

20-2196

**IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT**

Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam,
a woman,

v.

**CITIGROUP INC.,
CITICORP,
CITIBANK N.A.,**
Defendants-Appellees,

DOES 1-100,
Defendants,

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware
in Case No. [1:14-cv-00373-RGA](#), Judge Richard G. Andrews

Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam, *a woman's*
PETITION FOR *EN BANC* REHEARING

November 6, 2020

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Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam, a woman
Self-Represented Petitioner

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STATEMENT OF SELF-REPRESENTED PETITIONER

Based on my professional judgment, I believe the Court's decision is contrary to the following decision(s) of the Supreme Court or the precedents of this Court:

1. The Court's decision is contrary to the Supreme Court's decisions in *Bogan v. Scott-Harris*, 523 U.S. 44 (1998); *Central Land Company v. Laidley*, 150 U.S. 103 (1895); *In re Converse*, 137 U.S. 624.(1891); *Jordan v. Mass.*, 225 U.S. 167 (1912); *Falls Brook Irrigation District v. Bradley*, 164 U.S. 112, 167-170 (1896); *Louisville & Nashville Railway Co. v. Kentucky*, 183 U.S. 503, 516 (1902); *C.B. & Q. Railway v. Babcock*, 204 U.S. 585 (1907); *Fletcher v. Peck*, 10 U.S. 87 (1810); *Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward*, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); *Grant v. Raymond*, 31 U.S. 218 (1832); *U.S. v. American Bell Telephone Company*, 167 U.S. 224 (1897) and affirmations thereof; *Ableman v. Booth*, 62 U.S. 524 (1859); *Sterling v. Constantin*, 287 U.S. 397 (1932) on Government officials non-exempt from absolute judicial immunity:

“no avenue of escape from the paramount authority of the...Constitution...when ...exertion of...power... has overridden private rights secured by that Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial inquiry...against...individuals charged with the transgression.”

and, *Arunachalam v. Lyft*, 19-8029, in which Chief Justice Roberts recused for want of jurisdiction, voiding all his Orders in all of my cases; *Cooper v.*

Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); *Festo Corp. v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.*, 535 U.S. 722 (2002); **and**, any process or Court adjudicating a contract by estopping a material part of it from being considered *prima facie* denies due process.

See ALP VOL. 12. CONST. LAW, CH. VII, SEC. 1, § 140. Erroneous and Fraudulent Decisions:

“If the parties to a litigation have been given a fair hearing in their case, in a manner appropriate to the occasion, **neither can complain that his property has been taken without due process merely because a court has erroneously decided against him...”**

“The requirement of due process does, however, entitle a litigant to an honest...tribunal. If a litigant is injured through the corruption or fraud of the court ..., he is entitled to redress under this section of the Constitution.”

See ALP VOL. 12. CONST. LAW, CH. VII, SEC. 1, §141. With respect to Fundamental, Substantive, and Due Process Itself:

“and final decisions upon the ultimate question of due process cannot be conclusively codified to any non-judicial tribunal. Any attempt to do this whether by direct denial of access to the courts upon this question of due process by hindering access to the courts or making resort to the courts upon it **difficult, expensive, hazardous, all alike violate the Constitutional provision.” [§141]**

2. This Court’s decision is contrary to this Court’s decision in *Kumar v. Ovonix Battery Co., Inc. And Energy Conversion Devices, Inc.*, Fed. Cir. 02-1551, -1574, 03-1091 (2003), 351 F.3d 1364, 1368, 69. (2004); *Aqua Products Inc. v. Matal*, Fed Cir. Case 15-1177, October 4, 2017; *Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.*, No. 2018-2140, slip op. (Fed. Cir. Oct. 31, 2019); *Virnetx Inc.*

v. Cisco Systems and USPTO (intervenor) (Fed. Cir. 5/13/2020). *Arthrex* applies to: “All agency actions rendered by those [unconstitutionally appointed] APJs.”

3. Based on my professional judgment, I believe this Appeal/Petition for *En Banc* Rehearing requires an answer to one or more precedent-setting questions of exceptional importance:

QUESTION PRESENTED

1. Whether the lower and appellate courts have a ministerial duty to enforce the Law of the Case and Law of the Land.
2. If so, when is this Court going to do its ministerial duty to enforce the Law of the Case and Law of the Land, after failing to do so when it had a hundred chances to do so in Petitioner’s cases?
3. Whether Petitioner has any rights notwithstanding no remedy.
4. Whether this Court can administer justice and protect an elder’s rights in a pattern of no fair process, and name-calling an elder as defense, when the law is the Law of the Case and Law of the Land not reversed to date, and all orders of the courts are void with no quorum and no jurisdiction, and the fact is judges failing in their ministerial duty to defend the Constitution.
5. Whether the lower court ordering the Defendants to not answer the Complaint, and the appellate court having Appellees not answer the Appeal, in a 100 cases, in a pattern with no lawful intent, falls within the purview of RICO.
6. Whether a judge giving up solemn oath for brownie points is conduct inconsistent with the intent of the law.

Dated: November 6, 2020


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PETITION FOR *EN BANC* REHEARING

Petitioner Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam (“Dr. Arunachalam,” “Victim”) prays for *En Banc* Rehearing and hereby objects to the entirety of the Court’s 11/3/20 Order ECF18, replete with **FALSE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS** and **MATERIAL OMISSIONS**, falsely alleging Petitioner filed an Informal Appeal Brief, *omitting* Petitioner had filed a FORMAL OPENING APPEAL BRIEF; and that the Appeal is “lacking any arguable basis either in law or in fact,” *omitting* the law is the Law of the Case and Supreme Law of the Land **not been reversed to date**, and the fact is the concerted failure by public officials in their basic ministerial duty to abide by their oaths of office to defend the Constitution — the obligation of contracts in accord with the Contract Clause of the Constitution in over 100 cases, in a pattern of activity with no lawful intent, falling within the purview of RICO, with name-calling a 72-year old elder as defense.

SUMMARY OF MATERIAL OMISSIONS BY THE COURT

WHAT IS THE LAW? The law is the Law of the Case and Supreme Law of the Land — the *res judicata Mandated Prohibition* from repudiating patent contract grants — Supreme Court Precedents, as declared by Chief Justice Marshall in *Fletcher v. Peck*, 10 U.S. 87 (1810); *Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward*, 17 U.S. 518 (1819), in accord with the Contract Clause and Separation of Powers

Clause of the Constitution; *Festo Corp. v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.*, 535 U.S. 722 (2002). These have never been reversed to date.

WHAT IS THE FACT? The fact is judges, lawyers, clerks, and public officials failed to perform their ministerial solemn oath duty to enforce the Constitution and stare decisis Mandated Prohibition declared by the Supreme Court in accord with the Separation of Powers and Contract Clauses of the Constitution, constituting denial of due process to Petitioner in over 100 cases, with the Court name-calling a 72-year old elder as its defense.

THE COURT'S NAME-CALLING DEFENSE evidences the Court has no defense at all. This Court is name-calling an elder, Petitioner is 72 years old, and you are getting the Supreme Court to call her names, instead of doing your ministerial duty. You can't have 100 cases and not go to trial. How does that work? When all else fails, this Court resorts to name calling an elder in a groundhog legal process. The judicial process is not to have a process at all. There is nothing to consider. This Court is saying there is no law and no fact in a 100 cases! Petitioner has still not had her day in court in 100 cases! There is law and fact and the law is your obligation to carry out your duty. There are a 100 cases that proves this. There are 80 lawyers against one elder, they have no answer. District judge ordered Appellees not to answer Complaint, why is it this Court has the Appellees not answer the Appeal? Because they have no answer. Don't you have any shame

to name-call an elder for fighting for her rights, when you have not performed your ministerial duty to defend the Constitution? You, the Appellate Court, are blocking the Appellee from answering the Appeal. I had a revelation— **the Lower Court Orders Defendants not to answer the Complaint and the Appellate Court has Appellees not answer the Appeal!!!** The bottom line is this, I have been polite, but I am given no choice but to ask this Court to take Judicial Notice that the lower court and this Court are compromised, they cannot acknowledge *Fletcher/Dartmouth College*, because it proves they, in concert with the USPTO, have been deceiving the public and breaching public trust for decades. The nature of the case is judges failing in their ministerial duty. This gives due process a bad name. You must do your ministerial duty. This Court is blocking *amicus curiae* briefs that testify that judges and public officials have failed in their ministerial duty to abide by their solemn oaths to enforce the Constitution and the *Mandated Prohibition*. What kind of a defense is it for Judge Andrews to Order Defendants to untimely move for attorneys' fees after the appeal to the Supreme Court was over after almost 2 years? All of you are violating the Constitution. The very mandate in which this Court was created in 1982 is contrary to the Constitution. Why did Congress create you? To repudiate patents. Now, you are breaching your solemn oaths to oppress me, and abuse me in elder financial abuse and name-calling a 72-year old elder under color of law!! What is the purpose of a judge? The conduct of

judges in the lower and Appellate courts and the Supreme Court Justices has been horrifically unconstitutional. There is no quorum, where Chief Justice Roberts recused when asked whether it was sedition being a member of the Knights of Malta, and 6 Justices recused, there is no jurisdiction and all the Orders of all the courts are void and unconstitutional. The fact and the law remain intact in over a 100 of my cases. Yet the courts are engaged in extortion of an elder, abusing an elder in elder financial abuse, extorting money and threatening to sanction me when I am fighting for my property rights and constitutional rights, when I exercise my right to challenge the courts to prove jurisdiction, when you lost it by treasonously breaching your solemn oaths, in aiding and abetting antitrust by the Defendants by your obstruction of justice by denying me due process by failing to do your ministerial duty to abide by your solemn oaths of office.

1. **ECF18 CONSTITUTES DEFAMATORY FALSE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS ALLEGING PETITIONER IS “FRIVOLOUS” AND THAT THE CASE/APPEAL IS “LACKING ANY ARGUABLE BASIS EITHER IN LAW OR IN FACT,” DISMISSED THE CASE BASED ON VOID ORDERS, DENYING HER DUE PROCESS BY JUDGES FAILING TO PERFORM THEIR MINISTERIAL SOLEMN OATH DUTY TO ENFORCE THE CONSTITUTION AND *STARE DECISIS* MANDATED PROHIBITION DECLARED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN ACCORD WITH THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CONTRACT CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION:**

Chief Justice Marshall declared in *Dartmouth College*: “**THERE IS NO CASE OR CONTROVERSY**,” “there is nothing for the court(s) to consider or act upon,” save performing a ministerial solemn oath duty to enforce the Supreme

Law of the Land as declared by Chief Justice Marshall – the *stare decisis* *Mandated Prohibition* from repudiating patent contract grants. *See* Section 5 *infra*.

2. PETITIONER’S NEW DISCOVERY: IF A MINISTERIAL ACT IS NOT PERFORMED, THEN THE COURT MUST COMPEL THE PUBLIC OFFICIAL AND ITSELF TO PERFORM SAID ACT.

See Virginia Land Use law, citing *Phillips v. Telum, Inc.*, 223 Va. 585 (1982).

Petitioner further discovered: “Absolute or sovereign immunity does not apply to the performance or non-performance of ministerial acts.” *Bogan v. Scott-Harris*, 523 U.S. 44 (1998). The Court knew this, and willfully ignored its duty to compel/enforce. Ministerial acts were not performed by **this Court itself**, and inferior Courts, PTAB, Appellate Courts, Supreme Court, Clerks of the Court in over 100 cases of Petitioner.

3. DISMISSING THE APPEAL DOES NOT RELIEVE THIS COURT OF ITS OWN SOLEMN OATH DUTY TO PERFORM THE MINISTERIAL ACT OF ENFORCING *Fletcher/Dartmouth College*, TO RESTORE GOOD ORDER, DISCIPLINE AND JUSTICE IN THE JUDICIARY, STOP PERPETRATING THE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS, OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE AND OPPRESSING VICTIM, DENYING VICTIM HER DAY IN COURT IN OVER 100 CASES.

Due process to enforce such ministerial duty incorporates non-authority, so that the official has the burden to prove his authority to not enforce

Fletcher/Dartmouth College, failing which the Court has no discretion but to decide for the Petitioner.

Victim has been injured financially and physically by the concerted, patently oppressive, **corrupt process disorder** perpetuated by the Judiciary acting as Attorneys to Appellees, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order, discipline and justice, **of a nature to bring discredit upon the Judiciary and United States, and crimes and offenses which violate Federal and state laws and the Constitution**. The denial of due process could not have been more egregious by the Judiciary depriving her of her right to jury trial in 100 cases!

The courts failed in their ministerial duty to uphold their solemn oaths of office to enforce the Law of the Case and Law of the Land and perpetrated the process contaminated all the way up to the Supreme Court, where the Judge issued an Order to dismiss the case, upon filing of a Complaint, in over a 100 cases, without a hearing, protecting the Defendant from a Default, offering no remedy to Victim, diminishing the just and fair administration of justice, constituting an extraordinary breach by the courts, making extortionary threats to sanction her, to silence her from exercising her rights. The only remedy is to carry out their ministerial duty to enforce the Law of the Case and Law of the Land.

**4. VICTIM WAS DENIED HER DAY IN COURT IN OVER 100 CASES!
HOW? BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS FAILING TO PERFORM
MINISTERIAL ACTS IN AGGRAVATED WHITE COLLAR
CRIME:**

- Hate crime against an elder by felony interference with civil rights by damaging property;
- Human rights violations during a medical crisis;
- Forgery by falsifying documents;
- False personation;
- Perjury by false affidavit;
- Willful suppression and fabrication of evidence;
- Willful False Official Statements intended to mislead and defame;
- Violated False Claims Act;
- Altering court records;
- Bribing, intimidating, extortion of a witness;
- Making it expensive for Victim to have access to justice with petty procedural denial of access to the courts;
- Want of jurisdiction; Breach of Solemn Oaths;
- Silence as fraud of duty to enforce Supreme Court precedents and Contract Clause of the Constitution.

5. VICTIM HAS PROVEN *INFRA* THAT THE CASE IS NOT “LACKING ANY ARGUABLE BASIS EITHER IN LAW OR IN FACT.”

I. VICTIM HAS “A CLEAR AND INDISPUTABLE RIGHT TO RELIEF” AND PROTECTED RIGHTS TO:

A. TO PROCESS; TO DUE PROCESS; TO A HEARING; TO A FAIR HEARING; TO PROPERTY; TO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REDRESS:

which she has been denied to date in over 100 cases, in contempt of *stare decisis* Supreme Court precedents, *Central Land Company v. Laidley*, 150 U.S. 103 (1895); *In re Converse*, 137 U.S. 624.(1891); *Jordan v. Mass.*, 225 U.S. 167 (1912); *Falls Brook Irrigation District v. Bradley*, 164 U.S. 112, 167-170 (1896); *Louisville & Nashville Railway Co. v. Kentucky*, 183 U.S. 503, 516 (1902); *C.B. & Q. Railway v. Babcock*, 204 U.S. 585 (1907); *Fletcher v. Peck* (1810); *Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward* (1819), *et al.*; AMERICAN LAW AND PROCEDURE, VOL. 12. CONST. LAW, CH. VII, SEC. 1, § 140. Erroneous and Fraudulent Decisions:

“If the parties to a litigation have been given a fair hearing in their case, in a manner appropriate to the occasion, **neither can complain that his PROPERTY HAS BEEN TAKEN WITHOUT DUE PROCESS merely because a court has erroneously decided against him. DUE PROCESS does not assure a correct decision, but only a fair hearing.**”

“**The requirement of DUE PROCESS does, however, entitle a litigant to an honest...tribunal. If a litigant is injured through the corruption or fraud of the court..., he is ENTITLED TO REDRESS UNDER THIS SECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION.**”

§141. With respect to Fundamental, Substantive, and Due Process Itself:

“and final decisions upon the ultimate question of **DUE PROCESS** cannot be conclusively codified to any non-judicial tribunal. Any

attempt to do this whether by direct denial of access to the courts upon this question of **DUE PROCESS** by hindering access to the courts or making resort to the courts upon it **difficult, expensive, hazardous,** all alike violate the Constitutional provision.”

B. TO LIBERTY; TO RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH; TO BE PROTECTED FROM RETALIATORY HATE CRIME AGAINST AN ELDER AND EXTORTIONARY THREATS; TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES:

Dr. Arunachalam is **not a patent troll**, she is **THE** inventor of a foundationally important invention — the Internet of Things, Web Apps displayed on a Web browser — that has transformed our lives, like electricity and the telephone. The world is able to function remotely during COVID because of her inventions. Courts allowed Appellees to unjustly enrich themselves without paying Victim her royalties.

C. TO THE BENEFITS OF MATERIAL *PRIMA FACIE* INTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF PATENT PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL, A KEY CONTRACT TERM BETWEEN THE INVENTOR AND GOVERNMENT:

Precedential Rulings by the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit long before *Aqua Products* include at least *Festo Corp. v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.*, 535 U.S. 722 (2002); *Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., Inc. And Energy Conversion Devices, Inc.*, Fed. Cir. 02-1551, -1574, 03-1091 (2003); 351 F.3d 1364, 1368, 69. (2004).

Courts and USPTO/PTAB, in breach of contract, *disparately* failed to consider Patent Prosecution History in Victim’s patent cases and failed to apply Federal

Circuit’s *Aqua Products* ruling that reversed all Orders that failed to consider “the entirety of the record” – Patent Prosecution History – material *prima facie* intrinsic evidence that Victim’s patent claims are not invalid and that her patent claim terms are neither indefinite nor not enabled by written description. Judge Andrews, Corporate Infringers, lawyers, Judges and USPTO/PTAB propagated a false collateral estoppel from void Orders from a Judge who admitted he bought direct common stock in Defendant JPMorgan Chase & Co. and PTAB Judge who held common stock in Microsoft, which instituted re-exams against Victim, failed to recuse after losing subject matter jurisdiction and disparately failed to consider material *prima facie* intrinsic evidence, in FALSE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS.

D. TO THE BENEFITS OF STARE DECISIS MANDATED PROHIBITION FROM REPUDIATING A GOVERNMENT-ISSUED PATENT GRANT CONTRACT IN ACCORD WITH THE CONTRACT CLAUSE AND SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION — SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS DECLARED BY CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL IN *Fletcher v. Peck* (1810), *Trustees Of Dartmouth College v. Woodward* (1819), et al.

CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL RULED IN *Dartmouth College* THAT THERE IS NO CASE OR CONTROVERSY, AND THAT THE RULINGS BY ALL COURTS AND PTAB ARE VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Chief Justice Marshall declared in *Dartmouth College*:

“Circumstances have not changed it. In reason, in justice, and in law, it is now what was in 1769... **The law of this case is the law of all... The opinion of the Court, after mature deliberation, is that this is a contract the obligation of which cannot be impaired without violating the Constitution of the United States...** It results from this opinion that the acts of” (emphasis added) the Judiciary “are

repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and that the judgment on this special verdict ought to have been for the Petitioner.”

If a doubt could exist that **a grant is a contract**, the point was decided in *Fletcher*. If, then, **a grant be a contract within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States**, Chief Justice Marshall declared: **“these principles and authorities prove incontrovertibly that” a patent grant “is a contract.”** Chief Justice Marshall declared that **any acts and Orders by the Judiciary that impair the obligation of the patent grant contract within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States “are consequently unconstitutional and void.”** District and Appellate Court and Supreme Court Orders and this Court’s Order ECF18 impair the obligation of the patent grant contract within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States and **“are consequently unconstitutional and void.”**

E. TO PATENT STATUTES:

Courts allowed Appellees to violate 35 U.S.C §282, which states:

“A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid claim. ...The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”

APPELLEES FAILED TO FURNISH THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF “CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE” OF PATENT INVALIDITY, REQUIRED BY STATUTE.

District and Appellate Court Judges denied Petitioner due process, manufacturing false reasons to dismiss her case in an egregious abuse of judicial power under the color of law and authority. See Roberta Morris, pp. 22-23 in U.S. Supreme Court Case No. 10-290, *Microsoft v i4i*:

“the higher standard of proof should apply to "any issue developed in the prosecution history.”

“STANDARDS OF PROOF ON INVALIDITY ARE PART OF A VERY COMPLICATED CALCULUS.”

See Roberta Morris: pp. 9, 3:

“STANDARD OF PROOF WILL REQUIRE THE TRIAL JUDGE TO ANALYZE THE PROSECUTION HISTORY.”

p. 12: “...Those inquiries would not become stepchildren to a dispute over how well or ill the Patent Office did its job. ...participants in the patent system.”

II. VICTIM IS LEFT WITH RIGHTS WITH NO REMEDIES.

District and Appellate Court and Supreme Court rulings in Dr. Arunachalam’s 100 cases and *Oil States* and *Alice*, and AIA violate the “Law of the Land;” **deprived Dr. Arunachalam of rights without remedies** by denial of substantive and fundamental rights by procedural and substantive unconscionability on discriminating terms, not applying prevention of oppression, giving superior bargaining power to Appellees in violation of Equal Protection of the Law to Victim. Petitioner’s arguments are manifest in *Bronson v. Kinzie*, 42 U.S. 311

(1843):

“...it is manifest that **the obligation of the contract and the rights of a party** under it may in effect be **destroyed by denying a remedy altogether**, or may be seriously impaired by burdening the proceedings with new conditions and restrictions,... when this contract was made, no statute had been passed... changing the rules of law or equity in relation to a contract of this kind; and it must therefore be governed, and the rights of the parties under it measured, by the rules above stated. They were the laws...at the time...they were annexed to the contract at the time it was made, and formed a part of it; and any subsequent law, impairing the rights thus acquired, impairs the obligations which the contract imposed... Yet no one doubts his right or his remedy, for, by the laws ... then in force, **this right and this remedy were a part of the law of the contract, without any express agreement by the parties.** [*So also the rights of the inventor, as known to the laws, required no express stipulation to define or secure them.*]...**It appears to the Court not to act merely on the remedy, but directly upon the contract itself, and to engraft upon it new conditions injurious and unjust to [the inventor].** **Any such modification of a contract by subsequent legislation, against the consent of one of the parties, unquestionably impairs its obligations and is prohibited by the Constitution...** *these new interests are directly and materially in conflict with those which [the inventor acquired when the patent grant was made].*”

Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1 vol. 55, stated:

“**The remedial part of the law is so necessary...For in vain would rights be declared, in vain directed to be observed, if there were no method of recovering and asserting those rights when wrongfully withheld or invaded... the protection of the law... the connection of the remedy with the right... is the part of the ...law which protects the right and the obligation by which it enforces and maintains it.** *It is this protection which the clause in the Constitution now in question mainly intended to secure.* And it would be unjust ... to suppose that it was **designed to protect a mere barren and abstract right, without any practical operation upon the business of life.** It was **undoubtedly adopted as a part of the Constitution for a great and useful purpose.** *It was to maintain the integrity of contracts and to secure their faithful*

execution throughout this Union by placing them under the protection of the Constitution of the United States...This is his right by the law of the contract, and it is the duty of the court to maintain and enforce it without any unreasonable delay.”

“Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the means of enforcement. Without the remedy, the contract may, indeed, in the sense of the law, be said not to exist... both are parts of the obligation, which is guaranteed by the Constitution against invasion. The obligation of a contract "is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement." ... in the language of Mr. Justice Swayne: “A right without a remedy is as if it were not. For every beneficial purpose it may be said not to exist.” Von Hoffman v City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 552, 554 and 604 (1867).

III. EXTRAORDINARY BREACH OF MINISTERIAL DUTY TO ENFORCE THE LAW OF THE LAND IS INSURRECTION AND REBELLION AND WAR AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION BY ALL COURTS, DENYING VICTIM DUE PROCESS AND DISMISSING 100 CASES IMMEDIATE UPON FILING OF COMPLAINT AFTER ORDERING DEFENDANTS TO GO INTO DEFAULT AND VICTIM HAS NOT HAD HER DAY IN COURT IN OVER 100 CASES REQUIRE THE REMEDY OF THIS COURT ITSELF PERFORMING ITS MINISTERIAL SOLEMN OATH DUTY TO ENFORCE THE LAW OF THE LAND AND ORDERING THE DISTRICT COURT AND SUPREME COURT TO PERFORM THEIR MINISTERIAL DUTY.

This **extraordinary breach** has to stop. Victim has a protected right, to property, to constitutional redress. Courts are **in dishonor**. **The only way to protect Petitioner’s right is to perform the ministerial duty**. Non-enforcement of the Law of the Case/Land reinforces their own lawlessness, calling Victim names “frivolous, malicious”, in egregious hate crime against an elder, retaliatory extortion, **judicial process disorder and neglect, in dishonor**, with no jurisdiction, unproven. Judge Andrews and PTAB Judge McNamara admitted

holding stock in a litigant JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Microsoft, erroneous and fraudulent decisions of the PTAB and District and Appellate Courts, ordinary legal remedies were so inadequate, and threaten a failure of justice. The courts and clerks denied Victim access to a fair process and access to the courts.

IV. THIS COURT’S ORDER ECF18 INJURED VICTIM WITHOUT PROVIDING A REMEDY BY LEAVING HER BEREFT OF HER VESTED RIGHTS DIRECTLY TO FEDERAL GRANTS OF PATENTS UNDER THE IP CLAUSE, CONTRACT CLAUSE, SEPARATION OF POWERS, PUBLIC INTEREST/WELFARE, DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTIONS CLAUSES.

This Court’s Order **ECF18** is not a “faithful execution of the solemn promise made by the United States” to the inventor. This rescinding act has the effect of an *ex post facto* law and forfeits the Victim’s estate “for a crime not committed by” Victim, “but by the Adjudicators” by their Orders which “unconstitutionally impaired” the contract with Victim, which, “as in a conveyance of land, the court found a contract that the grant should not be revoked.”

The Judiciary is hell-bent on obstructing justice by procedural roadblocks, aiding and abetting anti-trust by Corporate Infringers against a small business and Victim, whose inventions are the backbone of the nation’s economy, power national security. Examples of Victim’s IoT machines are the millions of Web Apps in Apple’s App Store in Apple’s iPhone, in Google Play on Android devices, Web banking, healthcare Web Apps, Facebook, Twitter, social networking.

WHEREFORE, This Court must reverse ECF18, reverse the District Court's rulings, and itself perform its ministerial solemn oath duty to enforce *stare decisis Mandated Prohibition* from repudiating Patent Contract Grants.

Dated: November 6, 2020

Respectfully submitted,



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VERIFICATION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct based upon my personal knowledge.



Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam, a woman
Self-Represented Petitioner

Executed on November 6, 2020

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
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH FRAP 32(a)(7)(B)

The undersigned hereby certifies that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B).

1. The brief contains 3855 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
2. The brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in 14 point Times New Roman font.

November 6, 2020

Respectfully submitted,



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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on November 6, 2020, I filed an original of the foregoing paper and Addendum, with the Clerk of the Court in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, via CM/ECF to:

The Clerk of the Court,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
717 Madison Pl NW, Washington, DC 20439


and I certify that on the same day, I caused to be served a copy on counsel of record for Appellees, via CM/ECF and via the U.S. Postal Service at the following addresses:

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November 6, 2020

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ADDENDUM

Court Order ECF18 dated 11/3/20