON: I apologize for not being precise 20 the way I said it. 21 THE COURT: That's all right. 22 MR. THOMPSON: I just meant that it was from 23 this Circuit. It's from this Court, by the way, the 24 District of Delaware. 25 THE COURT: Was it Judge Farnan's? Whose was

1 | it?

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MR. THOMPSON: It was the Chief Judge before Schwartz, I believe.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay. So anyway, I'm happy to clarify that.

So in looking at what is the right that we're talking about? Well, one thing is I think you've got to look at the actual declaration. Right. So we've cited that there.

It's Exhibit H to their papers and I note this just so it makes it easy for the Court to actually refer to this, the document, the document that has it. It says, of course, which we've talked about that Philips, there's a phrase, and I won't bother repeating it here, but more or less with caveats, because there are specific things like it has to be essential and things like that, that they would be willing to offer a FRAND license under ETSI.

Now, one of the questions is: What does that mean? Right? What does being willing mean?

Well, one thing it means is that when you look at FRAND and what a rate or a term or an amount is in FRAND, it's oftentimes thought of as a range. Right?

So you can be -- the negotiation goes on. I think a lot of the cases, and you may see it as you review

both parties talk about that and mentioned it in their

them, talked about a range of FRAND where parties may negotiate and end up with it in this range, and I think

4 brief.

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As far as what the obligation of the plaintiff is or the patent owner is, the obligation is to be willing to make an offer in the FRAND range, and that is exactly what Philips has done, and we outlined -- and also, by the way, more than that, been willing to go beyond that and work for years to try --

THE COURT: But do you think I should get involved in all of this?

MR. THOMPSON: No, because I don't think they've proven it. I just raised it because I kind of felt like the Court deserved to hear a little bit more about what was going on rather than them coming in because their papers are really a per se. I mean, they say it's not, but in reality it's a per se argument that if -- that you can't get an injunction. I would say, of course --

THE COURT: I agree. I read their papers and it's policy.

MR. THOMPSON: Right.

THE COURT: You can't allow somebody to do this.

MR. THOMPSON: Right.

THE COURT: That if somebody said they're

willing to license, at that point the member can't seek an injunction. They've got to negotiate, and even maybe especially if you are already in front of a Court, but

that's really the gist that I took from their briefs.

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I took from the arguments this morning, they are much narrower. We've got these very particular facts, and if you look at these very particular facts and the representations we make either to the Court, and you hear this French law professor applies his understanding of French law to the particular facts of this case, then they should just be on the merits.

MR. THOMPSON: I submit they have not even come close to carrying their burden on that. I will say what I found particularly helpful was the 1994 policy at -- we call it ETSI.

Their 1994 policy is, of course, what's reflected in the declaration that is the actual contract. In 1993 there was a major debate which basically some parties were arguing exactly what they are arguing now.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. THOMPSON: That if an implementer were to say --

THE COURT: Actually, I read this and it was rejected.

MR. THOMPSON: It was rejected.

THE COURT: I remembered it. Right. Then I started thinking there was a problem with the way the briefing is.

All right. Do French courts consider

legislative history? Do French courts go and consider what
a commission, let alone Congress or the equivalent or
whatever the French body would be over there in Congress,
but do they consider this legislative -- this commission
equivalent of legislative history? I don't know. Right?
And nobody tells me what the French law says about what
French courts do then. You don't tell me that.

MR. THOMPSON: Right. But I can tell you what U.S. courts say about it, which is actually on slide 4. There are two citations where this very issue had come up.

Now, they're ITC cases, but they went through the back and forth and a couple quotes that you may look at later, but it's that the agreement doesn't intend to, it does not bar any remedy beyond the reach of -- there's no remedy beyond the reach of the parties.

And it talks about down in the second one that there were several attempts made to introduce the language. We gave you the direct evidence of it and that they have all been rejected. We gave you the direct evidence of that. This is a court that made a ruling on that and said, look, it's not --

THE COURT: You say it's a court.

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MR. THOMPSON: Well, it's a court in the sense that's the Commission's opinion from the ITC. That's a court. I mean, it's an administrative court. It's not an Article III.

THE COURT: It's the ITC --

MR. THOMPSON: It's not an Article III Court. I will say the same thing is reflected in the other decisions that we talked about, like with the Apple decision where it said no per se and that sort of stuff, that the same sort of notion has been reflected in Article III Courts as well.

Right?

And the bottom line is though, however you look at this, the point about let's say that we go back to what -- would the party Philips have agreed to it? It's pretty clear, no. It was raised and rejected and we have that record. Right?

And, in addition, I will say that I believe
Borghetti talked about under French law when you're doing
this sort of thing like you were saying in following
Delaware law, that they have followed the same sort of
thing. If it's not -- if it's something like this and it's
not in there, they won't put it in, French law won't put it
in.

And I'm afraid I don't have the citation for

145 that paragraph, but I do know that it's in Borghetti's 1 2 declaration. 3 So if you take that, right. So if we think 4 about that, and --5 THE COURT: They're moving to strike Borghetti's 6 declaration. Right? 7 MR. THOMPSON: No. We moved to strike --8 THE COURT: Oh, my goodness. Wait a second. 9 I've got them mixed up again. Borghetti is your guy. 10 MR. THOMPSON: It was the reply. 11 THE COURT: No, wait. No. If they didn't move 12 to strike -- I thought they did in their papers. Hold on a 1.3 second. 14 MR. LOWENSTEIN: Your Honor, you may be mixing 15 up our request. We said that there are a number of 16 paragraphs in Borghetti. 17 THE COURT: Right. You said he's not a French 18 law expert? 19 MR. LOWENSTEIN: No, no, not Borghetti. He is 20 definitely a French law expert, but Huber is not. 21 That's what it is. I am mixing it THE COURT: 22 up with Huber. I apologize. 23 MR. THOMPSON: All right. 24 THE COURT: I just remember you had a bunch of 25 paragraphs together.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Yes.

MR. THOMPSON: I was referring to Borghetti when it came to that.

THE COURT: Sorry.

MR. THOMPSON: I will say, one thing I would like to offer on page -- slide 5, is just an observation that might be useful to the Court from the Apple v. Motorola case before Judge Crabb.

You know, the thing about these arguments that guilty made by the implementers, right, is that they tend to argue a lot of policy because the contract simply doesn't provide the relief they want. They need to change it. And so it has come up in the context. Here's another instance where the judge has said, look, that's not what the declaration says.

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And so, you know, so one thing -- and so if we talk about the likelihood of success, right, so can they

show a likelihood of success?

In addition to that Apple v. Motorola case, the Microsoft v. Motorola case that's in the Ninth Circuit as well says that the right of an injunction is permitted under the ETSI contract. Right? So it's not just a breach.

And then, of course, we had the, okay, well, it's not a breach at least under a per se rule. We want a new rule for the facts of this case. And that's where we

withdrew and showed that they can't fail to show that

Philips was not offering a FRAND license. They need to show
that. They have to prove it. Right?

To show a likelihood of success, they have to show that Philips didn't offer a FRAND license, which we have. We submitted the license. They didn't. We did.

And, two, so they failed to prove. Right? If it comes from anywhere, it comes from us.

They've never really tried to address the negotiations. Only really we have, and when we did, in their reply brief, they responded.

THE COURT: Hold on a minute. So let's assume for argument's sake I agree with them, you didn't offer them a FRAND license.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay.

THE COURT: Do you lose on the likelihood of success on the merits?

MR. THOMPSON: If you were to conclude that not only was the license attached, not FRAND, but so were all of the other offers --

THE COURT: Yes, but let's suppose they say -let's suppose they persuaded me that you -- let's suppose
they just say you've reached the ETSI obligations.

MR. THOMPSON: Yes.

THE COURT: Are you saying they're the same

thing?

MR. THOMPSON: No, because there are other

factors, too. You have to go to the irreparable harm.

THE COURT: Are you saying they win --

MR. THOMPSON: On the likelihood of success on a breach of contract, if you find someone has breached this contract, then, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Wait. So then you agree with them, that the test is not whether you have a contractual obligation to not go to the ITC. You're saying they've got to prove that you just breached a contract, period?

MR. THOMPSON: Right. They had -- there are two levels to that. One, their argument, because they never addressed the argument because they can't show a breach. So they have to stick with that you can't go to the ITC. If I make a declaration, I can't go to the ITC, and that has been rejected under the contract like I was showing you before.

THE COURT: That part I get. Now you're adding this other thing. But if they show you breached any provision of the ETSI, then they've got likelihood of success on the merits to win an injunction to preclude you from going to the ITC?

MR. THOMPSON: They have to show the other elements, but they have not shown that is what I'm saying and that's the only other way that you could do it. It's

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Philips that has presented that to show that it has acted in good faith. It had five different offers to one of the parties and four different offers to the other one and it worked over the years to try to get them over the last six years to try to get them to license and then meanwhile this is supported in the evidence.

They declined the offers and still do today, right now. Right as we stand here, they're declining the FRAND offer that Philips made. Right? And they have also delayed over, over all of these many years and we provided the evidence for that.

THE COURT: All right. Give me a second. I'm confused.

MR. THOMPSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So I understood the likelihood of success on the merits for this injunction that's pending before me, this request for an injunction to be basically a likelihood of establishing that under the ETSI contract, Philips was precluded from going to the ITC. So the contractual breach that's at issue, as I understood it in this particular proceeding, is a breach of an obligation under ETSI not to go to the ITC.

MR. THOMPSON: I think that's correct.

THE COURT: And they had to establish, A, that ETSI has a requirement that precludes you from going to the

ITC, and clearly, once they establish that parameter, it's undisputed you did go to the ITC, so that would be the breach.

MR. THOMPSON: Right.

THE COURT: Now, there are obviously under ETSI other contractual obligations that are not in dispute.

Right? I guess one of them is at some point you have to offer them a FRAND. Under certain conditions, you have to offer them a FRAND.

MR. THOMPSON: I would suggest that that is actually the only contractual obligation. It's one that they are drumming up that doesn't existed in the agreement.

THE COURT: I get that, and that is why I think there may be a disconnect between us, because what I thought you said was that they showed that you breached your obligation to offer a FRAND, that they won, they won on the likelihood of success on the merits.

Now, I get where they win at the conclusion of this case. I mean, in other words, the claim before us is did you violate your obligations under ETSI.

MR. THOMPSON: Right.

THE COURT: And I'm oversimplifying, but I think one of those obligations is under, you know, certain circumstances to offer a FRAND.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay.

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THE COURT: And whoever -- and you're going to say we did offer a FRAND and they didn't, and that's the contract dispute that ultimately that I have to resolve on the merits in this case.

MR. THOMPSON: Yes, true.

THE COURT: But that's not what I have to resolve today is the way I understood it, because what I understand they are saying is, by the way, you have this other contractual obligation, you, Philips, and you can't go seek an injunction in the ITC. And in my mind coming in until about 20 minutes ago, that's what I thought I had to resolve today or in connection with the pending motion, is have they demonstrated a likelihood of establishing that, A, there is an obligation to preclude you from going to the ITC and, B, you did, you breached the obligation. But --

MR. THOMPSON: That's right. I think that that -- I don't mean to confuse the issue by pointing out what I pointed out. I just -- I agree with you, that they say that the obligation is you can't seek an injunction and that is all they've said, and our position is that there is no such requirement in the ETSI declaration contract, and as a result, there's just no way that they can carry that burden.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. THOMPSON: It's as simple as that.

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THE COURT: All right. Sorry, but I guess I just misinterpreted what the last ten minutes have been.

MR. THOMPSON: Well, and I apologize.

THE COURT: You don't need to apologize. I'm sure I'm wrong on this or I will figure it out. You don't need to apologize by any stretch. I'm just trying to figure it out. I feel like I'm missing something, and that's --

MR. THOMPSON: And I think that may be the reason that I said that, is because maybe that I thought that they had mis-portrayed what the obligation is, so I felt like I needed to talk about what I felt the actual obligation was.

But they are not trying to establish any likelihood of success under the actual obligation. It's only this one that they've created that's not in there. So maybe that's why I brought it up. I didn't think that they had asserted it because they haven't.

We addressed it because it actually kind of goes to what the actual agreement talks about. They've asserted an obligation in the agreement that simply does not exist.

And so I won't bother going through.

In our slides we did talk about all the different offers that were made. I will say on that, they never really offered any evidence in that regard, just like we're saying now. And I think that in that respect, I would

1 then turn to irreparable harm, if I may.

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THE COURT: Not yet.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay.

THE COURT: Let me hear the other side. First of all, do you have anything else you want to say in terms of likelihood of success on the merits?

MR. THOMPSON: I will say --

THE COURT: Likelihood --

MR. THOMPSON: I will skip over irreparable harm and just finish up on likelihood of success, if that's okay.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. THOMPSON: I will say there is a case that I think might be useful for the Court, which is the Apple v.

Motorola. It's DI 17, Exhibit 5, at pages 105 to 106 after

Judge Crabb heard the argument from the parties on a preliminary injunction like this. Maybe we can put that up.

Slide 23.

She's denying the motion for preliminary injunction. She can't see any likelihood of success and it would be inappropriate in her view for a district court to interfere with an ITC proceeding, and it makes no sense that that could be what Congress had in mind.

And then I would say another thing she pointed out is the status quo. Usually, with a preliminary

injunction, you try and maintain the status quo. 1 2 have a trial, a hearing -- hearing and trial is set in the 3 ITC for four months from now. 4 THE COURT: September? 5 MR. THOMPSON: It won't change. They hardly 6 ever change. It could possibly, but it's not like the 7 district court, where schedules, there are conflicts and 8 The ITC pretty much sticks to the schedule they've 9 got. And so in four months time -- she said three 10 11 months time, it's four months. It's very similar. 12 that's a ruling I thought might be helpful for Your Honor. 1.3 So with that, I will -- if you have any 14 Otherwise I will turn the podium over. questions? 15 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 16 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Yes? 18 MR. ZEINEDDIN: May I, Your Honor? 19 THE COURT: I'm definitely -- yes. So we could 20 take a lunch break now, come back. What do you want to do? 21 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Whatever you'd like to do, Your 22 Honor.

THE COURT: No. I mean, how long was your thought?

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MR. THOMPSON: No. I was just standing because I

1 thought we were going to have a conversation.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: I have a few quick points to make about some of the points that were made, but I can make them, whatever you want.

THE COURT: Why don't you finish up likelihood of success. We'll take a break for lunch. Then we'll do irreparable harm after lunch.

Mr. Lowenstein --

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I withdraw my head shake. I just wanted to make two points.

THE COURT: I will make sure you get a chance to do that. All right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Just -thank you for your indulgence. I want to start with that
last point on the Apple/Motorola before Judge Crabb. I was
actually in that courtroom.

In that very specific exhibit, Exhibit 7 that was just cited, Your Honor, it's telling -- if you take a look at page 84 and you'll see Motorola's counsel on the bottom saying, and this is, he's referring to --

THE COURT: Page what?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: This is Motorola's counsel.

THE COURT: Right. On 47?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Page 84.

THE COURT: Oh, 84. Sorry.

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: I misspoke.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So he's talking about what's going on there. There are portions of the record that are sealed, but this will show you what's going on. This, and then after that, what the judge will say.

To say -- this is at the bottom, around line 23.

To say we are not going to adjudicate FRAND and deal with

FRAND in court and we're going to splinter off existing

proceedings where those issues can be addressed in due

course, stop, throw a wrench into an ongoing ITC proceeding

in violation of clear statutory mandate demands that those

proceedings not be delayed.

So what Motorola is complaining of is Apple saying you've got to stop the ITC, but guess what? We're not going to discuss FRAND rates. We're not going to discuss the FRAND meaning in court.

Page 86 right across, it says, the Court on line
11: Right. My sense is that if the Court could do
anything, it would only be in the situation where the party
that had absolutely refused and the party with essential
benefits just said we're not going to -- we're going to
engage in any kind of negotiations. We don't want a license
and we don't have a license.

So, Your Honor, that kind of gives you an idea

of what was going on in that case. Two extremes. They're discussing the case where Apple at that point, who was the implementer, did not want to discuss FRAND, did not abide, did not indicate that it would abide by the Court's FRAND decision on any rate that the Court would render.

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This is not what we are talking about here.

We did not come here, nor did we ever say in our briefing we did not advance any dogmatic approaches. We're not talking about what's never available and what's always available.

THE COURT: Are you saying the Court, that the --

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And --

THE COURT: The accused infringer in the Wisconsin case --

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So --

THE COURT: -- said it wouldn't be bound by the Court?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So basically, you had Apple saying on one hand that you should -- that unless if they absolutely refuse to negotiate, that's when the injunction would be, would be granted. That is how extreme their position was. We're nowhere here.

In that case Apple never said they would abide by the Court's determination of FRAND rate. In that Court,

Apple never said they wanted to kind of start evaluating, you know, this back-and-forth kind of negotiation. As far as they're concerned, as long as there's any kind of back-and-forth negotiation, what you would end up with is no injunction.

We're in a very different situation here. We came here, Your Honor, where they came, and mind you, we were confused. They came here to set the rate and we said, fine. And on the point on that slide, the first slide that you saw, we never said we don't want to pay back damages or back release, whatever it is that they're entitled to. We followed the roadmap that they set and we have just told you here and we're here on the record. The license would be for the forward and then the past release and they get every penny they're entitled to as set by the Court for everything, past and forward.

Your Honor --

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THE COURT: You know, I am kind of in a way back where I started this morning. What gets me is although I am troubled by, in a sense, the duplication of resources, bringing a case here, bringing a case in the ITC, it really doesn't matter that they brought a case here. What matters, because you're seeking an injunction of their brining an ITC.

Suppose they went to the ITC and they didn't

file a lawsuit here and came here and said, give me an injunction to prevent them from going to the ITC. I would be back at, well, Congress gave them a right to go to the ITC and how can I prevent them?

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: So, again, the question that you -- the points that you were noting just a few minutes ago about the question of law. The question of law under French law, which we included actually is an exhibit is that contracts must be negotiated in good faith. That's simple code.

And as you noted, Your Honor, all of these experts are saying, the French experts, well, we think if this was adjudicated by the trier of fact in France, it would be here. And here, what we're saying is that under the circumstances, good faith dictates that when we say we will abide by what you said, which is what they requested. Then that's the end of the story, because the relief that you would be rendering is a hundred percent inconsistent with the relief they are seeking in the ITC.

THE COURT: Right. And the thing that I like about your position is at least I think I know the roadmap. The roadmap for, as I understand it, your position is, okay. They have breached a contract. You're a third-party beneficiary of the contract. You get to come here and make them comply with the terms of the contract. The contract is

the ETSI contract.

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The ETSI contract is governed by French law.

French law has an implied covenant of good faith. You don't have any decision from the French courts telling you what it is, but you've got United States district courts saying that general common law principles of contract interpretation that we use are also used by French courts. Therefore, you ought to apply them. Therefore, I can apply United States common law, principles about the implied covenant, good faith to the ETSI contract, and I can apply it to the facts of this case and make my decision. That's your roadmap.

Right?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Moreover, they came to a U.S. Court.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: They came to a U.S. Court to do exactly that.

THE COURT: I got you.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Okay.

THE COURT: I actually can follow that decision tree.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And that's exactly what we're saying.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And now there's one --

THE COURT: Now, your decision tree is a little bit different than Mr. Lowenstein's. I understand your decision tree.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Right.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And there's one more thing. So not every case that gets filed in the ITC on SEP, somebody comes to the district court and seeks a rate setting for the entire portfolio and then the other side, the implementer comes in and says, we're going to do it, the whole portfolio.

Your Honor, you would be setting the rate, you will be setting the money for the past and the future for French families, Chinese families. We want to present to you the evidence as to the likelihood of how good these are, what their incremental value is, and they'll do the same.

And, by the way, Your Honor, the U.K. Court that they keep citing, Unwired Planet, did just that, allowed the parties to present evidence. Well, how many of them do you think are essential? How good are they? Both parties said what they had to say and they came out with a rate.

And then, then the U.K. Court said, if you don't take that rate, I will enjoin you, and that went up to the Supreme Court in England.

THE COURT: Supreme Court of what?

1 MR. ZEINEDDIN: England.

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THE COURT: England?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And back then it was part of the EU. But the bottom line, Your Honor, was, you don't pay the rate, you've had your say, I've looked at everything. You came here and we're done. Now you're enjoined.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: As Professor Contrares pointed out in here, and we don't need to go there, but there has been a tradition in this country since 1950. On those standard patents where parties cannot agree, the Court sets a rate.

Your Honor, you asked a very important question and you ask asked a question about antitrust. The impetus of the commitment is the entire idea of level playing field and allowing certain companies to select technology to the exclusion of others and fix this market. It's the networking effect. There is no way --

THE COURT: I hear you on the policy.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: But you asked a very important question, Your Honor, and you did not hear the answer to that question, which is when did they give up the right to an injunction, because it's the patent. It's part of a bundle of rights in an injunction. It's because when they said select my technology, and when you do that, according

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to ETSI, you have to declare at the time, you have to declare any patents that you are well aware of that may become essential, so everybody can see. And then you have to say, I'm willing to grant it on fair, reasonable, nondiscriminatory. You also can say I am not, at which time everybody who is participating may say, do I want that technology really or not? So there is a process and all of these are part of the ETSI procedures back from the 1990s until now.

So this is -- this is why these are not your typical patents. And in this particular standard, Your Honor, I keep coming back to this, because there are other standards where it's not the issue. Another standard where, like, which compression algorithym you use on your computer? If you don't like this one, use that one. You've got to use this one to make the phone call. You've got to use tho collect to the network.

If I want to include Thales' module in these devices that's going to go for medical assistance for people to communicate, you've got to use this. You can't go, well, you know, just asking too much, go somewhere else.

And it was excluding that testimony. It's that outlet in that wall. They got that shape in there. They convinced people, and people said, oh, I trust you're going to collect X and then we could have had a different shape,

just as good. But, no, we went this way.

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And they cannot be the final one on FRAND.

There's one more thing. I'm not going to keep you too long.

One more thing. You keep asking why not go to the IT, why

here? Well, there's one thing. Regardless of what we think

of the ITC and the fact of an administrative agency and a

counterclaim and all of this, the practice of ETSI, there

has never been a counterclaim here.

But here's the thing. The ITC cannot set a rate. The ITC cannot force Philips to get into that rate. What the ITC can do is hand a sword, and once that sword is handed to Philips, we go in the backroom and the price that we pay is our access to the market, which is a hundred percent standing in every single way against anything that any Court in this country, including the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court said about the value of patents and their incremental value.

The Federal Circuit has said, and we're reserving this for later on where we're going to talk about the rate. It's not the value of the standard. You don't get to charge the value of the access to the market. You get to charge the incremental value of your patents.

And the problem here, Your Honor, is they say they got FRAND. They refer to this Arcos case. All this Arcos case said in the hay against a very French company is

that that French company failed to meet its burden to -- I
don't know if it's basically the declaratory judgment
upfront, like a summary judgment. At the time, based on the
evidence that they've presented, that Philips was not FRAND.
That's what they said.

It also said that .07 cents, which is what they offered, what Arcos offered, a small French company, was not FRAND. That we know, that whatever that company offered for their device, which, by the way, uses all the technology.

These are things you're going to be hearing about if you do this, Your Honor. They can't just come in and give you a cellphone case. The cellphone uses every part of that standard.

THE COURT: All right. Just watch your time.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: You know, and I'm going to stop

right now because I know everybody is tired. But I thank

Your Honor for the opportunity.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I just wanted to make two quick points. The case that Mr. Thompson was talking about from Delaware from 1985, 35 years ago, and I can confirm this at a lunch break with an associate. But from what I could tell last night, the patent statute in '85 didn't include

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lowenstein?

25 importation. It does now.

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And the Judge, Judge Schwartz I think said the ITC has certain jurisdiction. That's to prevent importation. I as a district court do not. And I think that's part of what influenced that decision.

The other ITC cases -- and, again, I will confirm this. I tried to do it last night. I don't think any of them exclude issues in an exclusion order.

So some of the cases of patents were held invalid or not infringed. There was no exclusion order. I think one, there was an exclusion order and then the Commission reversed.

We know in the Apple/Samsung case, the U.S. trade representative reversed. So to the extent those cases are up there for the proposition that they can issue exclusion orders, it's different. We are not saying that they can't, but those cases don't necessarily support that.

But I --

THE COURT: What are the powers of the ITC other than exclusion?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, they have an exclusion order. There's something called a cease and desist order, so I think the stuff that's in the U.S. can't be resold.

THE COURT: I guess that's why I'm at a loss then. I thought that was the only power they had. They can declare a patent invalid?

1	MR. LOWENSTEIN:	Yes.	In fact,	you c	an litigate
2	validity and infringement.				

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THE COURT: Well, in the context of ultimately, though, you can't go there to get a declaratory judgment on invalidity. Right? You can only go there to get an exclusion order of some sort. Is that right?

MR. THOMPSON: That's right.

THE COURT: Right. So I'm missing a point that you have made. You said those orders that were put on the screen?

MR. LÖWENSTEIN: The cases they cited ultimately did not result in an exclusion order.

THE COURT: Oh, they didn't result in one?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Correct.

THE COURT: And help me out why that's probative.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: As far as I can tell, they recited to a proposition that the ITC could issue exclusion orders for FRAND patents and I don't think those cases necessarily stand for that proposition, which is they didn't necessarily issue the exclusion order.

THE COURT: All right. How long do you need for lunch?

All right. So here's a thought. This is what I'm struggling with. It goes to this divestiture of

jurisdiction. The practical reality is that by using the ITC, you've got incredible leverage, especially under the circumstances, and you'll forgive me, but -- well actually, both parties, both companies.

So there's an argument that you undercut this

Court's ability or authority to adjudicate a FRAND. Now, I

understand, right, the same argument can be made. I don't

know that it's the same, I mean, but I kind of suggested in

questions I've asked, which is that -- well, they get to

challenge validity here. They are not just going to accept

the FRAND you offered. They get to challenge that. And I

know your argument is just as that was contemplated by ETSI,

there was the threat after an injunction contemplated by

ETSI. And, in fact, and I do think it's compelling, when

there was a proposal to codify a prohibition on injunction,

it was rejected by you. That's pretty powerful.

But I think just after lunch you ought to be prepared to address in the context of the anti-suit injunction case, you know, how this concern I've just raised should be addressed.

All right. So do you want to break until 1:30?

Does that sound good?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

(Luncheon recess taken.)

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169 1 2 Afternoon Session, 1:31 p.m. 3 THE COURT: I didn't realize Mr. Thompson wasn't 4 back yet, so we'll just wait. 5 (Pause.) 6 MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, my apologies. We got 7 hung up in security. 8 THE COURT: That's fine. All right. 9 Mr. Zeineddin, can I ask a question? 10 MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Just in your offer, you said, I 12 think, let me make -- I will set the FRAND date and you're 13 going to live by whatever that is, are you giving up your 14 right to appeal? 15 MR. ZEINEDDIN: The right to appeal? THE COURT: Whatever I decide to the Federal 16 17 Circuit. 18 MR. ZEINEDDIN: I mean, if there is, like, error 19 of law based on the --20 THE COURT: I am just wondering if you are 21 talking about, you've got this broad thing. I'm just 22 wondering if you are giving up your right to appeal. 23 MR. ZEINEDDIN: We would not waive that. 24 THE COURT: I just wondered. 25 MR. ZEINEDDIN: I mean, it's a decision by the

1 | Court. So --

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THE COURT: So you're not. That's fine.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Right.

THE COURT: Okay. Just curious. All right.

All right. Is there anything else anybody wants to address on likelihood of success on the merits either under the contract theory, I will call it, or under the anti-exclusion injunction?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Your Honor, on that last point, it's not so much the right to appeal on the waiver, but, for example, in the TCL case with Ericsson --

THE COURT: Wait. Don't go off on that. I'm not interested.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Okay.

THE COURT: I've got to watch the time.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Absolutely. Thank you.

THE COURT: I'm curious. I didn't think you were. I just wanted to make sure I understood. Okay.

Now, does anybody want to say anything else on the likelihood of success on the merits and what I'm also calling the anti-suit injunction. No? Okay.

Then I'm going to hear very, very brief argument on irreparable harm. Mr. Lowenstein, do you want to go first?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I'm sorry.

	171				
1	THE COURT: Sorry? Irreparable harm, do you				
2	want to address that?				
3	MR. LOWENSTEIN: I was going to talk about				
4	actually, I thought you wanted to discuss the effect on your				
5	jurisdiction, but I can talk about irreparable harm.				
6	THE COURT: No. When I say anti-suit, if you				
7	want to talk about that, go ahead, sure.				
8	MR. LOWENSTEIN: I don't have a whole lot to				
9	say. I was going to just walk you through the complaint.				
10	I've got some slides that I can put up.				
11	Is that all right if I put some slides up to the				
12	complaint?				
13	THE COURT: Sure.				
14	MR. LOWENSTEIN: So these are confidential. I'm				
15	not planning to discuss confidential information, but				
16	there's some in there.				
17	MR. THOMPSON: So my suggestion simply if this				
18	is marked confidential, we'll handle it with the typical				
19	seal of the Court.				
20	THE COURT: Do you see anybody in the room who				
21	poses a risk of				
22	MR. THOMPSON: I don't know everybody in the				
23	room I'm afraid to say.				
2.4	THE COURT: You don't? All right. I guess				

we'll keep it off the screen. Go ahead and make your

172 1 argument. 2 MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, I would suggest, as 3 far as I'm concerned, if he wants to show a slide he said 4 represents, knows is not confidential, then that's fine with 5 me. THE COURT: 6 Okay. 7 MR. THOMPSON: So counsel, I'm sure, will let me 8 know. 9 MR. LOWENSTEIN: I'm planning to skip over the 10 confidential. 11 THE COURT: That's fine. That's good then. 12 right. 1.3 MR. LOWENSTEIN: So this is all a bit above me. 14 It worked before when we were practicing. 15 THE COURT: There you go. 16 MR. LOWENSTEIN: So I just wanted to skip to the 17 complaint and just walk through what they've told you here. 18 As I said, they're asking for anti-suit 19 injunction that Telit should not be permitted to ask the 20 Court, this Court or any other Court worldwide to determine 21 a FRAND rate. 22 THE COURT: Wait, wait. I think you just said 23 they're not -- they're saying you guys shouldn't be 24 permitted to ask me a FRAND rate.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Should not be able to ask this

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Court or any other Court worldwide to determine a FRAND rate. I'm not sure what that means. They are saying that we can't really discuss with you what the FRAND rate should be.

THE COURT: No. I thought they are saying they should not be permitted to circumvent.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: They say that, too.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Telit and CalAmp should not be permitted to circumvent the Court's jurisdiction by asking a foreign Court or any other Court to set a FRAND rate and should the Court enter a judgment that Telit/CalAmp may not raise any claims seeking a determination of the FRAND rate in terms or raise any other FRAND rate or claims in this Court or any other Court.

Now, I don't really understand what this Court means. If you read it literally, it means I can't make an argument about FRAND. I don't suppose that's what they mean, but that's what it says.

And it carries on. It says that we're precluded from making any collateral --

THE COURT: Can we just clear that up? Is that a typo?

MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, you have to read it in context. It's because I had deemed courts in the

District of Delaware as cited there have found that these sorts of claims are advisory unless the parties have a meeting of the minds, and I think that that -- and that's when you talk about wiggle room. That's where the meaning of the minds doesn't happen.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: So they then say there's a case or controversy of sufficient immediacy, reality and ripeness. So immediacy to me means now. It doesn't mean six, eight, ten months after the ITC comes to some decision.

Then they talk about this sworn affidavit and they say that Philips is entitled to declaratory judgment determining the appropriate worldwide FRAND rate, and the prayer for relief basically repeats what they just said, that we're not entitled to raise a claim -- well, let's just skip over the this Court and any other Court, and we're not permitted to make any collateral attack on this Court's proper jurisdiction.

So it seems to me pretty obvious they're invoking the Court's jurisdiction. I don't know that you can do it in a big way, but that's really what they are doing. They are saying it's in this court and no place else. We cannot go anywhere else, but they can. And if we commit to accepting a FRAND rate, paragraph B, well, then, the Court should decide what the FRAND rate ought to be.

1	And so I think I've already covered these			
2	points, but Philips			
3	THE COURT: Wait, wait. Sorry. Can you go			
4	back? What was the last point you made?			
5	If you commit			
6	MR. LOWENSTEIN: If we commit my laser			
7	pointer doesn't work on the screen.			
8	THE COURT: Right.			
9	MR. LOWENSTEIN: commit to accepting the			
10	FRAND rate, then this Court should decide what that FRAND			
11	rate should be and no other Court, no other foreign Court.			
12	THE COURT: Okay.			
13	MR. LOWENSTEIN: So they're invoking the Court's			
14	jurisdiction. And in order for the Court, and I think we			
15	touched on this earlier			
16	THE COURT: And that's what you want. I mean,			
17	this last sentence is what you want?			
18	MR. LOWENSTEIN: Sure. We're happy to have the			
19	Court decide it.			
20	THE COURT: Right.			
21	MR. LOWENSTEIN: But that's what they wanted,			
22	too, and my understanding is you want us to talk about			
23	whether or not that had to the ITC action has some			
24	implication on the Court's jurisdiction.			

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: Which is invoked.

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THE COURT: Right. When you say I want you to, I want to offer you the opportunity to.

THE COURT: You don't have to, but the way I see

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: Okay.

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the world is you've either got a contractual right to

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grounds, and to do that, as far as I understand the Third

preclude them or you've got to win on anti-suit injunction

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Circuit law, which uses the restrictive approach, it's not

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embraced by the Ninth Circuit, you've got to basically

establish that there's some effect, divestiture of

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jurisdiction to this Court or some very big public policy

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that is served. I mean, there's some ambiguity in the case

That's how I read it and, you know, I've thrown out

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there the jurisdiction. You don't have to do it, but go

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ahead.

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: Let me skip to the Third Circuit test. There are three factors. Comity is not an issue. Right? So that doesn't apply. Protecting the Court's jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not so sure about that.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Okay.

THE COURT: I mean, the Third Circuit never applied the anti-suit injunction doctrine, to the ITC. that correct?

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177

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: I believe that's true.

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THE COURT: Okay. Has it applied it to anybody

I don't know the answer to

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other than a foreign Court?

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that. We looked at the cases we cited, the cases I guess

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MR. LOWENSTEIN:

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Judge Andrews cited and his decisions were all --I think the answer is no and I think THE COURT: the reason why is because there's a Federal Circuit that

precludes a federal court from enjoining a state court,

which would be the only other probably context it would come up. And that basically I recall the statute has -- there are exceptions, and one of them is if it would affect the jurisdiction of our Court, which is kind of the same test I

think that the Third Circuit was looking at when it applied it to foreign courts in the context of this theory.

I think this anti-suit injunction is very rarely I looked on Westlaw. I think there are only three invoked. Supreme Court cases that have even looked at it. this is a very unusual argument you are making. Right?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I don't think so in the context of FRAND, ITC and parallel lawsuits. I mean, we've all cited a dozen cases that touch on that issue. Some of them admittedly were Ninth Circuit. If you are talking about the Third Circuit, there are a half dozen or so cases that we've all found.

1 THE COURT: All right.

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: So, well, I'm not -- I mean,
I don't think comity applies because it's not a foreign
Court.

THE COURT: Right. But, see, that's why I kind of segued. I'm sorry. Let me address that.

So I'm not so sure about this, and this goes back to Congress created parallel tracks here. I mean, that's part of being what gave me concern, it gave the judge in Stonington concern. I'm supposed to give some comity I think to the ITC. No?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Going back to what you said about your wife liking dinner late, I mean, you have the right to complain about it, but still. So the fact that they have the right to go to the ITC doesn't mean that this case is one that should be in the ITC. The factors are inverse of my family, but, you know, I can't complain about it either. It the way it is. So I mean not every right that you have is one that you exercise.

So I will focus on these other two and I will go back to the previous slide.

It's a matter of common sense. With this

FRAND, potential ITC injunction hanging over our heads,

we can't get a FRAND rate. I mean, it's already, excuse

the -- whatever equilibrium there may or may not have been.

Right?

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I have not seen that Philips has disputed this, that they said, well, the ITC action really doesn't change the value of a patent. It happens. If you have a threat of an injunction over your head, just as a matter of common sense, it's going to change things. The Microsoft case, it recognizes that it fundamentally places a party at a disadvantage. So you have a choice of going out of business or paying the exorbitant rate. It's, you know, it's a Hobson's choice.

So that's kind of where we are. And to protect an important public policy, I mean I think, you know, we mentioned that, avoiding inconsistent judgments. If the ITC deems fit under its rules to grant an exclusion order without considering irreparable harm and then we come back here I suppose and you reconsider whether or not there should or shouldn't be an injunction applying all the eBay factors, you can say no. I mean --

THE COURT: On inconsistent judgments, let's talk about judgments. You could win a ruling in the ITC if the patents are invalid. Right?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Conceivably, we could, yes.

THE COURT: And contrary to the way I interpreted -- well, you actually could raise in the ITC as a defense harm to you where an exclusion would be entered,

1 couldn't you?

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: We can.

THE COURT: Irreparable harm that you can't raise in the ITC, they can't raise irreparable harm. They don't need to prove irreparable harm.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Correct. Just while we're talking about that, to touch on a point that Mr. Thompson made. You know, this issue about domestic industry. It's a pretty thin read in this case. They've identified the sleep apnea products that don't compete with our products at all. Right? We sell these little modules that go into these products, but we're not competitors. So their domestic industry isn't going to be affected.

THE COURT: Don't you get to argue that in the ITC?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: That it's not a domestic industry? As far as I know, no. Their argument is that, you know, at least one OF THE claims covers one of their products and that's sufficient to be a domestic industry product.

THE COURT: And you don't get to argue against that in the ITC?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I'm not an ITC expert. There's a technical prong of the domestic industry and if they can prove up that one of the patent claims, there are four

patents, 21 claims, something like that, if one of those claims covers one of their sleep apnea products, that, according to them, is going to be sufficient.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: I mean, we could argue that the patents don't cover it, but the answer to your question is, yes, we could.

THE COURT: Okay. You get to argue it. All right.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: And we also, you know, discussed the serious disruption if they were able to succeed on an exclusionary order. I don't think they could convince you here that they are suffering irreparable harm because they don't have a competitive product.

THE COURT: They don't have to have one, do they?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, if they were going to get an injunction from you.

THE COURT: But we're not going to deal with that unless --

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Not today.

THE COURT: Unless there's an infringement finding and we get to the very end of the case.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Right. But my point is that there's discrepancy between the two standards, that the ITC

would apply an injunction and that a district court would apply, and the primary distinction is irreparable harm and that's an important distinction.

You can go back to Judge Briar's comment in the eBay case, that they're non-manufacturing entities that could use injunctions or the threat of injunction as leverage and bargaining, like bargaining negotiations.

That's kind of where we're at here.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: That was the point. And then skipping back a couple of slides, it's not -- you know, it's not just my observation, but a couple of courts have said the same thing, that if the ITC were to enter an injunction, it would interfere with the equitable considerations and frustrate this Court's ability to adjudicate the issues properly before it, and I think that is kind of where we are.

In the complaint you see, they have invoked the Court's jurisdiction exclusively. We can't go anywhere else. Right? So they've said it's this Court or no place else. And in order for the Court to invoke its jurisdiction, like they've asked us to resolve this FRAND issue, you can't have us out of business or having a threat of us out of business. It will skew the result. You can't have a proper FRAND determination while there's a threat or

actual injunction in play.

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THE COURT: Well, I think this is your best argument, the quote from the California case, which isn't binding on me, and we talked about frustrating the Court's ability to adjudicate properly before it and I've made some comments today to Mr. Thompson that expressed some frustration. But really my frustration is the unnecessary requirement or duplication of the resources of the Court. That's really more what it's directed to.

I don't think, and I'm making a finding on this,

I don't think that the ITC proceeding divests me of

jurisdiction in any way. I don't think it usurps this Court

in any way of jurisdiction and that's also what the Third

Circuit has looked to in applying the anti-suit injunction

test. And as I say, I have expressed frustration that I

would have to expend resources that are being expended in

the ITC, and given our caseload, that is frustrating. But I

also understand why Philips would bring lawsuits here the

way it did, because it has got multiple defendants subject

to jurisdiction in Delaware, and rather than wait to bring

district court actions, which Congress has expressly

provided an ability to do so, it decided to bring all of

these suits in one place here.

And then the other thing that under Third Circuit law that application of anti-suit injunction

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doctrine requires consideration of, is there some big broad policy that's being served, and I think you've made compelling policy arguments today as has Mr. Zeineddin. But I think it's clear that FRAND policy is actually subject to significant debate. It's a hard issue.

One of the reasons I was so interested in this case is because it's a very, very difficult issue and there are experts on both sides, and we've had changes in the views, for instance, of the Department of Justice over the last decade on the positions and how to balance the right of an injunction that comes with a patent against the fair and reasonable licensing terms these standards organizations set and the benefits economically that come from both the standards setting body and the monopoly rights of a patent.

I mean, there's a lot of debate about that policy. It's not clear what the right answer is. So I don't think that given the lack of clarity on the policy issue we can say that there's a broad policy, a very important policy served by applying the anti-suit injunction to this case, so I'm not going to do that.

Now, we still have to adjudicate and make a final ruling on whether there's a likelihood of success based on contractual rights that you might have to preclude them from filing in the ITC, but as far as application of the anti-suit injunction act or doctrine, I don't think it

applies. And I just want to make clear, even the Third

Circuit has made clear, it did not choose to adopt the

liberal approach that has been adopted by the Ninth Circuit.

It has expressly held that it has a restrictive approach and

that's the approach that I used.

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: Okay. I just want to point out the restrictive approach that I read is the comity issue. I understand your position about the ITC.

One last point. You I think asked Mr. Thompson, you know, why did they sue in the ITC and here at the same time and it seems to me the question should be, you know, why did they sue in the ITC? They can get the same remedies here. In fact, they can get more remedies.

THE COURT: They can get more leverage in the ITC.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, that's the point that we made in our opening papers.

THE COURT: I go back to you made a great point.

It's a great argument. I get it. If you get leverage -- if they get leverage by going to the ITC, but you get leverage by saying, we'll take a -- you know, we'll enter into some negotiations and we're willing to accept a FRAND rate, but we're not willing to accept the rate you offered us. You have leverage like that.

So that's the way the system is set up. I mean,

there's very compelling policy arguments on both sides.

It's a fascinating issue.

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either from a Court or Congress, but I don't think in the first instance I'm the one who should just decide what the policy ought to be and I don't think you've established or failed to establish reasons that were justified under Third Circuit law using the anti-suit injunction to preclude Philips from going forward in the ITC. It's a doctrine that was not designed in the first instance to apply domestically at all in my mind. If at all, you could apply it to state proceedings, and again we have a statute that specifically addresses that, you know, full faith and credits clause and whatnot that addresses that issue, and I don't think it applies to the ITC, especially when at the end of the day Congress authorized patentees to pursue on parallel tracks proceedings before the ITC in the district courts.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I will just comment on that briefly. I mean, as I understand what Congress has authorized, it would be a parallel patent lawsuit and a parallel patent lawsuit in the ITC. That's not exactly what we have here. Right? We have a patent lawsuit coupled with declaratory judgment action seeking a FRAND rate coupled with an ITC action. So, yes, there is a statute that says that, but I don't think it's contemplated for this

1 situation.

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THE COURT: Well, you can make that argument to another Court. I appreciate it and I've enjoyed the argument on that.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else anybody wants to add on the irreparable harm? Sorry. On the likelihood of success? Okay. Then let's touch briefly on irreparable harm.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Your Honor, I'm happy to address that on behalf of Thales. And thank you, Your Honor.

On the irreparable harm, the question is not what will happen at the ITC eventually, and as we submitted two declarations on that, but what will happen in the meantime.

THE COURT: Right. So in a nutshell, give me your -- do you have slides or not?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: I do not, no.

THE COURT: Give me your bullet point. What's your irreparable harm?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So, Your Honor, this is an industry that is a native industry. It's ten years away from saturation. So competitors are capturing market share.

We have submitted declarations on this and I'm going to refer to the declaration is by Mr. Christopher

1 Morehead on behalf of Thales.

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THE COURT: Okay. Hold on a second. Can you give me the DI number? I want to have it in front of me when you speak.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So it is 691 is our brief and it is attached as Exhibit 2, I believe. I'm sorry. DI 21, Your Honor. Forgive me.

THE COURT: DI-26. I've got it. Thank you.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Hopefully, that's the right one.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

So the bullet point is that this is the market that's ten years from saturation, the IoT, the internet of things market. And right now to win what we call a design win when Thales or other companies like that want to take their modules and incorporate it into a potential customer, it takes about 18 months, and that's in the declaration.

And then you pretty much are set for about four years. This is the life cycle of those products.

Now, we also have a declaration from one of the customers, Xirgo, who is actually a co-defendant, and this is by Mr. Kenneth Boschwitz.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And in there -- and this is one of Thales' customers, he states in paragraph 7, dependency

of the ITC investigation casts significant doubt and uncertainty on Xirgo's business, which depends on reliable access to Thales' models.

So we have that from this customer. We also have now going back to Mr. Morehead's declaration, and which was filed under seal. You will see, Your Honor, at the end of paragraph 10, which is at the top of page 3 as well as paragraph 11, a number of companies that are customers who have expressed grave concerns with Thales' ability to supply to them.

So here what we have are customers that can buy from anybody, and this is a supply chain threat as far as they're concerned and the pendency of this action alone threatens our ability to supply to them in this country.

And if we lose that, whatever we lose from now until the ITC rules -- and the ITC has scheduled a target date in May next year -- we are under the cloud of that and we're losing the ability to do design win with our competitors who are not --

THE COURT: Can I just ask you this?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And lose market share.

THE COURT: There's a potential injunction that could issue in this case. Right? I could issue an injunction.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Against Thales from --

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1	THE COURT: Is it possible that an injunction	
2	could issue from this Court?	
3	MR. ZEINEDDIN: By injunction as in excluding	
4	Thales from the market? No, because we have said we would	
5	take a license, pay for the patent in the future.	
6	THE COURT: Well, there's relief requested in	
7	the form of an injunction, is there not?	
8	MR. THOMPSON: Yes, Your Honor.	
9	THE COURT: So how do you know the relief here	
10	sought in the form of an injunction, how do you know the	
11	Court wouldn't issue an injunction?	
12	MR. ZEINEDDIN: Because Your Honor would not	
13	issue an injunction and at the same time make us pay forward	
14	looking license. They've asked for that.	
15	To be very clear, they have come here and they	
16	said they want forward looking license. That's prayer	
17	relief G and B.	
18	And all they wanted was for us to sign an	
19	affidavit committing a hundred percent that we'll abide by	
20	the	
21	THE COURT: I mean, suppose I decided that the	
22	FRAND did you offer the FRAND license to both?	
23	MR. THOMPSON: Yes, Your Honor.	
24	THE COURT: You did?	

MR. THOMPSON: Yes.

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THE COURT: Suppose I said that's the FRAND and I'm going to require you to pay it right away, and I don't know. You say, do you want to appeal it? I said, then I'm going to issue an injunction. I guess my point is that they've requested an injunction. There's some possibility I could enter an injunction.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: That's a great point, Your

Honor. I was going to mention that before and this is a

great time to talk about it. You will hear a hearing,

you'll hear all the evidence. You say this is the FRAND.

Right? We'll enter into a license and they'll start getting
paid.

Now, if there's an appeal like what happened in TCL, they appeal, they lose, the license keeps going. If they don't, maybe there's an action to kind of figure out how this is going to rehash back and adjust. But they get their relief. So what we're not talking about here is waiting forever for them to get this license to be executed.

And this comports with the due process and why should anybody waive their right to contest something they believe is wrong? Meanwhile that doesn't mean, too, that they don't get paid? And if they got overpaid, then that's something the Court can address on remand if it sees fit and if it serves justice according to law and according to the procedure and the due process of both parties.

So what we're not talking about here is a gotcha, and when Your Honor -- you're absolutely right.

Yes, at the end of the day, there are two separate roads, one in the ITC and one here. This is the one that dispenses justice to both parties, period.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: And it's your discretion.

THE COURT: I didn't mean to cut you off.

Is there anything else you want to say for irreparable harm?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: No, Your Honor. Everything is in both of those declarations and nobody has contradicted any of the facts asserted.

THE COURT: Right. But I want to make sure, the summary of those declarations is somewhat loss of reputation, but the real gist of it, what you are getting at is that folks are worried that you won't be able to be on the market and therefore do business they want to do.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Lose market share and not be able to capture the market share that you would have captured in the space of market where others have taken it. And once you lose it, you've got at least four years to come back.

THE COURT: As far as market share, point me to explicitly what you've put in the record to demonstrate

1 that.

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Because there's a lot of conclusory assertions, but the burden to demonstrate irreparable harm you have to show by a preponderance of the evidence. Right?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So can you show me what you put on the record to establish that?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So, again, we're going back to Mr. Morehead's declaration. It's a short declaration.

So starting -- so after paragraph 11, which we have referred to the customer.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: As well as paragraph 12, still addressing that last customer.

Starting with page 13 -- I'm sorry, with paragraph 13, we're talking about how long it would take to win the design and also how long is the life cycle of the product? Four years.

But toward the top of page four, and he mentions that basically, if you don't win that, you're waiting four years. And then on page 14, it talks about Thales has a percentage market share that's stated at paragraph 14 in North America and it states the number of year plan that they have. And they talk about the IoT space being ten

years away from the market saturation.

And these are the factor that have not been covered. All they say is we have not lost yet, but this is very key here. Those customers, if they had started already working, planning to buy from somebody else, which is not unreasonable when you think of the market reality, they're still not there yet, but the point is we would be gone by now -- by next May when we have the final determination from the ITC. And we may very well win in the ITC, but by then, what's done is done.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: So that's what we stand to lose.

And all they stand to lose, Your Honor, is the interest,

which the Court would award anyway, prejudgment and

post-judgment interest.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Lowenstein?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I'm not sure I have too much to add. I think I've already said this, so I think in our papers, we've cited the Protek case for the propositions litigating in two fora simultaneously is evidence of irreparable harm.

THE COURT: So I don't buy that. I am going to make a ruling on that. I'm going to make a ruling that I do

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not believe being forced to litigate on parallel tracks in the ITC and the United States District Court can constitute irreparable harm. I think Congress has explicitly provided for that and I do not believe that would justify irreparable harm.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: We also said that there's inevitable loss of market share, right, if the ITC were to issue an injunction, and we've explained that in our supporting declaration.

THE COURT: Well, I want you to explain that.

There's no question there are conclusory assertions about

lost profit and lost market share, but what do you have on

the record? Show me, please.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I don't have anything other than the common sense argument that if there's an injunction entered against us, we stop selling and somebody else is presumably, their argument, there are numerous companies out there going to fill the void. So that's in our papers, too.

THE COURT: Well, I want you to make sure.

Okay. I don't want you to be able to repeat if I rule

against you on appeal what you have not said here. I want
you to point it out to me.

Again, this is a preliminary injunction. We're a really, really busy Court. I have gone through the

papers, but we're so busy, this is your opportunity. I've dedicated the day to listening to you.

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Tell me what it is you've got that constitutes irreparable harm. What numbers? Do you have any financial documents? What do you have other than a conclusory assertion that, well, we would lose market share if there's an injunction. I mean, I think that if that is all it took, you would never have to make a showing if you were faced with an injunction. So what do you have?

 $\label{eq:mr.lowenstein: If I can point to Dennis} $$\operatorname{Kelly's declaration.}$$

THE COURT: All right. So what document?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I don't have it in front of me.

He said if there's an injunction issued that would exclude

Telit from selling, Telit U.S. would lose two-thirds of its

sales in the U.S. if there's an exclusion order issued.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: And the company --

THE COURT: And so what are we talking dollars-wise, that is? How does it affect your overall revenue stream? What is the evidence that backs up that kind of raw data?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I didn't put in revenue numbers. Two-thirds of the sales I think is a pretty significant amount of sales. I can't, you know, pinpoint a

number and I can't necessarily give you the unit sales that would be excluded, but, you know, it comports with common sense. I mean, if you are out of business, you're going to lose sales.

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THE COURT: When you are saying you're out of business, so is that the implication of what he said? It's not expressed. That will put us out of business?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I think he goes on --

THE COURT: Let's pull up the declaration. What DI number are you talking about?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I will pull it out of my notebook. From memory, it is two-thirds if there's an exclusion order issued, and if the customers then switch to a different manufacturer, he believes that Telit, Inc. would have a hard time surviving in the U.S.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: So it's DI -- it looks like DI 11 in the 1708 case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: And paragraph 6 says what I just said.

THE COURT: What exhibit?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Sorry?

THE COURT: Is it an exhibit?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I think it's just a separate

document, docket entry. It's docket entry 11 in the 1708, the declaration of Dennis Kelly.

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THE COURT: All right. I've got it now.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: So paragraph 6. If Philips were successful in stopping Telit products from entering the U.S., it would reduce Telit sales by at least two-thirds, probably causing Telit to go out of business in the U.S.

And the next one says, assuming Telit were in business following an order preventing Telit from importing the accused modules causing customers to switch to new suppliers, it's highly unlikely they would switch back to Telit, and in this scenario it's highly likely that Telit would go out of business.

So that's the evidence that we've presented.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: I mean, I understand your question that you want something, you know, with numbers on it that's more solid than that, but it's a sales projection, and by definition, those are projections. Right? I mean, you can't pinpoint exactly what's going to happen six, eight, twelve months from now, but that seems to me a fairly plausible explanation.

THE COURT: I guess my concern with it is it's very conclusory and it has the word even probably if Philips were successful in stopping. And, again, we don't even know

what the scope of the injunction would be.

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well --

THE COURT: And we don't know the timing of it.

Right? I guess we heard maybe May, so between now and May.

What's going to happen in this case between now and May?

So, a lot.

And then you've got no documents to support there is a very broad assertion of a loss of sales of two-thirds "probably causing Telit," and it's only to go out of business in the U.S. So It has resources there, and who is to say that they can't get back in the market again? Who knows what's going to happen between now and May? So it's very general, maybe you can't do any better, but it does strike me as very general.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Okay.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: There's the flip side, the inequitable conduct -- I'm sorry, irreparable injury argument and we've touched on it today. I will just say it one more time, I guess. If you've agreed to license your patents, you've agreed to a remedy of law, financial compensation for the use of your patents. So the cases that we cited on page 17, and I think it was the Motorola case, I making sure at this point, say that it's unlikely that you can show irreparable harm if you have made this brand

commitment. So it's the flip side of the irreparable harm argument that addressed that.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Thompson?

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MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Your Honor. I will just say a few brief comments on this and I will just reference to slide 19 just so that the Court knows where to find some of these references, the citations.

I think that probably the one thing that is important is that the defendants, and they're both the same, they chose a path of infringement over licensing and the record shows all the licenses that were offered and the one that exists today that they could take.

I think on that part, they could take a license right now. I think that as a matter of fact just switches it over to a numerical number of damages rather than all of the claims of irreparable -- I'm sorry, of --

THE COURT: Irreparable harm.

MR. THOMPSON: Irreparable harm. Sorry.

THE COURT: That's all right. I've been calling likelihood of success irreparable harm.

MR. THOMPSON: Yes. So the claims that they make really just aren't there because they could always take the license and then claim damages.

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The other thing that they say is that they would be irreparably harmed if there was an exclusion order from the ITC. Well, that's after due process. That's actually called justice. Right? That's not called irreparable harm.

Everybody who is found guilty of infringement, patents and injunction issues, believes they're irreparably harmed. Right? So that's another part that's just really not irreparable harm.

And so the other thing is I think I guess I would just mention, then I will sit down, that, you know, they're asking to change the status quo. So the trial -- and they keep talking about a later time, but the trial is actually set in September as you mentioned earlier and so that's four months from now, very similar to the case with Judge Crabb that he was referring to that we cited.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. THOMPSON: Thank you.

THE COURT: Can I just ask the defendants, was there any record evidence of if you had taken, if you take the license that was offered, the financial, the relative financial effects on your company?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Thales, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes. Can you show me where?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: I'm sorry. Could you repeat your question?

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THE COURT: Is there record evidence of the actual financial result and its effect on Thales' current financial state were it to take the license that was offered to it that it rejected?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: No, Your Honor, we don't have that in the record. I mean, what you see from the brief is what they're asking for.

THE COURT: I know that. I just want to make

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes.

THE COURT: Because, you know, I can't be sure I captured everything I read.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes.

THE COURT: Or remember it. So --

MR. ZEINEDDIN: But --

THE COURT: I recall seeing that. I just want to make sure that is correct.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes. Your Honor, that's the thing. If you take this license, right, and admit it's FRAND just because they said so, what it makes no sense to us. I mean, we've --

THE COURT: First of all, you can take the license and continue in the lawsuit.

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Well, not really. They want us to admit to everything. Your Honor, even if we talked about

if you take a look in the record and the exhibits that will get attached, they talked about arbitration, but they want us to limit the evidence to one license only.

THE COURT: Well, I shouldn't say -- I don't know if you could. You could at least ask if you could take the license subject to --

MR. ZEINEDDIN: They want us to admit to infringement, invalidity of everything and acquiesce. Whatever that is, Your Honor, that's going to serve as a foundation, as a comparable for all other licensors. So question here --

THE COURT: Hold on. Mr. Thompson, that's right. When I think about it is, you only offered the license with basically a complete surrender associated with it. Right?

MR. THOMPSON: No, that's not true. In Lear v.

Atkins by the Supreme Court, it won't permit any licensor to
do that anyway. Right? So patents can always be challenged
for validity at any given time.

THE COURT: I don't know in a FRAND context, is that even --

MR. THOMPSON: It's not in the terms. You could review it yourself. There's no term in there that says they won't challenge validity. The case can go forward on those grounds.

THE COURT: Do you dispute that?

MR. ZEINEDDIN: Yes, Your Honor. Even here they said they wouldn't even want to do the rate setting without us first acquiescing to infringement and validity.

According to them, we can't do that until we capitulate.

They could get a default judgment tomorrow because we've admitted liability.

And then they talked to us about arbitration and they want to limit it only to the arbitrator's point of view at the beginning of one license, just one license, which, by the way, Your Honor, that's one of the big reasons why we couldn't even begin to truly figure out how to negotiate with them because they tell us there's a license. They won't show it to us. And they want us to take somebody else's word for it and it's a comparable to my house that I want to sell you, but I won't let you know whether it has a basement, the same bathroom. I won't let you know, maybe that price that was paid, you get two Porsches in the garage. You're not going to know any of that.

Is there a side deal? You're not going to know any of that. And before we walk into the arbitration, then, on top of it, before we do that, acquiesce that every single one of their patents are invalid and infringed, they're designing the rules and according to rules of FRAND calculation that they dictate.

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So this is -- we're talking about bad faith and negotiations, Your Honor. So you can imagine even what happened during the negotiation and you've seen some of this stuff in there and especially in our reply brief. They go back and forth.

We're not going to show you this, but we have this and they cite the U.K. decision about comparable decisions, but the U.K. decision itself says not every license is comparable and enumerates three or four of them. Right?

We talked to them about what we call the topdown analysis. If we pay you this and you have such a sliver -- Philips is a great company, Your Honor. Not in this industry. We're not talking about Ericsson, Qualcomm.

Those huge portfolios. Right?

And if they get this much -- they want to get -I mean, you've heard the number 75 cents. We didn't say it.
On a \$20 ASP, average selling price, for somebody that has what, one, two, three percent of the patents, will the market bear more than doubling the ASP just to pay it just because they said so?

This is the kind of evidence, Your Honor, you'd hear. Your Honor, you've said a lot of things today that make a great deal of sense, but the point is the FRAND commitment does not entitle them to be the final arbiter.

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THE COURT: All right.

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MR. ZEINEDDIN: So thank you, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Lowenstein?

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: To just address your question, we have not provided financial information what 75 cents would do for us.

I touched on this earlier and I think it bears This issue of Philips, royalty stacking is a repeating. severe problem. If we pay Philips 75 cents, I don't want to name the companies, but there are a number of other companies who are or will bang on their door and say, you pay paid Philips 75 cents, we want it, too. All of a sudden it becomes 3 or \$4, and as Mr. Zeineddin has said, you know, on a \$25 product, it's not a sustainable model.

THE COURT: All right. Okay.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: One last point. I apologize. I think Philips knows that 75 cents is not a realistic amount of money and that's what motivated them to file the lawsuit in the ITC, to put some extra pressure on us to sign up. It's not a number that Telit, it sounds like Thales or any of the customers can live with, and the fact that we're here I think is evidence of that.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lowenstein, a couple of other points with you. I want to go back to likelihood of success. I think in some of my questions to you when I

was forming them and maybe in some comments I made I conflated or gave, and in particular the length of Borghetti's declaration was the declaration that your client submitted, the French law professor, who I'm going to put his name in. I will look at it when I recite it this time so I don't are butcher it, which is Stoffel-Munck.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Correct.

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THE COURT: And I made that comment because, in fact, Stoffel-Munck's declaration is quite short and I went back and reread it at the lunch break because, as I said, in my mind and just we have again so many cases, so many papers, I kind of conflate things. And I had forgotten how conclusory his analysis was.

I want to give you a chance to respond to some of these things because you made the point and we had a back and forth. You can come up. We had a back and forth.

Sure. Go ahead.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Sorry. Go ahead. I'm just going to have it in front of me if you are going to ask me questions about it.

THE COURT: Well, that's a good idea. I told you my recollection of it was that it was not the situation of really discussing in any detail the facts. I mean, it was I drew the inference that there was a, what you were calling a per se violation under the ETSI contracts to seek

an injunction. When I went back and looked at it, I thought that was kind of the case.

I want to give you a chance to respond and make sure I'm not misinterpreting it. I mean, your are correct in about paragraph 40 he talks about what a reasonable person would understand from the contract. I don't think that would be a debated point in terms of what standard I ought to apply to the contract.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, it actually is.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. LOWENSTEIN: Because they say you need to look at the intent of the organization and Professor Stoffel-Munck says it's difficult to do, so I'm going to look at what a reasonable person --

THE COURT: On that, what I was referring to, I meant when it changed through application of the implied covenant of good faith.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Okay.

THE COURT: That's what I was referring to. I don't think that's disputed, but maybe I'd better ask, that I ought to look at. An implied covenant, good-faith analysis would look at like what a reasonable person in the shoes of a party would have negotiated?

MR. THOMPSON: Yes. There's another caveat to that that says Dr. Borghetti's declaration, which is the

hesitance to inject terms that would be very material to the agreement.

THE COURT: Under French law?

MR. THOMPSON: Under French law, yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. THOMPSON: So that's in there as well.

THE COURT: But anyway, we get back to the rest of the declaration, and I mean, you know, in paragraph 56, Mr. Stoffel-Munck says, talks about his conclusion "that a party irreparably declaring that it is prepared to grant an irrevocable license cannot at the same time it is seeking the Court to determine a FRAND rate and ask the other party to negotiate also seek an injunction against a prospective licensee." That's the first per se rule. Isn't it?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: No, I don't think so.

THE COURT: No?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: That seems to me the opposite of the per se rule. He's not saying that the ETSI contract is a prohibition from seeking an injunction. He's saying at the same time, have the Court determine a FRAND rate to look at what's going on here and ask the other party to continue negotiations, which is what's going on here, and also seek an injunction.

So this actually, 56 and then the conclusory paragraph, show that we're not in per se land. That's not

my term. That's Philips' term, what they used in their opposition papers.

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I was addressing their argument, and I think 56 is a good example of him saying under these facts, you can't get an injunction. And I think he repeats that at the end, 70-something or other. Given the circumstances, 70, it would not consistent with a mandatory requirement and he carries on and 71.

THE COURT: Well, 71, again, basically, it's a breach if you seek an injunction while FRAND license negotiations are ongoing.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: The next one, under French law seeking an injunction, parties are conducting ongoing negotiations while Philips has asked to continue the negotiations where the patentee has asked the Court to either prevent Telit from litigating the issue or determine the FRAND rate.

That's his last paragraph in his conclusion and
I think that's consistent with the one that you pointed out,
56.

THE COURT: Well, this might be semantics or maybe just frankly a miscommunication or misunderstanding or different understanding of words, but when you say the particular circumstances of the parties, that to me means I have to look at e-mails, I have to look at the precise words

the parties use as opposed to a rule of law.

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Now, and I would agree that this would be a rule of law for an expert to say, as I actually think he has said, that a party that has irrevocably declared that it's prepared to grant an irrevocable license cannot at the same time it is seeking to have a Court determine a FRAND rate and ask the other party to negotiate also seek injunction against a prospective licensee.

That's a statement of law. I'm willing to accept the declaration. I don't think he has established it and I don't think it's -- anyway, that's a statement of law, it seems to me, that I can look at under Rule 44.1. I do look at it. I'm not persuaded that it's right and I'm not persuaded by it's right because the analysis is cursory.

I think the Borghetti declaration has set forth significant analysis. I find it very compelling that there was an attempt at ETSI to add to the contract or revise the contract to address the issue before it and it was rejected. The contract does not expressly preclude or even address the propriety of seeking an injunction.

And all you've given me is essentially a relatively cursory analysis by a French professor. He cites one decision. I have no idea how that Court's authority lets me understand how French law would apply.

And then from Thales, I do get a decision tree,

which I will employ, which says basically that French law recognizes an implied covenant of good faith and plus the standard that French law would look to are the same standards that United States Courts employ and no one has objected to me looking at Delaware, which is the state I'm most familiar with, and its common law teaches that when you apply -- when you apply the implied covenant of good faith, you, A, only do so with respect to terms that are not expressly taught by the contract. Then when you apply it, you try to determine what the parties would have negotiated with respect to the challenged issue.

And in this case I don't think there has been any evidence and I'm not persuaded that Philips would ever have agreed or that ETSI would ever have adopted a contract that would have precluded a member from seeking a parallel injunction. And actually, we have pretty good proof of opposite because we actually have -- we know it's undisputed that ETSI did consider revising the contract to address the issue that is left unaddressed and it didn't adopt that revision.

So for that reason I don't think that the movants have established a likelihood of success on the merits, and as I previously ruled, I don't think that the movant established that under Third Circuit law, which I believe governs, that the anti-suit injunction doctrine

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would preclude Philips from pursuing the ITC injunction.

And I will say I'm just going to repeat so it's really clear, at the end of the day, I would add, I just am very troubled by the prospect of a district court effectively enjoining an ITC proceeding by barring a party from pursuing such proceeding when Congress passed a law that clearly contemplated parallel proceedings.

So that's my ruling. I have not gone into a recitation of cases for the applicable legal standard. I am more than happy to do so. I think it's implicit in everything I've discussed today. For instance, I do believe that the Third Circuit and the Federal Circuit, although they articulate the four prongs of the preliminary injunction analysis differently, at the end of the day, they both treat the first two factors the same and they are gateway factors — the irreparable harm factor, which is number two and then the likelihood of success. I think the courts are different how they articulated the third prong and they're the same about the fourth prong, which is they basically balance the equities.

If anybody thinks that that is an issue, please let me know, because I will make it a point in case somebody wants to take an appeal to articulate those, and I don't want to be faulted in front of the Federal Circuit.

Similarly, I did not identify the Third Circuit

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cases that articulate a position that I think is very clear from Third Circuit law that the Third Circuit uses a restrictive approach. The Third Circuit has expressly held that it would not adopt a Ninth Circuit liberal approach. I don't remember the case off the top of my head. I have the cases on my bench here in front of me.

If anybody thinks and is going to fault me for that on appeal, let me know, because I will lay the necessary record. And if there's any other question somebody has in that regard, for instance, the citation to a record or lack of citation to a record or case, you need to let me know now, because I would willingly address that.

I'm ruling from the bench because we have 600 cases each here in this district. I want to afford the movant an opportunity to litigate this matter in the Federal Circuit, which doesn't have 600 cases a judge, and I want to move expeditiously so that you all have a right to adjudicate this in a timely fashion in the Federal Circuit. So now is the time. Please let me know. I've got some time left in the day and I will address anything.

MR. KEELEY: Your Honor, if I may, I'm Michael Keeley from Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider, also for Teles with my partner.

Regarding appeal, we'll need to discuss with our client whether that is in the cards. I am satisfied that we

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all are looking at the same papers and thinking about the same cases from the different circuits and courts so that I don't think there will be confusion on appeal about the cases you were relying on, Your Honor, but I did want to be forthright with you that we may appeal and I don't want to be in the position of you feeling like we sandbagged you by not making clear that that was a possibility in the event that you wanted to recite more cases either on the record verbally or in a writing.

Thank you very much for that THE COURT: No. I will tell you, part of me was tempted not to rule on irreparable harm so that you could tee this first I issue up to the Federal Circuit, which is almost -- I think it's largely a legal issue, a policy issue that agencies and courts above my level could help weigh in on, but I also felt it would be unfair to Philips not to address irreparable harm, and I didn't think irreparable harm had been established because, as I mentioned, I just think the record is too conclusory. I think you need to do more. I absolutely believe, this is the one thing I'm confident about probably, is that it's not irreparable harm to have to litigate on two fronts when Congress has expressly allowed That just doesn't constitute irreparable harm in my mind.

But those are the only two factors I've ruled

216 1 upon. Because I've ruled against the movants on both of 2 them, I don't think it's necessary to address the two 3 remaining factors. A very interest issue. It will make for 4 interesting appeal. 5 Anything else, plaintiff? 6 MR. THOMPSON: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 7 THE COURT: Anything else? 8 MR. LOWENSTEIN: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 9 THE COURT: Anything else? 10 MR. ZEINEDDIN: No, your Honor. Thank you. 11 THE COURT: All right. Everybody have a good 12 day. Thanks very much. 13 MR. LOWENSTEIN: Thank you. 14 (Hearing concluded at 2:39 p.m.) 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

-	7			
\$	1:31 [1] - 169:2	600 [2] - 214:14,	103:16, 134:8,	144:18, 146:19
		214:16	156:21, 157:21,	address [31] - 7:24,
\$20 [1] - 205:18	2	616 [1] - 139:5	170:16, 192:2,	18:15, 25:1, 42:18,
\$25 [1] - 206:14	• 400.0	691 [1] - 188:5	215:20	54:11, 90:7, 92:11,
\$500,000 [1] - 123:19	2 [1] - 188:6	6:30 [1] - 76:14	abstract [2] - 15:21,	94:23, 97:5, 97:19,
	20 [2] - 123:17, 151:11	_	121:1	113:10, 122:20,
'	20-1708 [1] - 1:9	7	abuse [1] - 109:6	123:8, 123:10,
IOF 405:04	20-1711-CFC [1] -	7 m 455,47 400,05	abusing [1] - 31:11	126:4, 131:2, 147:9,
'85 [1] - 165:24	1:15 200 [1] - 126:8	7 [2] - 155:17, 188:25 70 [1] - 210:6	accept [10] - 80:19,	168:18, 170:6, 171:2, 178:6,
0	2013 [2] - 48:25, 69:19	70-something [1] -	83:16, 101:13, 101:14, 107:5,	187:10, 191:23,
U	2013 [2] - 40.23, 09.19 2021 [1] - 1:18	210:6	121:24, 168:10,	206:4, 211:18,
07 [1] - 165:6	21 [3] - 1:18, 181:1,	71 [2] - 210:8, 210:9	185:22, 185:23,	211:19, 212:18,
0.11	188:6	75 [10] - 123:17,	211:10	214:12, 214:20,
1	23 [2] - 153:18, 156:7	123:23, 128:23,	accepting [2] -	215:16, 216:2
•	25 [1] - 123:17	129:16, 130:8,	174:24, 175:9	addressed [8] - 13:11,
10 [1] - 189:7	28 [1] - 65:24	205:17, 206:5,	access [3] - 164:13,	19:21, 53:7, 148:14,
105 [1] - 153:15	28th [2] - 56:11, 56:12	206:9, 206:12,	164:21, 189:3	152:18, 156:10,
106 [1] - 153:15	2:39 [1] - 216:14	206:17	according [7] - 119:4,	168:20, 200:2
11 [6] - 7:1, 156:19,	2G [2] - 102:1, 102:2	757 [1] - 82:18	162:25, 181:3,	addresses [5] - 87:7,
189:8, 193:11,			191:24, 204:5,	121:22, 186:13,
197:18, 198:1	3	8	204:24	186:14
1134 [1] - 139:6			account [5] - 95:6,	addressing [3] -
12 [1] - 193:14	3 [4] - 69:19, 138:19,	8 [1] - 135:22	96:3, 96:19, 100:16,	95:19, 193:15, 210:3
1286 [1] - 82:18	189:7, 206:13	84 [3] - 155:19,	113:15	adequate [1] - 123:18
13 [2] - 193:16, 193:17	30 [3] - 54:25, 104:2,	155:24, 155:25	accused [3] - 8:11,	adjudged [1] - 99:2
1332 [1] - 83:1	132:1	86 [1] - 156:18	157:14, 198:10	adjudicate [8] - 34:3,
1337 [1] - 133:2	300 [1] - 132:2	9	achieve [1] - 51:6	130:25, 156:8, 168:6, 182:16,
1337(c [2] - 133:12, 136:21	337 [2] - 20:8, 69:14	9	acquiesce [2] - 203:8, 204:22	183:5, 184:21,
14 [2] - 193:22, 193:23	337(b)(1) [1] - 133:4 35 [6] - 99:9, 102:20,	9 [2] - 48:4, 49:20	acquiescing [1] -	214:18
1659 [7] - 65:24, 71:2,	105:17, 131:9,	9:00 [2] - 1:19, 4:4	204:4	adjudicated [5] - 49:3,
73:12, 73:17, 133:6,	133:8, 165:22	., ,	act [4] - 32:3, 32:12,	59:13, 123:3, 123:4,
137:7, 138:8	37 [1] - 136:15	Α	119:25, 184:25	159:13
17 [10] - 66:12, 67:16,	3G [2] - 10:5, 102:1		acted [1] - 149:1	adjudication [2] -
67:20, 67:23, 68:3,		a.m [2] - 1:19, 4:4	acting [2] - 108:4,	11:20, 25:25
68:10, 68:12,	4	abide [8] - 21:3, 89:3,	129:7	adjust [1] - 191:16
135:22, 153:15,	•	89:17, 157:3, 157:4,	action [21] - 7:16,	administration [5] -
199:23	4 [2] - 143:13, 206:13	157:24, 159:16,	7:25, 9:19, 10:23,	70:8, 134:16,
1708 [15] - 6:7, 6:11,	40 [2] - 104:2, 208:5	190:19	17:15, 18:21, 19:9,	134:17, 134:18,
6:16, 6:18, 7:2, 7:4,	41.2 [1] - 116:11	ability [9] - 34:2,	19:18, 19:23, 20:9,	135:8
7:8, 7:16, 8:11, 9:5,	412 [2] - 116:6	130:25, 168:6, 182:15, 183:5,	21:2, 25:21, 137:3,	administrative [2] -
9:9, 9:15, 9:19, 107:18, 108:1	44.1 [6] - 116:9,	183:22, 189:9,	175:23, 179:3,	144:4, 164:6
197:18, 198:1 1709 [1] - 6:13	116:12, 116:15,	189:14, 189:18	186:23, 186:24,	admissible [3] - 117:2, 117:11,
1711 [5] - 6:11, 6:18,	118:20, 118:23, 211:12	able [16] - 8:2, 32:12,	189:13, 191:15 ACTION [2] - 1:4, 1:10	117:2, 117:11,
6:23, 9:9, 9:16	47 [1] - 155:23	43:2, 51:21, 56:12,	actions [4] - 20:7,	admit [3] - 202:19,
1713 [4] - 6:12, 6:13,	4G [2] - 10:5, 102:1	71:19, 98:23,	61:4, 101:7, 183:21	202:25, 203:7
68:7, 68:8	10.0, 102.1	108:19, 113:23,	actual [9] - 31:20,	admitted [1] - 204:7
17th [1] - 56:10	5	116:22, 130:8,	85:15, 140:9,	admittedly [1] -
18 [1] - 188:17		172:25, 181:11,	142:17, 152:11,	177:23
19 [5] - 105:20, 131:9,	5 [3] - 135:4, 146:6,	192:17, 192:20,	152:14, 152:19,	admitting [1] - 8:10
133:2, 133:9, 200:8	153:15	195:21 absence [1] - 107:13	183:1, 202:2	adopt [3] - 185:2,
1950 [1] - 162:10	500 [1] - 123:15	absolute [2] - 31:17,	Adam [1] - 4:20	212:19, 214:4
1985 [1] - 165:22	56 [4] - 209:8, 209:24,	87:20	ADAM[1] - 2:3	adopted [2] - 185:3,
1990s [1] - 163:8	210:3, 210:20	absolutely [18] - 4:12,	add [4] - 187:6,	212:14
1993 [1] - 142:18	G	8:5, 31:1, 33:2,	194:20, 211:17,	advance [1] - 157:8
1994 [2] - 142:14, 142:16	6	53:17, 64:10, 78:1,	213:3 adding [1] - 148:18	advantage [1] - 101:11
1:30 [1] - 168:21	6 [2] - 197:20, 198:4	88:11, 88:13, 94:17,	addition [3] - 83:19,	advisory [2] - 105:14,
.100[1] 100.21	ļ		addition [0] 00.10,	

2

174:2 23:17, 23:19, 24:9, agreement [12] -36:3, 36:4, 37:17, apologize [9] - 82:25, affect [5] - 8:2, 10:8, 35:20, 37:1, 41:11, 64:23, 73:3, 77:16, 114:12, 114:13, 46:5, 49:13, 49:23, 52:18, 123:19, 137:4, 177:12, 77:10, 80:12, 99:14, 92:22, 94:3, 94:4, 139:19, 145:22, 126:24, 138:8, 196:20 99:20, 143:17, 111:9, 113:7, 152:3, 152:4, 152:6, affected [1] - 180:13 150:12, 152:19, 120:16, 135:9, 206:16 160:8, 160:10, 152:20, 209:2 176:19, 182:1, affects [1] - 8:23 136:9, 162:21, appeal [14] - 169:14, affidavit [10] - 21:2, agreements [1] -177:4, 177:7, 181:6, 169:15, 169:22, 182:2, 186:10, 184:16 170:10, 191:3, 186:11, 208:8, 21:15, 21:16, 115:7, 111:17 answered [3] - 36:5, 211:24, 212:7, 212:9 116:2, 116:4, 117:8, ahead [13] - 8:10, 191:13, 191:14, 37:16, 131:15 applying [11] - 12:19, 174:11, 190:19 75:15, 77:22, 97:23, 195:22, 213:23, 104:21, 106:25, anti [40] - 10:18, 214:8, 214:24, 15:25, 16:7, 16:8, affidavits [3] - 46:3, 10:25, 11:3, 11:9, 215:3, 215:5, 216:4 47:23, 118:16, 72:10, 126:2 110:13, 124:24, 15:6, 17:13, 18:17, 119:2, 120:1, 171:7, 171:25, appealed [2] - 18:22, afford [1] - 214:14 18:24, 19:6, 22:22, 179:17, 183:14, 176:16, 207:17, 19:1 affording [1] - 66:9 22:24, 32:17, 32:22, 184:19 afraid [3] - 39:6, 207:18 Appeals [1] - 15:3 akin [1] - 52:14 33:1, 38:13, 40:4, appear [1] - 132:8 appreciate [2] - 70:20, 144:25, 171:23 40:18, 40:25, 41:2, 187:3 afternoon [2] - 91:6, algorithym [1] -APPEARANCES[2] -42:13, 71:8, 75:20, approach [8] - 66:24, 163:14 2:1. 3:1 169:2 allege [1] - 43:14 85:14, 88:16, appellate [1] - 43:3 176:9, 185:3, 185:4, agencies [1] - 215:14 alleged [1] - 83:16 124:18, 125:22, 185:5, 185:7, 214:3, Apple [21] - 48:18, agency [2] - 39:23, 168:18, 170:8, 214:4 allegedly [1] - 20:5 48:24, 59:7, 59:15, 164:6 alleging [1] - 26:13 170:21, 171:6, 59:24, 59:25, 60:23, approaches [1] ago [5] - 106:1, allocated [1] - 91:5 172:18, 176:7, 157:8 61:1, 68:21, 82:17, 136:17, 151:11, 176:24, 177:16, appropriate [1] -100:10, 100:13, 159:7, 165:22 allow [6] - 71:6, 86:20, 183:14, 183:25, 174:13 144:9, 146:7, 113:11, 127:20, agree [65] - 12:20, 184:19, 184:25, approved [1] - 123:3 128:22, 141:23 146:19, 153:14, 16:10, 18:9, 21:24, 186:8, 212:25 allowed [8] - 32:8, 156:14, 157:2, arbiter [1] - 205:25 22:14, 22:17, 23:11, anti-exclusion [1] arbitration [3] - 203:2, 71:17, 82:1, 84:16, 157:19, 157:24, 23:22, 24:6, 24:11, 170.8 204:8, 204:21 121:17, 127:16, 158:1 24:14, 24:23, 27:1, anti-suit [39] - 10:18, Apple's [1] - 60:16 arbitrator's [1] - 204:9 27:3, 28:10, 28:11, 161:18, 215:22 10:25, 11:3, 11:9, Apple/Motorola [8] allowing [2] - 42:13, Arcos [7] - 123:4, 31:4, 34:6, 36:20, 15:6, 17:13, 18:17, 58:21, 59:11, 63:15, 123:13, 130:3, 39:17, 43:13, 43:22, 162:16 18:24, 19:6, 22:22, 44:14, 45:1, 45:10, allows [1] - 73:18 81:11, 81:14, 82:10, 130:7, 164:24, 22:24, 32:17, 32:22, 84:4, 155:15 164:25, 165:7 45:22, 53:15, 54:10, almost [5] - 9:10, 33:1, 38:13, 40:4, Apple/Samsung [2] argue [13] - 84:11, 65:19, 71:4, 76:15, 55:17, 127:14, 40:18, 40:25, 41:2, 76:16, 76:18, 76:24. 68:21, 166:12 85:9, 97:15, 102:16, 215:13 42:13, 71:8, 75:20, apples [1] - 104:11 103:10, 103:11, 77:14, 78:21, 78:23, alone [3] - 88:10, 85:14, 88:16, 81:1, 86:2, 91:22, applicable [3] - 16:2, 113:21, 128:12, 143:6, 189:13 124:18, 125:22, 17:14, 213:9 146:11, 180:14, 93:7, 100:15, altogether [2] - 8:1, 168:18, 170:21, 180:21, 181:5, 181:8 100:22, 100:24, application [6] - 45:4, 114:24 171:6, 172:18, arguendo [1] - 61:5 102:14, 102:18, 45:24, 118:2, ambiguity [1] - 176:13 176:7, 176:24, 183:25, 184:24, arguing [5] - 27:23, 102:24, 108:22, America [1] - 193:24 177:16, 183:14, 109:24, 109:25, 208:16 28:13, 94:4, 142:19 American [3] - 19:22, 183:25, 184:19, 110:2, 110:3, 110:5, applied [8] - 12:9, argument [36] - 6:1, 46:13, 48:16 184:25, 186:8, 110:16, 110:19, 16:15, 115:25, 10:19, 40:17, 42:10, Americans [2] - 48:15, 212:25 127:20, 127:25, 117:7, 117:18, 42:19, 90:22, 98:17, 49:4 antithetical [1] -128:7, 128:18, 176:24, 177:2, 98:19, 107:23, amount [4] - 66:1, 135:25 141:20, 147:13, 177:14 114:4, 114:14, 140:22, 196:25, antitrust [3] - 10:25, 148:8, 151:18, applies [16] - 12:2, 114:25, 126:21, 206:18 135:7, 162:14 162:11, 211:2 14:5, 14:7, 16:23, 128:13, 134:24, analysis [9] - 20:21, Antonitsch [1] - 89:12 **agreeable** [1] - 110:15 17:2, 20:13, 24:6, 141:18, 148:13, 111:17, 205:12, anyway [7] - 74:3, 148:14, 153:16, agreed [22] - 49:5, 47:21, 73:17, 207:13, 208:22, 122:8, 140:5, 49:12, 51:5, 53:10, 117:16, 127:1, 168:5, 168:7, 211:14, 211:16, 194:14, 203:18, 168:12, 170:22, 53:13, 53:21, 87:8, 138:9, 142:9, 178:3, 211:22, 213:14 209:7, 211:11 172:1, 173:18, 87:11, 87:16, 88:2, 185:1, 186:15 analyzed [1] - 108:24 apart [3] - 10:3, 110:2, 177:19, 180:17, 91:18, 95:9, 122:22, apply [36] - 11:23, **AND** [1] - 1:2 110:13 183:3, 185:19, 122:25, 123:1, 12:6, 12:14, 12:18, Andrews [3] - 12:8, apnea [2] - 180:10, 127:9, 127:10, 187:2, 187:4, 13:1, 14:11, 14:14, 49:8, 177:6 181:2 144:15, 199:20, 195:15, 195:17, 15:13, 15:22, 17:25, answer [23] - 8:14, apologies [1] - 169:6 199:19, 200:2, 210:3 199:21, 212:14 20:18, 23:12, 23:13, 10:16, 17:5, 18:18,

3

210:10 argument's [1] -168:6, 211:23 **BEFORE** [1] - 1:21 blanche [2] - 122:2, breached [13] - 25:20, 147:13 authorized [3] - 89:15, beg [1] - 82:7 122:4 arguments [7] - 11:11, 186:16, 186:20 BLUMENFELD[3] -36:14, 42:8, 43:14, begin [1] - 204:12 auxiliary [1] - 19:16 70:22, 91:4, 142:5, 2:15, 5:1, 6:8 55:18, 121:2, 121:4, beginning [5] - 4:4, 146:9, 184:3, 186:1 available [4] - 54:20, Blumenfeld [3] - 4:25, 148:6, 148:11, 4:10, 72:18, 138:18, 148:19, 150:15, arm's [1] - 92:19 71:25, 157:9, 157:10 5:2, 6:7 204:10 arose [3] - 18:19, average [2] - 123:17, body [3] - 48:7, 143:7, 151:15, 159:23 behalf [5] - 4:21, 5:7, 19:5, 20:1 205:18 184:14 break [13] - 74:13, 20:24, 187:11, 188:1 ARSHT[2] - 2:15, 3:3 avoiding [1] - 179:13 90:18, 90:19, 91:10, behavior [3] - 80:3, boils [9] - 32:5, 34:7, Article [3] - 144:5, 108:5, 110:11, award [1] - 194:14 80:4, 80:6 38:21, 54:13, 55:3, 120:14, 154:20, 144:7, 144:11 77:19, 80:1, 105:3, aware [1] - 163:2 believes [3] - 31:9, 155:6, 165:23, articulate [8] - 36:19, 114:25 aXINN [2] - 3:6, 3:11 197:14, 201:6 168:21, 207:10 Borghetti [14] - 6:17, 38:10, 38:13, 40:9, Axinn [2] - 5:8, 214:22 belongs [1] - 122:11 BRIAN [1] - 3:3 107:12, 117:21, 42:25, 213:13, bench [5] - 93:12, Brian [1] - 5:6 117:22, 119:5, 213:23, 214:1 95:5, 98:9, 214:6, В articulated [3] - 41:10, 119:7, 126:5, Briar's [1] - 182:4 214:13 back-and-forth [2] -43:6, 213:18 126:11, 144:19, brief [24] - 13:15, 17:9, beneficiaries [1] -158:2, 158:4 145:9, 145:16, 20:12, 48:4, 49:21, Asia [1] - 101:8 43:11 background [2] -145:19, 146:2, 67:19, 68:8, 69:2, aside [3] - 56:23, beneficiary [4] -121:3, 123:21 211:15 69:3, 69:5, 69:17, 75:22, 137:16 26:18, 28:15, 34:8, 69:20, 69:23, backroom [2] - 62:13, Borghetti's [4] -ASP [2] - 205:18, 159:24 164:12 145:1, 145:5, 207:3, 100:22, 101:2, 205:20 benefit [7] - 44:11, 101:4, 114:19, backs [1] - 196:21 208:25 assert [1] - 33:14 64:15, 89:15, 97:23, 141:4, 147:11, Boschwitz [1] asserted [15] - 7:15, bad [2] - 108:4, 205:1 120:3, 120:4, 124:2 170:22, 188:5, 188:22 7:23, 8:12, 9:14, balance [4] - 22:5, **benefiting** [1] - 64:15 200:7, 202:6, 205:4 Boston [1] - 2:11 62:3, 184:10, 213:20 25:9, 28:18, 28:19, benefits [2] - 156:22, bother [3] - 136:13, briefed [2] - 12:10, balancing [2] - 24:4, 28:22, 28:24, 29:5, 184:13 13:21 140:15, 152:21 24:18 best [4] - 14:3, 82:10, 42:17, 152:17, briefing [5] - 18:13, bothers [5] - 75:9, 152:19, 192:13 bang [1] - 206:11 103:22, 183:2 46:3, 67:25, 143:3, 115:23, 130:17 asserting [3] - 31:8, **bar** [1] - 143:18 better [7] - 6:15, 157:7 bottom [5] - 13:4, 33:15, 37:21 BARATZ[1] - 2:18 41:19, 64:25, 73:4, 144:13, 155:20, briefly [3] - 43:9, assertion [4] - 29:13, Barbara [1] - 100:9 107:2, 199:13, 156:7, 162:4 186:19, 187:8 55:2, 196:6, 199:8 bargaining [2] - 182:7 208:20 briefs [6] - 6:16, 14:2, assertions [2] - 193:4, bound [4] - 38:2, 93:7, barred [3] - 52:13, between [24] - 9:19, 32:19, 142:4 103:14, 157:17 195.11 53:21, 136:10 13:12, 31:19, 31:22, brightest [1] - 43:2 box [1] - 104:10 assess [1] - 4:16 barring [1] - 213:5 38:1, 48:24, 49:9, boy [1] - 46:2 bring [5] - 116:20, assessing [3] - 94:1, based [21] - 19:12, 51:18, 59:7, 59:15, 130:21, 183:18, branch [2] - 70:18, 94:2, 94:16 20:20, 25:25, 26:9, 65:2, 79:16, 82:17, 91:1, 99:22, 118:12, 71:15 183:20, 183:22 assistance [1] -27:14, 30:6, 37:22, bringing [4] - 70:20, brand [2] - 25:20, 135:17, 137:6, 163:19 43:4, 48:15, 49:2, 130:22, 158:21 199:25 137:9, 150:14, associate [1] - 165:23 49:10, 73:8, 75:24, brining [1] - 158:23 181:25, 199:4, breach [50] - 14:17, associated [1] -103:5, 103:6, 103:8, broad [4] - 169:21, 199:5, 199:12 14:19, 19:12, 19:16, 203:14 120:16, 121:15, beyond [4] - 115:11, 184:1, 184:18, 199:8 26:9, 26:14, 26:23, assume [2] - 24:20, 165:3, 169:19, 141:9, 143:18, brought [19] - 21:10, 27:22, 28:2, 28:4, 147:12 184:23 143:19 29:15, 36:5, 36:21, 28:1, 29:2, 29:5, assuming [4] - 51:3, basement [1] - 204:17 37:6, 37:13, 41:11, 29:7, 29:8, 29:12, big [8] - 9:21, 61:12, 61:5, 198:8 basing [1] - 55:6 34:3, 55:10, 55:23, 41:16, 41:20, 43:8, 61:23, 78:17, assumption [1] - 51:4 basis [5] - 28:15, 40:2, 44:1, 44:20, 52:23, 86:8, 112:12, 174:21, 176:12, 42:22, 121:5, 136:11 Atkins [1] - 203:17 130:18, 130:19, 184:1, 204:11 54:19, 55:5, 55:6, attached [6] - 89:6, bathroom [1] - 204:17 130:20, 131:1, 55:7, 55:9, 61:8, bigger [1] - 131:5 101:12, 105:10, bear [2] - 134:22, 136:22, 152:16, 61:9, 80:19, 99:23, bilateral [2] - 61:15, 147:19, 188:6, 203:2 205:20 158:22 105:12, 111:19, 80:12 attack [1] - 174:17 bears [1] - 206:7 120:23, 120:24, bucks [1] - 123:17 bill [1] - 113:23 attempt [1] - 211:17 beat [1] - 110:18 121:7, 121:9, bullet [2] - 187:19, binding [3] - 109:3, attempts [1] - 143:21 became [3] - 56:17, 188:12 121:10, 134:23, 135:5, 183:4 attribute [1] - 32:14 57:11, 61:1 136:12, 146:22, bunch [2] - 88:1, bit [8] - 68:5, 70:20, August [1] - 69:19 become [2] - 60:17, 146:24, 148:6, 145:24 80:15, 90:4, 132:20, Australia [1] - 101:8 163:3 148:14, 149:20, bundle [1] - 162:24 141:15, 161:2, authority [6] - 10:17. becomes [1] - 206:13 149:21, 150:3, burden [8] - 52:12, 172:13 33:1, 40:15, 133:19, bedrock [1] - 58:12

Case: 21-2106 Document: 15 Page: 278 Filed: 08/30/2021

4

53:8, 107:18, 119:8, 106:14, 106:21 carte [2] - 122:2, 122:4 132:19, 132:21, Chief [1] - 140:2 142:13, 151:23, case [232] - 4:15, 6:8, 132:22, 132:25, Cassion [1] - 107:8 China [2] - 18:25, 6:24, 7:2, 7:4, 7:6, 165:1, 193:4 133:23, 134:12, casts [1] - 189:1 79:17 burdens [1] - 134:1 7:9, 7:23, 8:11, 8:12, 134:13, 135:4, causing [3] - 198:7, Chinese [1] - 161:14 business [21] - 8:19, 8:24, 9:6, 9:23, 9:24, 135:6, 135:14, 198:10, 199:9 choice [3] - 137:17, 10:9, 96:21, 109:14, 10:8, 12:8, 12:11, 135:15, 135:17, caveat [2] - 18:10, 179:8, 179:10 110:14, 111:20, 12:12, 12:14, 12:17, 137:8, 137:11, 208:24 choose [1] - 185:2 123:23, 127:21, 13:13, 15:18, 15:20, 137:19, 137:20, caveats [1] - 140:16 chose [1] - 200:12 138:22, 139:8, 179:8, 182:23, 15:22, 16:2, 16:5, CDC [1] - 4:11 chosen [1] - 62:6 139:10, 142:10, 182:24, 189:2, 16:6, 16:11, 16:16, cease [1] - 166:21 Christmas [1] - 74:12 192:18, 197:3, 16:20, 17:8, 17:12, 146:8, 146:19, cellphone [3] -Christopher [1] -197:6, 197:7, 198:7, 17:13, 18:19, 18:20, 146:20, 146:25, 104:16, 165:13 187:25 198:9, 198:13, 18:21, 18:23, 19:2, 150:19, 151:4, cellphones [1] circle [1] - 80:20 199:10 19:5, 19:12, 19:15, 153:13, 157:1, 123:14 Circuit [133] - 11:18, busy [2] - 195:25, 19:18, 19:25, 20:2, 157:2, 157:15, cellular [1] - 58:22 11:19, 11:22, 11:23, 157:24, 158:21, 196:1 20:18, 20:19, 21:7, cent [2] - 123:17, 11:24, 12:1, 12:7, 158:22, 160:11, 21:20, 24:9, 25:5, butcher [1] - 207:6 130:8 12:9, 12:10, 12:18, 25:9, 32:12, 32:25, 161:7, 164:24, buy [3] - 189:11, cents [9] - 123:23, 12:19, 13:1, 13:3, 164:25, 165:13, 194:5, 194:24 39:12, 40:11, 40:24, 128:23, 129:16, 13:9, 13:10, 13:14, 165:21, 166:12, **BY** [7] - 2:3, 2:7, 2:11, 46:10, 46:17, 47:1, 165:6, 205:17, 14:5, 14:7, 14:11, 168:19, 170:11, 2:15, 2:19, 3:7, 3:11 47:5, 47:21, 48:9, 14:13, 14:15, 14:16, 206:5, 206:9, 174:7, 176:13, 48:11, 48:19, 50:5, 14:20, 14:23, 14:24, 206:12, 206:17 178:16, 179:6, 50:10, 50:20, 51:6, C 14:25, 15:2, 15:11, certain [11] - 17:14, 180:9, 181:23, 51:10, 51:21, 52:7, 49:22, 66:1, 69:12, 15:14, 15:16, 15:18, 182:5, 183:3, 184:7, cake [4] - 112:4, 54:21, 57:9, 57:25, 15:19, 15:22, 15:23, 79:6, 117:14, 184:20, 189:23, 58:21, 59:8, 59:10, 112:5, 112:9, 112:12 15:24, 15:25, 16:1, 119:14, 150:8, 194:21, 197:18, 60:4, 60:14, 60:15, CalAmp [1] - 173:9 16:5, 16:6, 16:7, 150:23, 162:16, 60:21, 61:5, 63:14, 199:5, 199:23, CALAMP[1] - 1:14 16:8, 16:9, 16:12, 166:2 64:22, 66:16, 66:17, 201:14, 203:24, calculation [1] -16:13, 16:23, 17:2, certainly [2] - 91:6, 208:2, 212:12, 67:11. 67:16. 67:25. 204:25 17:15, 17:16, 17:19, 99:1 213:22, 214:5, 68:2, 68:21, 68:22, California [3] - 15:21, 17:21, 17:25, 18:1, CFC [1] - 1:9 214:11 69:6, 69:8, 70:7, 50:19, 183:3 18:7, 18:22, 19:1, chain [1] - 189:12 caseload [1] - 183:17 73:19, 74:1, 74:2, candle [1] - 43:2 19:2, 19:9, 19:11, challenge [9] - 91:22, 74:3, 74:11, 74:18, cases [68] - 6:18, 9:9, cannot [16] - 50:2, 19:20, 20:10, 20:11, 91:24, 112:6, 112:7, 75:7, 81:12, 81:15, 9:23, 12:8, 13:9, 50:18, 51:15, 78:2, 20:13, 20:19, 21:25, 112:14, 128:11, 82:6, 82:13, 82:14, 13:11, 19:14, 33:24, 78:3, 78:4, 107:21, 22:19, 22:23, 23:3, 168:10, 168:11, 83:24, 84:3, 84:23, 46:1, 46:14, 47:22, 108:16, 112:3, 23:4, 23:23, 24:1, 203:24 48:1, 48:3, 49:7, 84:25, 91:7, 92:17, 162:11, 164:2, 24:7, 24:9, 24:10, challenged [2] -94:22, 95:18, 99:16, 49:8, 49:10, 49:20, 164:9, 164:10, 48:10, 56:3, 81:7, 203:18, 212:11 100:1, 100:11, 50:1, 50:4, 50:12, 174:23, 209:11, 81:8, 81:12, 81:17, challenging [3] -100:17, 106:6, 50:13, 50:17, 51:7, 211:5 81:19, 82:14, 82:16, 95:16, 95:20 106:10, 108:15, 55:23, 57:16, 57:20, capitulate [1] - 204:5 93:13, 104:6, 135:2, chambers [1] - 4:11 63:14, 66:13, 73:23, 109:21, 115:1, capture [1] - 192:20 135:15, 139:7, chance [7] - 11:17, 115:8, 115:11, 74:1, 81:23, 82:17, captured [2] - 192:21, 139:10, 139:14, 67:4, 88:22, 124:8, 115:14, 115:25, 87:1, 106:4, 107:14, 202:12 139:15, 139:16, 155:11, 207:14, 117:10, 117:16, 109:2, 131:21, 139:23, 146:20, capturing [1] - 187:23 208:3 117:17, 117:18, 132:2, 133:13, 164:15, 164:18, cards [2] - 122:21, change [8] - 107:8, 118:3, 118:11, 134:23, 137:20, 214:25 169:17, 176:9, 134:18, 146:12, 118:16, 119:4, 137:22, 138:5, 176:10, 176:18, care [2] - 17:20, 59:1 154:5, 154:6, 179:3, 140:25, 143:15, 120:2, 121:20, 176:23, 177:8, carefully [1] - 14:2 179:6, 201:11 122:12, 122:17, 166:5, 166:8, 177:14, 177:23, cares [1] - 11:4 changed [1] - 208:16 123:5, 123:7, 166:13, 166:16, 177:24, 183:14, Carpenter [2] changes [3] - 134:16, 124:23, 125:1, 167:11, 167:19, 183:25. 185:2. 135:15, 138:23 134:17, 184:8 125:4, 125:6, 177:5, 177:18, 185:3, 186:8, carried [2] - 26:1, chapter [1] - 38:7 125:13, 127:12, 177:22, 177:24, 212:24. 213:12. 121:13 charge [2] - 164:21, 130:3, 130:5, 199:22, 207:11, 213:24, 213:25, carries [2] - 173:20, 164:22 130:21, 130:22, 213:9, 214:1, 214:6, 214:2, 214:3, 214:4, 210:8 chart [2] - 100:3, 130:23, 131:7, 214:14, 214:16, 214:16, 214:18, carry [1] - 151:22 104:23 131:8, 131:17, 215:2, 215:4, 215:8 215:13 carrying [2] - 46:9, check [1] - 78:13 131:20, 132:3, cashed [1] - 78:13 circuit [4] - 11:19,

Cassation [2] -

Chicago [1] - 2:7

142:13

132:4, 132:6,

5

12:15, 135:19, 200:23 196:5, 198:24, comment [4] - 182:4, compendium [2] -139:11 207:13, 209:24, clarify [3] - 18:12, 186:18, 207:8, 69:17, 69:21 215:19 circuits [1] - 215:2 21:20, 140:6 215:11 compensation [1] conditions [8] - 27:19, circumstance [2] clarity [4] - 23:25, comments [3] - 183:6, 199:22 110:12, 121:9 117:20, 184:17, 200:7, 207:1 compete [1] - 180:10 29:19, 86:1, 89:21, circumstances [12] -93:1, 93:2, 96:1, 186:3 Commission [12] competitive [3] -18:13, 64:9, 75:23, clause [1] - 186:13 57:25, 59:4, 59:12, 150:8 110:23, 135:11, 108:1, 111:18, clauses [1] - 26:3 59:19. 59:20. 59:24. 181.14 conduct [1] - 199:18 117:18, 127:12, clean [1] - 121:6 60:11, 60:22, 64:24, competitors [3] conducted [1] - 90:22 conducting [1] -150:24, 159:15, 109:2, 109:5, 166:11 clear [26] - 6:19, 8:9, 180:12, 187:23, 168:3, 210:6, 210:24 commission [3] -210:13 20:23, 47:20, 51:20, 189:18 complain [3] - 72:9, circumvent [2] -53:11, 83:15, 87:19, 67:13, 143:6, 143:8 confident [1] - 215:20 173:6, 173:10 Commission's [1] -178:14, 178:17 confidential [5] -95:22, 95:23, 95:24, citation [6] - 17:8, 96:17, 100:6, 144:3 171:14, 171:15, complainants's [1] -101:2, 135:1, commit [5] - 89:15, 171:18, 172:4, 104:25, 137:5, 135:24 144:25, 214:10, 144:16, 156:12, 174:24, 175:5, 172:10 complaining [1] -214:11 173:22, 184:4, 175:6, 175:9 156:14 confidentiality [1] citations [3] - 99:5, 184:16, 185:1, commitment [20] complaint [10] - 9:15, 129:1 143:14, 200:9 185:2, 190:15, 25:20, 26:10, 26:13, confines [1] - 118:19 56:7, 56:8, 89:3, cite [11] - 17:8, 47:4, 213:3, 214:1, 215:7 26:22, 30:12, 44:6, confirm [2] - 165:22, 89:7, 124:10, 171:9, 47:19, 47:20, 47:22, clearly [3] - 116:23, 47:23, 49:3, 49:12, 166:6 171:12, 172:17, 66:16, 82:11, 82:18, 150:1, 213:6 58:6, 58:21, 58:22, 182:18 conflate [1] - 207:12 complaints [3] - 9:10, 82:25, 139:4, 205:7 clerk[1] - 67:4 58:23, 59:5, 61:14, conflated [3] - 38:13, cited [31] - 13:9, client [4] - 37:14, 76:22, 83:4, 162:15, 9:11, 9:12 38:15, 207:2 200:1, 205:25 13:10, 17:7, 20:12, 63:23, 207:3, 214:25 complete [1] - 203:14 conflicts [1] - 154:7 47:1, 47:12, 48:3, climb [1] - 87:14 committing [1] completely [1] - 55:21 confuse [1] - 151:17 49:20, 51:7, 54:21, close [2] - 8:19, 190:19 complication [1] confused [2] - 149:13, common [14] - 13:11, 69:7, 83:8, 83:11, 142:13 137:25 158:8 88:1, 106:4, 106:7, cloud [2] - 72:14, 131:4, 131:6, comply [1] - 159:25 confusing [3] - 34:23, 133:19, 134:10, 131:16, 131:19, 189:17 component [1] - 62:11 38:17, 47:7 135:4, 135:15, co [2] - 126:24, 188:21 132:16, 132:21, comports [2] - 191:19, confusion [1] - 215:3 139:2, 140:9, 160:6, 160:9, co-defendant [2] -197:2 Congress [24] - 65:16, 155:18, 167:11, 126:24, 188:21 178:22, 179:5, compression [1] -65:17, 65:23, 65:25, 174:1, 177:5, 177:6, 195:15, 197:2, 212:6 code [3] - 111:18, 163:14 66:4, 70:25, 105:17, 177:22, 194:21, commonly [1] - 15:17 126:9, 159:10 computer [1] - 163:14 105:19, 122:10, 199:23, 201:15 communicate [1] codify [1] - 168:15 computers [1] -122:16, 137:6, cites [2] - 46:21, 163:20 cohabitate [1] - 78:2 123:14 143:6, 143:7, 211:22 COMMUNICATIONS **COHEN** [1] - 2:18 153:23, 159:3, Conaway [1] - 4:21 citing [3] - 46:15, [2] - 1:8, 1:14 178:8, 183:21, Cohen [1] - 5:3 CONAWAY[1] - 2:2 63:15, 161:18 Communications [1] -186:4, 186:16, collateral [2] - 173:21, concede [1] - 95:8 CIVIL [2] - 1:4, 1:10 2:22 186:19, 195:3, 174:17 conceivably [1] civil [8] - 45:11, 45:17, companies [10] -213:6, 215:22 colleague [2] - 17:10, 179:22 106:7, 106:8, 19:22, 65:3, 101:9, Congress' [1] - 137:2 52:2 concept [1] - 30:24 107:11, 109:1, 162:16, 168:4, congressional [1] colleagues [1] - 12:23 concern [4] - 168:19, 111:18, 116:7 188:15, 189:8, 133:6 colleagues' [1] - 32:14 178:9, 178:10, claim [15] - 8:21, 195:17, 206:10, collect [2] - 163:17, congressionally [1] -198:23 14:17, 14:18, 21:2, 206:11 66.9 163:25 concerned [7] - 9:13, 26:24, 28:16, 29:8, company [13] - 18:25, Connecticut [1] - 3:12 collecting [1] - 31:13 20:6, 27:15, 89:25, 36:5, 43:8, 44:2, 20:20, 34:24, 56:11, connection [3] - 9:19, COLM [1] - 1:21 158:3, 172:3, 189:13 80:19, 120:25, 113:21, 113:22, comfortable [1] - 4:12 concerns [2] - 83:22, 99:22, 151:12 150:19, 174:15, 164:25, 165:1, **CONNOLLY** [1] - 1:21 coming [11] - 15:16, 189:9 200:25 165:7, 165:8, consider [18] - 22:1, 24:9, 68:25, 82:16, conclude [2] - 126:3, claimed [3] - 27:21, 196:18, 201:21, 24:4, 33:16, 42:12, 120:2, 120:6, 147:18 29:23, 88:20 205:13 109:8, 110:21, concluded [1] -137:23, 141:16, claims [12] - 34:3, comparable [4] -111:2, 117:25, 151:10, 163:12, 216:14 42:16, 130:25, 203:10, 204:15, 118:4, 118:22, 186:3 conclusion [4] -173:13, 173:14, 205:7, 205:9 119:8, 125:23, comity [5] - 22:20, 125:20, 150:18, 174:2, 180:18, compelling [5] -128:2, 129:11, 176:18, 178:3, 209:9, 210:18 180:25, 181:1, 70:22, 168:14, 143:4, 143:5, 143:8, 178:10, 185:7 conclusory [7] -181:2, 200:18, 184:3, 186:1, 211:16 212:18 commenced [1] - 4:3 193:3, 195:11,

49:23, 50:23, 51:12, consideration [4] corporations [1] -33:7, 92:9, 94:14, 53:6, 53:8, 53:11, 89:16 184:1 55:10, 58:11, 58:12, correct [38] - 24:19, considerations [2] -59:5, 76:19, 76:24, 26:11, 26:16, 26:19, 33:9, 182:15 77:4, 77:15, 79:6, 26:22, 27:6, 28:16, considered [2] - 20:6, 79:16, 80:19, 81:5, 28:17, 28:21, 28:25, 86:17, 86:21, 87:9, 29:2, 29:3, 29:4, 133:20 considering [1] -95:15, 95:17, 99:4, 29:13, 35:24, 36:15, 99:6, 99:12, 99:23, 179:15 37:22, 37:23, 53:2, 99:24, 107:19, consistent [3] - 78:2, 65:21, 68:18, 69:21, 107:21, 108:11, 70:9, 76:20, 78:25, 210:7, 210:19 108:14, 118:9, 86:25, 102:19, constitute [2] - 195:2, 119:18, 120:8, 108:13, 112:24, 215:23 120:22, 120:23, 115:12, 126:13, **constitutes** [1] - 196:3 120:24, 121:2, 149:23, 167:14, constitutional [1] -121:5, 121:19, 176:25, 180:6, 41:5 127:8, 136:12, 202:17, 207:7, 208:4 contemplated [5] -142:17, 146:11, cost [3] - 62:10, 122:10, 168:12, 146:22, 148:6, 123:14, 123:15 168:13, 186:25, 148:7, 148:11, Counsel [2] - 2:13, 213:7 148:17, 149:19, 2:21 contemplates [2] -151:3, 151:21, counsel [5] - 3:13, 66:4, 136:21 159:23, 159:24, 5:3, 155:19, 155:22, contention [1] - 98:22 159:25, 160:1, 172:7 contest [1] - 191:20 160:2, 160:6, counterclaim [14] contesting [2] - 93:7, 160:10, 170:7, 27:11, 28:1, 28:4, 93:9 208:6, 208:8, 28:7, 28:24, 29:1, context [16] - 32:22, 209:18, 211:17, 29:12, 29:13, 29:15, 39:19, 40:7, 45:19, 211:18, 211:19, 29:16, 136:23, 45:21, 84:22, 99:17, 212:9, 212:14, 136:25, 164:7, 164:8 132:18, 146:13, 212:18 counterclaims [5] -167:3, 168:18, contracts [7] - 44:15, 25:10, 29:14, 42:17, 173:25, 177:10, 55:10, 79:15, 127:5, 136:21, 137:4 177:15, 177:20, 127:6, 159:9, 207:25 country [8] - 20:14, 203:20 contractual [12] -22:13, 107:9, contingent [1] - 98:23 26:14, 34:7, 38:23, 121:18, 127:6, continue [9] - 64:5, 108:25, 126:11, 162:10, 164:15, 90:25, 115:16, 148:9, 149:20, 189:14 115:18, 120:19, 150:6, 150:11, country's [1] - 116:16 127:25, 202:23, 151:9, 176:6, 184:23 couple [6] - 6:3, 209:21, 210:14 contractually [1] -130:13, 143:16, Continued [1] - 3:1 32:6 182:11, 182:12, continued [1] - 25:20 contradicted [1] -206:23 continuum [1] - 61:4 192:12 coupled [2] - 186:22, contract [123] - 14:18, Contrares [1] - 162:8 186:23 14:20, 15:5, 19:13, contrary [1] - 179:23 course [17] - 15:17, 19:16, 26:18, 26:21, contribute [1] - 62:5 29:6, 55:17, 67:5, 26:24, 27:22, 27:23, controlling [1] - 15:2 101:10, 103:21, 28:2, 28:4, 28:13, controversy [1] -131:9, 132:23, 28:14, 28:16, 28:18, 174:8 133:3, 133:24, 28:23, 29:15, 33:14, conversation [1] -134:17, 137:7, 34:8, 36:5, 36:14, 155:1 140:14, 141:19, 36:22, 37:6, 37:13, Convertible [2] -142:16, 146:23, 37:22, 39:1, 39:8, 138:25. 139:1 156:11 39:10, 40:12, 41:16, convince [1] - 181:13 court [45] - 10:23, 41:20, 43:8, 43:11, convinced [2] - 95:6, 12:17, 30:24, 37:1, 43:15, 43:17, 43:20, 163:24 46:22, 65:1, 65:18, 43:23, 44:1, 44:6, copies [2] - 67:3, 67:9 66:2, 73:15, 73:16, 44:11, 44:21, 44:23, 76:13, 92:15, 94:1, **copy** [2] - 82:21, 82:22 45:2, 45:5, 45:15, 112:2, 114:20, CORP [1] - 1:14 46:8, 46:12, 49:21,

130:18, 131:8, 132:22, 132:24, 133:23, 135:18, 136:24, 137:2, 137:8, 137:10, 139:11, 139:16, 143:24, 144:1, 144:2, 144:4, 153:21, 154:7, 156:9, 156:17, 161:8, 166:3, 174:22, 177:9, 182:1, 183:21, 213:4 COURT [697] - 1:1, 4:6, 4:24, 5:5, 5:10, 5:15, 5:21, 5:24, 6:10, 6:14, 6:25, 7:2, 7:4, 7:7, 7:15, 7:18, 7:20, 8:9, 9:1, 9:4, 9:14, 9:17, 10:12, 10:16, 11:4, 11:7, 11:16, 12:1, 12:5, 12:12, 12:25, 13:4, 13:7, 13:18, 13:21, 13:24, 14:1, 14:8, 14:10, 15:4, 15:8, 15:13, 15:20, 16:1, 16:10, 16:15, 16:18, 16:22, 17:1, 17:6, 17:18, 17:23, 18:4, 18:9, 21:24, 22:7, 22:10, 22:12, 22:14, 22:17, 22:21, 22:25, 23:3, 23:6, 23:10, 23:16, 23:19, 23:22, 24:11, 24:14, 24:19, 24:22, 25:4, 25:7, 25:14, 26:3, 26:5, 26:8, 26:12, 26:17, 26:21, 26:23, 27:4, 27:7, 27:22, 28:1, 28:5, 28:8, 28:12, 28:18, 28:22, 29:1, 29:4, 29:7, 29:10, 29:17, 29:22, 29:25, 30:7, 30:13, 30:21, 31:4, 31:7, 31:15, 32:4, 33:4, 33:11, 33:18, 34:4, 34:10, 34:13, 34:15, 34:18, 34:20, 34:22, 35:1, 35:6, 35:9, 35:12, 35:15, 35:22, 35:25, 36:3, 36:8, 36:11, 36:16, 37:5, 37:8, 37:10, 37:12, 37:18, 37:20, 37:24, 38:5, 38:9, 38:12, 38:18, 39:5, 39:14, 39:18, 40:21, 40:24, 41:6, 41:9, 41:12, 41:14,

41:16, 41:19, 41:22, 42:21, 43:13, 43:19, 43:22, 43:25, 44:4, 44:9, 44:13, 44:17, 44:19, 44:25, 45:7, 45:9, 45:13, 45:17, 45:21, 45:24, 46:1, 46:10, 46:19, 47:1, 47:4, 47:7, 47:10, 47:15, 47:17, 47:19, 48:1, 48:5, 49:18, 50:1, 50:6, 50:9, 50:21, 51:2, 51:16, 51:19, 52:2, 52:10, 52:20, 52:22, 53:3, 53:5, 53:18, 53:20, 54:1, 54:3, 54:6, 54:9, 54:13, 54:17, 54:23, 56:4, 56:15, 56:22, 56:24, 57:4, 57:7, 57:15, 57:19, 57:23, 58:2, 58:4, 58:8, 58:10, 58:13, 58:16, 58:19, 58:24, 59:10, 59:16, 59:18, 59:22, 60:1, 60:7, 60:11, 62:16, 62:22, 62:24, 63:6, 63:12, 63:18, 63:21, 64:5, 64:11, 65:14, 65:22, 66:8, 66:23, 67:3, 67:6, 67:9, 67:17, 67:19, 67:24, 68:2, 68:4, 68:8, 68:10, 68:13, 68:18, 68:23, 69:2, 69:8, 69:12, 69:15, 69:20, 69:22, 70:1, 70:5, 70:7, 70:10, 70:14, 70:17, 71:22, 72:5, 72:19, 72:22, 72:25, 73:3, 73:10, 73:17, 73:21, 73:23, 74:4, 74:6, 74:10, 74:16, 74:23, 75:3, 75:6, 75:9, 75:15, 75:19, 76:2, 76:4, 76:9, 76:17, 76:23, 77:3, 77:9, 77:13, 77:19, 77:22, 77:24, 78:7, 78:10, 78:16, 78:20, 78:22, 78:24, 79:1, 79:13, 79:18, 80:14, 81:3, 81:14, 81:18, 81:22, 81:24, 82:2, 82:4, 82:8, 82:11, 82:13, 82:19, 82:21, 82:24, 83:2, 83:9, 83:11, 83:14, 83:23, 84:3, 84:6, 84:8, 84:11, 84:20, 85:4, 85:9,

			_	_
85:20, 86:5, 87:21,	132:15, 133:18,	176:21, 176:23,	89:22, 95:18, 98:17,	47:3, 48:21, 55:22,
87:24, 88:5, 88:9,	134:5, 136:3, 136:7,	177:2, 177:7, 178:1,	98:21, 105:16,	87:25, 98:22,
88:12, 88:14, 88:16,	137:10, 137:14,	178:5, 179:19,	105:18, 105:20,	106:24, 107:5,
88:21, 88:25, 89:6,	138:1, 138:4, 138:8,	179:23, 180:3,	106:11, 106:13,	109:4, 135:17,
89:9, 89:13, 89:24,	138:11, 138:20,	180:14, 180:21,	106:14, 106:19,	139:16, 143:4,
90:2, 90:4, 90:7,	138:24, 139:1,	181:4, 181:8,	106:20, 106:21,	143:5, 143:11,
90:12, 90:14, 90:17,	139:4, 139:7,	181:15, 181:19,	106:22, 106:24,	143:13, 160:4,
91:16, 91:20, 92:7,	139:10, 139:13,	181:22, 182:9,	107:3, 107:7, 109:7,	160:5, 160:7,
92:13, 92:20, 93:4,	139:21, 139:25,	183:2, 185:14,	109:13, 111:19,	173:25, 177:15,
93:6, 94:3, 94:9,	140:4, 141:11,	185:18, 187:2,	121:15, 122:6,	182:12, 186:17,
94:18, 94:21, 95:1,	141:20, 141:23,	187:6, 187:16,	124:12, 125:20,	213:18, 215:2,
95:3, 95:11, 95:14,	141:25, 142:20,	187:19, 188:2,	126:2, 127:7, 133:8,	215:15
96:10, 96:13, 96:15,	142:23, 143:1,	188:8, 188:10,	133:15, 137:18,	covenant [20] - 45:1,
97:3, 97:5, 97:10,	144:1, 144:6, 145:5,	188:23, 189:20,	138:7, 139:23,	45:14, 46:8, 52:11,
97:12, 97:14, 97:18,	145:8, 145:11,	189:22, 190:1,	140:12, 141:15,	52:24, 77:20, 79:2,
97:21, 98:2, 98:7,	145:17, 145:21,	190:6, 190:9,	142:3, 142:8, 144:7,	79:4, 79:9, 87:1,
98:10, 98:12, 102:6,	145:24, 146:4,	190:21, 190:24,	146:7, 153:14,	87:3, 87:5, 87:6,
102:9, 102:11,	147:12, 147:16,	191:1, 192:6, 192:8,	156:18, 156:19,	127:1, 160:3, 160:9,
102:13, 102:18,	147:21, 147:25,	192:14, 192:24,	157:5, 157:11,	208:17, 208:21,
102:22, 103:4,	148:4, 148:8,	193:3, 193:7,	157:18, 157:25,	212:2, 212:7
103:6, 103:10,	148:18, 149:12,	193:13, 194:11,	158:15, 160:14,	cover [5] - 8:16, 8:20,
103:17, 103:21,	149:15, 149:24,	194:16, 194:18,	160:16, 161:17,	10:4, 103:1, 181:6
103:24, 104:3,	150:5, 150:13,	194:24, 195:10,	161:22, 161:24,	covered [4] - 8:11,
104:19, 104:21,	150:22, 151:1,	195:20, 196:12,	161:25, 162:11,	25:24, 175:1, 194:3
104:23, 105:2,	151:6, 151:24,	196:17, 196:19,	164:15, 164:16,	covers [3] - 101:7,
105:22, 106:6,	152:1, 152:4, 153:2,	197:5, 197:9,	170:1, 171:19,	180:18, 181:2
106:9, 106:15,	153:4, 153:8,	197:16, 197:19,	172:20, 173:1,	Crabb [7] - 100:9,
106:18, 106:23,	153:12, 154:4,	197:22, 197:24,	173:11, 173:12,	101:22, 146:8,
107:16, 108:6,	154:15, 154:17,	198:3, 198:15,	173:15, 173:16,	153:16, 155:15,
108:9, 108:14,	154:19, 154:23,	198:23, 199:3,	174:16, 174:25,	201:15
110:4, 110:8, 111:1,	155:5, 155:11,	199:16, 200:3,	175:10, 175:11,	create [1] - 70:18
111:4, 111:6,	155:21, 155:23,	200:5, 200:19,	175:14, 175:19,	created [2] - 152:15,
111:11, 111:15,	155:25, 156:2,	200:21, 201:16,	176:12, 177:3,	178:8
112:5, 112:14,	157:11, 157:14,	201:18, 201:23,	177:13, 177:18,	creates [1] - 118:14
112:18, 112:21,	157:17, 158:18,	202:1, 202:8,	178:4, 182:20,	credibility [1] - 4:16
112:23, 112:25,	159:20, 160:15,	202:11, 202:14,	182:21, 183:8,	credible [1] - 77:13
113:3, 113:18,	160:18, 160:20,	202:16, 202:22,	183:12, 186:4,	credits [1] - 186:13
113:20, 114:6, 114:10, 114:13,	160:24, 161:1,	203:4, 203:12, 203:20, 204:1,	187:3, 190:2,	cross [2] - 41:4, 120:4
114:10, 114:13,	161:5, 161:25, 162:2, 162:7,	206:1, 206:3,	190:11, 191:23, 194:14, 195:2,	cross-examination [1]
115:10, 115:23,	162:19, 165:15,	206:15, 206:23,	195:25, 200:8,	- 120:4
116:10, 116:14,	165:19, 166:18,	207:8, 207:21,	203:17, 209:12,	crucial [1] - 61:11
116:19, 117:24,	166:23, 167:3,	208:10, 208:15,	209:20, 210:15,	curious [2] - 170:4,
118:7, 119:1, 119:6,	160.23, 167.3, 167:8, 167:13,	208:19, 209:3,	211:6	170:17
119:11, 119:16,	167:15, 167:22,	209:5, 209:7,	Court's [23] - 13:17,	current [2] - 80:16,
119:21, 121:13,	168:24, 169:3,	209:16, 210:9,	21:4, 32:13, 38:2,	202:2
122:4, 122:15,	169:8, 169:11,	210:21, 215:10,	40:22, 73:18, 89:4,	cursory [2] - 211:14,
123:1, 123:6,	169:16, 169:20,	216:7, 216:9, 216:11	117:5, 130:24,	211:22
123:10, 123:25,	169:24, 170:2,	Court [140] - 1:24, 8:3,	134:15, 157:4,	customer [6] - 6:22,
124:14, 124:25,	170:4, 170:12,	15:2, 19:20, 22:1,	157:25, 168:6,	6:23, 188:16, 189:4,
125:5, 125:8, 126:1,	170:15, 170:17,	24:4, 26:1, 26:2,	173:10, 174:17,	193:12, 193:15
126:23, 127:4,	171:1, 171:6,	26:7, 27:12, 27:16,	174:20, 175:13,	customers [14] -
127:23, 128:6,	171:13, 171:20,	29:18, 30:1, 30:19,	175:24, 176:20,	10:10, 21:18, 89:20,
128:10, 128:17,	171:24, 172:6,	31:20, 32:24, 36:23,	182:15, 182:19,	114:17, 114:23,
129:20, 130:1,	172:11, 172:15,	39:22, 40:6, 40:7,	183:4, 211:23	129:5, 188:21,
130:4, 130:10,	172:22, 173:5,	40:25, 42:14, 46:11,	courtroom [3] - 4:3,	188:25, 189:8,
130:12, 130:16,	173:8, 173:22,	47:12, 50:22, 51:22,	4:9, 155:16	189:11, 194:4,
131:6, 131:13,	174:6, 175:3, 175:8,	52:12, 54:21, 65:1,	Courts [3] - 107:8,	197:13, 198:10,
131:17, 131:19,	175:12, 175:16,	65:8, 70:22, 75:23,	144:11, 212:4	206:21
131:23, 132:2,	175:20, 175:25,	79:5, 80:9, 80:13,	courts [28] - 11:9,	cut [2] - 38:4, 192:8
132:5, 132:12,	176:2, 176:5,	87:23, 88:3, 88:6,	32:21, 33:25, 40:3,	cycle [2] - 188:19,
		4 DD3/202		

D. T7:5, 79:7, 144:8, 136:6, 136:8, 136:13, 179:25 defenses 42:17, 136:13, 179:25 defenses 42:17, 137:13, 157:25, 137:20, 137:13, 157:25, 137:20, 137:13, 157:25, 137:20, 137:13, 157:25, 137:20, 137:14, 177:13, 157:25, 146:14, 137:14, 146:15, 148:16,
D.C [1] - 3.8 deciaration [3] - deciarat
dallying 1- 129:7
damages [7] - 92:17, 36:6, 63:8, 88:6, 114:19, 125:14, 89:3, 89:14, 189:14, 137:13, 158:10, 97:20, 101:3, 106:3, 154:19 47:21, 64:11, 80:9, 47:21, 64:11, 80:9, 47:21, 64:11, 80:9, 47:21, 64:11, 80:9, 47:21, 64:11, 80:9, 47:21, 64:11, 80:9, 47:21, 64:11, 80:9, 47:21, 64:11, 80:9, 47:21, 64:11, 80:9, 47:21, 64:11, 80:9, 47:21, 64:11, 80:9, 47:21, 64:11, 80:9, 47:21, 64:11, 80:9, 47:21, 62:15, 47:21, 62:
114:19, 125:14, 137:13, 168:10, 200:17, 200:25 data [i] - 196:22 data [i] - 21:19 definitive [i] - 94:13 definitive [i] - 1:2 definitive
137:13, 158:10, 200:17, 200:25 108:24, 125:18, 108:24, 125:18, 140:9, 142:17, 140:9, 142:17, 140:9, 142:17, 140:9, 142:17, 140:17, 140:17, 140:17, 140:17, 140:17, 140:17, 140:17, 140:17, 140:17, 140:17, 140:17, 140:17, 140:17, 140:17, 140:17, 140:17, 140:18, 160:19, 140:19,
200:17, 200:25 108:24, 125:18,
data [1] - 196:22
date 3 - 74:8, 169:12, 145:2, 145:6, 198:19 173:1, 209:12, 209:20, 210:16, 211:16, 212:10 definitive 1] - 94:13 definitive 1] - 165:20, 209:20, 210:16, 211:16, 212:10 determining 2] - 211:16, 120:19 195:9, 196:11, 209:20, 210:16, 211:6, 212:10 determining 2] - 211:16, 120:19 195:9, 196:11, 200:20, 200:10, 200:10, 200:20, 210:16, 211:16, 212:10 determining 2] - 200:10, 200:20, 210:16, 211:16, 212:10 determining 2] - 200:20, 210:16, 211:16, 212:10 determining 2] - 200:20, 210:16, 211:16, 212:10, 210:20, 200:20, 210:16, 211:16, 212:10, 210:20, 200:20, 210:16, 211:16, 212:10, 211:18, 200:20, 210:16, 211:16, 212:10, 210:20, 200:20, 210:16, 211:16, 212:10, 211:18, 211:18, 211:18, 45:13, 53:6, 53:11, 200:20, 200:20, 210:16, 211:16, 212:10, 211:16, 212:10, 211:18, 211:18, 200:20, 210:16, 211:16, 212:10, 211:16, 212:10, 211:16, 212:10, 210:20, 200:20, 210:16, 211:16, 212:10, 211:16, 212:10, 211:18, 211:18, 45:13, 53:6, 53:11, 25:25, 200:20, 20:21, 200:20, 21:10, 211:16, 212:10, 211:18, 211:18, 211:18, 211:18, 200:20, 20:20, 21:16, 211:16, 212:10, 21:10, 21:10, 20:20, 20:20, 20:21, 20:20, 20:21, 20:20, 20:21, 20:20, 20:21, 20:20, 20:21, 20:20, 20:20, 20:20, 20:21, 20:20, 20:20, 20:21, 20:20, 2
189:16
DAVID [1] - 2:19
David
days [3] - 74:12,
115:16, 120:19
deal [10] - 57:8, 95:1, 197:9, 198:2, 207:3, 45:13, 53:6, 53:11, device [1] - 165:9 125:25 104:13, 107:22, 207:9, 208:25, 87:5, 127:6, 127:6, devices [4] - 69:13, discern [1] - 126:21 156:8, 181:19, 201:15 137:20, 139:9, 163:19 150:14 discount [1] - 55:1 dealing [3] - 46:9, 16:12, 187:14, 165:22, 174:1, 136:15, 153:15, discovery [3] - 25:11, 61:12, 68:6 187:24, 192:12, 183:20, 212:5 188:3, 188:6, 64:20, 123:12 debate [5] - 49:19, 10:23, 27:11, 29:16, 137:4 197:10, 197:17, discrepancy [1] - 181:25 debate [1] - 208:7 decade [1] - 184:10 166:23 delays [1] - 83:7 December [3] - 56:10, 166:23 delays [1] - 83:7 delays [1] - 204:25 discretion [3] - 33:7, 138:7, 192:7 discretion [3] - 33:7, 138:7, 192:7 138:7, 192:7 discate [1] - 204:25 discretion [3] - 33:7, 138:7, 192:7 138:7, 192:7 138:7, 192:7 138:7, 192:7 138:7, 192:7 138:7, 192:7 138:7, 192:7 138:7, 192:7 138:7, 192:7 138:7, 192:7 138:7, 192:7 138:7, 192:7 138:7
104:13, 107:22, 207:9, 208:25, 209:8, 211:10, 209:8, 211:10, 211:15 209:8, 211:10, 204:20, 205:24 205:2, 205:24 205:2, 205:24 205:2, 20
129:1, 137:25, 209:8, 211:10, 211:15 137:20, 139:9, 163:19 150:14
156:8, 181:19, 204:20, 205:24 declarations [5] - 137:20, 139:9, 163:19 DI [8] - 135:22, discount [1] - 55:1 discount [1] - 156:1 discount [1] - 156:1 discount [1] - 156:1 discount [1] - 156:1 disc
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$
dealing [3] - 46:9, 116:21, 187:14, 165:22, 174:1, 136:15, 153:15, discovery [3] - 25:11, 61:12, 68:6 187:24, 192:12, 183:20, 212:5 188:3, 188:6, 64:20, 123:12 debate [5] - 49:19, 192:15 delay [5] - 31:19, 197:10, 197:17, discrepancy [1] - 181:25 184:5, 184:15 10:23, 27:11, 29:16, 137:4 DI-26 [1] - 188:8 discretion [3] - 33:7, debated [1] - 208:7 decade [1] - 184:10 167:4, 174:12, 156:13 delayed [2] - 149:10, 138:7, 192:7 December [3] - 56:10, 186:23 delays [1] - 83:7 delays [1] - 83:7 dictate [1] - 204:25 dictates [2] - 51:8, decide [22] - 21:7, 163:1, 163:2, 166:25 Delta [4] - 12:8, 17:11, 17:12, 20:19 dictates [2] - 51:8, discuss [11] - 5:10, 35:17, 35:18, 35:21, 35:17, 35:18, 35:21, declared [2] - 93:18, 211:4 135:25 demands [1] - 156:12 23:7, 30:15, 30:17, 157:3, 171:4,
61:12, 68:6 debate [5] - 49:19, 78:16, 142:18, 184:5, 184:15 debated [1] - 208:7 decade [1] - 184:10 December [3] - 56:10, 56:11, 56:12 decide [22] - 21:7, 23:12, 32:25, 35:14, 35:17, 35:18, 35:21, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:10, 40:20, 37:30, 40:20, 37:10, 40:20, 38:3, 188:6, 197:10, 197:17, 197:18 197:18 197:18 197:18 197:18 181:25 diametrically [1] - 78:1 dictate [1] - 204:25 dictat
78:16, 142:18, 10:23, 27:11, 29:16, 137:4 197:18 181:25 137:4 197:18 181:25 137:4 197:18 181:25 137:4 197:18 181:25 137:4 197:18 181:25 137:4 197:18 181:25 137:4 197:18 181:25 137:4 197:18 181:25 137:4 197:18 181:25 181
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$
decade [1] - 184:10 167:4, 174:12, 156:13 78:1 discriminatory [5] - 27:13, 30:6, 62:7, dictate [1] - 204:25 December [3] - 56:10, 56:11, 56:12 declare [4] - 89:15, 163:1, 163:2, 166:25 Delta [4] - 12:8, 17:11, 17:12, 20:19 dictates [2] - 51:8, 159:15 dictating [1] - 62:15 dictating [1] - 156:12 dictating [1] - 156:12 dictating [1] - 156:12 dictating [1] - 156:12 dictating [1] - 156:15 dictating [1] - 62:15 dictating [1]
December [3] - 56:10, 186:23 delays [1] - 83:7 dictate [1] - 204:25 discriminatory [5] - 27:13, 30:6, 62:7, 62:21, 104:13 decide [22] - 21:7, 163:1, 163:2, 166:25 Delta [4] - 12:8, 17:11, 17:12, 20:19 dictates [2] - 51:8, 159:15 dictating [1] - 62:15 dictating [1] - 156:12 dictating [1] - 156:12 dictating [1] - 156:12 dictating [1] - 62:15 d
56:11, 56:12 decide [22] - 21:7, 23:12, 32:25, 35:14, 35:17, 35:18, 35:21, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, 37:36:24, 37:36:24, 37:36:24, 37:36:24, 37:36:24, 37:36:24, 37:36:24, 37:36:24, 37:36:24, 37:36:24, 37:36:
decide [22] - 21:7, 163:1, 163:2, 166:25 17:12, 20:19 159:15 discuss [11] - 5:10, 23:12, 32:25, 35:14, 21:4 declared [2] - 93:18, 135:25 differ [6] - 16:12, 23:4, 40:3, 69:22, 109:18 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, declaring [1] - 209:10 demands [1] - 156:12 23:7, 30:15, 30:17, 157:3, 171:4,
23:12, 32:25, 35:14, 35:17, 35:18, 35:21, 211:4 declaring [1] - 93:18, 211:4 demand [2] - 128:14, 135:25 differ [6] - 16:12, 23:4, 40:3, 69:22, 109:18 demands [1] - 156:12 deman
35:17, 35:18, 35:21, 35:25 differ [6] - 16:12, 23:4, 156:16, 156:17, demands [1] - 156:12 23:7, 30:15, 30:17, 30:18, 30:17, 36:24, 37:1, 46:20, declaring [1] - 209:10 demands [1] - 156:12
36:24, 37:1, 46:20, declaring [1] - 209:10 demands [1] - 156:12 23:7, 30:15, 30:17, 157:3, 171:4,
To 40 00 0 44 44 declined w 405:40
70:16, 88:9, 91:24, declined [2] - 135:19, demonstrate [2] - 33:18 171:15, 173:3,
103:12, 105:4, 149:7 192:25, 193:4 difference [14] - 13:5, 214:24
125:11, 125:13, declining [1] - 149:8 demonstrated [1] - 14:4, 14:8, 14:10, discussed [6] - 36:22
169:16, 174:25, dedicated [2] - 91:7, 151:13 14:22, 15:9, 15:14, 69:24, 109:3,
175:10, 175:19, 196:2 Dennis [2] - 196:10, 16:4, 17:4, 18:10, 115:24, 181:11,
186:5 deemed [1] - 173:25 198:2 21:21, 24:16, 31:19, 213:11
decided [6] - 40:4, deems [1] - 179:14 deny [1] - 43:4 107:10 discussing [2] -
48:12, 86:10, default [1] - 204:6 denying [1] - 153:19 differences [3] - 157:2, 207:23
134:15, 183:22,
190:21 1:15 59:23, 184:9 137:9 46:2, 46:4, 98:5,
deciding [2] - 33:22, defendant [7] - 41:1, dependency [1] - different [25] - 7:11, 115:6, 117:9, 134:22 73:14, 73:24. 188:25 15:17, 16:5, 18:12. 120:17, 120:19
100.20
54.00 50 5 50.40
05 45 00 40 00 4
65:15, 82:16, 89:4,
105:14, 108:18, 42:17, 74:2, 112:20, 188:14, 189:18, 149:3, 152:23, 100:17
109:2, 109:4, 183:19, 200:11, 193:18 158:6, 161:2, dispenses [1] - 192:4
113:13, 120:5, 201:18 designed [2] - 61:18, 163:25, 166:15, dispose [1] - 21:9
144:9, 157:5, 160:4, defense [19] - 28:4, 186:10 197:14, 210:23, dispositive [1] -
160:11, 160:20, 28:6, 28:8, 28:23, designing [1] - 204:24 213:18, 215:2 118:21
161:1, 161:3, 166:4, 29:4, 31:17, 91:1, desist [1] - 166:21 differently [1] - 213:14 dispute [21] - 13:12.
169:25, 174:10, 98:23, 99:17, detail [1] - 207:23 difficult [3] - 100:5, 35:20, 36:25, 42:15
205:7, 205:8, 105:15, 112:8, determination [15] - 184:7, 208:13 43:10, 44:13, 44:23
211:23, 211:25 134:9, 134:11, 21:4, 23:14, 28:20, difficulty [1] - 83:4 53:7, 58:18, 58:21,

9

59:12, 59:14, 60:4, 196:20 eBay [3] - 133:22, enforced [1] - 134:15 equilibrium [1] -60:5, 122:11, dollars-wise [1] -179:17, 182:5 enforcing [3] - 18:25, 178:25 122:23, 127:2, 196:20 EC [1] - 135:10 equitable [15] - 10:20, 19:7, 76:4 127:3, 150:6, 151:3, domestic [9] - 132:7, 33:7, 33:9, 38:1, echoes [1] - 126:12 engage [2] - 79:23, 204.1 132:8, 133:25, 156:23 38:3, 40:2, 40:22, economically [1] disputed [8] - 43:9, 134:1, 180:8, engaged [2] - 75:10, 75:17, 75:25, 184:13 51:1, 51:15, 51:18, 180:12, 180:16, 133:12, 133:14, economy [1] - 137:21 80:18 53:9, 179:2, 208:20 180:19, 180:24 134:9, 137:1, 182:14 effect [6] - 79:21, England [3] - 161:24, disputes [1] - 49:24 domestically [1] -83:7, 162:18, 171:4, 162:1, 162:2 equities [1] - 213:20 disputing [1] - 124:14 186:10 equity [1] - 32:25 176:11, 202:2 enjoin [8] - 20:12, disruption [1] done [22] - 11:9. 38:3, 56:2, 61:2, equivalent [2] - 143:6, effectively [6] - 10:1, 181:11 21:19, 36:7, 43:1, 33:24, 40:8, 42:14, 61:3, 71:3, 135:19, 143:9 distinct [1] - 25:12 61:2, 61:6, 61:7, 161:23 71:10, 213:4 Ericsson [9] - 48:9, enjoined [4] - 31:1, distinction [5] - 21:23, 80:10, 86:3, 92:5, 48:17, 50:5, 50:7, effects [1] - 201:21 38:1, 119:13, 182:2, 96:12, 96:14, 96:21, 50:11, 50:14, 51:18, 33:23, 33:25, 162:6 efficiency [1] - 5:16 96:22, 97:2, 127:18, 170:11, 205:14 182:3 enjoining [3] - 19:7, **EGAN** [3] - 3:3, 5:6, 131:25, 141:8, District [4] - 100:10, 177:9, 213:5 error[1] - 169:18 6:13 162:6, 194:10 139:24, 174:1, 195:2 enjoyed [1] - 187:3 escrow [2] - 114:1, Egan [1] - 5:6 district [27] - 12:16, door [1] - 206:11 114:2 eight [2] - 174:10, enormous [1] - 114:16 65:18, 66:2, 73:15, doubling [1] - 205:20 especially [4] - 142:3, 198:21 ensuring [1] - 83:21 73:16, 131:8, doubt [1] - 189:1 168:2, 186:15, 205:4 either [18] - 32:5, enter [11] - 25:22, 132:22, 132:24, down [15] - 32:5, 34:7, ESQ [10] - 2:3, 2:3, 51:21, 60:2, 66:2, 26:6, 27:14, 92:4, 133:23. 135:17. 38:21, 54:13, 55:3, 2:7, 2:11, 2:15, 2:19, 78:13, 112:2, 101:4, 109:13, 135:18, 136:24, 64:21, 77:19, 80:1, 115:22, 123:12, 173:12, 182:13, 3:3, 3:7, 3:7, 3:11 137:2, 137:7, 137:8, 105:4, 112:7, essential [18] - 20:6, 124:7, 125:11, 185:21, 191:6, 137:10, 139:16, 113:14, 114:25, 25:23, 27:20, 29:20, 191:11 129:15, 142:8, 153:21, 154:7, 120:20, 143:20, entered [5] - 28:14, 32:2, 49:11, 66:19, 170:6, 176:6, 160:5, 161:8, 166:3, 84:17, 89:18, 93:19, 201:10 45:2, 87:12, 179:25, 178:18, 186:4, downstream [1] -99:13, 99:17, 100:3, 182:1, 183:21, 210:16, 215:8 195:16 114:17 186:17, 213:4, entering [3] - 64:3, 140:17, 156:21, electronic [1] - 69:13 214:14 dozen [2] - 177:22, 101:6, 198:5 161:20, 163:3 element [1] - 105:8 **DISTRICT** [2] - 1:1, 1:2 177:24 essentiality [2] elements [1] - 148:24 enters [1] - 114:22 dive [1] - 64:12 Dr [1] - 208:25 95:21, 96:2 entertain [3] - 10:18, Eley [2] - 4:22, 130:11 diversity [1] - 19:21 drag [1] - 113:10 essentially [9] - 8:18, **ELEY** [1] - 2:7 42:11, 119:22 divert [1] - 99:5 draw [2] - 37:25, 38:4 9:12. 9:22. 28:9. eloquently [1] - 33:21 entire [5] - 7:13, 10:5, divest [3] - 10:1, drew [1] - 207:24 32:23. 99:24. elsewhere [1] - 25:25 21:4, 161:9, 162:15 dropped [1] - 67:15 119:24. 120:2. 10:14, 33:10 entirely [1] - 107:9 embedded [1] divested [1] - 40:8 211:21 drumming [1] -100:21 entirety [4] - 21:11, establish [23] - 24:3, divesting [2] - 32:24, 150:12 embellish [1] - 109:10 27:13, 29:19, 54:7 24:24, 25:15, 26:24, 71:10 due [8] - 133:14, entities [2] - 21:3, embraced [1] - 176:10 divestiture [3] - 32:15, 28:9, 36:13, 37:14, 133:15, 134:6, 182:5 employ [2] - 212:1, 167:25, 176:11 136:6, 156:10, 42:3, 42:7, 44:20, 212:4 entitle [1] - 205:25 divests [2] - 42:14, 191:19, 191:25, 45:22, 51:7, 75:13, entitled [18] - 11:2, encompass [2] - 7:13, 183:11 201:3 88:25, 108:19, 11:8, 31:16, 31:17, 75:17 division [1] - 135:7 duplication [2] -124:22, 126:9, 31:25, 32:1, 40:19, encouraging [1] -149:24, 150:1, divvy[1] - 91:2 158:20, 183:8 41:1, 43:14, 61:7, 83:19 152:13, 176:11, **DJ**[1] - 99:25 during [3] - 87:9, end [23] - 34:6, 54:23, 63:4, 81:8, 93:17, 186:7, 193:8 DJs [1] - 99:22 127:8, 205:3 109:16, 158:11, 66:19, 70:16, 72:12, established [8] dwell [2] - 10:13, 27:8 docket [2] - 198:1 158:15, 174:12, 72:17, 79:15, 90:23, 42:22, 70:11, 126:6, dynamic [1] - 100:12 doctrine [5] - 176:24, 98:20, 98:25, 174:15 186:6, 211:10, entitlement [4] -184:1, 184:25, 100:16, 104:8, 212:22, 212:24, 186:9, 212:25 Ε 70:23, 70:24, 76:6, 105:3, 141:2, 158:4, 215:18 80:23 document [4] -159:17, 181:23, e-mails [1] - 210:25 establishes [1] -140:13, 196:12, entity [1] - 20:14 186:15, 189:6, 122:5 eagerness [1] - 63:25 198:1 192:3, 210:5, 213:3, entry [2] - 198:1 establishing [5] earliest [1] - 133:4 documents [2] -213:14 enumerates [1] easiest [1] - 130:2 26:14, 42:8, 83:4, 196:5, 199:7 ended [1] - 100:16 205:9 149:18, 151:13 easy [1] - 140:12 dogmatic [1] - 157:8 ending [1] - 108:23 equal [7] - 27:19, 62:9, ETIS [1] - 26:18 eat [5] - 76:12, 76:14, **DOJ** [2] - 59:21, 135:7 62:12, 62:17, 62:18, ends [1] - 15:18 ETSI [88] - 26:20, 112:4, 112:5, 112:9 dollars [2] - 123:15, 62:20 enforce [1] - 67:12

Case: 21-2106 Document: 15 Page: 284 Filed: 08/30/2021

26:21, 26:22, 28:14, 194:22, 196:21, 71:15 214:3, 215:22 119:2, 119:4, 198:14, 201:19, 119:14, 120:2, 34:8, 36:14, 37:22, exercise [4] - 33:7, extensive [1] - 111:17 202:1, 203:3, 38:22, 39:1, 39:8, 74:5, 130:24, 178:19 extent [7] - 17:14, 205:22, 206:22, 39:10, 42:8, 43:11, exert [1] - 128:13 35:19, 42:23, 106:4, 43:15, 43:19, 43:23, 212:13 exhibit [6] - 89:2, 113:13, 117:15, exact [1] - 136:17 44:6, 44:7, 46:11, 89:7, 155:17, 159:8, 166:13 47:3, 47:23, 48:6, exactly [20] - 20:4, 197:22, 197:24 extra [2] - 66:15, 49:3, 49:11, 49:12, 25:18, 29:9, 33:20, Exhibit [7] - 69:18, 206:19 49:21, 50:2, 50:23, 64:19, 65:10, 76:1, 135:22, 136:16, extreme [2] - 121:14, 51:23, 52:9, 52:13, 76:3, 83:12, 92:14, 140:11, 153:15, 157:22 53:14, 58:12, 58:22, 94:19, 99:16, 155:17, 188:6 extremes [1] - 157:1 58:23, 59:4, 61:13, 128:19, 136:13, exhibits [1] - 203:1 62:18, 76:19, 76:21, 141:7, 142:19, exist [2] - 107:15, F 76:24, 77:10, 77:15, 160:17, 160:22, 152:20 84:17, 86:21, 87:12, 186:21, 198:20 F3d [1] - 82:18 existed [1] - 150:12 95:15, 95:17, 99:4, examination [1] face [2] - 25:11, 72:12 existence [1] - 115:20 99:14, 99:20, 120:4 faced [1] - 196:8 existing [3] - 126:10, 111:17, 112:21, examined [1] - 60:16 facing [1] - 63:22 126:12, 156:9 112:23, 112:25, example [11] - 15:15, fact [31] - 10:24, exists [3] - 40:15, 113:7, 118:9, 120:8, 18:20, 63:14, 64:14, 19:21, 21:8, 23:23, 99:12, 200:14 120:21, 126:6, 64:19, 83:18, 123:2, 33:8, 44:5, 48:13, exorbitant [1] - 179:9 126:9, 127:15, 137:19, 138:18, 55:16, 63:16, 78:12, expedite [2] - 91:18, 127:18, 140:18, 170:11, 210:4 80:5, 93:12, 94:1, 91:21 142:15, 146:22, except [2] - 68:17, 94:11, 95:5, 96:19, expedited [1] - 74:11 147:23, 148:20, 72:2 112:14, 116:3, expeditious [1] - 86:9 149:19, 149:22, exception [1] - 4:13 120:15, 126:10, expeditiously [1] -149:25, 150:5, exceptions [1] -129:13, 134:10, 214:17 150:20, 151:21, 159:13, 164:6, 177:12 expend [1] - 183:16 160:1, 160:2, exclude [7] - 8:6, 9:25, 167:1, 168:14, expended [1] - 183:16 160:10, 163:1, 50:14, 63:2, 84:10, 178:14, 185:13, expert [14] - 46:21, 163:8, 164:7, 166:7, 196:14 200:16, 206:21, 104:1, 116:5, 117:1, 168:12, 168:14, excluded [3] - 8:23, 207:9 117:25, 118:19, 207:25, 209:18, 34:2, 197:2 fact-finder [1] - 94:11 119:25, 125:19, 211:17, 212:14, excludes [1] - 8:1 fact-intensive [1] -126:16, 126:19, 212:18 129:13 excluding [3] - 85:7, 145:18, 145:20, ETSI's [3] - 51:12, factor [5] - 24:23, 163:22, 190:3 180:23, 211:3 126:17, 126:20 25:2, 25:13, 194:2, exclusion [28] - 8:15, experts [7] - 46:16, EU[1] - 162:4 8:19, 8:23, 10:4, 213:16 49:4, 49:12, 126:7, Europe [7] - 60:23, factors [34] - 11:23, 48:25, 66:18, 67:14, 159:12, 184:8 63:2, 65:1, 65:7, 11:25, 12:4, 13:3, 68:16, 68:24, 70:12, explain [3] - 44:20, 65:8, 101:8, 135:10 20:16, 22:1, 22:4, 114:22, 162:17, 129:16, 195:10 European [12] - 56:11, 22:15, 22:19, 22:22, 166:7, 166:9, explained [2] - 107:7, 57:25, 58:3, 59:4, 166:10, 166:15, 22:24, 23:13, 23:14, 195:8 59:11, 59:24, 60:11, 166:19, 166:20, 23:17, 23:20, 23:24, explanation [2] -60:22, 65:1, 95:18, 167:6, 167:12, 24:2, 24:3, 24:5, 109:22, 198:22 109:2, 109:5 24:17, 35:4, 40:20, 167:18, 167:21, explicitly [6] - 17:24, evaluating [1] - 158:1 125:22, 133:22, 170:8, 179:14, 32:19, 65:25, 71:18, event [2] - 89:10, 148:3, 176:18, 179:25, 196:16, 192:25, 195:3 215:7 178:16, 179:18, 197:13, 201:2 expound [1] - 29:11 eventually [1] - 187:13 213:15, 213:16, exclusionary [1] express [8] - 60:2, evidence [30] - 30:6, 215:25, 216:3 181:12 76:18, 76:24, 77:4, 53:20, 55:13, 70:16, facts [34] - 12:11, exclusive [1] - 105:19 77:15, 79:1, 115:25, 93:15, 97:1, 116:5, 19:25, 20:21, 39:11, exclusively [1] -136:11 116:8, 116:24, 40:11, 49:17, 64:13, 182:19 expressed [4] - 183:6, 117:2, 121:17, 108:15. 109:12. excuse [2] - 138:21, 183:15, 189:9, 197:7 143:22, 143:23, 113:9, 115:1, 115:8, 178:24 expressing [1] - 116:3 149:6, 149:11, 115:14, 115:24, execute [2] - 31:21, expressly [11] - 53:7, 152:24, 161:15, 117:7, 117:10, 89:17 70:25, 77:9, 86:18, 161:19, 165:4, 117:17, 118:3, executed [1] - 191:18 87:7, 183:21, 185:4, 191:10, 193:5, 118:11, 118:16, executive [2] - 70:18, 211:19, 212:9,

11

137:20, 161:7, 189:6 24:23, 114:14, 190:16, 203:24 168:6, 168:11, fast [3] - 62:2, 73:20, 75:1 filing [6] - 42:9, 66:2, 178:20 foundation [1] -169:12, 172:21, fault [1] - 214:7 132:17, 132:19, focusing [1] - 30:18 203:10 172:24, 173:1, 173:3, 173:11, 132:21, 184:24 FOLEY [2] - 2:6, 2:10 founded [1] - 76:4 faulted [1] - 213:24 fill [1] - 195:18 four [33] - 6:23, 7:14, 173:13, 173:14, Foley [1] - 4:22 faulting [1] - 139:13 173:18, 174:13, final [6] - 74:8, 89:21, folks [1] - 192:17 7:25, 8:11, 8:21, 9:6, favor [1] - 127:14 164:2, 184:22, 174:24, 174:25, federal [4] - 14:19, follow [4] - 4:11, 9:14, 9:23, 10:3, 175:10, 177:21, 194:8, 205:25 14:24, 15:11, 160:20 10:7, 11:23, 20:3, 20:14, 177:9 finally [1] - 61:1 178:23, 178:24, 20:15, 22:4, 22:14, followed [3] - 20:25, Federal [60] - 11:18, 182:22, 182:25, 23:13, 23:17, 23:20, financial [7] - 196:4, 144:21, 158:12 11:22, 12:7, 12:18, 199:21, 201:20, 121:25, 149:3, 184:4, 185:22, following [4] - 30:17, 12:19, 13:1, 14:5, 186:23, 190:22, 201:21, 202:2, 118:5, 144:20, 198:9 154:3, 154:10, 14:7, 14:11, 14:13, 191:1, 191:10, 202:3, 206:5 154:11, 180:25, 14:16, 14:23, 14:25, follows [1] - 15:1 202:20, 203:20, finder [1] - 94:11 188:18, 192:22, 15:11, 15:14, 15:19, footnote [2] - 67:15, 204:24, 205:24, 193:19, 193:20, fine [10] - 40:2, 90:14, 15:22, 15:24, 16:4, 67:20 209:12, 209:20, 193:21, 201:14, 93:12, 98:7, 98:10, 16:6, 16:7, 16:12, FOR [1] - 1:2 210:10, 210:17, 205:9, 213:13 16:23, 17:1, 17:19, 158:9, 169:8, 170:2, fora [1] - 194:22 fourth [2] - 24:5, 211.6 172:4, 172:11 17:21, 17:25, 18:7, force [2] - 74:8, frankly [4] - 12:13, finer [3] - 39:3, 41:23, 213:19 18:22, 19:1, 19:2, 164:10 38:15, 126:14, 20:10, 20:11, 20:13, 41:24 France [11] - 44:7, forced [1] - 195:1 210:22 47:25, 49:16, 55:24, 21:25, 23:4, 23:23, finish [6] - 37:10, forcing [1] - 92:4 free [6] - 30:4, 30:20, 24:7, 24:9, 48:10, 41:23. 47:13. 91:17. 56:11, 106:13, forego [2] - 94:4, 90:24, 98:2, 124:6, 106:19, 106:20, 81:7, 81:12, 81:16, 153:10, 155:5 94:13 124:7 119:4, 159:13 81:19, 82:14, 82:16, firm [2] - 5:4, 5:8 foreign [20] - 17:15, French [122] - 34:24, FRAND [127] - 7:12, 93:13, 104:6, first [61] - 5:17, 5:25, 18:25, 20:20, 21:5, 36:7, 43:23, 44:6, 121:15, 135:2, 6:14, 12:14, 24:2, 8:4, 9:5, 9:8, 9:13, 22:13, 32:21, 50:8, 44:8, 44:10, 44:14, 164:15, 164:18, 9:22, 10:2, 10:22, 24:23, 25:1, 27:8, 50:12, 116:13, 44:15, 44:19, 44:23, 169:16, 177:8, 10:24, 26:9, 26:13, 28:19, 29:15, 30:13, 116:15, 116:16, 45:2, 45:10, 46:1, 213:12, 213:24, 27:13, 27:18, 28:20, 30:14, 30:16, 32:6, 117:2, 121:16, 46:4, 46:7, 46:10, 214:15, 214:18, 29:19, 30:3, 30:9, 33:18, 34:9, 35:22, 121:19, 173:11, 46:11, 46:15, 46:17, 215:13 30:12, 35:18, 36:24, 36:8, 36:11, 38:19, 175:11, 177:3, 46:20, 47:1, 47:5, feet [1] - 68:5 38:21, 38:25, 43:7, 37:2, 42:15, 45:6, 177:15, 178:3 47:12, 47:20, 47:21, felt [4] - 141:14, 45:10, 54:9, 60:23, 50:18, 54:12, 54:20, forever [2] - 57:5, 47:23, 48:8, 49:2, 54:21, 55:15, 55:19, 152:11, 215:16 66:16, 68:21, 69:10, 191:18 57:8, 62:1, 63:17, 49:5, 49:12, 49:13, few [5] - 106:1, 109:2, 72:22, 75:1, 75:13, forfeited [1] - 60:20 49:15, 49:22, 49:23, 66:6, 74:18, 79:23, 155:2, 159:6, 200:7 85:13, 89:11, 91:23, forget [2] - 97:22, 50:2, 51:8, 51:11, 79:24, 81:23, 83:3, field [7] - 27:19, 62:10, 92:8, 92:24, 97:8, 124:23 51:12, 51:21, 51:22, 83:6, 83:18, 86:1, 62:12, 62:17, 62:19, 97:15, 98:2, 98:15, forgive [5] - 62:2, 88:2, 89:21, 94:15, 52:5, 52:6, 52:8, 104:14, 162:15 99:8, 99:11, 107:14, 67:5, 105:25, 168:3, 94:23, 95:25, 52:12, 52:17, 55:10, fifth [3] - 136:2, 136:8 116:21, 116:24, 188:7 57:20, 58:2, 58:4, 101:12. 105:11. fight [1] - 126:13 121:22, 122:5, forgot [1] - 91:17 58:6, 58:14, 58:15, 107:25, 109:13, 130:20, 131:3, figure [12] - 41:19, forgotten [1] - 207:12 58:19, 58:25, 59:5, 113:13, 114:20, 49:16, 55:18, 55:19, 131:14, 153:4, form [2] - 190:7, 60:22, 79:3, 79:6, 122:19, 122:22, 126:17, 126:20, 158:9, 170:24, 190:10 123:2, 123:18, 79:9, 79:12, 86:25, 127:9, 129:12, 186:5, 186:10, formal [1] - 124:8 124:21, 125:12, 87:1, 97:20, 106:3, 202:22, 204:4, 152:5, 152:6, format [1] - 67:1 106:10, 106:12, 125:13, 128:9, 209:14, 213:15, 191:15, 204:12 forming [1] - 207:1 106:15, 107:18, 131:17, 131:19, figuring [1] - 55:13 215:12 formula [1] - 96:20 140:18, 140:22, 108:17, 108:24, fit [4] - 113:23, 120:1, file [12] - 131:7, forth [12] - 55:20, 109:1, 109:4, 109:7, 141:1, 141:7, 147:2, 179:14, 191:23 131:16, 132:16, 59:6, 61:10, 80:17, 109:10, 111:11, 147:5, 147:14, five [4] - 91:10, 132:19, 132:22, 118:12, 143:16, 111:13, 111:18, 147:19, 149:9, 101:11, 101:16, 136:25, 137:10, 158:2, 158:4, 205:5, 115:4, 118:2, 150:8, 150:9, 137:14, 137:15, 149:2 207:16, 211:15 118:14, 118:15, 150:16, 150:24, fix [1] - 162:17 159:1, 206:18 forthright [1] - 215:5 119:13, 119:17, 151:2, 156:8, 156:9, fixed [1] - 56:6 filed [20] - 10:23, 20:2, forward [15] - 6:5. 120:21, 120:24, 156:16, 156:17, 20:7, 20:8, 29:1, flesh [3] - 11:17, 37:13, 39:2, 50:18, 122:7, 125:19, 157:3, 157:4, 80:15, 86:22 42:16, 54:1, 56:7, 80:21, 101:4, 103:2, 125:20, 126:2, 157:25, 164:2, 56:8, 56:9, 59:12, flexible [1] - 5:22 131:12, 158:14, 164:24, 165:4, 126:8, 126:10, 59:14, 60:7, 61:5, flip [2] - 199:17, 200:1 158:16, 186:3, 142:9, 142:10, 165:8, 167:19, 72:10, 137:19, focus [4] - 13:10, 186:9, 190:13, 143:4, 143:5, 143:7,

143:10, 143:11, gist [2] - 142:4, 192:16 hay [1] - 164:25 Н 144:19, 144:23, given [13] - 20:21, head [6] - 50:16, half [5] - 46:4, 56:8, 145:17, 145:20, 42:24, 68:5, 80:25, 60:13, 72:14, 155:9, 159:8, 159:12, 94:15, 101:3, 179:5, 214:5 97:1, 177:24 160:2, 160:3, 160:4, 118:11, 123:2, heads [1] - 178:23 hand [6] - 19:4, 83:5, 160:7, 161:14, 183:17, 184:17, hear [27] - 6:1, 12:22, 98:1, 98:8, 157:20, 164:25, 165:1, 203:19, 210:6, 164:11 35:9, 40:10, 43:9, 165:7, 207:4, 209:3, 211:21 handed [1] - 164:12 44:25, 80:16, 84:22, 209:4, 210:12, God [1] - 30:5 87:14, 92:23, 95:8, handle [1] - 171:18 211:22, 211:24, good-faith [2] - 44:24, 95:9. 97:15. 104:6. handling [1] - 7:2 212:1, 212:3 208:21 104:25. 105:23. hands [1] - 66:23 Friday [2] - 1:18, goodness [1] - 145:8 130:12, 133:10, hang [2] - 109:18, 100:13 Google [1] - 135:3 141:15, 142:8, 109:19 friend [1] - 91:17 153:4, 162:19, gotcha [1] - 192:2 hanging [2] - 72:14, front [18] - 11:5, 162:21, 170:22, govern [1] - 126:14 178:23 39:21, 42:1, 42:15, 191:9, 191:10, governed [6] - 44:15, happy [13] - 27:16, 50:21, 51:10, 84:11, 205:23 44:24, 46:8, 47:23, 65:6, 74:25, 86:2, 84:12, 84:13, 85:9, heard [14] - 19:1, 48:8, 160:2 90:3, 97:7, 97:21, 102:20, 122:17, 48:11, 48:21, 48:22, government[1] -98:8, 123:8, 140:5, 142:3, 188:3, 49:8, 52:7, 65:2, 39:23 175:18, 187:10, 196:13, 207:19, 88:23, 97:1, 104:9, governs [8] - 11:19, 213:10 213:24, 214:6 136:13, 153:16, 43:23, 44:4, 44:14, harbor [1] - 80:8 fronts [1] - 215:22 199:4, 205:17 49:13, 65:7, 127:5, hard [4] - 54:11, frustrate [1] - 182:15 hearing [8] - 101:14, 212:25 87:14, 184:5, 197:15 frustrates [1] - 34:2 120:3, 120:6, 154:2, grant [10] - 38:20, **hardly** [1] - 154:5 frustrating [2] - 183:4, 165:11, 191:9, 70:12, 77:7, 79:16, **HARKRIDER** [2] - 3:6, 183:17 122:24, 123:1, 216:14 3:11 Hedemann [1] - 5:9 frustration [3] - 183:7, 163:4, 179:14, Harkrider [1] - 214:22 **HEDEMANN**[1] - 3:11 183:15 209:10, 211:5 harm [58] - 5:25, 22:5, full [7] - 42:25, 74:8, held [4] - 40:25, 166:8, granted [6] - 48:25, 24:17, 72:8, 72:9, 91:5, 133:14, 185:4, 214:3 68:17, 96:6, 105:17, 72:11, 83:5, 85:18, 133:15, 186:13 129:25, 157:22 help [5] - 70:2, 73:4, 85:21, 105:23, fully [5] - 11:17, 71:4, grants [1] - 30:19 84:13, 167:15, 105:24, 110:22, 128:3, 128:17, 215:15 grateful [1] - 96:16 111:2, 113:22, 130:25 helpful [7] - 51:4, grave [1] - 189:9 114:21, 125:3, function [1] - 106:23 51:7, 90:22, 104:23, great [10] - 18:16, 133:10, 133:16, 134:21, 142:14, fundamentally [2] -24:22, 64:18, 95:5, 133:19, 133:22, 10:8, 179:7 154:12 185:18, 185:19, 134:6, 148:3, 153:1, helps [1] - 69:15 future [4] - 30:25, 191:7, 191:9, 153:10, 155:7, 78:5, 161:13, 190:5 hesitance [1] - 209:1 205:13, 205:24 170:23, 171:1, highlighted [2] grounds [2] - 176:8, 171:5, 179:15, G 30:22, 136:19 203:25 179:25, 180:3, highly [2] - 198:11, 180:4, 180:5, **GSM** [1] - 102:1 garage [1] - 204:19 181:13, 182:2, 198.12 guarantee [1] - 25:22 gateway [5] - 24:2, 187:7, 187:9, himself [1] - 48:13 guess [17] - 13:10, 24:6, 24:17, 24:23, 187:12, 187:20, hinging [1] - 29:12 99:2, 99:7, 102:22, 213:16 192:10. 193:4. history [6] - 67:11, 118:5, 118:21, General [2] - 16:19, 194:23, 195:3, 69:6. 69:9. 122:17. 150:7, 152:1, 17:24 195:5. 196:4. 143:5. 143:9 156:15, 166:23, general [10] - 12:20, 171:24, 177:5, 199:25, 200:1, hits [1] - 105:6 16:21, 16:22, 68:20, 191:4, 198:23, 200:19, 200:20, Hobson's [1] - 179:10 118:2, 118:16, 200:22, 201:4, 199:4, 199:20, 201:9 hodgepodge [1] -

135:5, 160:6,

127:11

117:16

58:8

199:13, 199:14

generally [2] - 116:23,

generis [2] - 108:18,

German [2] - 19:7,

203:12 holders [2] - 61:14, 61:23 holding [1] - 46:11 honest [1] - 30:5 Honor [172] - 4:20, 5:1, 5:6, 5:12, 6:9, 6:21, 14:6, 14:12, 16:17, 18:11, 19:14, 20:9, 20:17, 23:8, 23:15. 23:18. 23:21. 24:8, 24:12, 25:3, 25:5, 25:8, 27:6, 28:3, 30:1, 30:18, 31:20, 33:21, 34:12, 44:3, 45:25, 46:6, 46:24, 47:14, 47:18, 48:4, 48:10, 48:21, 49:15, 49:25, 50:5, 50:20, 50:25, 51:14, 52:1, 52:4, 55:22, 56:10, 56:17, 57:24, 58:9, 60:14, 61:9, 61:17, 62:10, 63:13, 64:18, 65:4, 66:11, 67:18, 68:1, 68:7, 68:19, 69:4, 69:16, 70:9, 72:16, 73:9, 73:25, 74:7, 74:25, 75:5, 75:8, 75:14, 78:9, 79:10, 81:1, 81:6, 82:15, 82:23, 85:6, 85:12, 85:15, 85:24, 85:25, 87:19, 88:18, 88:24, 89:4, 89:10, 90:1, 91:11, 91:12, 91:19, 92:1, 92:2, 93:11, 94:19, 95:6, 95:22, 96:6, 97:4, 97:7, 97:11, 97:24, 98:14, 100:8, 102:8, 102:21, 104:5, 131:3, 135:1, 145:14, 149:14, 154:12, 154:16, 154:18, 154:22, 155:13, 155:18, 156:25, 158:7, 158:17, 159:11, 161:12, 161:17, 162:4, 162:13, 162:21, 163:12, 164:23, 165:12, 165:18, 169:6, 169:10, 170:9, 172:2, 173:24, 187:10, 187:11, 187:21, 188:7, 188:11, 189:6, 190:8, 190:12, 190:23, 191:8,

12

201:8, 213:16,

215:12, 215:17,

215:21, 215:23

harmed [2] - 201:2,

harms [1] - 22:5

hate [1] - 101:18

Hartford [1] - 3:12

201:7

11:22

hold [19] - 13:8, 22:12,

67:17, 67:24, 79:18,

80:14, 83:23, 94:3,

108:6, 108:9,

116:14, 145:12,

147:12, 188:2,

22:21, 37:8, 53:5,

guidepost [1] - 104:15

guides [1] - 108:25

guilty [2] - 146:10,

Gunning [1] - 1:24

guys [3] - 54:24,

121:4, 172:23

guy [2] - 117:22, 145:9

201:5

13

192:2, 192:11, 142:21, 157:3, 161:9 188:16 190:3, 190:7, 18:24, 19:6, 19:8, 20:16, 22:2, 22:15, 190:10, 190:11, 193:2, 193:6, implementers [2] incorporated [1] -22:22, 22:24, 23:1, 190:13, 191:4, 194:13, 194:17, 111:20, 146:10 89:20 23:24, 32:17, 32:22, 191:5, 191:6, 195:8, 200:6, 201:22, implicates [1] - 12:16 increase [2] - 110:24, 202:5, 202:18, implication [2] -110:25 33:1, 33:25, 36:12, 195:15, 195:24, 196:7, 196:9, 202:25, 203:9, 175:24, 197:6 incredible [1] - 168:2 36:25, 38:14, 38:20, 204:2, 204:11, implicit [1] - 213:10 incremental [3] -38:24, 39:11, 40:4, 196:14, 199:1, implied [19] - 45:1, 205:2, 205:13, 40:18, 41:1, 41:2, 201:6, 208:1, 161:16, 164:17, 205:22, 205:23, 42:1, 42:2, 42:6, 209:13, 209:19, 45:14, 52:11, 52:24, 164:22 206:2, 214:21, indeed [3] - 16:9, 42:13, 42:23, 43:4, 209:23, 210:5, 77:20, 79:2, 79:4, 215:4, 216:6, 216:8, 50:3, 50:16, 50:24, 210:10, 210:13, 79:8, 87:2, 87:4, 99:15, 131:7 216:10 51:13, 51:24, 52:8, 211:7, 211:20, 87:6, 126:25, Indeed [1] - 16:17 HONORABLE [1] -52:14, 53:15, 53:22, 212:16, 212:25, 136:11, 160:3, indefinitely [1] -213:1, 213:14 53:24, 54:1, 64:8, 160:9, 208:16, 113:11 hook [1] - 92:10 64:17, 66:6, 70:2, injunctions [7] -208:21, 212:2, 212:7 independent [1] hope [1] - 108:23 impliedly [1] - 71:1 71:8, 71:11, 71:14, 17:13, 18:25, 39:8, 19:23 75:21, 75:24, 75:25, hopefully [1] - 188:9 50:13, 81:9, 81:21, implies [2] - 86:18, indicate [2] - 131:11, 76:5, 76:11, 76:13, 182:6 hoping [1] - 95:24 86:19 157:4 76:20, 76:25, 77:5, hour [1] - 88:23 injunctive [2] implying [1] - 135:11 indicated [1] - 122:16 77:11, 77:16, 78:1, 125:14, 136:1 house [1] - 204:15 important [16] - 27:17, indulgence [2] - 82:7, 79:25, 80:24, 81:8, 40:5, 65:15, 75:7, injury [1] - 199:18 HTC [1] - 48:17 155:14 82:6, 83:5, 83:17, Huawei [4] - 18:24, 83:22, 91:7, 99:11, innovate [1] - 62:5 industry [15] - 104:14, 83:25, 84:5, 84:10, inquire [2] - 51:25, 19:15, 49:9, 65:3 101:19. 117:4. 104:15, 132:7, 84:16, 84:21, 85:1, 75:14 Huawei/ZTE [1] -133:10, 162:13, 132:9, 133:25, 85:3, 85:4, 85:8, insist [1] - 104:5 162:20, 179:12, 95:18 134:1, 180:8, 85:14, 85:15, 86:20, insofar [1] - 9:12 Huber [2] - 145:20, 182:3, 184:19, 180:13, 180:17, 87:13, 88:17, 92:3, 145:22 200:11 instance [11] - 6:17, 180:19, 180:24, 92:4, 107:25, 187:22, 205:14 38:21, 53:6, 134:11, huge [1] - 205:15 importantly [1] -108:11, 108:15, 118:21 138:3, 146:13, hundred [5] - 62:20, inequitable [1] -108:20, 109:7, 184:9, 186:5, importation [2] -199:18 103:20, 159:18, 109:14, 109:16, 186:10, 213:11, 165:25, 166:3 164:13, 190:19 inevitable [1] - 195:7 110:19, 110:25, importing [1] - 198:9 214:10 hundreds [3] - 8:25, inference [1] - 207:24 111:8, 111:24, 10:9, 61:22 impose [1] - 22:2 instances [1] - 136:23 inferior [1] - 46:22 112:2, 113:1, 113:6, imposed [1] - 75:24 intellectual [2] - 64:6, hung [1] - 169:7 inferred [1] - 116:2 113:8, 115:2, 64:16 hypothetical [1] imposing [1] - 42:12 influenced [1] - 166:4 115:13, 115:20, intend [1] - 143:17 improper [2] - 120:22, 16:11 influential [1] - 109:4 120:9, 121:15, intensive [1] - 129:13 129:16 information [2] -124:18, 125:22, improperly [1] - 129:7 intent [3] - 96:18, 171:15, 206:5 127:11, 127:17, 208:12 **IN** [2] - 1:1, 1:2 informed [1] - 25:21 133:23, 141:19, idea [8] - 62:20, 62:25, intention [4] - 64:3, inappropriate [1] infringe [1] - 64:6 142:2, 146:21, 126:17, 126:20, 129:6, 132:15, 153:21 infringed [5] - 8:22, 148:21, 149:16, 156:25, 162:15, 126:21 **INC** [2] - 1:8, 1:14 95:8, 95:10, 166:9, 149:17, 151:10, 207:21, 211:23 intentions [1] - 126:14 Inc [2] - 2:21, 197:14 204:23 151:19, 153:17, identical [2] - 9:10, InterDigital [1] - 49:7 incidentally [5] infringement [16] -153:20, 154:1, interest [12] - 31:14, 71:16, 73:23, 90:18, 12:17, 20:7, 20:9, 157:21, 158:5, identified [1] - 180:9 31:24, 65:2, 83:19, 114:6, 117:12 21:12, 32:3, 92:18, 158:23. 159:2. identify [1] - 213:25 113:16, 129:13, include [2] - 163:18, 93:25, 96:2, 100:1, 162:23. 162:24. III rsi - 144:5, 144:7. 135:23, 194:13, 165:24 129:14, 167:2, 168:13. 168:15. 144:11 194:15, 216:3 included [1] - 159:8 181:22, 200:12, 168:19, 170:8, Illinois [1] - 2:7 interested [3] - 58:24, includes [2] - 101:25, 201:5, 203:8, 204:4 170:21, 172:19, illustration [1] -170:13, 184:6 131:10 infringer [3] - 83:6, 176:7, 176:24, interesting [2] - 75:11, 136:20 including [7] - 21:5, 99:3, 157:14 177:16, 178:23, imagine [1] - 205:2 216:4 25:24, 33:9, 55:22, infringer's [1] - 83:16 179:5, 179:17, immediacy [2] - 174:8, interfere [2] - 153:22, 88:1, 133:25, 164:15 inherent [1] - 45:14 181:18, 182:1, 174.9 182:14 incompatible [1] inherently [1] - 76:22 182:6, 182:14, international [1] immediate [2] -111:21 inject [1] - 209:1 183:1, 183:14, 13:12 124:12, 124:21 inconsistent [5] injunction [194] - 7:8, 183:25, 184:11, impetus [1] - 162:14 internet [1] - 188:13 31:1, 86:20, 159:18, 10:18, 10:25, 11:10, 184:20, 184:25, interpret [4] - 79:8, implementer [6] -179:13, 179:19 11:13, 11:25, 12:4, 186:8, 189:22, 87:1, 87:2, 116:1 61:16, 62:11, 95:20, incorporate [1] -15:6, 17:2, 18:17, 189:24, 190:1,

Case: 21-2106 Document: 15 Page: 288 Filed: 08/30/2021

interpretation [5] -200:19, 200:20, 10:4, 10:18, 11:10, 166:18, 167:18, 52:6, 53:10, 73:12, 200:22, 201:4, 12:17, 20:4, 20:8, 168:2, 174:10, 119:18, 160:6 201:8, 213:16, 20:12, 20:14, 20:20, 175:23, 176:24, 215:12, 215:17, 21:5, 22:11, 25:21, 177:21, 178:11, interpreted [4] -48:14, 49:22, 109:1, 215:21, 215:23 25:25, 28:10, 29:2, 178:15, 178:16, 178:23, 179:3, 179:24 irreparably [3] - 201:2, 29:5, 29:8, 30:8, interpreting [4] -201:6, 209:10 30:9, 30:10, 30:23, 179:13, 179:20, 31:10, 32:7, 32:23, 179:24, 180:4, 49:23, 51:22, 120:1, irrevocable [2] -33:10, 37:15, 37:21, 180:15, 180:22, 120:21 209:11, 211:5 38:23, 39:2, 42:9, 180:23, 181:25, interprets [3] - 87:4, irrevocably [1] - 211:4 87:5, 87:6 issue [86] - 5:25, 8:22, 42:13, 48:24, 48:25, 182:13, 183:11, 52:15, 53:22, 53:25, 183:17, 184:24, interrupt [1] - 65:14 10:21, 12:23, 13:13, 56:7, 56:8, 57:1, 185:8, 185:10, intervening [1] - 74:13 13:16, 19:5, 35:21, 57:13, 58:25, 60:8, 185:12, 185:15, 36:23, 38:19, 38:25, introduce [1] - 143:21 60:21, 61:5, 65:18, 185:20, 186:9, 40:4, 48:11, 48:13, invalid [8] - 94:6, 186:15, 186:17, 49:6, 52:4, 53:7, 66:2, 66:13, 66:17, 94:12, 95:7, 129:18, 66:18, 66:25, 67:12, 186:21, 186:24, 166:9, 166:25, 53:9, 54:15, 55:11, 68:16, 69:11, 70:8, 187:13, 189:1, 56:18, 59:1, 60:19, 179:21, 204:23 189:16, 192:4, 71:13, 71:19, 71:24, 67:13, 70:23, 71:9, invalidity [2] - 167:5, 194:9, 195:2, 195:7. 71:25, 72:2, 72:6, 74:19, 75:1, 75:12, 203:8 72:12, 72:19, 72:23, 201:3, 206:19, 84:14, 86:14, 87:7, inverse [1] - 178:17 73:7, 73:12, 73:16, 213:1, 213:5 87:9, 90:7, 97:20, investigation [3] -80:22, 81:15, 84:12, itself [9] - 61:8, 61:9, 112:2, 114:1, 59:21, 136:10, 189:1 85:3, 85:5, 85:10, 77:25, 78:11, 79:25, 116:16, 120:13, invocation [1] - 32:14 85:17, 86:11, 86:14, 127:7, 127:11, 121:22, 122:20, invoke [1] - 182:21 99:18, 107:19, 136:20, 205:8 123:21, 124:13, invoked [3] - 176:1, 110:21, 111:2, 124:21, 129:1, 177:17, 182:18 111:12, 114:21, J 129:22, 133:17, invoking [2] - 174:20, 143:14, 149:20, 115:21, 118:10, 175:13 118:15, 120:20, Jack [1] - 5:1 151:17, 163:13, involved [7] - 18:21, 122:11, 122:17, **JACK**[1] - 2:15 166:14, 167:18, 18:23, 19:15, 64:1, 123:12, 124:19, job [1] - 36:19 167:21, 176:19, 71:15, 72:6, 141:12 124:24, 125:13, John [1] - 6:17 177:22, 180:8, IOT [2] - 104:15, 182:23, 184:5, 130:19, 130:20, joining [1] - 5:8 114:18 130:22, 131:7, 184:7, 184:18, judge [10] - 43:3, IoT [2] - 188:13, 131:10, 132:4, 185:7, 186:2, 186:3, 48:13, 50:17, 193:25 132:6, 132:8, 186:14, 189:23, 100:10, 119:25, IP [1] - 132:1 132:10, 132:17, 190:2, 190:11, 120:3, 146:14, irrefutable [1] - 78:12 190:13, 191:4, 132:19, 132:21, 156:6, 178:9, 214:16 irreparable [58] - 5:25, 195:8, 206:8, 133:8, 133:11, Judge [24] - 12:8, 22:5, 24:17, 72:8, 133:20, 133:24, 210:16, 211:18, 16:19, 17:24, 18:24, 72:9, 72:11, 83:4, 134:5, 135:14, 212:11, 212:19, 19:10, 39:18, 49:8, 85:18, 85:20, 135:17, 135:19, 213:21, 215:13, 50:11, 51:11, 82:16, 105:23, 105:24, 136:4, 136:9, 215:14, 216:3 86:8, 100:9, 101:22, 110:22, 111:2, 136:20, 136:22, issued [5] - 66:1, 118:8, 139:25, 113:21, 114:21, 136:25, 137:15, 68:24, 196:14, 140:2, 146:8, 125:3, 133:10, 143:15, 144:3, 196:16, 197:13 153:16, 155:15, 133:16, 133:19, 144:6. 148:10. issues [16] - 7:10, 166:1, 177:6, 182:4, 133:22, 148:3, 148:15. 148:16. 18:3, 19:5, 35:10, 201:15 153:1, 153:9, 155:7, 148:22, 149:19, 35:12, 38:19, 65:9, judges [1] - 48:16 170:23, 171:1, 149:22, 150:1, 65:10, 106:1, judgment [22] - 10:23, 171:5, 179:15, 150:2, 151:10, 121:25, 122:1, 21:12, 27:11, 29:16, 180:3, 180:4, 180:5, 151:14, 153:22, 125:21, 156:10, 31:14, 31:23, 31:24, 181:13, 182:2, 154:3, 154:8, 166:7, 182:16, 201:6 64:20, 78:5, 96:1, 187:7, 187:8, 156:11, 156:15, issuing [1] - 83:17 113:16, 113:23, 187:12, 187:20, 158:21, 158:24, IT [2] - 136:1, 164:4 124:22, 134:15, 192:9, 193:4, 158:25, 159:2, ITC [213] - 6:23, 7:9, 165:2, 165:3, 167:4, 194:23, 195:3, 159:4, 159:19, 173:12, 174:12, 7:16, 7:22, 7:25, 8:1, 195:4, 196:4, 161:7, 164:6, 164:9, 186:23, 194:15, 8:6, 8:13, 8:21, 9:6, 199:18, 199:25, 164:10, 164:11, 9:15, 9:19, 9:25, 204:6 200:1, 200:18,

judgments [3] -179:13, 179:19, 179:20 jurisdiction [39] -10:2, 10:14, 12:16, 13:17, 14:19, 19:17, 19:22, 32:13, 32:15, 32:24, 40:8, 42:14, 94:21, 105:17, 105:19, 124:12, 124:15, 124:20, 124:22, 133:8, 133:9, 166:2, 168:1, 171:5, 173:10, 174:18, 174:20, 175:14, 175:24, 176:12, 176:15, 176:20, 177:13, 182:19, 182:22, 183:12, 183:13, 183:20 jurisdictions [2] -50:8, 50:12 jury [4] - 48:12, 93:13, 93:14, 104:5 Justice [3] - 59:23, 95:18, 184:9 justice [5] - 65:2, 117:24, 191:24, 192:5, 201:4 justified [3] - 55:14, 83:5, 186:7 justifies [1] - 83:17 justify [2] - 42:23, 195:4

14

Κ

KEELEY [3] - 3:7, 68:7, 214:21 Keeley [2] - 5:9, 214:22 keep [12] - 63:14, 63:16, 75:21, 86:17, 96:23, 118:7, 161:18, 163:12, 164:3, 164:4, 171:25, 201:12 keeping [1] - 110:22 keeps [2] - 60:17, 191:14 Kelly [1] - 198:2 Kelly's [1] - 196:11 Kenneth [1] - 188:22 kept [1] - 63:24 Kevin [1] - 4:22 **KEVIN** [1] - 2:11 key [5] - 63:10, 63:20, 65:9, 65:13, 194:4 kick [2] - 78:4, 78:6

166:2, 166:5,

kind [28] - 8:5, 8:6, 11:22, 19:16, 32:16, 48:7, 48:23, 72:16, 129:11, 141:14, 152:18, 156:23, 156:25, 158:1, 158:2, 158:3, 158:18, 168:8, 177:13, 178:5, 179:11, 182:8, 182:17, 191:15, 196:22, 205:22, 207:12, 208:2 knowing [1] - 121:5 knowledge [1] knows [5] - 72:13, 172:4, 199:12, 200:8, 206:17 KONINKLIJKE [2] -1:4, 1:10 Korea [1] - 79:17

L

lack [2] - 184:17, 214:11 land [2] - 106:24, 209:25 language [3] - 62:23, 77:4, 143:21 laptop [1] - 123:14 Lardner [1] - 4:22 **LARDNER** [2] - 2:6, 2:10 largely [1] - 215:14 laser [1] - 175:6 last [17] - 54:25, 100:2, 101:11, 132:1, 149:4, 152:2, 155:15, 165:24, 166:6, 170:9, 175:4, 175:17, 184:10, 185:9, 193:15, 206:16, 210:18 late [2] - 91:6, 178:13 Latin [1] - 108:17 LATZER [1] - 2:18 law [206] - 5:8, 11:18, 11:19, 11:23, 12:2, 12:6, 12:7, 12:9, 12:10, 12:15, 12:18, 12:19, 13:1, 14:5, 14:7, 14:11, 14:13, 14:15, 14:21, 14:23, 14:24, 15:5, 15:6, 15:11, 15:14, 15:23, 15:25, 16:2, 16:7, 16:8, 16:9, 16:12, 16:13, 16:23, 17:2,

17:22, 17:25, 18:1, 18:7, 19:24, 20:13, 21:25, 23:23, 24:7, 24:9, 36:7, 38:15, 43:23, 44:4, 44:6, 44:8, 44:10, 44:14, 44:15, 44:19, 44:23, 45:3, 45:10, 45:14, 46:4, 46:7, 46:15, 46:20, 47:5, 47:21, 47:24, 48:8, 49:2, 49:12, 49:13, 49:22, 49:23, 50:2, 51:8, 51:12, 51:22, 52:6, 52:8, 52:17, 52:18, 52:25, 53:6, 53:11, 57:20, 58:2, 58:3, 58:4, 58:6, 58:8, 58:14, 58:15, 58:19, 58:25, 59:5, 60:22, 65:5, 71:5, 71:16, 73:4, 79:4, 79:6, 79:7, 79:9, 79:12, 86:23, 97:20, 106:3, 106:24, 107:18, 108:24, 109:10, 111:13, 115:4, 116:3, 116:6, 116:13, 116:15, 116:23, 117:3, 117:6, 117:7, 117:11, 117:13, 117:14, 117:15, 117:17, 117:18, 118:1, 118:3, 118:14, 118:15, 118:24, 119:2, 119:3, 119:13, 119:14, 119:17, 119:19, 119:22, 120:1, 120:21, 120:24, 121:4, 121:16, 121:17, 121:19, 122:5, 122:7, 125:19, 126:8, 126:10, 126:12, 127:5, 127:6, 132:1, 134:20, 134:25, 135:11, 142:9, 142:10, 143:10, 144:19, 144:21, 144:23, 145:18, 145:20, 159:7, 159:8, 160:2, 160:3, 160:6, 160:9, 169:19, 176:9, 176:14, 183:25, 186:8, 191:24, 199:21, 207:4, 209:3, 209:4,

210:12, 211:1, 211:3, 211:9, 211:11, 211:24, 212:1, 212:3, 212:6, 212:24, 213:6, 214:2 laws [1] - 118:16 lawsuit [10] - 86:8, 129:8, 130:18, 132:16, 159:1, 186:20, 186:21, 186:22, 202:23, 206:19 lawsuits [4] - 12:4, 106:8, 177:21, 183:18 lay [2] - 133:16, 214:8 Lear [1] - 203:16 learned [1] - 116:24 least [12] - 8:21, 23:10, 49:20, 59:2, 75:18, 94:6, 146:24, 159:21, 180:18, 192:22, 198:6, 203:5 leave [1] - 126:3 left [2] - 212:19, 214:20 legal [39] - 28:9, 28:12, 30:7, 30:10, 30:11, 31:7, 31:10, 31:15, 32:11, 33:13, 33:14, 33:15, 37:14, 37:20, 38:1, 39:16, 39:24, 39:25, 40:14, 40:21, 41:7, 45:9, 70:19, 70:23, 75:13, 75:16, 76:5, 76:6, 76:17, 82:5, 108:19, 115:1, 115:3, 133:12, 133:13, 134:9, 135:12, 213:9, 215:14 legally [1] - 135:5 legislative [4] -122:16, 143:5, 143:8, 143:9 lend [1] - 78:11 length [2] - 92:19, 207:2 lengthy [1] - 109:22 less [2] - 99:2, 140:16 letter [10] - 56:12, 66:25, 67:1, 69:3, 69:4, 69:16, 69:18, 71:13, 134:10, 134:11 letterhead [1] - 56:13 level [7] - 27:19, 62:10, 62:19, 88:19, 104:13, 162:15,

levels [1] - 148:13 leverage [8] - 128:13, 168:2, 182:7, 185:14, 185:19, 185:20, 185:24 liability [1] - 204:7 liberal [2] - 185:3, 214:4 license [91] - 9:21, 25:23, 26:6, 27:14, 29:21, 30:4, 30:5, 30:20, 31:21, 33:8, 35:18, 45:6, 54:7, 56:2, 61:20, 61:21, 63:9, 64:3, 66:6, 77:8, 77:25, 79:16, 79:24, 83:16, 83:18, 87:18, 89:17, 91:23, 94:5, 94:10, 96:12, 99:1, 101:12, 101:15, 101:24, 103:1, 105:9, 105:10, 109:18, 111:19, 111:24, 114:21, 115:16, 115:17, 122:22, 122:23, 122:24, 123:2, 127:16, 127:21, 128:2, 128:14, 130:3, 130:7, 135:24, 136:11, 140:18, 142:1, 147:2, 147:5, 147:6, 147:14, 147:19, 149:5, 156:23, 156:24, 158:13, 190:5, 190:14, 190:16, 190:22, 191:11, 191:14, 191:18, 199:20, 200:15, 200:25, 201:20, 202:3, 202:19, 202:23, 203:3, 203:6, 203:14, 204:10, 204:13, 205:9, 209:11, 210:10, 211:5 licensed [4] - 21:10, 31:18, 92:5, 96:24 licensee [19] - 54:2, 54:4, 54:5, 55:2, 60:18, 67:14, 69:1, 74:23, 77:1, 77:6, 79:22, 79:23, 87:17, 95:19, 109:17, 115:19, 209:14,

licenses [5] - 61:15, 96:6, 128:24, 129:24, 200:13 licensing [3] - 33:23, 184:12, 200:12 licensor [4] - 45:16, 45:18, 74:21, 203:17 licensors [1] - 203:10 lies [1] - 64:23 life [2] - 188:19, 193:18 likelihood [41] - 22:4, 24:16, 24:25, 25:16, 25:19, 26:24, 35:23, 36:13, 42:3, 42:7, 71:12, 80:18, 85:21, 105:24, 111:7, 125:24, 146:17, 146:18, 147:4, 147:16, 148:5, 148:20, 149:16, 149:18, 150:17, 151:13, 152:14, 153:6, 153:8, 153:10, 153:20, 155:5, 161:15, 170:6, 170:20, 184:22, 187:7, 200:22, 206:24, 212:22, 213:17 likely [2] - 26:14, 198.12 limit [2] - 203:3, 204:9 limited [3] - 52:10, 115:8, 118:1 line [8] - 13:4, 23:24, 38:4, 128:18, 144:13, 156:7, 156:18, 162:4 lines [1] - 138:15 listed [1] - 66:12 listening [2] - 35:3, 196:2 litany [1] - 126:20 literally [1] - 173:17 litigant [1] - 112:13 litigate [6] - 112:13, 124:24. 167:1. 195:1. 214:15. 215:22 litigating [9] - 11:14, 11:15, 28:10, 30:9, 37:15, 37:21, 129:14, 194:22, 210:16 litigation [3] - 64:14, 112:7, 137:24 Littman [1] - 4:22 **LITTMAN**[1] - 2:11 live [2] - 169:13,

15

215:15

211:8

88:3

licensees [2] - 70:13,

16

206:21 10:15, 10:19, 11:6, 79:19, 81:25, 83:15, 171:14, 172:9, maker [1] - 124:1 86:6, 88:4, 100:19, **LLP** [6] - 2:2, 2:15, 11:8, 11:21, 12:3, 172:13, 172:16, mandate [5] - 73:1, 105:3, 105:5, 2:18, 3:3, 3:6, 3:11 12:7, 12:24, 13:2, 172:25, 173:7, 133:7, 137:2, 137:5, 173:9, 174:7, 175:6, 13:6, 13:8, 13:20, 156:12 112:16, 112:19, logical [1] - 121:14 13:23, 13:25, 16:21, 175:9, 175:13, mandatory [2] - 76:5, 114:10, 115:23, look [40] - 20:15, 116:23, 117:14, 38:18, 56:20, 58:5, 22:18, 22:23, 23:2, 175:18, 175:21, 210:7 58:8, 58:19, 65:11, 23:5, 23:21, 24:12, 176:1, 176:4, manner [2] - 69:12, 117:20, 119:6, 24:15, 24:20, 34:14, 176:17, 176:22, 119:8, 119:10, 66:16, 67:10, 67:22, 90.21 34:16, 34:19, 34:21, 177:1, 177:4, 119:14, 120:25, 70:3, 80:11, 86:6, manufacturer [4] -34:24, 35:2, 35:8, 177:20, 178:2, 121:3, 121:6, 88:16, 88:19, 90:20, 63:7, 63:24, 127:25, 101:24, 126:18, 35:10, 35:13, 35:17, 178:12, 179:22, 122:11, 124:11, 197:14 35:24, 36:2, 36:4, 180:2, 180:6, 125:16, 125:21, 135:13, 140:9, manufacturing [1] -36:10, 36:15, 36:18, 180:16, 180:23, 126:4, 127:17, 140:21, 142:7, 182:5 129:8, 129:21, 37:7, 37:9, 37:11, 181:5, 181:10, 143:16, 143:24, mark[1] - 128:18 37:16, 37:19, 37:23, 181:17, 181:21, 132:18, 137:19, 144:14, 146:14, marked [1] - 171:18 138:2, 138:7, 37:25, 38:8, 38:11, 181:24, 182:10, 155:19, 186:3, market [29] - 33:24, 38:17, 39:3, 39:6, 185:6, 185:16, 139:11, 140:20, 203:1, 207:5, 34:2, 50:14, 84:10, 141:17, 144:4, 208:12, 208:14, 39:17, 40:16, 40:22, 186:18, 187:5, 85:7, 110:23, 150:19, 151:17, 41:3, 41:8, 41:10, 194:19, 195:6, 208:21, 208:22, 114:24, 162:17, 41:13, 41:15, 41:17, 195:14, 196:10, 154:23, 168:8, 209:20, 210:25, 164:13, 164:21, 41:21, 42:20, 69:16, 196:13, 196:18, 169:18, 169:25, 211:12, 211:13, 187:23, 188:12, 173:19, 174:9, 69:21, 69:24, 70:4, 196:23, 197:8, 212:3 188:14, 189:21, 97:11, 97:13, 97:19, 197:11, 197:17, 175:16, 176:13, looked [11] - 16:4, 190:4, 192:18, 106:1, 106:7, 197:20, 197:23, 176:23, 177:18, 16:5, 19:20, 59:6, 192:19. 192:20. 106:14, 106:17, 197:25, 198:4, 177:21, 178:2, 60:23, 162:5, 177:5, 192:21, 192:24, 106:21, 106:25, 198:16, 199:2, 178:8, 178:13, 177:17, 177:18, 193:23, 194:1, 199:15, 199:17, 178:15, 178:18, 107:20, 108:13, 183:14, 208:1 194:6, 195:7, 108:22, 110:7, 200:4, 206:4, 178:24, 179:12, looking [32] - 15:1, 195:12, 196:6, 110:10, 111:3, 206:16, 207:7, 179:18, 181:5, 17:8, 18:17, 18:18, 199:11, 205:20 111:5, 111:8, 207:18, 208:9, 184:15, 185:25, 20:14, 46:14, 47:3, mask [2] - 4:13, 4:17 111:13, 111:16, 208:11, 208:18, 186:19, 190:21, 47:24, 48:5, 48:13, masks [1] - 4:8 112:11, 112:16, 209:15, 209:17, 191:21, 192:8, 48:14, 52:9, 52:11, Massachusetts [1] -112:19, 112:22, 210:12, 216:8, 196:7, 197:3, 55:12, 58:5, 59:4, 2:11 112:24, 113:2, 216:13 198:16, 198:19, 60:22, 61:10, 65:14, master [2] - 129:12, 113:4, 113:19, Lowenstein [12] - 5:3, 202:6, 202:21, 66:22, 67:25, 96:6, 129:21 113:25, 114:9, 97:11, 97:12, 97:14, 205:17, 207:23, 101:5, 104:11, material [2] - 118:22, 114:12, 114:15, 105:23, 130:14, 208:4, 209:8 140:7, 177:14, 209:1 190:14, 190:16, 115:3, 115:9, 155:8, 165:19, meaning [3] - 93:2, matter [21] - 4:8, 10:7, 212:5, 215:1 115:12, 116:9, 170:23, 194:18, 156:17, 174:4 15:22, 20:18, 20:21, 116:12, 116:18, looks [1] - 197:17 206:3, 206:23 means [9] - 53:12, 55:16, 71:5, 86:23, 117:22, 118:5, 77:8, 132:8, 140:21, Lowenstein's [1] loose [1] - 17:16 111:1, 111:3, 111:6, 118:25, 119:3, 173:2, 173:17, 161:2 lose [15] - 33:12, 111:12, 120:21, 119:10, 119:12, 174:9, 210:24 lower [3] - 46:22, 71:24, 98:25, 121:4, 122:5, 134:9, 119:20, 120:12, 107:5, 128:14 meant [10] - 6:11, 147:16, 189:15, 158:22, 178:22, 121:21, 122:9, 189:21, 191:14, lunch [7] - 154:20, 15:21, 16:15, 41:1, 179:5, 200:16, 122:18, 123:8, 155:6, 155:7, 78:8, 100:14, 192:19, 192:22, 214:15 123:11, 124:9, 100:15, 139:22, 165:23, 167:23, 194:12, 194:13, matters [6] - 12:25, 124:16, 125:2, 208:16 168:17, 207:10 196:6, 196:15, 197:4 18:6, 90:23, 111:5, 125:7, 125:10, luncheon [1] - 168:25 meantime [2] losing [1] - 189:17 126:15, 158:22 126:4, 127:3, loss [5] - 7:7, 166:23, Lynn [2] - 16:19, 17:24 105:16, 187:15 maximum [1] - 32:1 127:15, 128:5, 192:15, 195:7, 199:8 LÖWENSTEIN [1] meanwhile [3] - 8:7, mean [106] - 7:21, 128:7, 128:15, 149:5, 191:21 lost [3] - 194:3, 195:12 167:11 10:19, 12:18, 13:15, 128:21, 129:23, mechanism [3] loud [1] - 104:25 13:22, 17:23, 22:4, 130:2, 130:5, 65:25, 73:7, 129:24 М love [1] - 92:11 23:22, 35:5, 38:6, 130:15, 145:14, mechanisms [1] low [1] - 94:5 40:16, 41:6, 45:17, 145:19, 146:1, magic [1] - 96:20 LOWENSTEIN [228] -113:15 45:19, 46:2, 48:21, 155:9, 165:20, mails [1] - 210:25 medical [1] - 163:19 2:19, 5:12, 6:21, 7:1, 51:5, 51:7, 54:24, 166:20, 167:1, maintain [2] - 61:8, meet [1] - 165:1 7:3, 7:6, 7:10, 7:17, 62:20, 65:22, 70:19, 167:14, 167:17, 154.1 meeting [1] - 174:3 7:19, 7:24, 8:14, 9:3, 71:12, 71:17, 74:14, 168:23, 170:25, major [1] - 142:18 member [17] - 50:2, 9:8, 9:16, 9:20, 74:15, 75:20, 79:15, 171:3, 171:8,

Case: 21-2106 Document: 15 Page: 291 Filed: 08/30/2021

50:23, 51:13, 51:23, 215:24 24:15, 24:20, 25:3, MORRIS [2] - 2:15, 3:3 52:13, 63:6, 63:9, minds [2] - 174:3, most [1] - 212:6 25:5, 25:8, 25:18, 63:22, 63:25, 64:7, 174:5 motion [8] - 7:21, 26:4, 26:6, 26:11, 64:15, 77:5, 79:25, minute [2] - 91:9, 11:5, 37:18, 55:6, 26:16, 26:20, 26:22, 86:20, 142:1, 212:15 147:12 111:9, 116:17, 27:2, 27:6, 27:10, minutes [4] - 130:13, memory [2] - 17:10, 151:12, 153:19 27:25, 28:3, 28:6, 197:12 151:11, 152:2, 159:6 motivated [1] - 206:18 28:11, 28:17, 28:21, men [1] - 48:16 28:25, 29:3, 29:6, mirror [2] - 6:23, 21:1 Motorola [16] - 19:7, 29:9, 29:14, 29:18, mention [2] - 191:8, mis [1] - 152:10 48:18, 59:7, 59:15, mis-portrayed [1] -29:23, 30:1, 30:11, 201:10 60:6, 60:7, 61:1, mentioned [11] - 9:15. 30:16, 30:22, 31:6, 152:10 82:17, 100:11, 31:11, 31:16, 33:2, 10:14, 55:4, 114:18, miscommunication 146:7, 146:19, 33:6, 33:17, 33:20, 124:6, 133:3, 133:5, [1] - 210:22 146:20, 153:15, 34:9, 34:12, 34:14, 141:3, 179:13, 156:14, 199:23 misconstrue [1] -34:16, 34:19, 34:21, 201:13, 215:18 Motorola's [4] - 58:23, 96:18 34:24, 35:2, 35:8, mentions [1] - 193:20 84:5, 155:19, 155:22 misinterpreted [1] -35:10, 35:13, 35:17, mere [1] - 8:8 Motorola/Apple [1] -152:2 35:24, 36:2, 36:4, merged [2] - 35:4, misinterpreting[1] -57:25 36:10, 36:15, 36:18, 35:6 movant [9] - 24:3, 208:4 37:7, 37:9, 37:11, 24:24, 25:1, 32:18, merits [36] - 22:5, misplaced [1] - 60:15 37:16, 37:19, 37:23, 24:25, 25:16, 25:19, 53:8, 55:1, 107:17, miss [1] - 125:9 37:25, 38:8, 38:11, 26:8, 26:25, 35:3, 212:24, 214:15 missing [4] - 6:19, 38:17, 39:3, 39:6, 35:11, 35:13, 35:15, movant's [2] - 42:22, 9:18, 152:7, 167:8 39:17, 40:16, 40:22, 35:17, 35:20, 35:23, 90:20 misspoke [1] - 156:1 41:3, 41:8, 41:10, 36:1, 36:21, 36:22, movants [7] - 5:17, misstated [1] - 138:22 41:13, 41:15, 41:17, 42:2, 42:7, 43:10, 36:24, 37:3, 45:7, misunderstanding [1] 41:21, 42:20, 43:12, 57:8, 71:12, 85:22, 44:1, 212:22, 216:1 - 210:22 43:16, 43:21, 43:24, 111:7, 120:5, move [11] - 6:5, 57:1, mixed [3] - 47:8, 44:3, 44:5, 44:10, 57:2, 73:15, 87:17, 121:23, 125:17, 84:24, 145:9 44:16, 44:18, 44:22, 142:11, 147:17, 90:5, 92:2, 138:4, mixing [2] - 145:14, 45:4, 45:8, 45:12, 148:21, 149:16, 138:7, 145:11, 145:21 45:16, 45:19, 45:23, 150:17, 151:4, 214:17 model [1] - 206:14 45:25, 46:6, 46:13, 153:6, 170:6, moved [2] - 50:11, models [1] - 189:3 46:24, 47:2, 47:6, 170:20, 212:23 145:7 modified [1] - 72:3 47:9, 47:14, 47:16, mess [1] - 42:5 moves [1] - 100:7 module [1] - 163:18 47:18, 47:22, 48:3, MICHAEL [1] - 3:7 moving [3] - 7:8, 39:1, modules [5] - 89:19, 48:6, 49:25, 50:4, Michael [2] - 5:9, 145:5 123:16, 180:11, 50:7, 50:10, 50:25, 214:21 **MR** [705] - 4:20, 5:1, 188:16, 198:10 51:14, 51:17, 51:25, Microsoft [5] - 19:6, 5:6, 5:12, 5:13, 5:16, moment [1] - 138:13 52:4, 52:16, 52:21, 19:8, 19:12, 146:20, 5:22, 6:8, 6:13, 6:21, Monday [1] - 100:13 53:1, 53:4, 53:17, 179:6 7:1, 7:3, 7:6, 7:10, money [12] - 31:13, 53:19, 53:23, 54:2, Microsoft/Motorola 7:17, 7:19, 7:24, 31:21, 31:22, 62:9, 54:4, 54:7, 54:11, [6] - 19:4, 19:18, 8:14, 9:3, 9:8, 9:16, 74:22, 113:15, 54:16, 54:19, 55:4, 19:19, 57:14, 64:24, 9:20, 10:15, 10:19, 113:25, 114:2, 56:5, 56:16, 56:23, 84:2 11:6, 11:8, 11:21, 114:19, 125:14, 57:2, 57:6, 57:10, mid [1] - 91:6 12:3, 12:7, 12:24, 161:13, 206:18 57:18, 57:22, 57:24, middle [1] - 80:8 13:2, 13:6, 13:8, monopoly [1] - 184:14 58:3, 58:5, 58:9, midst [1] - 134:18 13:20, 13:23, 13:25, months [8] - 154:3, 58:11, 58:15, 58:17, might [15] - 16:12, 14:6, 14:9, 14:12, 154:10, 154:11, 58:20, 59:2, 59:14, 15:7, 15:10, 15:15, 32:10, 43:2, 71:4, 174:10, 188:17, 59:17, 59:20, 59:23, 15:24, 16:3, 16:14, 71:5, 71:15, 74:23, 198:21, 201:14 60:6, 60:9, 60:12, 16:17, 16:21, 16:24, 114:6, 114:14, Morehead [1] - 188:1 62:19, 62:23, 62:25, 16:25, 17:5, 17:7, 137:22, 146:7, Morehead's [2] -63:10, 63:13, 63:19, 153:14, 154:12, 17:11, 17:12, 17:21, 189:5, 193:10 64:4, 64:9, 64:18, 184:23, 210:21 18:2, 18:8, 18:11, moreover [1] - 160:13 65:20, 66:7, 66:11, mind [10] - 99:4, 22:3, 22:8, 22:11, morning [9] - 4:6, 66:24, 67:5, 67:7, 22:13, 22:16, 22:18, 107:8, 110:22, 4:20, 4:24, 5:1, 5:6, 67:10, 67:18, 67:22, 22:23, 23:2, 23:5, 134:22, 151:10, 5:11, 97:8, 142:5, 68:1, 68:3, 68:7, 23:8, 23:15, 23:18, 153:23, 158:7, 158:19 23:21, 24:8, 24:12,

69:10, 69:14, 69:16, 69:21, 69:24, 70:4, 70:9, 70:11, 70:15, 71:21, 72:2, 72:7, 72:21, 72:24, 73:1, 73:8, 73:14, 73:19, 73:22, 73:25, 74:5, 74:7, 74:12, 74:21, 74:25, 75:5, 75:8, 75:14, 75:16, 76:1, 76:3, 76:8, 76:16, 76:21, 77:1, 77:7, 77:12, 77:18, 77:21, 77:23, 77:25, 78:8, 78:15, 78:19, 78:21, 78:23, 78:25, 79:10, 79:14, 80:2, 80:25, 81:6, 81:16, 81:19, 81:23, 81:25, 82:3, 82:7, 82:9, 82:12, 82:15, 82:20, 82:23, 82:25, 83:3, 83:10, 83:13, 83:15, 84:2, 84:4, 84:7, 84:9, 84:14, 85:2, 85:6, 85:11, 85:23, 87:19, 87:22, 87:25, 88:8, 88:10, 88:13, 88:15, 88:18, 88:24, 89:2, 89:8, 89:10, 89:14, 90:1, 90:3, 90:6, 90:10, 90:13, 90:15, 91:11, 91:12, 91:19, 91:25, 92:11, 92:14, 93:1, 93:5, 93:9, 94:7, 94:16, 94:19, 94:25, 95:2, 95:4, 95:13, 95:17, 96:11, 96:14, 96:16, 97:4, 97:7, 97:11, 97:13, 97:17, 97:19, 97:24, 98:4, 98:8, 98:11, 98:13, 102:8, 102:10, 102:12, 102:16, 102:21, 102:25, 103:5, 103:8, 103:16, 103:18, 103:22, 103:25, 104:4, 104:20, 104:22, 105:1, 105:7, 106:1, 106:7, 106:14, 106:17, 106:21, 106:25, 107:20, 108:8, 108:13, 108:22, 110:7, 110:10, 111:3, 111:5, 111:8, 111:13, 111:16, 68:9, 68:12, 68:14, 112:11, 112:16, 112:19, 112:22, 68:19, 68:24, 69:4,

17

186:11, 207:11,

Morris [2] - 5:2, 5:7

112:24, 113:2,	156:3, 157:13,	200:23, 201:17,	152:4, 152:6, 162:9,	176:10, 177:23,
		· · · · ·		
113:4, 113:19,	157:16, 157:19,	201:22, 201:24,	167:22, 180:5,	185:3, 214:4
113:25, 114:9,	159:5, 160:13,	202:5, 202:10,	208:11, 214:11,	NO [2] - 1:9, 1:15
114:12, 114:15,	160:16, 160:19,	202:13, 202:15,	214:24, 215:19	nobody [6] - 21:19,
115:3, 115:9,	160:22, 160:25,	202:18, 202:24,	needed [1] - 152:11	51:1, 51:18, 86:11,
115:12, 116:9,	161:4, 161:6, 162:1,	203:7, 203:16,	needs [2] - 61:6, 132:9	143:10, 192:12
116:12, 116:18,	162:3, 162:8,	203:22, 204:2,	negotiate [8] - 126:7,	non [7] - 27:13, 30:6,
117:22, 118:5,	162:20, 165:16,	206:2, 206:4,	128:3, 141:2, 142:2,	62:7, 62:21, 63:17,
118:25, 119:3,	165:20, 166:20,	206:16, 207:7,	157:21, 204:12,	104:13, 182:5
119:10, 119:12,	167:1, 167:7,	207:18, 208:9,	209:13, 211:7	non-discriminatory
119:20, 120:12,	167:11, 167:14,	208:11, 208:18,	negotiated [6] - 53:9,	[5] - 27:13, 30:6,
121:21, 122:9,	167:17, 168:23,	208:24, 209:4,	53:14, 87:12, 159:9,	62:7, 62:21, 104:13
122:18, 123:4,	169:6, 169:10,	209:6, 209:15,	208:23, 212:10	non-manufacturing
123:7, 123:8,	169:15, 169:18,	209:17, 210:12,	negotiating [2] -	[1] - 182:5
123:11, 124:9,	169:23, 169:25,	214:21, 216:6,	39:12, 40:12	non-reasonable [1] -
124:16, 125:2,	170:3, 170:9,	216:8, 216:10,	negotiation [9] -	63:17
125:7, 125:10,	170:14, 170:16,	216:13	44:24, 108:3, 110:1,	nondiscriminatory [6]
126:4, 127:3,	170:25, 171:3,	multidistrict [1] -	115:18, 127:8,	- 62:7, 62:22, 63:5,
127:15, 128:5,	171:8, 171:14,	137:24	140:24, 158:2,	80:10, 96:25, 163:5
128:7, 128:15,	171:17, 171:22,	multiple [2] - 60:16,	158:4, 205:3	none [2] - 65:4,
128:21, 129:23,	172:2, 172:7, 172:9,	183:19	negotiations [18] -	135:11
130:2, 130:5,	172:13, 172:16,	multitude [1] - 50:8		
130:11, 130:15,	172:10, 172:10,	Munck [8] - 36:6,	64:1, 79:24, 83:7, 87:9, 92:16, 115:10,	nonetheless [1] -
131:3, 131:7,	173:9, 173:24,			19:14
131:15, 131:18,	174:7, 175:6, 175:9,	109:9, 115:5,	115:14, 115:17,	noninfringement [1] -
131:21, 131:25,	175:13, 175:18,	117:23, 126:16,	118:12, 147:10,	99:18
131.21, 131.23,	175:13, 175:16, 175:21, 176:1,	207:6, 208:13, 209:9	156:23, 182:7,	North [1] - 193:24
		Munck's [1] - 207:9	185:22, 205:2,	note [2] - 52:3, 140:11
132:13, 132:18,	176:4, 176:17,	must [6] - 9:17, 22:1,	209:22, 210:11,	notebook [1] - 197:12
133:21, 134:8,	176:22, 177:1,	27:21, 116:17,	210:14, 210:15	noted [1] - 159:11
136:5, 136:8,	177:4, 177:20,	117:5, 159:9	network [1] - 163:17	notes [1] - 106:2
137:12, 137:16,	178:2, 178:12,		networking [1] -	nothing [3] - 56:9,
				110tilling [0] 00.0,
138:2, 138:6, 138:9,	179:22, 180:2,	N	162:18	79:1, 84:20
138:12, 138:21,	180:6, 180:16,		162:18 neutral [1] - 25:25	79:1, 84:20
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5,	N name [9] - 16:19,		
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7,	neutral [1] - 25:25	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24,	name [9] - 16:19,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19,	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15,	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9,	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24,	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24,	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5,
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10,	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3,
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20,
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24,
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 187:22	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21,	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6,
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 187:22 nature [1] - 132:11	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11,
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14, 145:19, 145:23,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25, 190:3, 190:8,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 187:22 nature [1] - 132:11 necessarily [7] - 71:1,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10 news [1] - 132:17	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11, 131:10, 145:15,
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14, 145:19, 145:23, 146:1, 146:2, 146:5,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25, 190:3, 190:8, 190:12, 190:23,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 187:22 nature [1] - 132:11 necessarily [7] - 71:1, 83:17, 94:23,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10 news [1] - 132:17 next [5] - 74:9, 189:17,	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11, 131:10, 145:15, 188:3, 189:8,
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14, 145:19, 145:23, 146:1, 146:2, 146:5, 147:15, 147:18,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25, 190:3, 190:8, 190:12, 190:23, 190:25, 191:7,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 187:22 nature [1] - 132:11 necessarily [7] - 71:1, 83:17, 94:23, 166:16, 167:20,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10 news [1] - 132:17 next [5] - 74:9, 189:17, 194:8, 198:8, 210:12	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11, 131:10, 145:15, 188:3, 189:8, 193:24, 197:1,
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14, 145:19, 145:23, 146:1, 146:2, 146:5, 147:15, 147:18, 147:24, 148:2,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25, 190:3, 190:8, 190:12, 190:23, 190:25, 191:7, 192:7, 192:11,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 132:11 necessarily [7] - 71:1, 83:17, 94:23, 166:16, 167:20, 167:21, 197:1	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10 news [1] - 132:17 next [5] - 74:9, 189:17, 194:8, 198:8, 210:12 nice [1] - 39:21	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11, 131:10, 145:15, 188:3, 189:8, 193:24, 197:1, 197:10, 200:17,
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14, 145:19, 145:23, 146:1, 146:2, 146:5, 147:15, 147:18, 147:24, 148:2, 148:5, 148:12,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25, 190:3, 190:8, 190:12, 190:23, 190:25, 191:7, 192:7, 192:11, 192:19, 193:2,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 187:22 nature [1] - 132:11 necessarily [7] - 71:1, 83:17, 94:23, 166:16, 167:20, 167:21, 197:1 necessary [2] - 214:9,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10 news [1] - 132:17 next [5] - 74:9, 189:17, 194:8, 198:8, 210:12 nice [1] - 39:21 Nichols [2] - 5:2, 5:7	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11, 131:10, 145:15, 188:3, 189:8, 193:24, 197:1, 197:10, 200:17, 205:17, 206:10,
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14, 145:19, 145:23, 146:1, 146:2, 146:5, 147:15, 147:18, 147:24, 148:2, 148:5, 148:12, 148:23, 149:14,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25, 190:3, 190:8, 190:12, 190:23, 190:25, 191:7, 192:7, 192:11, 192:19, 193:2, 193:6, 193:9,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 187:22 nature [1] - 132:11 necessarily [7] - 71:1, 83:17, 94:23, 166:16, 167:20, 167:21, 197:1 necessary [2] - 214:9, 216:2	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10 news [1] - 132:17 next [5] - 74:9, 189:17, 194:8, 198:8, 210:12 nice [1] - 39:21 Nichols [2] - 5:2, 5:7 NICHOLS [2] - 2:15,	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11, 131:10, 145:15, 188:3, 189:8, 193:24, 197:1, 197:10, 200:17, 205:17, 206:10, 206:20, 213:17
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14, 145:19, 145:23, 146:1, 146:2, 146:5, 147:15, 147:18, 147:24, 148:2, 148:5, 148:12, 148:23, 149:14, 149:23, 150:4, 150:10, 150:21,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25, 190:3, 190:8, 190:12, 190:23, 190:25, 191:7, 192:7, 192:11, 192:19, 193:2, 193:6, 193:9, 193:14, 194:12, 194:17, 194:19,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 187:22 nature [1] - 132:11 necessarily [7] - 71:1, 83:17, 94:23, 166:16, 167:20, 167:21, 197:1 necessary [2] - 214:9, 216:2 need [34] - 6:1, 18:5,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10 news [1] - 132:17 next [5] - 74:9, 189:17, 194:8, 198:8, 210:12 nice [1] - 39:21 Nichols [2] - 5:2, 5:7 NICHOLS [2] - 2:15, 3:3	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11, 131:10, 145:15, 188:3, 189:8, 193:24, 197:1, 197:10, 200:17, 205:17, 206:10, 206:20, 213:17 Number [1] - 19:19
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14, 145:19, 145:23, 146:1, 146:2, 146:5, 147:15, 147:18, 147:24, 148:2, 148:5, 148:12, 148:23, 149:14, 149:23, 150:4, 150:25, 151:5,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25, 190:3, 190:8, 190:12, 190:23, 190:25, 191:7, 192:7, 192:11, 192:19, 193:2, 193:6, 193:9, 193:14, 194:12, 194:17, 194:19, 195:6, 195:14,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 187:22 nature [1] - 132:11 necessarily [7] - 71:1, 83:17, 94:23, 166:16, 167:20, 167:21, 197:1 necessary [2] - 214:9, 216:2 need [34] - 6:1, 18:5, 18:7, 23:25, 25:11,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10 news [1] - 132:17 next [5] - 74:9, 189:17, 194:8, 198:8, 210:12 nice [1] - 39:21 Nichols [2] - 5:2, 5:7 NICHOLS [2] - 2:15, 3:3 night [2] - 165:24,	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11, 131:10, 145:15, 188:3, 189:8, 193:24, 197:1, 197:10, 200:17, 205:17, 206:10, 206:20, 213:17
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14, 145:19, 145:23, 146:1, 146:2, 146:5, 147:15, 147:18, 147:24, 148:2, 148:5, 148:12, 148:23, 149:14, 149:23, 150:4, 150:10, 150:21, 150:25, 151:5, 151:16, 151:25,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25, 190:3, 190:8, 190:12, 190:23, 190:25, 191:7, 192:7, 192:11, 192:19, 193:2, 193:6, 193:9, 193:14, 194:12, 194:17, 194:19, 195:6, 195:14, 196:10, 196:13,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 187:22 nature [1] - 132:11 necessarily [7] - 71:1, 83:17, 94:23, 166:16, 167:20, 167:21, 197:1 necessary [2] - 214:9, 216:2 need [34] - 6:1, 18:5, 18:7, 23:25, 25:11, 26:24, 27:17, 27:18,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10 news [1] - 132:17 next [5] - 74:9, 189:17, 194:8, 198:8, 210:12 nice [1] - 39:21 Nichols [2] - 5:2, 5:7 NICHOLS [2] - 2:15, 3:3 night [2] - 165:24, 166:6	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11, 131:10, 145:15, 188:3, 189:8, 193:24, 197:1, 197:10, 200:17, 205:17, 206:10, 206:20, 213:17 Number [1] - 19:19
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14, 145:19, 145:23, 146:1, 146:2, 146:5, 147:15, 147:18, 147:24, 148:2, 148:5, 148:12, 148:23, 149:14, 149:23, 150:4, 150:10, 150:21, 150:25, 151:5, 151:16, 151:25, 152:3, 152:8, 153:3,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25, 190:3, 190:8, 190:12, 190:23, 190:25, 191:7, 192:7, 192:11, 192:19, 193:2, 193:6, 193:9, 193:14, 194:12, 194:17, 194:19, 195:6, 195:14, 196:10, 196:13, 196:18, 196:23,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 187:22 nature [1] - 132:11 necessarily [7] - 71:1, 83:17, 94:23, 166:16, 167:20, 167:21, 197:1 necessary [2] - 214:9, 216:2 need [34] - 6:1, 18:5, 18:7, 23:25, 25:11, 26:24, 27:17, 27:18, 47:20, 49:15, 51:19,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10 news [1] - 132:17 next [5] - 74:9, 189:17, 194:8, 198:8, 210:12 nice [1] - 39:21 Nichols [2] - 5:2, 5:7 NICHOLS [2] - 2:15, 3:3 night [2] - 165:24, 166:6 nine [1] - 6:14	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11, 131:10, 145:15, 188:3, 189:8, 193:24, 197:1, 197:10, 200:17, 205:17, 206:10, 206:20, 213:17 Number [1] - 19:19 numbers [4] - 6:15,
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14, 145:19, 145:23, 146:1, 146:2, 146:5, 147:15, 147:18, 147:24, 148:2, 148:23, 149:14, 149:23, 150:4, 150:10, 150:21, 150:25, 151:5, 151:16, 151:25, 152:3, 152:8, 153:3, 153:7, 153:9,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25, 190:3, 190:8, 190:12, 190:23, 190:25, 191:7, 192:7, 192:11, 192:19, 193:2, 193:6, 193:9, 193:14, 194:12, 194:17, 194:19, 195:6, 195:14, 196:10, 196:13, 196:18, 196:23, 197:8, 197:11,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 187:22 nature [1] - 132:11 necessarily [7] - 71:1, 83:17, 94:23, 166:16, 167:20, 167:21, 197:1 necessary [2] - 214:9, 216:2 need [34] - 6:1, 18:5, 18:7, 23:25, 25:11, 26:24, 27:17, 27:18, 47:20, 49:15, 51:19, 57:1, 68:5, 86:9,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10 news [1] - 132:17 next [5] - 74:9, 189:17, 194:8, 198:8, 210:12 nice [1] - 39:21 Nichols [2] - 5:2, 5:7 NICHOLS [2] - 2:15, 3:3 night [2] - 165:24, 166:6	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11, 131:10, 145:15, 188:3, 189:8, 193:24, 197:1, 197:10, 200:17, 205:17, 206:10, 206:20, 213:17 Number [1] - 19:19 numbers [4] - 6:15, 196:4, 196:24,
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14, 145:19, 145:23, 146:1, 146:2, 146:5, 147:15, 147:18, 147:24, 148:2, 148:23, 149:14, 149:23, 150:4, 150:10, 150:21, 150:25, 151:5, 151:16, 151:25, 152:3, 152:8, 153:3, 153:7, 153:9, 153:13, 154:5,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25, 190:3, 190:8, 190:12, 190:23, 190:25, 191:7, 192:7, 192:11, 192:19, 193:2, 193:6, 193:9, 193:14, 194:12, 194:17, 194:19, 195:6, 195:14, 196:10, 196:13, 196:18, 196:23, 197:8, 197:11, 197:17, 197:20,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 187:22 nature [1] - 132:11 necessarily [7] - 71:1, 83:17, 94:23, 166:16, 167:20, 167:21, 197:1 necessary [2] - 214:9, 216:2 need [34] - 6:1, 18:5, 18:7, 23:25, 25:11, 26:24, 27:17, 27:18, 47:20, 49:15, 51:19, 57:1, 68:5, 86:9, 87:8, 88:22, 90:18,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10 news [1] - 132:17 next [5] - 74:9, 189:17, 194:8, 198:8, 210:12 nice [1] - 39:21 Nichols [2] - 5:2, 5:7 NICHOLS [2] - 2:15, 3:3 night [2] - 165:24, 166:6 nine [1] - 6:14	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11, 131:10, 145:15, 188:3, 189:8, 193:24, 197:1, 197:10, 200:17, 205:17, 206:10, 206:20, 213:17 Number [1] - 19:19 numbers [4] - 6:15, 196:4, 196:24, 198:17
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14, 145:19, 145:23, 146:1, 146:2, 146:5, 147:15, 147:18, 147:24, 148:2, 148:23, 149:14, 149:23, 150:4, 150:10, 150:21, 150:25, 151:5, 151:16, 151:25, 152:3, 152:8, 153:3, 153:7, 153:9, 153:13, 154:5, 154:16, 154:18,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25, 190:3, 190:8, 190:12, 190:23, 190:25, 191:7, 192:7, 192:11, 192:19, 193:2, 193:6, 193:9, 193:14, 194:12, 194:17, 194:19, 195:6, 195:14, 196:10, 196:13, 196:18, 196:23, 197:23, 197:25,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 187:22 nature [1] - 132:11 necessarily [7] - 71:1, 83:17, 94:23, 166:16, 167:20, 167:21, 197:1 necessary [2] - 214:9, 216:2 need [34] - 6:1, 18:5, 18:7, 23:25, 25:11, 26:24, 27:17, 27:18, 47:20, 49:15, 51:19, 57:1, 68:5, 86:9, 87:8, 88:22, 90:18, 108:6, 119:7,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10 news [1] - 132:17 next [5] - 74:9, 189:17, 194:8, 198:8, 210:12 nice [1] - 39:21 Nichols [2] - 5:2, 5:7 NICHOLS [2] - 2:15, 3:3 night [2] - 165:24, 166:6 nine [1] - 6:14 Ninth [19] - 11:24,	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11, 131:10, 145:15, 188:3, 189:8, 193:24, 197:1, 197:10, 200:17, 205:17, 206:10, 206:20, 213:17 Number [1] - 19:19 numbers [4] - 6:15, 196:4, 196:24, 198:17 numerical [1] - 200:17
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14, 145:19, 145:23, 146:1, 146:2, 146:5, 147:15, 147:18, 147:24, 148:2, 148:23, 149:14, 149:23, 150:4, 150:10, 150:21, 150:25, 151:5, 151:16, 151:25, 152:3, 152:8, 153:3, 153:7, 153:9, 153:13, 154:5, 154:16, 154:18, 154:21, 154:25,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25, 190:3, 190:8, 190:12, 190:23, 190:25, 191:7, 192:7, 192:11, 192:19, 193:2, 193:6, 193:9, 193:14, 194:12, 194:17, 194:19, 195:6, 195:14, 196:10, 196:13, 196:18, 196:23, 197:23, 197:21, 197:23, 197:25, 198:4, 198:16,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 187:22 nature [1] - 132:11 necessarily [7] - 71:1, 83:17, 94:23, 166:16, 167:20, 167:21, 197:1 necessary [2] - 214:9, 216:2 need [34] - 6:1, 18:5, 18:7, 23:25, 25:11, 26:24, 27:17, 27:18, 47:20, 49:15, 51:19, 57:1, 68:5, 86:9, 87:8, 88:22, 90:18, 108:6, 119:7, 125:23, 126:17,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10 news [1] - 132:17 next [5] - 74:9, 189:17, 194:8, 198:8, 210:12 nice [1] - 39:21 Nichols [2] - 5:2, 5:7 NICHOLS [2] - 2:15, 3:3 night [2] - 165:24, 166:6 nine [1] - 6:14 Ninth [19] - 11:24, 12:1, 15:16, 15:18,	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11, 131:10, 145:15, 188:3, 189:8, 193:24, 197:1, 197:10, 200:17, 205:17, 206:10, 206:20, 213:17 Number [1] - 19:19 numbers [4] - 6:15, 196:4, 196:24, 198:17 numerical [1] - 200:17 numerous [1] - 195:17
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14, 145:19, 145:23, 146:1, 146:2, 146:5, 147:15, 147:18, 147:24, 148:2, 148:23, 149:14, 149:23, 150:4, 150:10, 150:21, 150:25, 151:5, 151:16, 151:25, 152:3, 152:8, 153:3, 153:7, 153:9, 153:13, 154:5, 154:16, 154:18, 154:21, 154:25, 155:2, 155:9,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25, 190:3, 190:8, 190:12, 190:23, 190:25, 191:7, 192:7, 192:11, 192:19, 193:2, 193:6, 193:9, 193:14, 194:12, 194:17, 194:19, 195:6, 195:14, 196:10, 196:13, 196:18, 196:23, 197:23, 197:25, 198:4, 198:16, 199:2, 199:15,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 132:11 necessarily [7] - 71:1, 83:17, 94:23, 166:16, 167:20, 167:21, 197:1 necessary [2] - 214:9, 216:2 need [34] - 6:1, 18:5, 18:7, 23:25, 25:11, 26:24, 27:17, 27:18, 47:20, 49:15, 51:19, 57:1, 68:5, 86:9, 87:8, 88:22, 90:18, 108:6, 119:7, 125:23, 126:17, 129:15, 129:23,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10 news [1] - 132:17 next [5] - 74:9, 189:17, 194:8, 198:8, 210:12 nice [1] - 39:21 Nichols [2] - 5:2, 5:7 NICHOLS [2] - 2:15, 3:3 night [2] - 165:24, 166:6 nine [1] - 6:14 Ninth [19] - 11:24, 12:1, 15:16, 15:18, 15:25, 16:1, 16:8,	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11, 131:10, 145:15, 188:3, 189:8, 193:24, 197:1, 197:10, 200:17, 205:17, 206:10, 206:20, 213:17 Number [1] - 19:19 numbers [4] - 6:15, 196:4, 196:24, 198:17 numerous [1] - 195:17 nutshell [1] - 187:16
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14, 145:19, 145:23, 146:1, 146:2, 146:5, 147:15, 147:18, 147:24, 148:2, 148:23, 149:14, 149:23, 150:4, 150:10, 150:21, 150:25, 151:5, 151:16, 151:25, 152:3, 152:8, 153:3, 153:7, 153:9, 153:13, 154:5, 154:16, 154:18, 154:21, 154:25, 155:2, 155:9, 155:13, 155:22,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25, 190:3, 190:8, 190:12, 190:23, 190:25, 191:7, 192:7, 192:11, 192:19, 193:2, 193:6, 193:9, 193:14, 194:12, 194:17, 194:19, 195:6, 195:14, 196:10, 196:13, 196:18, 196:23, 197:23, 197:21, 197:23, 197:25, 198:4, 198:16, 199:2, 199:15, 199:17, 200:4,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 187:22 nature [1] - 132:11 necessarily [7] - 71:1, 83:17, 94:23, 166:16, 167:20, 167:21, 197:1 necessary [2] - 214:9, 216:2 need [34] - 6:1, 18:5, 18:7, 23:25, 25:11, 26:24, 27:17, 27:18, 47:20, 49:15, 51:19, 57:1, 68:5, 86:9, 87:8, 88:22, 90:18, 108:6, 119:7, 125:23, 126:17,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10 news [1] - 132:17 next [5] - 74:9, 189:17, 194:8, 198:8, 210:12 nice [1] - 39:21 Nichols [2] - 5:2, 5:7 NICHOLS [2] - 2:15, 3:3 night [2] - 165:24, 166:6 nine [1] - 6:14 Ninth [19] - 11:24, 12:1, 15:16, 15:18, 15:25, 16:1, 16:8, 16:9, 17:16, 19:9,	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11, 131:10, 145:15, 188:3, 189:8, 193:24, 197:1, 197:10, 200:17, 205:17, 206:10, 206:20, 213:17 Number [1] - 19:19 numbers [4] - 6:15, 196:4, 196:24, 198:17 numerous [1] - 195:17 nutshell [1] - 187:16
138:12, 138:21, 138:25, 139:2, 139:5, 139:9, 139:11, 139:19, 139:22, 140:2, 140:5, 141:13, 141:22, 141:24, 142:12, 142:21, 142:25, 143:12, 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 145:10, 145:14, 145:19, 145:23, 146:1, 146:2, 146:5, 147:15, 147:18, 147:24, 148:2, 148:23, 149:14, 149:23, 150:4, 150:10, 150:21, 150:25, 151:5, 151:16, 151:25, 152:3, 152:8, 153:3, 153:7, 153:9, 153:13, 154:5, 154:16, 154:18, 154:21, 154:25, 155:2, 155:9,	180:6, 180:16, 180:23, 181:5, 181:10, 181:17, 181:21, 181:24, 182:10, 185:6, 185:16, 186:18, 187:5, 187:10, 187:18, 187:21, 188:5, 188:9, 188:11, 188:24, 189:21, 189:25, 190:3, 190:8, 190:12, 190:23, 190:25, 191:7, 192:7, 192:11, 192:19, 193:2, 193:6, 193:9, 193:14, 194:12, 194:17, 194:19, 195:6, 195:14, 196:10, 196:13, 196:18, 196:23, 197:23, 197:25, 198:4, 198:16, 199:2, 199:15,	name [9] - 16:19, 47:15, 97:10, 102:7, 106:20, 117:21, 130:10, 206:10, 207:5 namely [1] - 136:1 Napoleonic [1] - 126:9 narrower [1] - 142:6 narrowly [1] - 116:1 native [1] - 132:11 necessarily [7] - 71:1, 83:17, 94:23, 166:16, 167:20, 167:21, 197:1 necessary [2] - 214:9, 216:2 need [34] - 6:1, 18:5, 18:7, 23:25, 25:11, 26:24, 27:17, 27:18, 47:20, 49:15, 51:19, 57:1, 68:5, 86:9, 87:8, 88:22, 90:18, 108:6, 119:7, 125:23, 126:17, 129:15, 129:23,	neutral [1] - 25:25 never [16] - 60:19, 87:13, 87:15, 107:25, 115:13, 128:2, 147:9, 148:13, 152:24, 157:9, 157:24, 158:1, 158:10, 164:8, 176:23, 196:8 New [3] - 2:19, 5:4 new [3] - 116:21, 146:25, 198:10 news [1] - 132:17 next [5] - 74:9, 189:17, 194:8, 198:8, 210:12 nice [1] - 39:21 Nichols [2] - 5:2, 5:7 NICHOLS [2] - 2:15, 3:3 night [2] - 165:24, 166:6 nine [1] - 6:14 Ninth [19] - 11:24, 12:1, 15:16, 15:18, 15:25, 16:1, 16:8, 16:9, 17:16, 19:9, 19:11, 19:20, 56:3,	79:1, 84:20 notice [2] - 116:13, 116:17 noticed [1] - 18:14 noting [1] - 159:6 notion [1] - 144:11 nowhere [1] - 157:23 number [25] - 19:5, 25:10, 28:13, 48:3, 68:2, 68:6, 96:20, 101:9, 109:24, 109:25, 110:6, 110:16, 114:11, 131:10, 145:15, 188:3, 189:8, 193:24, 197:1, 197:10, 200:17, 205:17, 206:10, 206:20, 213:17 Number [1] - 19:19 numbers [4] - 6:15, 196:4, 196:24, 198:17 numerous [1] - 195:17 nutshell [1] - 187:16

19

0 o'clock [1] - 1:19 Obama [2] - 70:7, 134:14 obey [1] - 30:25 objected [1] - 212:5 objectively [1] - 55:13 obligated [1] - 107:5 obligation [18] -26:15, 99:12, 105:8, 126:7, 141:5, 141:6, 148:10, 149:22, 150:11, 150:16, 151:9, 151:14, 151:15, 151:19, 152:10, 152:12, 152:14, 152:20 obligations [8] -38:23, 42:9, 108:25, 109:1, 147:23, 150:6, 150:20, 150:23 observation [4] -98:15, 100:8, 146:6, 182:12 obtained [1] - 19:8 obtaining [2] - 18:23, 136:10 obvious [2] - 6:20, 174:19 obviously [8] - 8:1, 8:22, 19:25, 107:1, 111:25, 115:19, 137:21, 150:5 **OF** [2] - 1:2, 180:18 offer [27] - 45:6, 54:12, 54:20, 54:22, 55:12, 60:23, 63:9, 63:11, 63:17, 63:19, 83:17, 105:9, 140:18, 141:7, 146:6, 147:5, 147:13, 149:9, 150:8, 150:9, 150:16, 150:24, 151:2, 169:11, 176:3, 190:22 offered [16] - 57:7, 83:18, 101:12, 101:25, 120:10, 121:18, 152:24, 165:7, 165:9, 168:11, 185:23, 200:13, 201:20, 202:3, 203:13 offering [1] - 147:2 offers [8] - 55:20, 61:10, 98:23, 147:20, 149:2, 149:3, 149:7, 152:23

office [2] - 4:23, 70:18 Official [1] - 1:24 oftentimes [1] -140.23 old [1] - 20:16 old-fashioned [1] -20:16 once [14] - 27:15, 30:19, 31:18, 56:7, 60:17, 61:2, 86:1, 92:2, 96:11, 96:22, 114:23, 150:1, 164:11, 192:22 one [137] - 5:18, 6:22, 8:21, 9:11, 9:21, 12:13, 18:15, 19:5, 20:3, 22:19, 25:11, 25:18, 27:2, 27:3, 27:10, 27:24, 28:13, 29:15, 29:16, 34:9, 36:12, 40:19, 42:7, 47:12, 50:13, 50:15, 51:25, 55:10, 55:11, 56:6, 57:10, 59:8, 59:18, 61:20, 61:23, 64:25, 65:16, 66:5, 67:4, 67:10, 69:10, 73:23, 74:1, 81:3, 82:22, 92:18, 94:10, 95:11, 95:14, 99:9, 100:8, 100:20, 101:16, 101:23, 103:19, 104:22, 106:6, 106:10, 108:2, 121:25, 123:23, 125:24, 129:10, 129:16, 129:17, 135:14, 135:22, 136:12, 136:16, 137:7, 137:12, 137:18, 138:2, 140:8, 140:19. 140:21. 143:20, 146:5, 146:16, 148:13, 149:2, 149:3, 150:7, 150:11, 150:23, 152:15, 157:20, 160:25, 161:6, 163:15, 163:16, 164:2, 164:3, 164:4, 164:5, 166:10, 167:13, 177:12, 178:16, 178:19, 180:18, 180:25, 181:1, 181:2, 181:15, 183:23, 184:6, 185:9, 186:5, 188:9, 188:20, 188:24, 192:4,

198:8, 199:20, 200:10, 200:13, 203:3, 204:10, 204:11, 204:23, 205:19, 206:16, 210:12, 210:19, 211:23, 212:4, 215:20 One [1] - 19:19 ongoing [6] - 30:25, 32:23, 115:14, 156:11, 210:11, 210:13 opening [3] - 48:4, 101:4, 185:17 opined [1] - 51:11 opinion [20] - 15:23, 60:2, 61:23, 70:18, 109:6, 109:11, 115:4, 115:11, 115:25, 116:3, 116:5, 116:23, 117:21, 120:3, 120:10, 121:18, 122:7, 125:20, 138:17, 144:3 opinions [1] - 54:18 opportunity [9] - 8:3, 42:25, 96:17, 97:15, 106:10, 165:18, 176:3, 196:1, 214:15 opposed [5] - 6:11, 17:25, 48:12, 78:1, 211:1 opposite [5] - 84:25, 128:15, 128:19, 209:17, 212:17 opposition [3] - 67:23, 68:9, 210:2 order [25] - 8:15, 8:19, 10:4, 40:7, 48:25, 67:14, 68:24, 71:14, 114:22, 166:7, 166:9, 166:10, 166:21, 167:6, 167:12, 167:21, 175:14, 179:14, 181:12, 182:21, 196:16, 197:13, 198:9, 201:2 ordered [1] - 30:25 orders [6] - 66:18, 68:16, 70:12, 166:15, 167:9,

Orrick [1] - 18:24 otherwise [2] - 128:4, 154.14 ought [12] - 11:14, 33:16, 38:20, 46:5, 60:20, 79:8, 160:8, 168:17, 174:25, 186:6, 208:8, 208:21 ourselves [4] - 21:1, 21:18, 80:11, 87:23 outlet [2] - 61:18, 163:23 outlined [2] - 40:20, 141:8 outside [2] - 99:14 overall [1] - 196:20 overlapped [1] - 7:11 overlapping [1] - 7:5 overlays [1] - 99:16 overpaid [1] - 191:22 oversimplifying[1] -150:22 overturn [1] - 71:25 overvalued [1] - 83:21 owed [3] - 26:15, 26:17, 31:13 own [4] - 17:22, 25:12, 61:23, 133:24 owner [7] - 84:7, 84:9, 84:15, 107:25, 109:6, 115:13, 141:6 Ρ

48:4, 49:20, 66:12, 67:16, 67:20, 67:23, 68:3, 68:10, 68:12, 82:20, 135:4, 146:6, 155:19, 155:21, 155:24, 156:18, 189:7, 193:16, 193:20, 193:22, 199:23 page-and-a-half [1] -46:4 pages [2] - 97:22, 153:15 paid [5] - 78:12, 191:12, 191:22, 204:18, 206:12 paper [2] - 66:23, 68:5 papers [18] - 10:1, 11:12, 70:2, 89:5, 125:2, 135:9, 139:2, 140:11, 141:16, 141:20, 145:12, 185:17, 194:21,

p.m [2] - 169:2, 216:14

package [2] - 8:6, 9:21

page [23] - 38:6, 46:4,

195:18, 196:1, 207:12, 210:2, 215:1 paragraph [16] -81:13, 145:1, 174:24, 188:25, 189:7, 189:8, 193:11, 193:14, 193:17, 193:23, 197:20, 198:4, 208:5, 209:8, 209:25, 210:18 paragraphs [2] -145:16, 145:25 parallel [12] - 12:4, 65:18, 66:4, 71:2, 177:21, 178:8, 186:16, 186:20, 186:21, 195:1, 212:15, 213:7 parameter [1] - 150:1 parameters [1] - 85:12 parcel [1] - 55:15 parent [1] - 89:16 part [34] - 9:10, 27:20, 49:19, 51:2, 55:5, 55:15, 65:20, 69:16, 69:25, 74:3, 75:19, 80:4, 84:17, 88:17, 93:13, 93:14, 95:24, 96:5, 98:5, 99:20, 99:25, 100:5, 104:11, 126:8, 148:18, 162:3, 162:23, 163:8, 165:14, 166:4, 178:9, 200:15, 201:7, 215:11 participating [1] -163:6 participation [1] -83:20 particular [20] - 20:2, 40:11, 45:20, 50:4, 50:10, 60:15, 60:21, 98:5, 98:21, 118:3, 118:11, 118:13, 138:2, 142:6, 142:7, 142:10, 149:21, 163:11, 207:2, 210:24 particularly [2] -17:13, 142:14 parties [30] - 12:10, 18:12, 51:5, 53:9, 85:19, 87:8, 100:6, 110:12, 118:12, 118:13, 121:8, 127:8, 127:9, 141:1,

141:3, 142:19,

143:19, 149:3,

167:19

208:12

organization [1] -

organizations [2] -

originally [1] - 35:2

83:20, 184:12

20

153:16, 161:19, 165:4, 174:12, 10:4, 10:7, 10:8, 141:18, 144:10, **POFF** [2] - 2:3, 4:20 161:20, 162:11, 20:3, 20:4, 20:5, 146:24, 207:25, 175:2, 179:2, point [74] - 17:3, 27:3, 209:14, 209:18, 183:18, 186:9, 168:4, 174:2, 20:6, 20:7, 21:5, 27:17, 39:3, 39:15, 41:24, 53:19, 56:6, 191:25, 192:5, 21:6, 21:13, 25:24, 209:25 198:4, 198:24, 210:13, 210:24, 31:12, 32:2, 32:3, percent [7] - 62:20, 205:13, 206:8, 60:8, 64:8, 67:21, 103:20, 104:2, 206:9, 206:12, 211:1, 212:10 48:8, 48:23, 49:11, 68:21, 70:21, 72:17, partner [1] - 214:23 58:22, 66:19, 68:20, 159:18, 164:14, 206:17, 210:14, 73:17, 79:5, 79:7, 89:18, 91:22, 92:1, 190:19, 205:19 212:13, 213:1, parts [1] - 14:13 80:23, 95:19, 100:2, 92:9, 93:16, 93:17, 215:16 party [32] - 11:13, percentage [1] -100:3, 100:23, 93:18, 94:5, 94:6, Philips' [9] - 25:23, 20:3, 26:18, 28:15, 193:23 100:24, 103:13, 34:7, 39:20, 39:22, 94:10, 94:11, 94:14, perform [1] - 54:20 27:14, 29:19, 55:2, 104:25, 107:20, 94:24, 95:16, 99:13, 66:12, 67:23, 68:9, 108:21, 108:23, 43:10, 44:12, 60:3, perhaps [1] - 5:14 99:15, 99:19, 99:23, 89:17, 210:1 111:9, 113:10, 109:20, 109:24, period [3] - 8:23, 103:20, 103:23, phone [3] - 109:19, 113:14, 117:5, 109:25, 116:16, 148:11, 192:5 112:7, 129:15, periodically [1] -109:20, 163:16 121:11, 122:15, 119:21, 120:9, 129:18, 131:24, 120:11, 129:8, phrase [2] - 127:23, 124:10, 128:11, 107:9 162:11, 163:2, 138:8, 144:15, permissible [1] -140:15 128:17, 128:19, 163:11, 164:16, 156:20, 156:21, picture [2] - 102:19, 130:3, 134:20, 116:4 164:22, 166:8, 159:23, 179:7, permit [1] - 203:17 131:5 137:12, 142:1, 167:19, 179:21, 144:14, 150:7, 208:23, 209:10, permitted [7] - 118:22, pie [4] - 61:24, 96:7, 181:1, 181:6, 209:12, 209:21, 155:15, 157:2, 146:21, 172:19, 96:8 199:21, 199:22, 158:9, 167:8, 170:9, 211:4, 211:7, 213:5 172:24, 173:6, pinpoint [2] - 196:25, 201:6, 203:18, 175:4, 180:7, pass [1] - 64:5 198:20 173:10, 174:17 204:23, 205:19 181:24, 182:10, passed [1] - 213:6 place [11] - 50:15, person [6] - 126:18, path [1] - 200:12 185:6, 185:9, past [11] - 31:23, 78:5, 59:11, 59:17, 61:20, 127:19, 127:21, PAUL [1] - 3:7 185:16, 185:18, 93:13, 93:14, 101:6, 62:1, 104:18, 208:6, 208:14, Paul [2] - 5:9, 47:16 187:19, 188:12, 101:17, 103:1, 137:23, 174:22, 208:22 Pause [1] - 169:5 191:4. 191:7. 104:6, 158:14, 182:20, 183:23 perspective [2] -192:24, 194:7. pay [18] - 30:25, 78:3, 158:16, 161:13 places [3] - 57:13, 126:18, 128:20 195:23. 196:10. patent [41] - 7:6, 9:23, 78:5, 99:3, 100:22, persuade [4] - 43:2, 61:21, 179:7 199:24, 204:9, 9:24, 12:17, 14:15, 101:16, 101:23, Plaintiff [3] - 1:5, 1:11, 57:19, 87:11, 107:18 205:24, 206:16, 102:2, 158:10, 14:18, 18:2, 19:17, persuaded [4] -207:15, 208:7, 162:4, 164:13, 19:23, 25:23, 29:20, 147:22, 211:13, plaintiff [9] - 4:21, 213:22 190:5, 190:13, 61:14, 61:22, 84:7, 40:25, 42:16, 43:10, 211:14, 212:13 191:2, 205:12, pointed [5] - 132:23, 84:9, 84:15, 84:17, 60:3, 83:24, 134:2, petition [1] - 39:23 151:18, 153:24, 205:20, 206:9, 84:19, 92:18, 93:24, 141:5, 216:5 PHILIPS [2] - 1:4, 1:10 162:8, 210:19 206:12 100:9, 100:22, plaintiff's [1] - 137:17 Philips [79] - 4:21, paying [3] - 101:6, pointer [1] - 175:7 112:15, 112:20, 20:2, 20:5, 20:6, plaintiffs [3] - 9:5, 101:10, 179:9 pointing [1] - 151:17 128:4, 128:11, 28:19, 136:9 21:1, 25:19, 25:20, 132:2, 132:3, 141:6, PEARL[1] - 2:18 points [9] - 101:1, plan [1] - 193:24 25:21, 26:2, 28:14, 162:23, 165:24, Pearl [1] - 5:3 136:17. 155:2. Planet [2] - 135:3, 30:9, 30:23, 31:8, 166:25. 179:4. 155:3, 155:10, peculiar [1] - 115:10 36:13, 37:15, 37:21, 161:18 180:25. 184:11. 159:6, 165:21, pendency [1] - 189:13 planning [3] - 171:15, 38:22, 42:8, 43:14, 175:2, 206:24 184:14, 186:20, pending [4] - 101:15, 48:19, 49:24, 52:13, 172:9, 194:5 186:21, 186:22, policy [35] - 32:7, 105:11, 149:17, 53:13, 53:21, 53:23, plausible [1] - 198:22 40:5, 40:6, 62:1, 190:5 151:12 54:12, 54:19, 60:17, play [3] - 13:14, 122:6, patentee [8] - 63:6, 65:15, 70:22, 71:5, penny [1] - 158:15 70:24, 76:19, 76:25, 183:1 75:12, 78:17, 86:6, 83:3, 83:25, 84:6, people [12] - 4:19, 78:23, 81:2, 86:8, played [1] - 44:7 124:1, 134:11, 84:21, 84:25, 85:2, 46:16, 61:19, 62:4, 87:11, 87:15, 89:24, playing [8] - 27:19, 210:15 134:14, 134:16, 62:12, 63:3, 96:17, 91:3, 95:24, 107:19, 62:10, 62:12, 62:17, patentees [1] - 186:16 134:19, 134:24, 114:17, 132:15, 118:9, 118:15, 62:19, 104:14, 135:5, 135:6, patentholder [1] -163:19, 163:24 123:21, 127:10, 122:21, 162:15 141:21, 142:14, 60:4 per [24] - 11:11, 39:8, 127:18, 128:13, PLC [3] - 1:8, 1:14, 142:16, 146:11, patents [87] - 6:23, 39:9, 81:9, 81:10, 129:8, 130:18, 2:22 162:19, 176:12, 7:1, 7:5, 7:9, 7:11, 81:20, 107:23, 134:2, 137:20, pleading [1] - 116:17 7:13, 7:14, 7:15, 107:24, 108:12, 179:12, 184:2, 140:14, 141:8, plug [1] - 61:17 184:3, 184:4, 7:22, 7:25, 8:2, 8:10, 108:13, 113:5, 144:15, 147:2, plus [1] - 212:2 184:16, 184:17, 8:12, 8:16, 8:20, 115:7, 117:13, 147:5, 149:1, 149:9, podium [2] - 90:15, 184:18, 184:19, 8:21, 8:24, 8:25, 9:6, 117:15, 118:8, 149:19, 151:9, 154:14 186:1, 186:6, 215:14 9:9, 9:14, 9:22, 10:3, 118:9, 141:17, 164:10, 164:12, Poff [2] - 4:19, 4:20

21

94:7, 94:8, 104:4, 136:22 118:14, 168:15, Porsches [1] - 204:18 190.16 portfolio [15] - 7:13, precedent [7] - 13:10, 138:14, 161:14, procedure [2] - 70:12, 209:19 15:1, 15:2, 107:4, 161:19 191:25 prohibits [1] - 52:8 9:21, 21:11, 25:24, presentation [2] -27:14, 29:20, 54:8, 109:3, 139:15, procedures [2] projection [1] - 198:18 75:2, 101:7, 101:24, 139:17 9:11, 124:8 134:1, 163:8 projections [1] -101:25, 102:4, precise [2] - 139:19, presentations [1] proceed [3] - 5:11, 198:19 161:9, 161:11 210:25 124:2 42:14, 50:19 promise [1] - 44:12 presented [6] - 99:22, portfolios [2] - 21:4, precisely [3] - 63:21, proceeding [29] promises [1] - 63:25 205:15 75:10, 110:19 109:3, 133:13, 7:22. 8:13. 9:7. 9:15. prong [9] - 27:24, portions [1] - 156:4 precision [1] - 68:6 149:1, 165:4, 198:14 10:18. 11:1. 29:2. 35:22, 36:11, 72:7, preclude [25] - 7:22, presenting [2] - 99:9, 29:5, 32:7, 32:23, portrayed [1] - 152:10 97:8, 97:15, 180:24, poses [1] - 171:21 28:9, 30:8, 30:9, 120:7 38:23, 42:9, 42:13, 213:18, 213:19 president [5] - 71:14, 31:8, 37:15, 37:21, 60:8, 66:5, 118:15, position [16] - 32:18, prongs [2] - 37:3, 39:22, 50:11, 70:24, 71:17, 71:18, 71:23, 130:19, 130:20, 80:1, 80:2, 99:15, 213:13 76:6, 80:21, 80:23, 71:24 131:12, 132:17, 108:10, 115:24, pronounce [1] - 102:7 82:5, 115:2, 119:21, President [1] - 134:14 134:3, 134:6, 137:4, 121:14, 134:5, pronounced [1] -127:11, 148:21, 134:7, 151:20, pressure [1] - 206:19 149:21, 153:22, 34:21 151:14, 176:7, 156:11, 183:11, 157:23, 159:21, presumably [3] pronounces [1] -159:22, 185:8, 184:23, 186:8, 213:5, 213:6 91:21, 110:1, 195:17 27:16 214:1, 215:6 211:19, 213:1 proceedings [14] pretty [13] - 14:2, 49:6, pronunciation [1] precluded [13] - 32:7, 53:11, 87:15, 137:5, 32:22, 65:18, 66:5, positioned [1] - 54:24 117:25 positions [3] - 6:4, 38:22, 39:1, 50:23, 144:16. 154:8. 71:2, 73:13, 73:18, proof [4] - 78:12, 51:23, 53:15, 58:25, 91:15, 105:21, 98:15, 184:10 168:16, 174:19, 130:7, 134:2, 212:16 84:21, 95:20, 133:3, 156:10, Posner's [1] - 82:16 180:9. 188:18. proper [5] - 129:12, 116:23, 149:19, 156:13, 186:12, possibility [2] - 191:5, 196:24, 212:16 130:6, 137:18, 173:20, 212:15 186:17, 213:7 prevail [2] - 42:2, 215:7 174:18, 182:25 precludes [14] - 51:12, 86:23 Proceedings [1] - 4:3 possible [5] - 74:22, properly [3] - 130:25, 76:22, 76:25, 77:4, proceeds [1] - 30:2 75:1, 128:13, 129:8, prevent [9] - 8:16, 182:16, 183:5 77:15, 79:25, process [7] - 133:14, 64:15, 76:19, 85:5, 190.1 property [3] - 64:6, 107:19, 108:11, 133:15, 136:6, possibly [2] - 98:20, 86:13, 159:2, 159:4, 64:16, 128:3 108:14, 108:20, 163:7, 191:19, 166:2, 210:16 154:6 proposal [1] - 168:15 118:9, 120:8, prevented [1] - 77:10 191:25, 201:3 post [4] - 31:14, proposed [1] - 109:17 149:25, 177:9 31:24, 113:16, preventing [2] - 66:8, processed [1] - 61:18 proposition [3] predicate [1] - 51:1 product [9] - 8:1, 8:7, 194:15 198.9 166:14, 167:18, predict [1] - 102:13 110:23, 123:19, previous [1] - 178:21 post-judgment [4] -167:20 preferred [1] - 131:11 127:25, 180:20, 31:14, 31:24, previously [1] propositions [1] prejudgment [4] -181:14, 193:19, 113:16, 194:15 212:23 194:21 31:14, 31:23, 206:14 potential [5] - 74:23, price [3] - 164:12, propriety [1] - 211:20 113:16, 194:14 products [13] - 8:11, 79:22, 178:23, 204:18, 205:18 prospect [1] - 213:4 prejudice [1] - 90:24 8:17, 10:5, 21:18, 188:16, 189:22 primary [2] - 133:1, prospective [2] preliminary [27] -89:20, 96:23, potentially [1] - 16:12 182:2 209:13, 211:8 11:24, 12:3, 15:5, 180:10, 180:12, power [4] - 33:1, 38:3, principle [1] - 126:24 protect [2] - 32:13, 17:2, 20:16, 22:2, 180:19, 181:2, 114:14, 166:24 principles [6] - 45:10, 179:11 22:15, 23:1, 23:24, 188:19, 198:5 powerful [1] - 168:16 49:23, 79:6, 118:2, protected [2] - 128:4, 36:12, 36:25, 38:14, **Professor** [5] - 36:6, PowerPoints [1] -160:6, 160:9 132:9 38:20, 38:24, 42:1, 109:8, 115:5, 162:8, 98:3 printing [2] - 82:21, protecting [2] - 13:16, 42:2, 42:6, 50:16, 208:12 powers [6] - 32:24, 82:22 176:19 70:2, 71:11, 111:8, professor [10] - 106:3, 40:13, 40:23, 71:10, printout [1] - 98:6 protects [1] - 40:5 125:22, 153:17, 108:24, 109:11, 130:24, 166:18 pro [1] - 12:11 Protek [8] - 12:12, 153:19, 153:25, 111:12, 119:13, probative [1] - 167:16 practical [2] - 133:4, 12:14, 12:20, 16:19, 195:24, 213:13 119:17, 121:17, 168:1 problem [17] - 46:19, 16:21, 16:22, 17:24, 142:9, 207:4, 211:22 prepared [10] - 5:18, practice [11] - 30:4, 51:3, 74:17, 74:18, 194:21 10:20, 45:5, 77:7, profit [3] - 64:6, 131:4, 131:6, 74:19, 74:20, 75:19, protracted [2] - 64:14, 98:3, 122:24, 124:3, 123:24, 195:12 131:16, 131:19, 78:17, 80:20, 85:22, 112:7 168:18, 209:10, profitably [1] - 123:20 95:8, 112:17, 128:9, 131:24, 132:1, prove [12] - 53:16, 211:5 profits [1] - 110:24 132:16, 132:22, 143:2, 164:23, 206:9 56:19, 86:22, 93:24, preponderance [1] prohibited [2] - 81:10, 137:17, 164:7 procedural [5] - 4:8, 94:11, 119:11, 193:5 118:14 practicing [2] - 32:2, 14:14, 15:25, 16:2, 130:8, 147:3, 147:7, present [10] - 5:17, prohibiting [1] - 81:21 172:14 16:7 148:11, 180:5, 93:11, 93:15, 93:25, prohibition [3] prayer [2] - 174:14, procedurally [1] -180:25

proven [1] - 141:14 provide [3] - 86:18, 116:25, 146:12 provided [8] - 65:25, 66:9, 70:25, 109:21, 149:10, 183:22, 195:3, 206:5 provides [4] - 45:13, 71:18, 73:11, 133:2 proving [1] - 36:13 provision [6] - 76:18, 76:24, 77:15, 87:7, 126:12, 148:20 provisions [1] -131:11 public [8] - 22:6, 32:25, 40:5, 40:6. 83:19, 135:22, 176:12, 179:12 publishes [1] - 109:5 pull [3] - 62:14, 197:9, 197:11 punished [1] - 60:20 purely [1] - 19:12 purported [1] - 121:15 purpose [2] - 37:18, 42:6 purposes [1] - 42:2 pursuant [1] - 118:23 pursue [5] - 25:21, 32:8, 53:24, 57:12, 186:16 pursued [1] - 136:2 pursuing [6] - 31:9, 32:7, 50:12, 118:15, 213:1, 213:5 put [32] - 21:14, 37:13, 39:3, 41:23, 42:15, 46:25, 61:17, 61:25, 62:1, 80:17, 98:3, 104:1, 104:13, 113:25, 114:2, 124:7, 124:11, 127:7, 128:18, 138:20, 144:23, 153:17, 167:9, 171:10, 171:11, 192:25, 193:8, 196:23, 197:7,

Q

206:19, 207:4

Qualcomm[1] -205:14 qualification [1] - 26:7 Quantel [1] - 74:1 questions [12] - 6:4, 13:24, 18:16, 37:4, 66:12, 73:6, 106:2, 140:19, 154:14, 168:9, 206:25, 207:20

quick [3] - 92:22, 155:2, 165:20

quickly [1] - 12:23

quite [3] - 98:18, 125:16, 207:9

quo [3] - 153:25, 154:1, 201:11

quote [3] - 136:3, 137:3, 183:3

quotes [1] - 143:16

R

raise [10] - 98:23, 105:15, 112:8, 134:9, 173:13, 173:14, 174:15, 179:24, 180:4 raised [9] - 35:10, 87:10, 99:17, 114:2, 134:12, 135:23, 141:14, 144:16, 168:19 raises [2] - 116:16, 136:17 raising [1] - 136:6 range [4] - 140:23, 141:1, 141:2, 141:7 rarely [1] - 177:16 rate [81] - 7:12, 8:4, 9:5, 9:9, 9:13, 10:22, 10:24, 18:18, 18:21, 19:9, 21:4, 21:8, 21:9, 36:24, 37:2, 55:16, 55:18, 86:1, 87:18, 91:23, 92:2, 92:3, 92:7, 92:8, 92:10, 92:24, 93:1, 93:8, 94:15, 94:23, 95:25, 100:16, 109:13, 109:23, 110:15, 123:3, 124:21, 125:12, 125:13, 128:9, 128:23, 128:24, 129:3, 129:4, 129:5, 129:12, 140:22, 157:5, 157:25, 158:8, 161:8, 161:12, 161:21, 161:23, 162:5, 162:12, 164:10, 164:20, 172:21, 172:24, 173:2, 173:3, 173:11, 173:13, 173:14, 174:13, 174:24,

174:25, 175:10, 175:11, 178:24, 179:9, 185:22, 185:23, 186:23, 204:3, 209:12, 209:20, 210:17, 211:6 rates [4] - 10:2, 88:3, 103:8, 156:16 rather [3] - 141:16, 183:20, 200:17 raw [1] - 196:22 re [3] - 135:15, 138:23, 138:25 reach [3] - 125:20, 143:18, 143:19 reached [1] - 147:23 read [20] - 14:1, 14:2, 39:10, 81:12, 82:9, 84:20, 84:23, 86:21, 96:17, 97:21, 117:8, 126:1, 141:20, 142:23, 173:17, 173:24, 176:14, 180:9, 185:7, 202:12 reading [1] - 84:3 real [3] - 5:25, 64:23, 192:16 realistic [1] - 206:17 reality [4] - 141:17, 168:1, 174:8, 194:6 realize [3] - 115:24, 115:25, 169:3 really [59] - 6:20, 10:3, 10:7, 11:14, 12:23, 13:9, 13:12, 13:14, 18:18, 38:19, 54:13, 55:3, 63:24, 64:2, 64:12, 64:14, 65:10, 65:15, 72:16, 74:14, 87:18, 90:23, 92:22, 95:7, 99:11, 101:19, 105:3, 105:5, 109:17, 117:14, 122:19, 123:12, 124:9, 126:17, 130:23, 131:6, 134:21, 141:17, 142:4, 147:9, 147:10, 152:24, 158:21, 163:7, 173:3, 173:16, 174:21, 179:3, 183:7, 183:9, 195:25, 200:24, 201:7, 202:24, 207:23, 213:2 Realtek [1] - 64:19

85:11, 85:16, 105:16, 113:20, 116:20, 125:11, 137:18, 138:3, 152:9, 177:8, 212:21 reasonable [23] -27:12, 30:5, 62:6, 62:8, 62:17, 63:5, 63:9, 63:11, 63:17, 80:10, 96:25, 104:12, 123:18, 126:18, 127:19, 127:24, 129:25, 163:4, 184:12, 208:5, 208:14, 208:22 reasons [7] - 122:13, 128:23, 129:17, 135:20, 184:6, 186:7, 204:11 recalcitrant [1] -109:17 recess [3] - 91:13, 91:15, 168:25 recitation [1] - 213:9 recite [2] - 207:5, 215:8 recited [1] - 167:18 recognized [1] - 68:16 recognizes [2] -179:7, 212:2 recollection [1] -207:22 reconsider [1] -179:16 record [23] - 51:20, 59:3, 80:16, 88:25, 89:1, 99:6, 128:18, 144:17, 156:4, 158:13, 192:25, 193:8, 195:13, 200:13, 201:19, 202:1, 202:6, 203:1, 214:9, 214:11, 215:8, 215:19 recover [1] - 114:22 reduce [1] - 198:6 reduced [1] - 87:18 redundant [1] -126:12 refer [4] - 99:7, 140:12, 164:24, 187:25 reference [1] - 200:8 references [1] - 200:9 referred [2] - 136:23, 193:12 referring [7] - 68:15, 135:14, 146:2,

155:20, 201:15,

208:15, 208:19 reflect [1] - 129:5 reflected [3] - 142:17, 144:8, 144:11 refusal [1] - 83:16 refuse [1] - 157:21 refused [1] - 156:21 refuses [1] - 83:6 regard [3] - 134:6, 152:24, 214:10 regarding [2] - 58:7, 214:24 regardless [5] - 8:24, 21:7, 30:2, 56:17, 164:5 regional [1] - 12:15 regular [1] - 84:19 rehash [1] - 191:16 rejected [11] - 17:16, 54:12, 57:8, 142:24, 142:25, 143:23, 144:16, 148:17, 168:16, 202:4, 211:18 rejecting [1] - 63:16 rejects [1] - 63:8 related [1] - 7:25 relates [1] - 103:1 relating [1] - 52:7 relationship [1] -137:6 relative [4] - 18:2, 98:14, 131:10, 201:20 relatively [1] - 211:22 release [2] - 158:11, 158:14 relevant [1] - 41:6 reliable [1] - 189:2 relief [11] - 125:14, 135:25, 136:10, 146:12. 159:17. 159:19, 174:14, 190:6, 190:9, 190:17, 191:17 relies [2] - 18:18, 48:20 reluctant [1] - 75:10 rely [1] - 107:11 relying [2] - 65:5, 215.4 remaining [1] - 216:3 remand [1] - 191:23 remedies [3] - 136:1, 185:12, 185:13 remedy [9] - 70:24, 71:25, 114:16, 128:8, 137:1, 143:18, 143:19, 199:21

22

reason [15] - 19:11,

20:17, 61:12, 72:6,

remember [7] - 60:12, 69:3, 83:24, 116:20, 145:24, 202:14, 214:5 remembered [2] -138:23, 143:1 remind [1] - 135:21 render [2] - 96:1, 157:5 rendering [1] - 159:18 rent [4] - 78:4, 78:5, 78:13 renting [1] - 78:3 repeat [4] - 135:24, 195:21, 201:24, 213:2 repeated [2] - 5:19, 124:10 repeatedly [1] - 68:16 repeating [4] - 9:20, 136:14, 140:15, 206.8 repeats [2] - 174:14, 210:5 repercussions [1] -114:16 reply [9] - 66:12, 69:2, 69:3, 69:5, 69:17, 69:22, 145:10, 147:11, 205:4 **Reporter** [1] - 1:24 representations [1] -142:8 Representative [1] -69:18 representative [2] -49:1, 166:13 represents [1] - 172:4 reputation [1] -192:16 request [4] - 43:4, 84:5, 145:15, 149:17 requested [4] - 85:25, 159:16, 190:6, 191:5 require [4] - 4:16, 55:11, 61:9, 191:2 required [1] - 4:9 requirement [6] -126:6, 133:25, 149:25, 151:21, 183:8, 210:7 requires [4] - 52:17, 79:12, 79:20, 184:1 reread [1] - 207:10 reserve [3] - 75:6, 98:17, 100:5 reserved [2] - 75:3, reserving [1] - 164:19 resist [1] - 98:19

resold [1] - 166:22 resolution [1] - 74:11 resolve[7] - 75:1, 124:21, 138:16, 151:3, 151:7, 151:12, 182:22 resolved [1] - 133:4 resorting [1] - 32:5 resources [4] -158:20, 183:8, 183:16, 199:10 respect [8] - 9:6, 15:4, 15:5, 22:1, 101:19, 152:25, 212:8, 212:11 respective[1] - 6:4 respond [7] - 5:18, 91:4, 119:7, 127:4, 207:14, 208:3 responded [1] -147:11 responding [1] -67:20 response [1] - 102:14 rest [1] - 209:7 restrictive [4] - 176:9, 185:4, 185:7, 214:3 result [7] - 30:3, 51:8, 151:22, 167:12, 167:13, 182:24, 202:2 resumed [1] - 91:15 revenue [2] - 196:21, 196:23 reversal [1] - 48:11 reverse [1] - 71:19 reversed [4] - 70:8, 107:7, 166:11, 166:13 review [3] - 124:1, 140:25, 203:23 revise [1] - 211:17 revising [1] - 212:18 revision [1] - 212:20 rid [1] - 122:5 rights [6] - 31:9, 75:16, 100:5, 162:24, 184:14, 184:23 ringer [2] - 93:24, 96:22 ripe [1] - 7:21 ripeness [1] - 174:9 risk [2] - 9:20, 171:21 road [1] - 105:6

roadmap [5] - 21:1,

158:12, 159:21.

159:22, 160:11

roads [1] - 192:3

Rob [1] - 4:23

Robart [1] - 19:10 Robert [1] - 89:11 **ROBERT**[1] - 2:3 rode [1] - 113:14 role [1] - 122:6 room [11] - 54:25, 89:25, 90:5, 90:9, 97:6, 97:25, 98:14, 105:3, 171:20, 171:23, 174:4 Rowing [2] - 138:25, 139:1 royalties [3] - 30:25, 96:25 royalty [4] - 62:7, 83:6, 123:17, 206:8 rubber [1] - 105:6 Rule [3] - 116:15, 118:20, 211:12 rule [25] - 4:14, 10:2, 11:11, 39:8, 39:9, 81:20, 93:21, 107:24, 113:5, 114:7, 116:6, 116:7, 116:25, 118:8, 126:10, 127:14, 146:24, 146:25, 195:21, 209:14, 209:18, 211:1, 211:2, 215:12 ruled [8] - 12:9, 50:22, 52:12, 59:19, 71:23, 212:23, 215:25, 216:1 rules [10] - 72:3, 116:4, 116:7, 116:24, 117:2, 179:14, 189:16, 204:24 ruling [15] - 94:13, 95:25, 117:6, 118:23, 119:1, 133:15, 143:24, 154:12, 179:20, 184:22, 194:25, 213:8, 214:13 run [1] - 76:13

S

safe [1] - 80:8 sake [1] - 147:13 sales [9] - 8:23, 196:16, 196:24, 196:25, 197:1, 197:4, 198:6, 198:18, 199:8 sample [2] - 129:18 Samsung [4] - 18:23, 19:15, 48:24, 51:18

66:17 Samsung/Huawei [1] - 18:23 sandbagged [1] -215:6 satisfaction [1] - 43:1 satisfied [1] - 214:25 satisfy [1] - 25:13 saturation [3] -187:23, 188:13, 194:1 saw [3] - 107:12, 116:21, 158:10 scenario [1] - 198:12 schedule [3] - 86:9, 91:21, 154:8 scheduled [1] -189:16 schedules [1] - 154:7 Schwartz [2] - 140:3, 166:1 science [1] - 4:10 scope [3] - 93:2, 127:1, 199:1 screen [3] - 167:10, 171:25, 175:7 se [24] - 11:11, 39:8, 39:9, 81:9, 81:10, 81:20, 107:23, 107:24, 108:12, 108:13, 113:5, 115:7, 117:13, 117:15, 118:8, 118:9, 141:17, 141:18, 144:10, 146:24, 207:25, 209:14, 209:18, 209:25 seal [2] - 171:19, 189:6 **sealed** [1] - 156:5 seat [2] - 6:3, 127:7 seated [1] - 4:7 seats [1] - 127:8 Seattle [1] - 19:10 Sebastian [1] - 6:17 second [30] - 12:15, 27:5, 27:7, 27:8, 27:10, 27:24, 29:10, 29:11, 30:8, 30:14, 30:17, 31:8, 32:10, 32:16, 33:4, 34:4, 36:16, 42:10, 53:5, 60:24, 70:6, 83:23, 93:10, 116:14, 136:17, 143:20, 145:8, 145:13, 149:12, 188:2 seconds [1] - 54:25

Samsung/Apple [1] -

secret [3] - 61:15, 80:12, 104:9 section [1] - 137:5 security [1] - 169:7 see [20] - 4:18, 32:16, 33:12, 35:4, 46:19, 55:20, 79:18, 83:11, 112:11, 139:17, 140:25, 153:20, 155:19. 163:3. 171:20, 176:5. 178:5, 182:18, 189:6, 202:6 seeing [1] - 202:16 seek [21] - 50:2, 64:8, 73:11, 73:13, 73:24, 74:11, 86:20, 87:13, 109:7, 109:13, 111:2, 121:15, 125:5, 142:1, 151:10, 151:19, 207:25, 209:13, 209:22, 210:10, 211:7 seeking [42] - 7:21, 9:4, 9:5, 9:8, 10:25, 28:20, 50:23, 51:13, 51:23, 52:7, 52:14, 53:15, 53:22, 70:24, 76:19, 76:25, 77:5, 77:10, 77:16, 79:25, 80:23, 82:5, 85:1, 85:3, 85:4, 107:24, 108:11, 108:15, 108:20, 120:8, 127:11, 158:23, 159:19, 173:13, 186:23, 209:11, 209:19, 210:13, 211:6, 211:20, 212:15 seeks [1] - 161:8 seem [3] - 101:1, 118:1, 129:4 sees [2] - 120:1, 191.23 segued [1] - 178:6 select [2] - 162:16, 162:25 sell [8] - 8:2, 8:7, 89:19, 96:23, 123:16, 123:20, 180:11, 204:16 selling [5] - 8:16, 9:25, 195:16, 196:15, 205:18 sells [3] - 10:5, 123:13, 123:18 Selna [2] - 50:11, 51:11

semantics [1] - 210:21 sending [1] - 129:11 sense [15] - 12:14, 31:2, 36:9, 126:11, 138:3, 144:2, 153:22, 156:19, 158:20, 178:22, 179:6, 195:15, 197:3, 202:20, 205:24 sent [1] - 67:1 sentence [5] - 12:13, 12:14, 12:15, 12:20, 175:17 SEP [3] - 107:25, 115:13, 161:7 SEP's [1] - 109:6 separate [3] - 25:12, 192:3, 197:25 separately [1] - 89:19 SEPs [3] - 83:21, 89:18, 123:22 September [2] - 154:4, 201.13 series [1] - 49:8 serious [1] - 181:11 serve [1] - 203:9 served [3] - 176:13, 184:2, 184:19 serves [1] - 191:24 Session [1] - 169:2 set [37] - 7:12, 10:22, 10:24, 12:11, 26:7, 27:11, 27:12, 29:18, 30:3, 74:1, 85:13, 86:1, 88:3, 90:11, 90:19, 91:23, 92:7, 92:8, 92:9, 92:24, 94:22, 110:15, 111:19, 122:10, 128:8, 154:2, 158:8, 158:12, 158:15, 164:9, 169:12, 173:11, 184:12, 185:25, 188:18, 201:13, 211:15 sets [2] - 107:4, 162:11 **setting** [17] - 18:18, 18:21, 19:9, 21:8, 21:9, 55:16, 55:17, 83:20, 84:22, 92:2, 94:15, 95:25, 161:8, 161:12, 161:13, 184:14, 204:3 settled [2] - 19:2, 130:9 seventh [1] - 114:7 several [1] - 143:21 severe [1] - 206:9

shake [1] - 155:9 **shall** [1] - 137:4 shape [2] - 163:23, 163:25 share [10] - 93:17, 187:23, 189:21, 192:19, 192:20, 192:24, 193:23, 195:7, 195:12, 196:6 shares [1] - 110:23 shoes [1] - 208:23 short [9] - 73:5, 89:18, 91:13, 91:15, 94:3, 94:4, 124:4, 193:10, 207.9 shortchange [1] -124:4 show [34] - 40:15, 48:1, 50:22, 51:10, 51:11, 51:15, 51:21, 52:23, 53:8, 53:12, 58:13, 67:7, 77:3, 129:24, 134:2, 146:18. 147:1. 147:2, 147:4, 147:5, 148:14, 148:19, 148:23, 149:1, 156:5, 172:3, 193:5, 193:7, 195:13, 199:25, 201:23, 204:14, 205:6, 209:25 showed [3] - 134:11, 147:1, 150:15 showing [3] - 132:10, 148:17, 196:8 shown [2] - 132:8, 148:24 shows [2] - 80:18, 200:13 shrift [1] - 124:5 shut [1] - 120:20 side [10] - 42:22, 56:20, 90:20, 91:1, 128:1, 153:4, 161:9, 199:17, 200:1, 204:20 sides [3] - 85:15, 184:8, 186:1 sign [2] - 190:18, 206:19 signed [1] - 53:14 significant [5] - 75:11, 184:5, 189:1, 196:25, 211:16 silent [6] - 34:18,

34:20, 34:25,

127:7

silly [1] - 73:5

112:23, 112:25,

similar [3] - 100:11, 154:11, 201:14 similarly [1] - 213:25 simple [3] - 100:11, 151:25, 159:9 simply [4] - 126:12, 146:11, 152:20, 171:17 simultaneously [1] -194:22 single [7] - 21:12, 33:3, 50:13, 72:4, 103:19, 164:14, 204:22 sister [1] - 89:16 sit [2] - 78:4, 201:10 situated [1] - 52:13 situation [10] - 21:14, 45:20, 87:23, 99:21, 117:16, 119:7, 156:20, 158:6, 187:1, 207:22 situations [1] - 20:25 **six** [12] - 7:1, 7:6, 7:13, 8:20, 8:24, 9:23, 10:4, 10:7, 20:4, 149:4, 174:10, 198:20 six-patent [2] - 7:6, 9:23 sketchy [1] - 38:16 skew [1] - 182:24 skills [2] - 108:17 skip [5] - 153:9, 172:9, 172:16, 174:16, 176:17 skipping [1] - 182:11 slate [1] - 121:6 sledgehammer [1] -110:17 sleep [2] - 180:9, 181:2 sleeve [1] - 101:21 slew [1] - 106:7 slice [3] - 61:24, 96:7, 102:3 slide [14] - 98:1, 99:9, 102:20, 123:13, 135:4, 138:19, 143:13, 146:6, 153:18, 158:9, 172:3, 178:21, 200:8 slides [9] - 97:25, 124:6, 124:7, 138:18, 152:22, 171:10, 171:11, 182:11, 187:17 sliver [1] - 205:12 slow [1] - 112:6

smack [1] - 80:7 small [3] - 113:21, 113:22, 165:7 smart [1] - 61:13 smartphone [3] -48:22, 61:13 sold [1] - 89:19 solid [1] - 198:18 solution [1] - 74:17 **SOLUTIONS** [2] - 1:7, 1:13 Solutions [1] - 2:21 **someone** [1] - 148:6 sometimes [1] - 73:5 somewhat [2] - 38:6, 192:15 somewhere [3] -124:17, 124:19, 163:21 soon [3] - 56:9, 57:11, 74:22 Sorbonne [1] - 109:12 sorry [31] - 21:22, 23:2, 28:5, 34:15, 34:22, 37:9, 47:15, 54:3, 59:22, 62:2, 65:14, 102:11, 131:18, 138:21, 139:12, 146:4, 152:1, 155:25, 170:25, 171:1, 175:3, 178:6, 187:7, 188:6, 193:16, 197:23, 199:18, 200:18, 200:20, 201:24, 207:18 sort [13] - 11:11, 35:4, 36:23, 39:6, 100:12, 114:3, 136:15, 136:19, 144:10, 144:20, 144:21, 167:6 sorts [2] - 98:22, 174:2 sought [7] - 50:14, 66:1, 83:24, 83:25, 125:10, 135:25, 190:10 sound [1] - 168:22 sounds [6] - 54:25, 62:16, 106:15. 119:1, 127:14, 206:20 source [2] - 28:12, 118:22 space [2] - 192:21, 193:25 speaking [2] - 20:24, 62:2 special [2] - 129:12,

129.21 specific [7] - 20:18, 20:21, 25:16, 99:5, 121:3, 140:16, 155:17 specifically [9] -17:16, 19:20, 49:7, 65:2, 72:9, 73:11, 92:12, 113:7, 186:12 specifics [1] - 117:9 spectrum [3] - 80:3, 80:6 speculate [1] - 127:17 spelled [1] - 47:9 spend [1] - 104:24 spent [1] - 97:8 **splinter** [1] - 156:9 **split** [1] - 10:3 spring [1] - 74:9 square [1] - 81:3 stacking [1] - 206:8 stances [1] - 60:16 stand [7] - 81:2, 90:24, 130:6, 149:8, 167:20, 194:12, 194:13 standard [27] - 13:14, 14:15, 15:16, 17:13, 17:17, 20:6, 25:23, 29:20, 32:2, 49:10, 61:25, 62:4, 66:18, 71:7, 83:20, 84:17, 84:22, 89:18, 127:20, 162:11, 163:11, 163:13, 164:20, 165:14, 208:7, 212:3, 213:9 standards [5] -163:13, 181:25, 184:12, 184:14, 212:4 standing [2] - 154:25, 164:14 standpoint [1] - 14:14 star [1] - 107:10 **STARGATT**[1] - 2:2 start [11] - 23:11, 34:5, 61:9, 68:14, 75:24, 81:9, 120:13, 131:5, 155:14, 158:1, 191:11 started [4] - 41:23, 143:2, 158:19, 194:4 starting [4] - 108:21, 108:23, 193:11, 193:16 state [5] - 87:4, 177:9, 186:11, 202:3, 212:5 statement [4] - 79:22, 135:3, 211:9, 211:11

24

slowing [1] - 133:25

statements [5] -30:23, 87:20, 124:11, 135:5, 135:23 states [4] - 51:23, 87:2, 188:25, 193:24 STATES[1] - 1:1 States [9] - 22:3, 39:23, 51:22, 63:1, 126:25. 160:5. 160:8, 195:2, 212:4 status [4] - 26:18, 153:25, 154:1, 201:11 statute [21] - 45:11, 45:18, 65:20, 68:20, 71:18, 72:25, 73:10, 109:1, 122:16, 122:19, 131:10, 132:11, 132:23, 133:1, 133:24, 136:20, 137:2, 165:24, 177:11, 186:12, 186:24 statutes [3] - 106:8, 107:11, 131:9 statutory [1] - 156:12 stay [15] - 65:25, 72:23, 73:7, 73:11, 73:13, 73:16, 73:18, 73:24, 92:1, 124:23, 125:1, 125:5, 125:10, 133:6, 138:4 stayed [5] - 74:1, 74:3, 125:4, 137:8 stays [1] - 132:24 step [3] - 42:7, 87:8, 95:12 stick [1] - 148:15 sticks [1] - 154:8 still [9] - 39:15, 42:10, 80:20, 125:23, 149:7, 178:14, 184:21, 193:14, 194.7 Stoffel [8] - 109:9, 115:5, 117:23, 126:16, 207:6, 207:9, 208:13, 209:9 Stoffel-Munck [7] -109:9, 115:5, 117:23, 126:16, 207:6, 208:13, 209:9 Stoffel-Munck's [1] -207:9 Stoffle [1] - 36:6 Stoffle-Munck [1] -36.6 stonewalling [1] -64:2

success [41] - 22:4, Stonington [1] -178:10 24:17, 24:25, 25:19, stop [13] - 11:14, 34:1, 26:25, 35:3, 35:11, 41:18, 74:13, 83:10, 35:23, 36:13, 37:3, 83:13, 85:6, 101:13, 42:3, 42:8, 71:12, 105:21, 156:11, 85:21, 88:19, 156:15, 165:16, 105:24, 111:7, 195:16 121:22, 125:17, 125:24, 146:17, stopping [2] - 198:5, 146:18, 147:4, 198:25 stops [1] - 56:7 147:17, 148:5, 148:21, 149:16, story [4] - 56:21, 150:17, 152:14, 66:19, 86:14, 159:17 153:6, 153:10, straight [1] - 100:1 153:20, 155:6, stream [1] - 196:21 stretch [2] - 40:3, 170:6, 170:20, 184:22, 187:8, 152:6 200:22, 206:25, strict [1] - 107:10 212:22, 213:17 strike [5] - 42:4, successful [4] -145:5, 145:7, 134:12, 134:13, 145:12, 199:14 198:5, 198:25 strikes [1] - 32:5 **sudden** [1] - 206:12 strings [1] - 62:14 sue [6] - 127:16, struggling [1] -127:17, 127:20, 167:25 127:21, 185:10, stuck [1] - 8:7 185:12 studied [1] - 24:15 sued [7] - 39:13, 50:7, stuff [8] - 90:17, 95:7, 109:22, 115:15, 96:4, 104:9, 144:10, 120:18, 130:18 154:8, 166:22, 205:4 suffer [3] - 113:21, subject [10] - 44:7, 114:21, 134:7 59:5, 79:24, 83:3, suffering [2] - 125:3, 87:16, 99:24, 99:25, 181:13 183:19, 184:4, 203:6 sufficient [4] - 125:15, subjectively [1] -174:8, 180:19, 181:3 55:14 sufficiently [1] - 25:12 submission [1] suggest [7] - 14:20, 110:18 79:6, 98:4, 114:7, submissions [2] -118:2, 150:10, 172:2 135:9, 136:16 suggested [1] - 168:8 submit [10] - 80:6, suggesting [1] - 63:23 97:20, 99:4, 106:3, suggestion [4] - 5:14, 116:22, 117:1, 129:10, 134:24, 118:23, 121:17, 171:17 122:12, 142:12 suggests [1] - 32:25 submitted [10] - 21:2, sui [2] - 108:18, 36:6, 117:1, 123:7, 117:16 135:22, 136:16, suit [43] - 10:18, 147:6, 187:13, 10:25, 11:3, 11:9, 187:24, 207:4 15:6, 17:13, 18:17, subsequent [3] -18:24, 19:6, 20:3, 67:11, 69:6, 69:9 20:4, 22:22, 22:24, **subsidiary** [1] - 101:9 32:17, 32:22, 33:1, substantive [2] -38:13, 40:4, 40:18, 14:15, 18:2 40:25, 41:2, 42:13, succeed [6] - 24:24, 71:8, 75:20, 85:14, 26:14, 42:4, 86:4, 88:16, 112:12, 99:19, 181:12

170:21, 171:6, 172:18, 176:7, 176:24, 177:16, 183:14, 183:25, 184:19, 184:25, 186:8, 212:25 suited [1] - 98:5 suits [3] - 20:2, 21:9, 183:23 **summarize** [1] - 97:22 summary [6] - 64:20. 97:23, 98:1, 99:10, 165:3, 192:15 super [1] - 63:16 Supplement [1] -139:5 supplemental [1] -19:17 suppliers [1] - 198:11 supply [3] - 189:9, 189:12, 189:14 support [4] - 120:24, 120:25, 166:16, 199:7 supported [1] - 149:6 **supporting** [1] - 195:9 suppose [14] - 31:4, 63:23, 121:24, 122:19, 128:15, 130:9, 147:21, 147:22, 158:25, 173:18, 179:16, 190:21, 191:1 supposed [8] - 107:6, 117:11, 119:17, 122:6, 122:7, 127:7, 133:7, 178:10 **Supreme** [13] - 65:1, 65:8, 106:13, 106:19, 106:20, 106:22, 106:23, 107:3, 161:24, 161:25, 164:16, 177:18, 203:17 surrender [1] - 203:14 surrendered [2] -80:9, 87:23 surviving [1] - 197:15 sustainable [1] -206:14 switch [4] - 132:20, 197:13, 198:10, 198:11 switched [1] - 115:21 switches [1] - 200:16 sword [2] - 164:11 sworn [2] - 21:15, 174:11 system [2] - 133:7, 185:25

Т

25

table [2] - 5:3, 125:23 tablet [1] - 123:14 talks [8] - 17:12, 63:15, 68:20, 143:20, 152:19, 193:22, 208:5, 209:9 tangent [1] - 70:21 target [2] - 74:8, 189:16 taught [1] - 212:9 **TAYLOR** [1] - 2:2 TCL [14] - 18:20, 19:15, 48:9, 50:5, 50:7, 50:11, 50:14, 50:21, 50:22, 103:1, 104:6, 170:11, 191:14 teaches [1] - 212:6 tease [1] - 101:20 teasing [1] - 63:25 tech [1] - 12:11 technical [1] - 180:24 technically [1] - 21:16 technology [9] - 62:5, 62:6, 62:13, 62:14, 101:10, 162:16, 162:25, 163:7, 165:10 tee [1] - 215:12 Teles [1] - 214:22 **TELIT** [4] - 1:7, 1:8, 1:13, 1:14 Telit [36] - 2:21, 2:22, 5:2, 6:8, 6:21, 10:5, 20:24, 21:3, 34:13, 34:14, 34:16, 34:22, 39:12, 47:8, 90:24, 114:17, 129:3, 129:5, 136:2, 172:19, 173:9, 196:15, 197:14, 198:5, 198:6, 198:7, 198:8, 198:9, 198:12, 199:9, 206:20, 210:16 Telit/CalAmp[1] -173:12 tempted [1] - 215:11 ten [7] - 74:12, 91:9, 152:2, 174:10, 187:22, 188:13, 193:25 ten-minute [1] - 91:9 tend [1] - 146:10 term [5] - 123:2, 140:22, 203:23, 210:1 terms [24] - 26:7,

115:15, 124:18,

125:22, 168:18,

succeeding [2] -

25:16, 80:18

26

27:13, 27:18, 29:19, 166:23, 167:3, 28:18, 28:22, 29:1, 73:23, 74:4, 74:6, 116:19, 117:24, 30:3, 31:20, 33:23, 29:4, 29:7, 29:10, 74:10, 74:16, 74:23, 118:7, 119:1, 119:6, 167:8, 167:13, 83:18, 86:1, 89:21, 29:17, 29:22, 29:25, 75:3, 75:6, 75:9, 119:11, 119:16, 167:15, 167:22, 93:1, 93:2, 94:21, 30:7, 30:13, 30:21, 75:15, 75:19, 76:2, 119:21, 121:13, 168:24, 169:3, 95:25, 103:9, 153:5, 31:4, 31:7, 31:15, 76:4, 76:9, 76:17, 122:4, 122:15, 169:8, 169:11, 123:1, 123:6, 169:16, 169:20, 159:25, 173:14, 32:4, 33:4, 33:11, 76:23, 77:3, 77:9, 184:12, 203:22, 33:18, 34:4, 34:10, 77:13, 77:19, 77:22, 123:10, 123:25, 169:24, 170:2, 208:7, 209:1, 212:8 34:13, 34:15, 34:18, 77:24, 78:7, 78:10, 124:14, 124:25, 170:4, 170:12, 34:20, 34:22, 35:1, 78:16, 78:20, 78:22, 125:5, 125:8, 126:1, 170:15, 170:17, test [9] - 23:1, 24:6, 36:12, 75:13, 87:10, 35:6, 35:9, 35:12, 78:24, 79:1, 79:13, 126:23, 127:4, 171:1, 171:6, 148:9, 176:18, 35:15, 35:22, 35:25, 79:18, 80:14, 81:3, 127:23, 128:6, 171:13, 171:20, 177:13, 183:15 36:3, 36:8, 36:11, 81:14, 81:18, 81:22, 128:10, 128:17, 171:24, 172:6, 36:16, 37:5, 37:8, 81:24, 82:2, 82:4, 129:20, 130:1, 172:11, 172:15, testify [1] - 4:15 37:10, 37:12, 37:18, 172:22, 173:5, 82:8, 82:11, 82:13, 130:4, 130:10, testimony [2] - 117:1, 37:20, 37:24, 38:5, 82:19, 82:21, 82:24, 130:12, 130:16, 173:8, 173:22, 163:22 38:9, 38:12, 38:18, 83:2, 83:9, 83:11, 131:6, 131:13, 174:6, 175:8, Texas [1] - 48:18 39:5, 39:14, 39:18, 83:14, 83:23, 84:3, 131:17, 131:19, 175:12, 175:16, Thales [33] - 3:13, 5:7, 175:20, 175:25, 131:23, 132:2, 40:21, 40:24, 41:6, 84:6, 84:8, 84:11, 25:6, 25:9, 25:21, 41:9, 41:12, 41:14, 132:5, 132:12, 176:2, 176:5, 84:20, 85:4, 85:9, 34:14, 34:17, 34:22, 41:16, 41:19, 41:22, 85:20, 86:5, 87:21, 132:15, 133:18, 176:21, 176:23, 46:25, 47:8, 47:9, 87:24, 88:5, 88:9, 42:21, 43:13, 43:19, 134:5, 136:3, 136:7, 177:2, 177:7, 178:1, 56:13, 74:2, 78:23, 88:12, 88:14, 88:16, 43:22, 43:25, 44:4, 137:10, 137:14, 178:5, 179:19, 89:1, 89:16, 89:19, 44:9, 44:13, 44:17, 88:21, 88:25, 89:6, 138:1, 138:4, 138:8, 179:23, 180:3, 89:20, 99:8, 129:4, 44:19, 44:25, 45:7, 89:9, 89:13, 89:24, 138:11, 138:20, 180:14, 180:18, 136:15, 187:11, 45:9, 45:13, 45:17, 90:2, 90:4, 90:7, 138:24, 139:1, 180:21, 181:4, 188:1, 188:15, 45:21, 45:24, 46:1, 90:12, 90:14, 90:17, 139:4, 139:7, 181:8, 181:15, 189:25, 190:4, 91:16, 91:20, 92:7, 46:10, 46:19, 47:1, 139:10, 139:13, 181:19, 181:22, 193:22, 201:22, 47:4, 47:7, 47:10, 92:13, 92:20, 93:4, 139:21, 139:25, 182:9, 183:2, 206:20, 211:25 47:15, 47:17, 47:19, 93:6, 94:3, 94:9, 140:4, 141:11, 185:14, 185:18, Thales' [5] - 163:18, 48:1, 48:5, 49:18, 94:18, 94:21, 95:1, 141:20, 141:23, 187:2, 187:6, 188:25, 189:3, 50:1, 50:6, 50:9, 95:3, 95:11, 95:14, 141:25, 142:20, 187:16, 187:19, 189:9, 202:2 50:21, 51:2, 51:16, 96:10, 96:13, 96:15, 142:23, 143:1, 188:2, 188:8, **THE** [698] - 1:1, 1:2, 51:19, 52:2, 52:10, 97:3, 97:5, 97:10, 144:1, 144:6, 145:5, 188:10, 188:23, 4:6, 4:24, 5:5, 5:10, 52:20, 52:22, 53:3, 97:12, 97:14, 97:18, 145:8, 145:11, 189:20, 189:22, 5:15, 5:21, 5:24, 53:5, 53:18, 53:20, 97:21, 98:2, 98:7, 145:17, 145:21, 190:1, 190:6, 190:9, 6:10, 6:14, 6:25, 7:2, 54:1, 54:3, 54:6, 98:10, 98:12, 102:6, 145:24, 146:4, 190:21, 190:24, 7:4, 7:7, 7:15, 7:18, 54:9, 54:13, 54:17, 102:9, 102:11, 147:12, 147:16, 191:1, 192:6, 192:8, 7:20, 8:9, 9:1, 9:4, 102:13, 102:18, 192:14, 192:24, 54:23, 56:4, 56:15, 147:21, 147:25, 9:14, 9:17, 10:12, 56:22, 56:24, 57:4, 102:22, 103:4, 148:4, 148:8, 193:3, 193:7, 10:16, 11:4, 11:7, 148:18, 149:12, 193:13, 194:11, 11:16, 12:1, 12:5, 57:7, 57:15, 57:19, 103:6, 103:10, 149:15, 149:24, 194:16, 194:18, 57:23, 58:2, 58:4, 103:17, 103:21, 12:12, 12:25, 13:4, 58:8, 58:10, 58:13, 150:5, 150:13, 194:24, 195:10, 103:24, 104:3, 13:7, 13:18, 13:21, 58:16, 58:19, 58:24, 104:19, 104:21, 150:22, 151:1, 195:20, 196:12, 13:24, 14:1, 14:8, 59:10, 59:16, 59:18, 104:23, 105:2, 151:6, 151:24, 196:17, 196:19, 14:10, 15:4, 15:8, 59:22, 60:1, 60:7, 105:22, 106:6, 152:1, 152:4, 153:2, 197:5, 197:9, 15:13, 15:20, 16:1, 60:11, 62:16, 62:22, 106:9, 106:15, 153:4, 153:8, 197:16, 197:19, 16:10, 16:15, 16:18, 62:24, 63:6, 63:12, 106:18, 106:23, 153:12, 154:4, 197:22, 197:24, 16:22, 17:1, 17:6, 63:18, 63:21, 64:5, 107:16. 108:6. 154:15, 154:17, 198:3, 198:15, 17:18, 17:23, 18:4, 64:11, 65:14, 65:22, 108:9, 108:14, 154:19. 154:23. 198:23. 199:3. 18:9, 21:24, 22:7, 66:8, 66:23, 67:3, 110:4, 110:8, 111:1, 155:5, 155:11, 199:16, 200:3, 22:10, 22:12, 22:14, 67:6, 67:9, 67:17, 111:4, 111:6, 155:21, 155:23, 200:5, 200:19, 22:17, 22:21, 22:25, 67:19, 67:24, 68:2, 111:11, 111:15, 155:25, 156:2, 200:21, 201:16, 23:3, 23:6, 23:10, 68:4, 68:8, 68:10, 112:5, 112:14, 157:11, 157:14, 201:18, 201:23, 23:16, 23:19, 23:22, 157:17, 158:18, 68:13, 68:18, 68:23, 112:18, 112:21, 202:1, 202:8, 24:11, 24:14, 24:19, 69:2, 69:8, 69:12, 112:23, 112:25, 159:20, 160:15, 202:11, 202:14, 24:22, 25:4, 25:7, 69:15, 69:20, 69:22, 113:3, 113:18, 160:18, 160:20, 202:16, 202:22, 25:14, 26:3, 26:5, 70:1, 70:5, 70:7, 113:20, 114:6, 160:24, 161:1, 203:4, 203:12, 26:8, 26:12, 26:17, 70:10, 70:14, 70:17, 114:10, 114:13, 161:5, 161:25, 203:20, 204:1, 26:21, 26:23, 27:4, 71:22, 72:5, 72:19, 114:25, 115:6, 162:2, 162:7, 206:1, 206:3, 27:7, 27:22, 28:1, 72:22, 72:25, 73:3, 115:10, 115:23, 162:19, 165:15, 206:15, 206:23, 28:5, 28:8, 28:12, 165:19, 166:18, 73:10, 73:17, 73:21, 116:10, 116:14, 207:8, 207:21,

27

208:10, 208:15, 77:18, 77:20, 77:21, 22:23, 23:3, 23:23, 146:2, 146:5, today [18] - 5:8, 18:6, 80:20, 122:10, 208:19, 209:3, 24:1, 24:10, 135:15, 147:15, 147:18, 40:3, 42:12, 53:23, 123:19, 126:9, 209:5, 209:7, 139:7, 139:10, 147:24, 148:2, 101:13, 105:11, 128:15, 128:19, 209:16, 210:9, 139:14, 139:15, 148:5, 148:12, 112:3, 149:7, 151:7, 210:21, 215:10, 139:16, 176:8, 148:23, 149:14, 151:12, 181:21, 151:5, 177:1, 203:16 176:17, 176:23, 216:7, 216:9, 216:11 149:23, 150:4, 183:6, 184:3, truly [1] - 204:12 theirs [2] - 96:9, 97:2 177:14, 177:24, 150:10, 150:21, 199:19, 200:14, trump [1] - 71:16 183:13, 183:24, 150:25, 151:5, 205:23, 213:11 themselves [2] - 66:9, trust [1] - 163:24 185:1, 186:7, 151:16, 151:25, 98:16 together [4] - 35:4, truth [1] - 30:19 212:24, 213:12, 152:3, 152:8, 153:3, theories [1] - 43:5 35:7, 38:2, 145:25 try [14] - 7:24, 14:24, theory [36] - 14:24, 213:25, 214:2, 214:3 153:7, 153:9, tomorrow [1] - 204:6 94:22, 100:25, third-party [5] - 26:18, 153:13, 154:5, 27:5, 27:7, 27:8, tons [1] - 104:24 110:13, 111:20, 28:15, 34:7, 43:10, 154:16, 154:25, 29:11, 30:8, 30:14, took [3] - 142:4, 114:16, 125:18, 159:23 167:7, 169:6, 30:16, 30:17, 31:8, 142:5, 196:7 137:25, 141:10, thirds [5] - 196:15, 171:17, 171:22, 31:10, 31:15, 32:6, top [10] - 50:15, 60:13, 149:4, 149:5, 154:1, 172:2, 172:7, 32:10, 32:16, 32:17, 196:24, 197:12, 100:21, 104:11, 212:10 173:24, 190:8, 198:6, 199:9 33:5, 33:19, 34:4, 133:16, 137:7, trying [11] - 36:18, 190:23, 190:25, THOMAS [1] - 3:11 34:11, 36:8, 36:11, 189:7, 193:20, 51:5, 59:2, 70:1, 200:6, 200:20, 36:17, 37:5, 37:12, Thomas [1] - 5:9 204:22, 214:5 91:20, 109:14, 200:23, 201:17, 37:13, 38:20, 40:21, THOMPSON [149] topdown [1] - 205:11 120:20, 132:5, 203:16, 203:22, 42:25, 43:5, 52:23, 2:7, 5:13, 5:16, 5:22, 133:21, 152:6, totality [1] - 86:21 208:24, 209:4, 170:7, 177:15 14:12, 15:7, 15:10, totally [2] - 17:18, 152:13 209:6, 216:6 thereafter [1] - 91:24 15:15, 15:24, 16:3, TUNNELL [2] - 2:15, 19:23 Thompson [12] - 4:22, therefore [5] - 23:25, 16:14, 16:17, 16:25, touch [3] - 177:22, 130:11, 130:12, 117:7, 160:7, 160:8, 17:5, 17:7, 17:12, turn [7] - 29:20, 43:7, 180:7, 187:8 130:16, 165:21, 192:18 17:21, 18:2, 18:8, touched [3] - 175:15, 64:21, 93:19, 169:3, 180:7, 183:6, they've [25] - 10:22, 23:8, 23:15, 24:8, 199:19, 206:7 123:24, 153:1, 185:9, 200:5, 203:12 11:12, 14:17, 27:21, 43:12, 43:16, 43:21, touching [1] - 65:10 154:14 thousand [3] - 61:22. 43:24, 45:4, 45:8, 40:17, 42:3, 55:7, turning [1] - 29:12 toward [1] - 193:20 123:15, 129:14 99:15, 122:22, 45:12, 45:16, 45:19, twelve [1] - 198:21 TQ [5] - 12:8, 17:9, threat [7] - 115:20, 141:13, 142:2, 45:23, 45:25, 49:25, twice [2] - 94:22, 17:10, 17:12, 20:19 168:13, 179:4, 147:9, 148:10, 54:11, 54:16, 54:19, 101:18 tracks [4] - 32:9, 182:6, 182:23, 73:25, 74:5, 90:1, two [53] - 6:18, 7:10, 148:20, 151:20, 178:8, 186:16, 195:1 182:25, 189:12 90:3, 90:6, 90:10, 152:15, 152:19, Trade [1] - 69:18 14:13, 19:14, 19:22, 90:13, 90:15, 91:12, threatens [1] - 189:14 154:8, 165:4, 20:2, 24:2, 24:3, trade [2] - 49:1, 97:7, 97:17, 97:24, three [11] - 22:18, 172:17, 180:9, 25:10, 32:8, 35:10, 166:13 98:4, 98:8, 98:11, 22:19, 113:24, 182:20, 182:22, 35:12, 37:3, 38:19, tradition [1] - 162:10 98:13, 102:16, 115:16, 120:18, 190:14, 191:5 39:12, 43:5, 55:9, **traditional** [1] - 20:16 104:22, 105:1, 129:5, 154:10, thin [1] - 180:9 61:21, 65:2, 67:3, transaction [1] - 92:19 105:7, 123:4, 123:7, 176:18, 177:17, thinking [9] - 65:23, 67:9, 68:5, 72:7, trap [1] - 107:22 116:10, 116:12, 130:11, 131:3, 205:9, 205:19 109:21, 111:21, treat [2] - 117:11, 131:7, 131:15, threshold [3] - 6:6, 121:13, 121:20, 113:14, 115:15, 213:15 131:18, 131:21, 12:23, 41:5 138:14, 139:15, 120:17, 121:8, treated [2] - 60:23, 131:25, 132:3, throughout [1] - 18:6 143:2, 215:1 126:2, 143:14, 117:5 132:7, 132:13, throw [6] - 98:16, thinks [3] - 37:1, 147:7, 148:12, treating [1] - 39:20 213:21, 214:7 132:18, 133:21, 109:14, 110:13, 155:10, 157:1, treats [1] - 24:1 134:8, 136:5, 136:8, 111:20, 127:21, third [10] - 24:4, 26:18, 165:20, 178:20, tree [4] - 160:21, 137:12, 137:16, 156:11 28:15, 34:7, 43:10, 181:25, 187:14, 161:1, 161:3, 211:25 138:2, 138:6, 138:9, thrown [1] - 176:14 44:12, 60:25, 92:3, 192:3, 194:22, trial [6] - 100:13, 138:12, 138:21, thrust [1] - 114:3 159:23, 213:18 196:15, 196:24, 100:16, 154:2, Third [54] - 11:19, 138:25, 139:2, tie [3] - 108:5, 110:11, 197:12, 198:6, 201:11, 201:12 139:5, 139:9, 12:9, 12:10, 13:1, 120:15 199:9, 204:18, tribunal [1] - 46:22 139:11, 139:19, timeline [1] - 73:2 205:19, 213:15, 13:2, 13:9, 13:10, tried [2] - 147:9, 166:6 139:22, 140:2, 13:14, 14:5, 14:11, timely [1] - 214:18 213:17, 215:22, trier [7] - 21:8, 80:5, 140:5, 141:13, 14:14, 14:20, 14:23, 215:25, 216:2 timing [1] - 199:3 93:12, 94:1, 95:4, 141:22, 141:24, 14:24, 15:2, 15:10, two-thirds [5] tired [1] - 165:17 96:19, 159:13 142:12, 142:21, 15:14, 15:23, 16:6, 196:15, 196:24, Title [8] - 65:24, troubled [2] - 158:20, 142:25, 143:12, 16:7, 16:12, 17:15, 197:12, 198:6, 199:9 105:17, 105:20, 213:4 144:2, 144:7, 145:7, 17:19, 18:1, 18:7, type [1] - 63:22 131:9, 133:2, 133:8, troubles [1] - 130:22 145:10, 145:23, 20:19, 21:25, 22:19, types [1] - 55:9 133:9 true [14] - 7:17, 77:17,

Case: 21-2106 Document: 15 Page: 302 Filed: 08/30/2021

28

103:14, 105:4,

105:5, 105:9,

105:14, 110:9,

149:18, 149:22, 203:19, 203:24, 25:1, 74:21, 97:18, typical [2] - 163:11, 115:20, 115:21, 170:5, 172:3, 187:6, 171:18 150:5, 150:8, 120:13 204:4 typo [1] - 173:23 150:20, 150:23, Unwired [2] - 135:3, value [11] - 94:2, 213:23 wars [5] - 48:22, 152:14, 159:7, 161:18 94:16, 95:13, U 159:14, 168:2, up [76] - 6:19, 15:18, 113:15, 161:16, 48:23, 61:13 164:16, 164:17, 170:7, 179:14, 19:8, 19:10, 19:11, Washington [2] - 3:8, U.K [7] - 13:12, 55:22, 183:24, 186:7, 22:12, 23:24, 25:7, 164:20, 164:21, 19:10 56:3, 161:17, 189:6, 189:17, 164:22, 179:4 30:12, 39:12, 47:8, watch [2] - 165:15, 161:22, 205:7, 205:8 207:25, 209:3, various [3] - 108:25, 49:7, 67:24, 68:20, 170:15 **U.S** [31] - 13:12, 21:5, 209:4, 210:4, 70:20, 80:25, 81:1, ways [2] - 49:19, 22:9, 46:14, 47:3, 210:12, 211:12, 81:2, 81:4, 84:24, vastly [1] - 43:17 129:17 47:22, 49:1, 52:18, 212:24 90:11, 90:24, 91:2, Veltrop [1] - 214:22 we' [1] - 34:14 52:24, 63:15, 65:5, undercut [1] - 168:5 91:16, 96:20, 98:1, **VELTROP** [2] - 3:6, wear [3] - 4:9, 4:13, 65:11, 69:18, 79:7, underlying [1] - 36:23 98:3, 98:8, 98:24, 4:17 101:8, 105:18, undermining [2] -100:17, 100:24, venue [1] - 137:17 weekends [1] - 74:13 109:12, 111:19, 32:23, 130:24 101:21, 108:6, verbally [1] - 215:9 weeks [4] - 39:12, 114:24, 132:9, understandably [1] -109:18, 109:19, versus [4] - 17:19, 109:21, 115:15, 143:13, 160:13, 109:20, 109:23, 124:4 48:9, 48:17, 48:18 120:17 160:16, 166:12, understood [9] -115:15, 116:20, weigh [3] - 114:19, view [13] - 15:7, 32:21, 166:22, 196:15, 13:22, 48:15, 48:16, 120:17, 122:10, 122:1, 215:15 32:23, 43:18, 86:7, 196:16, 197:15, 65:17, 85:12, 122:18, 124:7, 86:19, 94:8, 107:11, welcome [2] - 4:9, 198:6, 198:7, 199:10 149:15, 149:20, 124:11, 135:2, 122:16, 128:6, 4:18 U.S.C.R [4] - 66:20, 137:23, 138:20, 151:7, 170:18 129:25, 153:21, Western [1] - 100:10 66:21, 66:25, 68:25 141:2, 143:14, undisputed [4] -204:9 Westlaw [5] - 66:22, U.S.D.C.J [1] - 1:21 145:9, 145:15, 46:21, 120:17, viewed [1] - 32:21 67:2, 67:10, 69:6, 145:22, 146:13, ultimately [9] - 7:12, 150:2, 212:17 views [1] - 184:9 177:17 150:12, 152:16, 33:22, 50:17, 92:16, unequivocally [2] violate [1] - 150:20 whatnot [1] - 186:14 153:10, 153:17, 117:10, 134:21, 25:22, 89:22 violated [1] - 121:19 whatsoever [1] - 92:9 151:3, 167:3, 167:11 155:5. 158:4. unfair [2] - 76:10, violation [3] - 121:16, whole [20] - 31:25, **UMTS**[1] - 102:1 161:23. 162:22. 215:16 156:12, 207:25 33:8, 33:12, 33:13, 166:14, 169:7, unaddressed [1] unfold [1] - 86:8 virtually [1] - 74:19 33:16, 34:6, 57:9, 169:13, 169:22, 212:19 unfolds [1] - 86:7 virtue [2] - 26:17, 71:1 64:1, 67:13, 75:1, 171:10, 171:11, uncertainty [3] unfortunately [1] -102:16, 104:10, void [1] - 195:18 173:22, 177:11, 72:14, 100:18, 189:2 105:12, 111:5, VRANA[1] - 2:3 180:25, 185:25, unclear [1] - 134:19 unilaterally [1] - 83:6 Vrana [1] - 4:23 113:17, 114:20, 196:21, 197:9, under [85] - 24:9, 30:7, unit [1] - 197:1 134:18, 161:10, vs [2] - 1:6, 1:12 206:20, 207:16, 31:8, 33:1, 36:7, United [9] - 22:3, 171:8 215:13 38:15, 38:22, 39:11, 39:23, 51:22, 63:1, widespread [1] - 62:4 W upfront [1] - 165:3 40:21, 40:22, 43:5, 126:25, 160:5, wife [2] - 76:12, useful [3] - 100:9, 44:6, 44:19, 45:2, 160:8, 195:2, 212:4 wait [24] - 12:1, 49:18, 178:13 146:7, 153:14 46:14, 49:22, 49:23, UNITED [1] - 1:1 57:15, 61:19, 67:6, wiggle [9] - 89:25, uses [6] - 11:24, 50:2, 51:12, 52:6, unless [8] - 37:4, 79:18, 81:14, 92:2, 90:5, 90:9, 97:5, 101:7, 165:9, 52:22, 52:24, 53:11, 40:13, 64:16, 124:25, 131:23, 97:25, 98:14, 101:1, 165:13, 176:9, 214:2 57:20, 58:25, 60:22, 157:20, 174:2, 133:18, 137:14, 105:3, 174:4 usurps [1] - 183:12 64:9, 71:16, 73:12, 181:20, 181:22 139:7, 145:8, willing [57] - 40:6, 79:6, 79:9, 80:11, unlike [1] - 104:16 145:11, 148:8, 42:11, 45:5, 45:16, ٧ 87:10, 99:12, unlikely [3] - 129:9, 169:4. 170:12. 54:2, 54:4, 54:5, 105:17, 105:19, 198:11. 199:24 172:22. 175:3. 54:14, 55:2, 56:19, vaccinated [1] - 4:12 107:18, 108:15, unnecessary [1] -183:20 57:11, 60:18, 61:1, 109:12, 110:4, Valerie [1] - 1:24 waited [2] - 64:20, 63:8, 64:12, 67:14, 183:7 111:13, 111:18, valid [3] - 92:9, 93:19, 69:1, 70:13, 78:11, unreasonable [3] -86:12 115:1, 115:4, 116:4, 95:10 129:6, 130:8, 194:6 waiting [2] - 191:18, 78:18, 79:23, 80:8, 117:2, 118:11, validity [22] - 21:12, unreasonably [1] -193:21 88:3, 92:23, 92:24, 118:20, 119:14, 91:22, 91:24, 93:7, waive [2] - 169:23, 94:4, 94:10, 94:12, 83:7 127:12, 133:2, 93:9, 93:24, 94:13, 95:19, 100:18, 191:20 unusual [1] - 177:19 94:14, 94:24, 95:16, 133:8, 133:9, 100:20, 101:16, waiver [1] - 170:10 unwilling [15] - 56:18, 96:1, 96:10, 112:6, 134:14, 137:5, walk [3] - 171:9, 102:2, 103:13, 60:18, 60:24, 60:25, 112:8, 112:15, 138:7, 140:18,

128:12, 129:14,

167:2, 168:10,

77:1, 77:5, 109:20,

109:23, 109:25,

110:6, 115:19,

144:19, 146:21,

146:24, 148:17,

172:17, 204:21

wall [1] - 163:23

wants [8] - 20:12,

115:21, 120:9,	Х	50:7, 50:1
120:10, 120:13,	^	51:14, 51
140:18, 140:20,	Xirgo [1] - 188:21	52:4, 52:1
141:6, 141:9, 142:1,	Xirgo's [1] - 189:2	53:1, 53:4
163:4, 185:22,	•	53:19, 53
185:23, 211:9	Υ	54:4, 54:7
willingly [1] - 214:12	•	56:5, 56:1
willingness [2] -	year [3] - 56:8, 189:17,	57:2, 57:6
78:18, 110:5	193:24	57:18, 57
Wilmington [1] - 1:18	year-and-a-half [1] -	58:3, 58:5
win [17] - 36:11, 41:7,	56:8	58:11, 58
55:1, 72:5, 114:5,	years [19] - 64:5,	58:20, 59
121:16, 148:4,	101:11, 101:16,	59:17, 59
148:21, 150:18,	113:14, 113:24,	60:6, 60:9
176:7, 179:20,	126:8, 132:1,	62:19, 62
188:14, 188:15,	141:10, 149:4,	63:10, 63
189:18, 193:18,	149:5, 149:10,	64:4, 64:9
193:21, 194:9	165:22, 187:22,	65:20, 66
WIRELESS [2] - 1:7,	188:13, 188:18,	66:24, 67
1:13	192:22, 193:19,	67:10, 67
wireless [1] - 123:16	193:22, 194:1	68:1, 68:3
Wireless [2] - 2:21,	York [3] - 2:19, 5:4	68:12, 68
5:2	Young [1] - 4:21	68:24, 69
Wisconsin [4] - 48:19,	YOUNG [1] - 2:2	69:14, 70
82:13, 100:10,	yourself [3] - 34:6,	70:15, 71
157:15	72:18, 203:23	72:7, 72:2
wise [1] - 196:20	yourselves[1] - 91:1	73:1, 73:8
withdraw [1] - 155:9	_	73:19, 73 74:12, 74
withdrew [1] - 147:1	Z	75:5, 75:8
witnesses [1] - 4:15	7EDEK (1) 0.10	75:16, 76
won [2] - 150:16	ZEDEK [1] - 2:18	76:8, 76:1
wondered [2] - 72:22,	Zeineddin [10] - 5:9,	77:1, 77:7
169:24	47:16, 47:17, 47:19, 102:8, 102:9,	77:18, 77
wondering [2] -	102:0, 102:9,	77:25, 78
169:20, 169:22	169:9, 184:3	78:19, 78
word [5] - 33:3, 105:2,	ZEINEDDIN [322] - 3:7,	78:25, 79
124:5, 198:24,	14:6, 14:9, 16:24,	80:2, 80:2
204:15	17:11, 18:11, 22:3,	81:16, 81
words [12] - 10:14,	22:8, 22:11, 22:13,	81:25, 82
16:18, 77:12, 94:9,	22:16, 23:18, 25:3,	82:9, 82:1
102:19, 111:11, 117:6, 117:13,	25:5, 25:8, 25:18,	82:20, 82
118:7, 150:19,	26:4, 26:6, 26:11,	83:3, 83:1
210:23, 210:25	26:16, 26:20, 26:22,	83:15, 84
world [2] - 76:10,	27:2, 27:6, 27:10,	84:7, 84:9
176:6	27:25, 28:3, 28:6,	85:2, 85:6
worldwide [7] - 25:23,	28:11, 28:17, 28:21,	85:23, 87
79:16, 89:17, 93:3,	28:25, 29:3, 29:6,	87:25, 88
172:20, 173:1,	29:9, 29:14, 29:18,	88:13, 88
174:13	29:23, 30:1, 30:11,	88:24, 89
worried [1] - 192:17	30:16, 30:22, 31:6,	89:10, 89
worth [2] - 96:8,	31:11, 31:16, 33:2,	91:19, 91
114:10	33:6, 33:17, 33:20,	92:14, 93
wrench [1] - 156:11	34:9, 34:12, 44:3,	93:9, 94:7
write [1] - 138:16	44:5, 44:10, 44:16,	94:19, 94
writing [3] - 71:5,	44:18, 44:22, 46:6,	95:4, 95:1
116:17, 215:9		96:11, 96
110.17.213.8	46:13, 46:24, 47:2,	
written [1] - 122:19	46:13, 46:24, 47:2, 47:6, 47:9, 47:14, 47:16, 47:18, 47:22,	97:4, 102 102:12, 1

48:3, 48:6, 50:4,

10, 50:25, 103:18, 103:22, 1:17, 51:25, 103:25, 104:4, 16, 52:21, 104:20, 108:8, 4, 53:17, 154:18, 154:21, 3:23, 54:2, 155:2, 155:13, 7, 55:4, 155:22, 155:24, 16, 56:23, 156:1, 156:3, 6, 57:10, 157:13, 157:16, 7:22, 57:24, 157:19, 159:5, 5, 58:9, 160:13, 160:16, 8:15, 58:17, 160:19, 160:22, 9:2, 59:14, 160:25, 161:4, 161:6, 162:1, 162:3, 9:20, 59:23, 9, 60:12, 162:8, 162:20, 165:16, 169:10, 2:23, 62:25, 3:13, 63:19, 169:15, 169:18, 9, 64:18, 169:23, 169:25, 6:7, 66:11, 170:3, 170:9, 7:5, 67:7, 170:14, 170:16, 7:18, 67:22, 187:10, 187:18, 3, 68:9, 187:21, 188:5, 8:14, 68:19, 188:9, 188:11, 9:4, 69:10, 188:24, 189:21, 0:9, 70:11, 189:25, 190:3, 190:12, 191:7, 1:21, 72:2, 21, 72:24, 192:7, 192:11, 8, 73:14, 192:19, 193:2, 3:22, 74:7, 193:6, 193:9, 1:21, 74:25, 193:14, 194:12, 8, 75:14, 194:17, 201:22, 6:1, 76:3, 201:24, 202:5, 16, 76:21, 202:10, 202:13, 7, 77:12, 202:15, 202:18, 7:21, 77:23, 202:24, 203:7, 204:2, 206:2, 216:10 8:8, 78:15, 8:21, 78:23, zeineddin [1] - 206:13 9:10, 79:14, **ZTE** [2] - 49:9, 65:3 25, 81:6, 1:19, 81:23, 2:3, 82:7, 12, 82:15, 2:23, 82:25, 10, 83:13, 1:2, 84:4, 9, 84:14, 6, 85:11, 7:19, 87:22, 8:8, 88:10, 8:15, 88:18, 9:2, 89:8, 9:14, 91:11, 1:25, 92:11, 3:1, 93:5, 7, 94:16, 1:25, 95:2, 13, 95:17, 5:14, 96:16, 2:8, 102:10, 102:21, 102:25, 103:5, 103:8, 103:16,

FORM 30. Certificate of Service

Form 30 July 2020

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Case Number 20	021-2106			
Short Case Caption Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Thales DIS AIS USA LLC				
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATIONS

Cas	e Number:	2021-2106		
Short Cas	se Caption:	Koninklijke F	hilips N.V. v.	Thales DIS AIS USA LLC
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

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Cas	se Number:	2021-2106			
Short Cas	se Caption:	Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Thales D	IS AIS USA LLC		
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