

Case Nos. 2019-2078 (L.), -2080, -2090, -2316
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit

GARY E. ALBRIGHT, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants

CLAUDE J. ALLBRITTON, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs

v.

UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee

Appeals from the United States Court of Federal Claims in Nos. 1:16-cv-00912-NBF, 1:16-cv-01565-NBF, and 1:18-cv-00375-NBF, Senior Judge Nancy B. Firestone.

**CORRECTED BRIEF FOR BELLISARIO PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS¹**

Meghan S. Largent
Lindsay S.C. Brinton
LEWIS RICE LLC
600 Washington Avenue, Suite 2500
St. Louis, Missouri 63101
(314) 444-7704
mlargent@lewisrice.com
*Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants
in Case No. 19-2078*

¹ Carole J. Bellisario, Martha Bush, George W. DeGeer and Tracy J. Keegan, David L. Hubbell, Gregory K. Hulbert Trust, Jamieson Land and Timber, LLC, Gail M. Kessinger, James A. and Susan M. Kliewer, Little Family Trust, James C. Miller, Diane Foeller Miller, Daniel Mathias Foeller, and Thomas Charles Foeller, Thomas J. Rinck and Sandra Gift Trust, Switzer Family Trust, Steven Michael and Linda Ann Van Doren and Willa Worley, Richard John Vidler, Jr., and Arlene Frances Wolever Trust.

PERRY LOVERIDGE, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs

NEAL ABRAHAMSON, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee

GARY E. ALBRIGHT, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs

DANIEL EARL HIGGINS, III, MICHAEL J.
OPOKA, ZELDA L. OPOKA,
Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee

2019-2078, -2080, -2090, -2316

FORM 9. Certificate of Interest

Form 9
Rev. 10/17

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Albright, et al., v. United StatesCase No. 2019-2078, 2019-2080, 2019-2090, 2019-2316

AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST

Counsel for the:

☐ (petitioner) ☒ (appellant) ☐ (respondent) ☐ (appellee) ☐ (amicus) ☐ (name of party)

Petitioner/Appellants

certifies the following (use "None" if applicable; use extra sheets if necessary):

1. Full Name of Party Represented by me	2. Name of Real Party in interest (Please only include any real party in interest NOT identified in Question 3) represented by me is:	3. Parent corporations and publicly held companies that own 10% or more of stock in the party
Carole J. Bellisario	None	None
Martha Bush	None	None
George W. DeGeer and Tracy J. Keegan	None	None
David L. Hubbell	None	None
Gregory K. Hulbert Trust	None	None
Jamieson Land and Timber, LLC	None	None
Gail M. Kessinger	None	None

4. The names of all law firms and the partners or associates that appeared for the party or amicus now represented by me in the trial court or agency or are expected to appear in this court (and who have not or will not enter an appearance in this case) are:

Arent Fox LLP, James H. Hulme, Mark F. Hearne II, Stephen S. Davis, Debra Albin-Riley, Abram J. Pafford.

FORM 9. Certificate of Interest**Form 9**
Rev. 10/17

5. The title and number of any case known to counsel to be pending in this or any other court or agency that will directly affect or be directly affected by this court's decision in the pending appeal. *See* Fed. Cir. R. 47. 4(a)(5) and 47.5(b). (The parties should attach continuation pages as necessary).

The following appeals pending in this Court directly affected by this case are, Neal Abrahamson et al., v. United States, case number 2019-2080, Claude J. Allbritton et al., v. Unites States, case number 2019-2090, and Daniel Earl Higgins III, Michael J. Opoka, Zelda L. Opoka et al., v. United States, case number 2019-2316

11/4/2019

Date

/s/ Meghan S. Largent

Signature of counsel

Meghan S. Largent

Printed name of counsel

Please Note: All questions must be answered

cc: All Counsel of Record**Reset Fields**

1. Full Name of Party Represented by me:	2. Name of Real Party in interest (Please only include any real party in interest NOT identified in Question 3) represented by me is:	3. Parent corporations and publicly held companies that own 10% or more of stock in the party:
James A. and Susan M. Kliewer	None	None
Little Family Trust	None	None
James C. Miller, Diane Foeller Miller, Daniel Mathias Foeller, and Thomas Charles Foeller;	None	None
Thomas J. Rinck and Sandra Gift Trust	None	None
Switzer Family Trust	None	None
Steven Michael and Linda Ann Van Doren and Willa Worley	None	None
Richard John Vidler, Jr.	None	None
Arlene Frances Wolever Trust	None	None

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES	1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE	2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	3
A. The thirteen deeds to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company conveyed easements.	6
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT	16
ARGUMENT	18
I. The standard of review for this appeal is <i>de novo</i>	18
II. The CFC did not properly apply Oregon law in holding that these thirteen conveyances of a strip of land to a railroad conveyed the fee estate.	19
A. The fact that the railroad had already entered the landowners’ property in 1907 and surveyed, staked, or were even operating their railroad, over the land must be considered in discerning the meaning of these thirteen deeds.	19
1. The Articles of Incorporation and Supplementary Articles of Incorporation of the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company limit its power to acquire real property to the extent necessary for its corporate purpose.	26
2. Oregon Statutes likewise limited a railway corporation’s power to acquire real property necessary for its corporate purpose and when it did so by entering lands pursuant to the company’s eminent domain authority, it acquired only an easement.....	27
3. Oregon common law at the time provided that a railroad only acquires an easement in real property taken for its right-of-way regardless of whether it settled on the amount of compensation with the landowner or had to institute condemnation proceedings.....	29
B. The factors Oregon courts consider are a tool, not the law, and when applied properly these factors demonstrate these 1907 deeds granted the railroad an easement.	31
III. The CFC’s inconsistent rulings undermine Oregon landowners’ settled expectations of their property interests.....	43

CONCLUSION.....	47
-----------------	----

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

<i>Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.</i> 477 U.S. 242 (1986)	18
<i>Barclay v. United States</i> , 443 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006), <i>cert denied</i> , 549 U.S. 1209 (2007).....	18
<i>Bernards v. Link</i> , 248 P.2d 341 (Or. 1952)	passim
<i>Bouche v. Wagner</i> , 293 P.2d 203 (Or. 1956).....	passim
<i>Boyer v. United States</i> , 123 Fed. Cl. 430 (2015)	passim
<i>Cappelli v. Justice</i> , 496 P.2d 209 (Or. 1976).....	36
<i>Cienega Gardens v. United States</i> , 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).....	18
<i>Cogswell v. Oregon & C.R. Co.</i> , 6 Or. 417 (Or. 1877)	25
<i>Egaas v. Columbia Cty.</i> , 673 P.2d at 1375 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) ...	36, 41, 42
<i>Ford v. Oregon Elec. Ry. Co.</i> , 117 P. 809 (Or. 1911)	25
<i>Holladay v. Patterson</i> , 5 Or. 177 (Or. 1874)	25
<i>Leo Sheep Co. v. United States</i> , 440 U.S. 668 (1979).....	46, 47
<i>Luse v. Isthmus Transit Co.</i> , 6 Or. 125 (Or. 1876)	25
<i>Marvin M. Brandt Rev. Trust v. United States</i> , 572 U.S. 93 (2014)	46
<i>Norris v. Vermont Cent. R.R. Co.</i> , 28 Vt. 99 (1855)	25
<i>Oregon Cent. R. Co. v. Wait</i> , 3 Or. 428 (Or. 1869).....	25
<i>Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Oregon Real Estate Co.</i> , 10 Or. 444 (1882)	24, 29, 30

<i>Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found.</i> , 524 U.S. 156 (1998)	19
<i>Powers v. Coos Bay Lumber Co.</i> , 263 P.2d 913 (Or. 1953)	36
<i>Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n</i> , 494 U.S. 1 (1990) 19, 20, 31, 41	
<i>Robinson v. Missisquoi R. Co.</i> , 10 A. 522 (Vt. 1887)	23
<i>Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.</i> , 467 U.S. 986 (1984)	19
<i>Seely v. Sebastian</i> , 4 Or. 25 (Or. 1870)	25
<i>Shively v. Hume</i> , 10 Or. 76 (Or. 1881)	25
<i>Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Env’tl.</i> <i>Protection</i> , 560 U.S. 702 (2010)	19
<i>Tamerlane Ltd. v. United States</i> , 81 Fed. Cl. 752 (2008)	46
<i>Wason v. Pilz</i> , 48 P. 701 (Or. 1897)	23, 32, 36
<i>Wavetronix LLC v. EIS Elec. Integrated Sys.</i> , 573 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2009)	18
<i>Whitcomb v. Vermont Central Railroad Co.</i> , 25 Vt. 49 (Vt. 1852)	30
<i>Wiser v. Elliot</i> , 209 P.3d 337 (Or. Ct. App. 2009)	41

Statutes

16 U.S.C. §1241	4
28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(3)	2
28 U.S.C. §1491(a)(1)	2
Bellinger and Cotton’s Annotated Codes and Statutes of Oregon (1902)	27, 28

Treatises

REDFIELD ON RAILWAYS..... 23, 24, 25, 30

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

This present case, *Albright v. United States*, No 1:16-cv-01565, was consolidated in the United States Court of Federal Claims (“CFC”) with *Aeder v. United States*, No. 1:18-cv-00375. The Plaintiffs in the *Albright* and *Aeder* cases were represented in the CFC by the same counsel until January 2019. This appeal involves those certain Plaintiff-Appellants represented in the CFC and in this Court by Lewis Rice LLC. Other *Albright* Plaintiffs are represented by Arent Fox LLP and separately filed an appeal to this Court, Case No. 19-2090. Certain *Aeder* Plaintiffs also separately filed an appeal to this Court, Case No. 19-2316. The *Aeder* Plaintiff-Appellants are also represented by Arent Fox LLP.

This case is also related to *Loveridge v. United States*, No. 1:16-cv-00912, which is currently on appeal in this Court, Case No. 19-2080. *Albright/Aeder* and *Loveridge* were not consolidated in the CFC. However, the *Loveridge* case involves the same federal order, the same railroad corridor at issue in this appeal, and identical claims by different landowners. The Court of Federal Claims issued a single opinion for all three cases, *Albright*, *Aeder*, and *Loveridge*. (Appx1-128).

There are no other cases related to this appeal.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The government took these owners' property in July 26, 2016. The Fifth Amendment requires the United States to justly compensate owners when it takes their property. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §1491(a)(1), grants the CFC jurisdiction to hear claims founded upon the Constitution. These owners filed timely claims for compensation in 2016, and the CFC entered final judgment denying their claims on April 29, 2019 (Appx254-259), and June 26, 2019 (Appx261).

On June 27, 2019, these landowners filed a timely notice of appeal. (Appx3186). Under federal law, 28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(3), this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal "from a final decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims."

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether the CFC correctly applied the law of the state of Oregon to determine whether certain conveyances from the early 1900s to a railroad conveyed the fee estate in the land or a perpetual easement for railroad purposes?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The fifteen owners bringing this appeal² own land in Washington County and Tillamook County, Oregon. These owners' land underlies portions of an almost eighty-one-mile long abandoned railroad right-of-way that starts in Banks, Oregon in the east and takes a meandering path west through dense forest until it arrives on the west coast of Oregon, where it then travels south along the coast of the Pacific Ocean to Tillamook. This railroad right-of-way was originally acquired by the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company in the early 1900s. Most recently, the Port of Tillamook Bay Railroad (the "Railroad"), Pacific Railway & Navigation Company's successor-in-interest, held the right-of-way.³

In July 2016, at the request of the Railroad and Salmonberry Trail Intergovernmental Authority ("Salmonberry Trail"), the Surface

² Thomas J. and Kathryn M. Rinck, Carole J. Bellisario, Martha Bush, Gail M. Kessinger, Switzer Family Trust, George DeGeer, Diane Foeller-Miller, David L. Hubbell, James A. and Susan M. Kliwer, Steven M. and Linda A. Van Doren, Gregory Hulbert, William and Patricia Little (Little Family Trust), Richard J. Vidler Jr., Jamieson Land & Timber, Arlene F. Wolever

³ See Appx797-799.

Transportation Board (“STB”) issued an order invoking Section 1247(d) of the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. §1241 *et seq* (the “Trails Act”).⁴ The STB’s Order allowed Salmonberry Trail to build a public recreational trail across the owners’ land notwithstanding Oregon law to the contrary. The STB’s order “destroy[ed]” or “eliminate[d]” these owners’ “reversionary”⁵ property rights. Under Oregon law, prior to the STB’s Order, these landowners enjoyed the right to regain unencumbered title and the right to exclusive use and possession of their land within the railroad right-of-way upon abandonment of the easement for railroad purposes.

⁴ See Appx816-818.

⁵ The landowners use “reversionary” in the generic sense as the term was used by this Court in *Barclay v. United States*, 443 F.3d 1368, 1371 (2006), consolidated on appeal with *Renewal Body Works v. United States*. Additionally, as this Court noted in *Toews v. United States*:

We note in passing that as a matter of traditional property law terminology, a termination of the easements would not cause anything to ‘revert’ to the landowner. Rather, the burden of the easement would simply be extinguished, and the landowner’s property would be held free and clear of any such burden.

376 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also *Preseault v. United States*, 100 F.3d 1525, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“*Preseault II*”).

In *Preseault v. United States*, 100 F.3d 1525, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (*Preseault II*), this Court ruled, “[W]e conclude that the taking that resulted from the establishment of the recreational trail is properly laid at the doorstep of the Federal Government.” This Court has reaffirmed *Preseault II* numerous times, including in *Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States*, where this Court held a compensable Trails Act taking involves three inquiries:

- (1) [W]ho owns the strip of land involved, specifically, whether the railroad acquired only an easement or obtained a fee simple estate;
- (2) [I]f the railroad acquired only an easement, were the terms of the easement limited to use for railroad purposes, or did they include future use as a public recreational trail (scope of the easement); and
- (3) [E]ven if the grant of the railroad’s easement was broad enough to encompass a recreational trail, had this easement terminated prior to the alleged taking so that the property owner at the time held a fee simple unencumbered by the easement (abandonment of the easement).

564 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

This case concerns the first inquiry, whether the Pacific Railway & Navigation company acquired the fee estate in land or a perpetual

railroad easement by way of thirteen separate conveyances from the turn of last century.

A. The thirteen deeds to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company conveyed easements.

There are thirteen original conveyances to the Pacific Navigation & Railway Company that affect these fourteen owners' property:

Conveyance (Book/Page)	Plaintiff-Appellant
Stowell 75/32	Thomas J. and Kathryn M. Rinck
J. Rinck 77/454	Thomas J. and Kathryn M. Rinck
Woodbury 16/481	Carole J. Bellisario; Martha Bush; Gail M. Kessinger; Switzer Family Trust
Watt 12/343	George DeGeer; Diane Foeller-Miller
Smith 16/515	David L. Hubbell
Gattrell 13/311	James A. and Susan M. Kliever
Woodbury 23/399	Steven M. and Linda A. Van Doren
Westinghouse 85/39	Gregory Hulbert
Jeffries 85/70	William and Patricia Little (Little Family Trust)
Bryden 74/273	Richard J. Vidler Jr.
Hagen 75/279	Jamieson Land & Timber
Cummings 77/262	Arlene F. Wolever
Galvani 77/37	Jamieson Land & Timber

The **Bryden Deed 74/273**⁶ is a form deed that provides in pertinent part:

⁶ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1234.

Know all Men by these Presents, *That*

James Bryden and Addie Bryden , [sic] his wife and John Stewart and Clara Stewart, his wife of xxxxxxxx
State of Oregon, in consideration of Twenty Two [sic] and 05/100 (\$22.05) DOLLARS, *to them paid by* Pacific Railway and Navigation Company of Portland , Multnomah [sic] *County xx State of Oregon * * * * ** *have bargained and sold, and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell and convey unto said* Pacific Railway Navigation Company[,] its successors * * * *and assigns, all the following bounded and described real property, situated in the County of Washington and State of Oregon:*

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side[]of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's Railway as surveyed, located and adopted across W½ [sic] of N. W [sic] ¼ Sec. 290, T. P. 3 N. R. 4 W. W. M. described as follows:

Beginning at a point on the east line of W½ of NW¼ 685 feet north of the Southeast corner thereof, said point being at the intersection of said east line with the west line of said Right of Way; running thence North 7 degrees and 59 minutes west along said west line of Right of Way 820 feet; thence by a spiral to the left 60 feet; thence * * * [describing property] * * * * *; containing four and 58/100 (4.58) acres.

The **Cummings Deed 77/262**⁷ provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That for and in consideration of the sum of \$217.00 to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, James Cummings and Ann Cummings[,] his wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property

⁷ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1263.

situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit:-

A strip of land one hundred feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through the West half of the Southeast quarter of Section 29 in Township 3 North of Range 4 West of the Willamette Meridian, containing 7.70 acres more or less.

The **Galvani Deed 77/37**⁸ provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE made this 11th day of April A. D. 1907, between W. H. Galvani, a single man[]of Portland, Multnomah, Oregon, party of the first part, and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, party of the second part[,] WITNESSETH:

That the said party of the first part for and in consideration of the sum of \$1 to him in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged[,] has granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell [sic] convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part and its successors and assigns, all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and being a portion of the Southwest quarter of Section 30, T. 3 N. R. 4 W. of the Will. Mer., being a strip of land 100 feet wide, being 50 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company's railway as now surveyed, located and adopted across said lands, said center line being described as follows,[]to-wit

* * * [Description] * * * and containing 11.31 acres, reserving grade farm crossings at two points to be selected by the party of the first part.

⁸ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1300.

The **Gattrell Deed 13/311**⁹ provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of One (\$1.00), to him in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, F.J. Gattrell an unmarried man, hereinafter called the grantor, does bargain, sell, grant[,] convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, a strip of land sixty (60) feet in width, being thirty (30) feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is now located, surveyed and staked out through lot two (2) of section twenty nine (29) in township two (2) North of range ten (10) West of the Willamette Meridian, in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To have and to hold unto the [above named] grantee and to its successors and assigns forever, confirming to the grantee likewise the right to build, maintain and operate a railway line thereover.

The **Hagen Deed 75/279**¹⁰ provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 22 day of April, 1907, between Bridget Hagen (a [sic] single woman) of Portland Multnomah County, Oregon, party of the first part, and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, party of the second part, WITNESSETH:

That the said party[]of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar (\$1) and other good and valuable considerations, to her in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, h[]ave

⁹ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1302-1303.

¹⁰ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1312-1313.

[sic] granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed, and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns, all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in Washington County,[]Oregon, to-wit:

Being a portion of Section 30, T. 3 N. R. 4 W. of the Will.
Mer. described as follows:

A strip of land 100 feet wide being 50 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's railway, as surveyed, located and adopted across said lands, said center line being described as follows:

* * * [Description] * * *

The **Jeffries Deed 85/70**¹¹ provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That Minnie Jeffries and George H.[]Jeffries her husband for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby bargain, sell[,] grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit: A strip of land one hundred feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as the same is surveyed and located through the North half of the Northwest quarter of Section Thirty (30) Township three (3) North, Range Four (4) West of W.M.

The **Rinck Deed 77/454**¹² provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar to him in hand paid,

¹¹ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1357-1358.

¹² A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1438.

the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and other valuable considerations moving to him, J. H. Rinck, an unmarried man, hereinafter called the grantor, does hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, [sic] all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to wit:

“A strip of land 100 feet wide, being 50 feet on each side of the centerline [sic] of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company as the same is constructed through the North half of the northeast quarter of Section 32, in township 3 North of range 4 west of the Willamette Meridian containing 3.17 acres.”

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, granting also the grantee the right to operate a railway line thereover as well as the fee of the aforesaid premises. The grantor does covenant that he is seised [sic] of the aforesaid premises in fee simple and that the same are free from all liens and encumbrances, and that he will and his heirs, executors and administrators shall forever warrant and defend the same against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

The **Smith, Loyd Deed 16/515**¹³ provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of One Hundred Fifty and 00/100 Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I, Lloyd C Smith a widower, of Garibaldi, Tillamook County[,] Oregon[,] hereinafter called the grantor, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following

¹³ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1468-1469.

described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

A strip of land one hundred(100) [sic] feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lot 3 of Section 8, Lot 4 of Section 7, Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 and North-West [sic] quarter of South-West[]quarter of Section 17, Lot 3 of Section 20 and Tide Land fronting and abutting upon Lots 3 and 4 of Section 20, all in Township 1 North of Range 10 West of Willamette Meridian; save and except that from Station No 651 to Station No. 677 said right of way hereby conveyed shall be only 65 feet wide being 50 feet on the Easterly side and 15 feet on the Westerly side of said center line.

The **Stowell Deed 75/32**¹⁴ provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 8th day of February A.D.1907, between S. H. Stowell and Josephine Stowell, his wife, of Washington County, Oregon, parties of the first part, and the PACIFIC RAILWAY & NAVIGATION COMPANY, party of the second part, WITNESSETH:

That the parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of \$50.00 and other good and valuable consideration to them in hand paid, by the party of the second part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in t[h]e County of Washington, State of Oregon and being more particularly described as follows:-

Being in the S. W. [1/4] of Sec.[]33 and in the N. E. [1/4] of Sec 32, all in[]T. 3 N R. 4. W. Will. Mer. a strip of land 100 feet wide being 50 feet on each side of the center line of the

¹⁴ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1473-1474.

Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's Railway, as surveyed, located and adopted across said lands and described as follows:-

Beginning at a point where the East line of said Right of Way intersects the West line of said Stowells [sic] land, 475 feet North and 109 feet East of the Southwest corner of said Section 33; Running [sic] thence in a Northwesterly direction along said West line, 180 feet; thence in a North Easterly direction along said West line, 520 feet to its intersection with the West line of said Right of Way; thence in a Northeasterly direction along said Right of way, [sic] on a spiral to the Right, 170 feet; thence * * * *; Also Beginning [sic] at a point where the West line of said Right of Way intersects the East line of said N. E. $\frac{1}{4}$ of said Sec. 32, 390 feet North of the Southeast corner thereof; Running * * * *, and continuing 6.96 acres.

The **Watt Deed 12/343**¹⁵ is entitled "No. 8225. Railway Deed."

and provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One and 00/100 DOLLARS , [sic] The [sic] receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, George Watt and Helen Watt, his wife[,] and Robert Watt and Lois A. Watt, his wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and * * * to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

"A strip of land sixty (60) feet wide being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway o f [sic] the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lots One, two and three of Section Seven and Lot one of Section eight, all

¹⁵ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1500.

in Township One North of Range ten West [sic] of
Willamette Meridian.

The **Westinghouse Deed 85/39**¹⁶ provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That I, John F. Westinghouse, a single man[,] for and in consideration [sic] of the sum of One Dollars, [sic] to me in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby bargain, sell, grant,[]convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet in width, being fifty (50) feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as the same is surveyed and located through a strip of land more particularly described as the West one half of Southwest one quarter and the Southwest one quarter of Northwest one quarter of Northwest one quarter [of] Sec.[]26, T 3 N. R. 5 W., Willamette Meridian and containing four and forty two hundredths (4.42) acres more or less.

The **Woodbury Deed 16/481**¹⁷ provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of Ten (\$10.00) Dollars, to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and of other valuable considerations, E. D. Woodbury and Maude Woodbury, his wife,, hereinafter called the grantors, do bargain, sell[,] grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

¹⁶ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1510-1511.

¹⁷ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1526.

A strip of land sixty (60) feet in width, being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the grantee's railway as the same is surveyed and located through the following described real property, to wit:

* * * [Describing the property through which the strip conveyed runs] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining,

To Have and to Hold to the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors covenant with the grantee that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever claiming by, through or under the grantors or either of them.

The **Woodbury Deed 23/399**¹⁸ provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That we, E.E. Woodbury and Maude Woodbury, his wife, the grantors, in consideration of the sum of Two + 00/100 Dollars, paid by Pacific Railway and Navigation, the grantee herein, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have bargained and sold, and by these presents do bargain, sell, transfer and convey unto said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, an Oregon Corporation, and to its successors and assigns forever, a strip of land sixty (60) feet in width, being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of said Company as the same is now located, staked out, and operated through Section Twenty-Nine (29), Township Two (2) North, Range Ten (10) West of the Willamette Meridian. Which strip lies between the line between Sections 29 and 32 on the South and the North boundary of North Street of said Lake Lytle Tract, as the same is platted in and by Lake

¹⁸ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1528.

Lytle Plat and between Blks. [sic] 1, 7 and 3 of Lake Lytle on the East and Blks [sic] 4, 8 and 14 of Lake Lytle on the West.

To Have and to Hold the above described premises unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors and assigns forever.

The CFC found that these thirteen conveyances to the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company from the early 1900s conveyed the fee estate in narrow strips of land to the Railroad.¹⁹ The landowners appealed.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Under Oregon law these deeds to the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company must be read in light of Oregon law at the time they were created. Through this lens, it is clear that, when a railroad surveyed and located its railway through an owner's land (by virtue of the Oregon statutes granting the railroad the power of eminent domain), the railroad acquired only the interest in the property necessary for its corporate purpose. These statutes required the railroad to first try to negotiate a

¹⁹ See the Court's holding on each deed at Appx24-25 (Bryden); Appx35-36 (Cummings); Appx45-46 (Galvani); Appx46-47 (Gattrell); Appx51-52 (Hagen); Appx63 (Jeffries); Appx88 (Rinck); Appx97-98 (Smith); Appx100-102 (Stowell); Appx112-114 (Watt); Appx117-118 (Westinghouse); Appx123-234 (Woodbury 16/481); and Appx124-125 (Woodbury 23/399).

price for the right-of-way with the landowner before invoking its eminent domain powers to take the land against the owner's will. The result, however, was no different than if the railroad had condemned the land – the railroad received an easement for purposes of running its trains over the landowner's property. Later Oregon court decisions have confirmed that, absent clear evidence to the contrary, the parties' intent when deeding a "strip of land" to a railroad was to convey an easement, and nothing more. However, the CFC has turned Oregon case law on its head, and instead found that, absent clear language in the deed indicating an easement, the presumption was that the railroad acquired the fee estate. In so holding, the Court found that deeds that granted "strips of land across" or "strips of land through" the grantor's land conveyed the fee estate in the land. The Court further held that deeds which possessed several indicia of an easement under the Oregon Supreme Court's prevailing opinions, were nonetheless grants of the fee estate where they did not use the words "right of way" or where they didn't require the railroad to build a fence or cattle guard. The CFC's reading of these thirteen deeds is not in harmony with Oregon law and, therefore, this

Court should reverse the CFC's grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States.

ARGUMENT

I. The standard of review for this appeal is *de novo*.

Summary judgment is appropriate only where evidence demonstrates “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.* 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of any material facts. *Id.* at 256. Any doubt over factual issues will be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. *Wavetronix LLC v. EIS Elec. Integrated Sys.*, 573 F.3d 1343, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

An order granting summary judgment is reviewed *de novo* “in all respects.” *Cienega Gardens v. United States*, 331 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This Court owes no deference to the CFC's legal conclusions. *Barclay v. United States*, 443 F.3d 1368, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2006), *cert denied*, 549 U.S. 1209 (2007).

II. The CFC did not properly apply Oregon law in holding that these thirteen conveyances of a strip of land to a railroad conveyed the fee estate.

A. The fact that the railroad had already entered the landowners' property in 1907 and surveyed, staked, or were even operating their railroad, over the land must be considered in discerning the meaning of these thirteen deeds.

In *Preseault II*, 100 F.3d at 1531, and *Phillips*, 564 F.3d at 1373, this Court held that in order to prove a taking pursuant to the Trails Act, the landowners must first show that the railroad acquired an easement in the portion of the corridor over their land. To do so, the federal courts must apply the law of the state of Oregon. "Generally speaking, state law defines property interests." *Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Env'tl. Protection*, 560 U.S. 702, 707 (2010) (citing *Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found.*, 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998)). See also *Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n*, 494 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("*Preseault I*") (quoting *Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.*, 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984)).

The Oregon Supreme Court has recognized:

A study of the cited cases suggests that the courts have little difficulty, where a railroad company is grantee, in declaring that the instrument creates ***only an easement*** whenever the grant is a use to be made of the property, usually, but not invariably, described as for use as a right of way in the grant.

Bouche v. Wagner, 293 P.2d 203, 209 (Or. 1956) (en banc) (emphasis added). This echoes Justice Brennan’s observation in *Preseault I*, noting “many railroads do not own their rights-of-way outright but rather hold them under easements or similar property interests.” 494 U.S. at 8.

This is especially so when the railroad obtains the conveyance from the landowner after it has already entered upon the landowner’s land and constructed its tracks. In *Preseault II*, this Court noted that, because railroads possess the ability to acquire a right-of-way by use of eminent domain, even voluntary transfers from a landowner “retained its eminent domain flavor.” 100 F.3d. at 1537. “Thus it is that a railroad that proceeds to acquire a right-of-way for its road acquires only that estate, typically an easement, necessary for its limited purposes...” *Id.*

This Court directly cited the Oregon Supreme Court in *Preseault II* for the proposition that:

[P]ractically without regard to the documentation and manner of acquisition, when a railroad for its purposes acquires an estate in land for laying track and operating railroad equipment thereon, the estate acquired is no more than that needed for the purpose, and that typically means an easement, not a fee simple estate.

Id. at 1535, 1535 n.10 (citing *Bernards v. Link*, 248 P.2d 341 (Or. 1952)).

And it is a principle the Oregon Supreme Court has repeatedly

acknowledged when it observed that the courts have “little difficulty” in finding that a conveyance was only an easement when it is to a railroad. *Bouche*, 293 P.2d at 209.

This is precisely what occurred in this matter. All thirteen conveyances at issue in this appeal state that *at the time of the conveyance* the railroad was already “surveyed, located, and adopted through the grantor’s land”²⁰ or “constructed through,” the grantor’s land,²¹ or “operated through” the grantor’s land.²² Therefore, the conveyances here are four-square within the rule and analysis of this Court’s *Preseault II* decision, consistent with Oregon law at the time; and, therefore, would have been assumed at the time of their creation to convey easements.

²⁰ Appx24-25 (Bryden); Appx45-46 (Galvani); Appx51-52 (Hagen); and Appx100-102 (Stowell). The following state they are “surveyed and staked out through” the grantor’s land. Appx35-36(Cummings); Appx46-47 (Gattrell) (“located surveyed and staked out”); Appx63 (Jeffries); Appx97-98 (Smith); Appx112-114 (Watt); and Appx117-118 (Westinghouse).

²¹ Appx88 (Rinck).

²² Appx124-125 (Woodbury) (“located, staked out, and operated”).

- i. **Oregon law at the time these conveyances were executed recognized that a deed obtained by a railroad in the process of staking out its rail line through the state's eminent domain statutes acquired an easement only.**

Consistent with this Court's direction in *Preseault II*, it is important to examine the railroad's charter, the governing statutes, and common law at the time the railroad right-of-way was created. *See Bernards*, 248 P.2d at 352 (stating that in order to rule upon a deed executed in 1910, "When we construe the meaning of the parties, we must endeavor to place ourselves in their position and that cannot be done effectively without retreating in time about two score of years."). Indeed, the CFC rightly acknowledged in its opinion that "the task of the court is to ascertain the intent of the original parties by considering the language of the deed in its entirety and the surrounding circumstances." (Appx11, citing *Bouche*, 293 P.2d at 208). But the CFC paid no heed to this direction, completely ignoring the evidence in the record of the Pacific Navigation & Railway Company's Articles of Incorporation, as well as the Oregon statutes and decisions at the time. (See Appx1783-1793, Appx1838-2087).

In reaching its ruling in *Bernards*, the Oregon Supreme Court, looked to a much older Oregon Supreme Court case, *Wason v. Pilz*, to

determine whether the deed before it conveyed an easement to a railroad. *Bernards*, 248 P.2d at 344 (citing *Wason v. Pilz*, 48 P. 701 (Or. 1897) (“We believe that the *Wason* decision is determinative of the issues under consideration and hold that the deed, which we have quoted, granted an easement. The grantors retained the fee.”). The Court observed that at least as far back as 1897, the “[*Wason*] court experienced no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the deed granted an easement only.” *Bernards*, 248 P.2d at 343.

The deed in *Wason* provided:

A parcel of land for the purposes of a road, twenty feet wide, across the center, running east and west over and across the following described real estate: . . . The said strip of twenty feet, so herein conveyed for a road as above states, is to be inclosed by a good substantial board fence by the said Peter Schmeer, and kept in repair by him.

Wason, 48 P. at 701. In analyzing this deed, the *Wason* Court noted:

Language of similar import was held in *Robinson v. Railroad Co.*[], to create an easement. In that case the estate was described as ‘a strip of land four rods in width, across my land, and being the same land now occupied by the St. Albans and Richford Plank-Road Company for their road, for the use of a plank road.’

Wason, 48 P. at 701 (quoting *Robinson v. Missisquoi R. Co.*, 10 A. 522 (Vt. 1887)). It is significant that *Wason* cited to a Vermont Supreme Court case, because Oregon courts and statutes at the time heavily relied on

the treatise REDFIELD ON RAILWAYS, written by Vermont Judge Isaac T. Redfield.²³ In a still earlier opinion, the Oregon Supreme Court cited to the then contemporary treatise by Judge Redfield to illustrate the proposition that railroad were limited to acquiring an easement in lands by agreement with the owners when the railroad held the power to acquire the same land via its statutory condemnation authority. *Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Oregon Real Estate Co.*, 10 Or. 444, 445-46 (1882) (citing 1 REDFIELD ON RAILWAYS 246). In that matter, the Oregon Supreme Court held:

So land can only be taken for the particular use for which it is sought to be appropriated – that is, in this case, for the purpose of a railway, an easement was all that was called for, and all that the respondent could acquire.

Id. REDFIELD ON RAILWAYS similarly states:

In this country, most of the railway charters contain a power to the company to acquire lands, by agreement with the owner. In such case it has been held the rights of the company are the same as where they take their land under their compulsory powers.

²³ A copy of the relevant excerpts cited herein from ISAAC F., KINNEY, J. KENDRICK REDFIELD, LAW OF RAILWAYS EMBRACING THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, EMINENT DOMAIN, CONTRACTS, COMMON CARRIERS, TELEGRAPH COMPANIES, EQUITY JURISDICTION, TAXATION, THE CONSTITUTION, RAILWAY INVESTMENTS (6th ed. 1888) [hereinafter “REDFIELD ON RAILWAYS”] are at Appx1909-2087.

1 REDFIELD ON RAILWAYS 221 (§ 61, ¶5) . The treatise continues:

In case of a deed to a railway company of land, on which to construct their road . . . the rights and duties of the company, in such case, are precisely the same as if the land had been condemned by proceedings in invitum, under the statute.

Id. at 222 (§ 61, ¶ 7, ¶7 n.6) (citing *Norris v. Vermont Cent. R.R. Co.*, 28 Vt. 99, 100-102 (1855)). The fact that *Wason* too cites to a Vermont state case to support its holding demonstrates that the Oregon courts continued to follow Redfield's treatise and similar Vermont state court opinions.²⁴

At the time these thirteen conveyances were executed in 1907, it was well understood that when the railroad invoked its powers to survey and stake its rail line, it was required to attempt to reach an agreement with the owners. Only when that failed could it resort to its condemnation power. (See Appx1783-1790). And the leading treatise at

²⁴ Numerous Oregon Supreme Court decisions have shown reliance on REDFIELD ON RAILWAYS as authority. See, e.g., *Ford v. Oregon Elec. Ry. Co.*, 117 P. 809 (Or. 1911); *Shively v. Hume*, 10 Or. 76 (Or. 1881); *Cogswell v. Oregon & C.R. Co.*, 6 Or. 417 (Or. 1877); *Luse v. Isthmus Transit Co.*, 6 Or. 125 (Or. 1876); *Holladay v. Patterson*, 5 Or. 177 (Or. 1874); *Seely v. Sebastian*, 4 Or. 25 (Or. 1870); *Oregon Cent. R. Co. v. Wait*, 3 Or. 428 (Or. 1869).

the time, relied on by the Oregon courts, found that the railroad in that situation could, at most, obtain an easement.

1. The Articles of Incorporation and Supplementary Articles of Incorporation of the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company limit its power to acquire real property to the extent necessary for its corporate purpose.

The Pacific Railway & Navigation Company was chartered in October 13, 1905.²⁵ The company planned to build a railroad between Portland and Astoria by way of the Willamette Valley. Appx1839-1843. Article II of the Articles of Incorporation stated that the railroad would “have the following powers: 1. To construct, equip and operate a line of railroad in the State of Oregon . . . and to acquire the necessary rights of way and other property therefor . . . [between Portland and Astoria].” *Id.* The Railroad’s charter clearly limited the purpose for which the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company was established; and the

²⁵ In November 1905, the railroad filed supplementary articles of incorporation providing that the railroad would now be building a right-of-way between Buxton in Washington County and Tillamook in Tillamook County, the line at issue here. A copy of the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company’s Supplementary Articles of Incorporation is attached as Appx1845-1846. A copy of the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company’s original Articles of Incorporation is attached as Appx1839-1843.

authority it was granted was limited to building and operating a railroad between these cities.

2. Oregon Statutes likewise limited a railway corporation's power to acquire real property necessary for its corporate purpose and when it did so by entering lands pursuant to the company's eminent domain authority, it acquired only an easement.

The railroad's charter makes clear that it is vested only with the rights given to it by way of the Oregon statutes. So, it is necessary to examine the relevant Oregon statutes. Section 5056 of Bellinger and Cotton's Annotated Codes and Statutes of Oregon (1902) ("Oregon Annotated Code of 1902") address "Powers of the Body Corporate."²⁶ The statute states:

Upon making and filing the articles of incorporation . . . the persons subscribing the same are incorporators, and authorized to carry into effect the objects specific in the articles, in the manner provided in this chapter . . . they and their successors, associates, and assigns, by the name assumed in said articles, shall thereafter be deemed a body corporate, with power, -- To purchase, posses, and dispose of such real and personal property as may be necessary and convenient to carry into effect the objects of the incorporation . . . for the purpose of aiding in the objects of such corporation . . .

* * *

²⁶ A copy of the cited sections of the Bellinger & Cotton's Laws of Oregon (1902) is attached as Appx1852-1920.

In case the object or purpose for which any such corporation is incorporated is in whole or in part to construct, or construct and operate a railroad, to lease any part or all its road to any other company incorporated for the purpose of maintaining and operation a railroad . . .

Chapter II of the Oregon Annotated Code of 1902 addressed “Land May be Appropriated, to What Extent.” *Id.* at § 5075. It states, “Such corporation may appropriate so much of said land as may be necessary for the line of such road . . . not exceeding sixty feet in width . . .” *Id.* Section 5095 addressed “Procedure for Appropriation of Land”:

Whenever any corporation authorized as in the provision of this act, to appropriate lands, right of way, . . .or other right or easement in lands, is unable to agree with the owners thereof as to the compensation to be paid therefore, or if such owner be absent from the state, such corporation may maintain an action in the circuit court of the proper county, against such owner, for the purpose of having such lands . . . or other right or easement appropriate to its use, and for determining the compensation to be paid to such owner therefor.

Id.

These laws were in place at the time the railroad was incorporated and the Supplementary Articles of Incorporation were filed. In 1907, when the majority of the deeds to the railroad were executed, sections 5074, 5075, and 5094 of the Oregon Annotated Code of 1902 were

amended to allow a railroad to acquire up to a two-hundred foot-wide right-of-way.²⁷ The substance of the law stayed the same. Appx1904-06.

3. Oregon common law at the time provided that a railroad only acquires an easement in real property taken for its right-of-way regardless of whether it settled on the amount of compensation with the landowner or had to institute condemnation proceedings.

One of the earliest Oregon Supreme Court cases, noted in the annotations to the relevant statutes, is *Oregon Ry.*, mentioned above. This case involved a dispute between the landowner and the railroad for the compensation due the owner for the railroad's acquisition of its right-of-way. *Oregon Ry.*, 10 Or. at 444. The court recognized the requirement that before the railroad could exercise its statutory power to acquire its right-of-way by eminent domain, it must first make an effort to agree on compensation with the owner. *Id.* at 445. The court then held:

The entry of judgment for the land, absolutely, was error. A title that may be freed from public use, cannot be acquired by a private corporation, by eminent domain. *So land can only be taken for the particular use for which it is sought to be appropriated – that is, in this case, for the purpose of a railway, an easement was all that was called for, and all that the respondent could acquire.*

²⁷ A copy of the relevant sections of the Oregon Annotated Code of 1902, as amended, is attached as Appx1904-1906.

Id. (emphasis added). As already noted, the Court in *Oregon Ry.* cited Judge Redfield's treatise in its decision, clarifying that land taken from landowners by agreement conveys the same rights as if obtained via condemnation. *Id.* at 446 (citing 1 REDFIELD ON RAILWAYS 221 (§61, ¶¶5, 7)).²⁸

Redfield's treatise presciently foresaw the very dispute these landowners are having with the government today. Redfield wrote,

Questions have sometimes arisen in regard to the precise title acquired by a railway company in lands purchased by them, where the conveyance is fee-simple. It is certain, in this country, upon general principles, that a railway company, by virtue of their compulsory powers, in taking lands, could acquire no absolute fee-simple, but only the right to use the land for their purposes.

1 REDFIELD ON RAILWAYS 221 at §69, p. 255.²⁹

²⁸ Judge Redfield cites to *Whitcomb v. Vermont Central Railroad Co.*, 25 Vt. 49, 69 (Vt. 1852) in the footnote to this section and explains, "This right to acquire lands, by contract with the owners, is probably limited, by implication, if not expressly, to the necessities of the company, the same as the right taken *in invitum*, and cannot be extended to any private use." *Id.* at n. 4.

²⁹ See also *Id.* at §69, ¶3 ("Hence, in some of the cases, it seems to be a just inference from the reasoning of the court, that a railway, by a deed in fee-simple acquires only a right of way, that being all which the corporation is capable of taking.").

When a railroad exercised this power of eminent domain and located its right-of-way across an owner's land it was not an arms-length transaction between equals. The railroad possessed the extraordinary power of eminent domain. Confronted with this circumstance an owner's only choice was to consent to the railroad's occupation of the owner's land and execute a voluntary conveyance memorializing the railroad's right-of-way or to hold-out and await a condemnation decree.

Judge Plager, for this Court *en banc*, explained that even when an owner acceded to the railroad's acquisition and executed a "voluntary conveyance" – even a general warranty deed – it still had the "flavor" of a condemnation. *See Preseault II*, 100 F.3d at 1537 ("On balance it would seem that...the proceeding retained its eminent domain flavor, and the railroad acquired only that which it needed, an easement for its roadway.").

B. The factors Oregon courts consider are a tool, not the law, and when applied properly these factors demonstrate these 1907 deeds granted the railroad an easement.

In determining whether a deed to a railroad conveyed an easement or the fee estate in the land, the Oregon Court in *Bernards* considered the various tests set forth in the Restatement of the Law, Property and

Thompson on Real Property, but, as discussed above, ultimately relied on an Oregon Supreme Court case from 1897, *Wason v. Pilz*, 48 P. 701. *Bernards*, 248 P.2d at 585 (“We believe that the *Wason* decision is determinative of the issues under consideration . . .”).

The *Wason* decision looked to the indication that the deed granted a use of the property as controlling finding that terms “for use of a plank road” and “for road purposes” are “are indicative of an easement only, and are controlling as the measure of the estate granted.” *Wason*, 48 P. 701. The deed at issue in *Wason* made no mention of “right of way”:

[A] parcel of land for the purposes of a road, twenty feet wide across the center, running east and west over and across the following described real estate . . . The said strip of twenty feet, so herein conveyed for a road as above stated, is to be inclosed by a good and substantial board fence by [grantee] and kept in repair by him.

Bernards, 248 P.3d at 343 (quoting *Wason*, 48 P. at 701).

In *Bernards* the Oregon Supreme Court described the earlier precedent it relied on, *Wason v. Pilz*, as a case finding the court had “no difficulty” in finding a deed to a railroad to be limited to an easement. *Bernards*, 248 P.2d at 344.

Nothing changed with the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision four years later in *Bouche*. There, the Court succinctly held, “A study of the

cited cases suggests that the courts have little difficulty, where a railroad company is grantee, in declaring that the instrument creates only an easement *whenever the grant is a use to be made of the property*, usually, but not invariably, described as for use as a right of way in the grant.” *Bouche*, 293 P.2d at 209 (emphasis added). *Bouche* instructed to look for “additional language *relating to the use or purpose* to which the land is to be put *or in other way cutting down or limiting, directly or indirectly*, the estate conveyed.” *Id.* at 209 (emphasis added). The Oregon Supreme Court in *Bouche* declared that only if there was no language “relating to” the use or purpose being for a railroad or “directly or indirectly” limiting the estate would the Court find a fee estate was granted.

The *Bernards* and *Bouche* cases set forth several factors courts should look to as a limitation on the estate conveyed. *See Bouche*, 293 P.2d at 209 (relying on six factors), and *Bernards v. Link*, 248 P.2d at 343 (relying on eight factors). The majority of these factors relied on by the Oregon Supreme Court in *Bouche* and *Bernards* direct the Court to find these thirteen deeds granted only an easement such as whether the conveyance involves a “strip of land” and whether the description of that land is “over and across” or “through” the lands of the grantor; whether

the “strip of land” is described with precision; and whether nominal consideration was paid for the “strip of land.”

The CFC at the outset of its opinion completely disregards three factors only because virtually all of the deeds at issue possessed them. All thirteen deeds at issue in this appeal convey a “strip of land” either “across” or “through” the grantor’s land.” On page 14 of the CFC’s opinion the court states three factors are of “limited value in discerning intent”:

In examining the deeds remaining in dispute, the court recognized that virtually all of the 102 disputed deeds, like most of the ones agreed upon by the parties, used phrases like “strip of land” and “through the land” in the body of the deed and also described the property conveyed with similar degrees of specificity. As such, the court has determined that these factors are of limited value in discerning intent.

Appx14.

This sentence demonstrates fundamental flaws in the CFC’s reasoning. The *Bouche/Bernards* decision explicitly list these three characteristics of a deed as demonstrating an intent to convey an easement. It is inconsistent with Oregon law to disregard the fact that “virtually all” of these deeds convey a “strip of land through [the land of the grantor]” as “limited value of discerning intent.” These factors weigh in favor of the finding of an easement. This is especially so when these

two factors – “strip of land” and “through the land” – are two of the factors the Court previously relied on in its earlier decision analyzing railroad deeds under Oregon law in *Boyer*, discussed in more detail below. Compare *Boyer*, 123 Fed. Cl. 430, 437 (2015).

The CFC also mischaracterizes the “similar degree of specificity” with which the “strip of land” conveyed in the deed is described. (Appx14, quoted in full above). Most of the deeds state that the “strip of land” being conveyed is “through the land of the grantor.” And, it is not the “strip of land” that is described with any specificity, but rather the grantor’s land that is described with specificity. Six of these conveyance at issue in this appeal describe the “strip of land” being conveyed more than to say that it is a set number of feet from the centerline of the tracks or temporary survey stakes that *were already on the land*.³⁰ Those survey stakes are long gone, and the tracks are now gone too. There is no way to know the boundaries of the “strip of land” without the railroad tracks. The fact that the parties at the time used the tracks as the sole point of

³⁰ Rinck (77/454) (Appx88); Woodbury (16/481) (Appx123-124); Watt (12/343) (Appx112); Smith (16/515) (Appx97); Westinghouse (85/39) (Appx117-18); Jeffries (85/70) (Appx63); and Cummings (77/262) (Appx35-36).

reference for describing the boundaries is indicative of the parties' intent that these conveyances be for a railroad and only a railroad.

The landowners have been unable to find a single Oregon case where a conveyance to a railroad describing a "strip of land" "across" or "through" the grantor's land was held to convey anything other than an easement. The Oregon Supreme Court has repeatedly held the conveyance of a "strip of land" "over and across" or "across" the land of the grantor conveys an easement to a railroad. *See Wason*, 48 P. at 702; *Bernards*, 248 P.2d at 344; *Powers v. Coos Bay Lumber Co.*, 263 P.2d 913, 944 (Or. 1953); *Bouche*, 293 P.2d at 209; *Cappelli v. Justice*, 496 P.2d 209, 213 (Or. 1976); *Egaas v. Columbia Cty.*, 673 P.2d 1372 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).

Bouche and *Bernards* further note that nominal consideration is indicative of intent to convey only an easement. *See Bouche*, 293 P.2d at 209 (holding that the fact the consideration was "substantial" was a factor in determining whether a deed conveyed an easement to a railroad or the fee estate in the land); *Bernards*, 248 P.2d at 343 (holding that a deed in which the recited consideration was only one-dollar indicated a conveyance of an easement only). Here, several of the deeds, like the

deed in *Bernards*, only had nominal consideration of one-dollar³¹ or ten-dollars.³² The Oregon Supreme Court would – as it did in *Bouche* and *Bernards* – find this fact to be indicative of an intent to convey only an easement.

The thirteen deeds contain the following indicia of easements as set forth in *Bouche/Bernards*:

Bryden Deed 74/273³³

- Describes the property as “a strip of land . . . as surveyed, located and adopted across [the grantor’s land].” It also describes the “strip of land” as a “Right of Way” in the body of the deed.

Cummings Deed 77/262³⁴

- Describes the property as “a strip of land . . . as surveyed, located and adopted through [the grantor’s land].” The “strip of land” is not described with precision, only in reference to fifty-feet in either direction of the centerline of the tracks.

³¹ Appx45-46 (Galvani); Appx46-47 (Gattrell); Appx51-52 (Hagen); Appx63 (Jeffries); Appx88 (Rinck); Appx112-114 (Watt); and Appx117-118 (Westinghouse).

³² Appx124-125 (Woodbury).

³³ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1234.

³⁴ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1263.

Galvani Deed 77/37³⁵

- Describes the property as “a strip of land . . . as surveyed, located and adopted across [the grantor’s land].” The stated consideration is one dollar.

Gattrell Deed 13/311³⁶

- Describes the property as “a strip of land sixty (60) feet in width, being thirty (30) feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is now located, surveyed and staked out through [grantor’s land.” The “strip of land” is not described with precision and the stated consideration is one dollar. The deed also states it is “confirming to the grantee likewise the right to build, maintain and operate a railway line thereover.”

Hagen Deed 75/279³⁷

- Describes the property as “a strip of land . . . as surveyed, located and adopted across [the grantor’s land].” The stated consideration is one dollar.

The Jeffries Deed 85/70³⁸

- Describes the property as “a strip of land one hundred feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as the same is surveyed and located through [grantor’s

³⁵ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1300.

³⁶ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1302-1303.

³⁷ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1312-1313.

³⁸ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1357-1358.

land].” The stated consideration is one dollar. The “strip of land” is not described with precision.

The Rinck Deed 77/454³⁹

- Describes the property as “[a] strip of land 100 feet wide, being 50 feet on each side of the centerline [sic] of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company as the same is constructed through [grantor’s land].” The stated consideration is one dollar.

The Smith, Loyd Deed 16/515⁴⁰

- Describing the property as “[a] strip of land one hundred(100) [sic] feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through [grantor’s land].” The deed also references the “strip of land as “said right of way hereby conveyed shall be only 65 feet wide being 50 feet on the Easterly side and 15 feet on the Westerly side of said center line.” The centerline is not described with any further precision.

The Stowell Deed 75/32⁴¹

- Describing the property as “a strip of land 100 feet wide being 50 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company’s Railway, as surveyed, located and adopted across [grantor’s land].” The deed references the “strip of land” as “said Right of Way” three additional times.

³⁹ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1438.

⁴⁰ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1468-1469.

⁴¹ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1473-1474.

The Watt Deed 12/343⁴²

- Describing the property as “[a] strip of land sixty (60) feet wide being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway o f [sic] the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through [grantor’s land].” The stated consideration is one dollar. This deed is also titled “Railway Deed.”

The Westinghouse Deed 85/39⁴³

- Describing the property as “[a] strip of land one hundred (100) feet in width, being fifty (50) feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as the same is surveyed and located through [grantor’s land].” The stated consideration is one dollar.

The Woodbury Deed 16/481⁴⁴

- Describing the property as “[a] strip of land sixty (60) feet in width, being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the grantee’s railway as the same is surveyed and located through [grantor’s land].”

The Woodbury Deed 23/399⁴⁵

- Describing the property as “a strip of land sixty (60) feet in width, being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of said Company as the same is now located, staked out, and operated through [grantor’s land.]” The stated consideration

⁴² A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1500.

⁴³ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1510-1511.

⁴⁴ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1526.

⁴⁵ A copy of the original conveyance is at Appx1528.

is one dollar and the right-of-way is not described with any precision.

In its opinion, the CFC mischaracterized the lesser-cited *Bouche* case⁴⁶ stating that *Bouche* “focused its analysis on whether the deed contains language that can be fairly read as limiting the railroad’s use of the estate conveyed to only a ‘right.’” Appx14. The Court doesn’t cite where *Bouche* says this. And this is not Oregon law. The CFC completely changed the law of Oregon to require multiple explicit statements limiting the railroad’s use to an easement to find an easement. Rather, Oregon law is that any direct or indirect limitation on the estate conveyed or language relating to railroad use should be considered evidence the intent of the grantors was to convey an easement. See *Bouche*, 293 P.2d 203 and *Bernards*, 248 P.2d 341.

⁴⁶ The Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in *Bouche* was handed down four years after its decision in *Bernards*. But it is the earlier decision, *Bernards*, which had been cited far more often and bears more authoritative guidance as to Oregon law. *Bernards* is the Oregon case this Court relied on and cited in its seminal Trails Act takings opinion in *Preseault II*, 100 F.3d at 1535. The Oregon courts have only cited the *Bouche* decision twice, and neither case determined the railroad to own the fee estate in portions of its right-of-way. See *Egaas* at 1372 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) and *Wiser v. Elliot*, 209 P.3d 337 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). By comparison *Bernards* has been cited by Oregon courts twenty-seven times (including the federal district court for Oregon and the Ninth Circuit in addition to this Court).

Under the CFC's analysis many of the deeds the Oregon courts have found to be easements, would instead be declared by the CFC to convey the fee estate. The deed in *Wason* would not pass muster. Applying CFC's analysis, because the *Wason* deed does not use "strip of land," "right of way," or "*over and across*" this Court would likely find the *Wason* deed to be a conveyance of the fee estate. The same would be true for the deed in the Oregon Appellate Court case *Egaas v. Columbia Cty.*, 673 P.2d 1372 (Or. Ct. App. 1983). There the deed conveyed "[a] strip of land 60 feet in width, being thirty (30) feet in width on each side of the parallel with the following described center line of plaintiff's railroad as the same is surveyed, located and staked out as aforesaid over and across the said premises of defendants'. . ."⁴⁷ Applying the CFC's analysis in *Egaas* would find that the absence of "right of way" language or provisions requiring the railroad to construct fencing would weigh against a finding that the deed conveyed an easement despite the Oregon Appellate Court's finding that it did.

⁴⁷ While the railroad did acquire its easement by condemnation in *Egaas*, the court made an explicit finding that *even if* there was no condemnation judgment, the deed conveyed only an easement.

III. The CFC's inconsistent rulings undermine Oregon landowners' settled expectations of their property interests.

In 2015, the CFC, Judge Firestone, considered the deeds of thirty-three similar conveyances to a railroad from the early 1900s affecting similarly situated landowners in Benton County, Oregon, who brought claims against the federal government for the uncompensated taking of their property. *Boyer*, 123 Fed. Cl. 430. The CFC was tasked with determining whether several conveyances to the Corvallis & Alsea Railway, and its later successor the Portland, Eugene, and Eastern Railway, conveyed an easement through the land or the fee simple estate in the land itself. The CFC found “Most of the Deeds in Dispute Granted an Easements to the Railroad.” *Id.* at 437. The court divided the deeds presented to it in *Boyer* into three groups.

One group of deeds in *Boyer* did not contain “right of way” language, but used “across” or “over and across” to describe the interest granted. The CFC recognized, “As noted, the Oregon Supreme Court has held the presence of the phrase ‘over and across the lands of the grantors’ weighs in favor of finding an easement.” *Boyer*, 123 Fed Cl. at 438 (citing *Bouche*, 293 P.2d at 209; *Bernards*, 248 P 2d 343.) The Court in *Boyer* went on to also note that the phrase “over and across”

was used “to refer to a pre-existing, or already-located railroad track.” *Boyer*, 123 Fed. Cl. at 438. In fact the government too argued in *Boyer* that “over,” “across,” and “along,” or “through” were all to the same effect as used in the deeds to describe the location of the right-of-way. *Id.* at 439. The court though agreed with the landowners in *Boyer* on the importance of using any of these words to describe the interest granted.

The court finds that ‘over and across’ language used in these deeds favors the plaintiffs. It is clear from reading these deeds that they were granted to allow for railroad construction and use. The court finds that this view is confirmed by a review of the additional factors laid out in *Bernards* and *Bouche*.

Id. The court found that deeds in this group used “strip of land,” stated nominal consideration, and required fencing were easements. *Id.* at 438. The court also found that deeds in this group that also failed to describe the strip with precision to be easements. *Id.*

When one compares the CFC’s holding in *Boyer* to its holding in this case, they simply cannot be squared. Here, the court affords no importance to three of the *Bouche/Bernards* factors simply because “virtually all” of the deeds contain these three factors, which indicate an easement: (1) referencing the easement as a “strip of land,”

(2) describe the interest as running “through” the lands of the grantor; and (3) do not describe the strip of land with precision. If these deeds though were considered in the *Boyer* case, all with nominal consideration would have been held to be an easement. The *Boyer* court focused correctly on the Oregon Court’s direction to look for any language that makes it “clear . . . that they were granted to allow for railroad construction and use.” *Boyer*, 123 Fed. Cl. at 439.

In the present case, the landowners moved the CFC to reconsider its ruling with regard to forty-five conveyances to the Pacific Navigation & Railway Company which the CFC ruled conveyed the fee estate to the railroad under Oregon law. The government responded by agreeing with the landowners that this Court’s holding is inconsistent with this Court’s 2015 opinion in the Oregon Trails Act taking case, *Boyer*, 123 Fed. Cl. 430. *See* Appx3121. But, despite this admitted inconsistency, the government argued these Oregon landowners have not demonstrated a “manifest injustice” stating, “[A]lthough Plaintiffs are correct that the Courts’ conclusions here differ in certain respects from its rulings three years ago in *Boyer*, this Court has more than once held that ‘[d]ecisions of the one judge (or the same judge) on the court of

Federal Claims do not serve to bind another judge of the court.” *Id.* (quoting *Tamerlane Ltd. v. United States*, 81 Fed. Cl. 752, 759 (2008)).⁴⁸

These Oregon landowners disagree. To the contrary, such disparate holdings on the state-law property rights of owners within the same state, and only three years apart, violates the Supreme Court’s holding that when property rights are concerned, there is a “special need for certainty and predictability.” *See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States*, 440 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1979).

In *Leo Sheep*, the Supreme Court held, “this Court has traditionally recognized the special need for certainty and predictability where land titles are concerned, and we are unwilling to upset settled expectations to accommodate some ill-defined power to construct public thoroughfares without compensation.” *Id.* The Court reaffirmed this principle in *Marvin M. Brandt Rev. Trust v. United States*, 572 U.S. 93, 110 (2014), “We decline to endorse [the

⁴⁸ The government argued facts in this case and *Boyer* are not “substantially similar” because the Oregon landowners in *Boyer* are not the same Oregon landowners in *Albright* and the conveyances being challenged were “different.” Appx3121. The parties were different, the conveyances were different, but how to interpret virtually identical language under the same state’s law makes the cases substantially similar.

government's] stark change in position, especially given 'the special need for certainty and predictability where land titles are concerned.'" (quoting *Leo Sheep*, 440 U.S. at 687).

The CFC's conclusions deprive these Oregon landowners of their constitutional right to be justly compensated for the land the government took in order to facilitate the construction of the Salmonberry Trail. Had these Oregon landowners brought their claims before this Court in *Boyer*, they would have prevailed and their constitutional rights would be vindicated. The law should not be so inconsistently applied such that citizens' constitutional rights become discretionary. This Court should reverse the CFC's ruling to correct the error.

CONCLUSION

The landowners ask this Court to reverse the decision of the CFC, and remand this case with instructions to enter partial summary judgment in favor of these landowners on the issue of whether the railroad held an easement in the right-of-way over these fifteen owners' property pursuant to Oregon law.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Meghan S. Largent

Meghan S. Largent

Lindsay S.C. Brinton

LEWIS RICE LLC

600 Washington Avenue, Suite
2500

St. Louis, Missouri 63101

(314) 444-7704

mlargent@lewisrice.com

*Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants
in Case No. 19-2078*

ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM TABLE OF CONTENTS

Date Filed	Dkt. No.	Docket Text	Appx No.
08/13/2018	55	REPORTED OPINION denying in part and granting in part Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Plaintiffs and Motion for Summary Judgment by United States	Appx1-Appx128
2/8/2019	76	REPORTED OPINION granting Motion for Reconsideration in part, and denying Motion for Reconsideration in part	Appx129-Appx247
4/29/2019	123	JUDGMENT entered, pursuant to Rule 58, in favor of defendant.	Appx254-Appx259
6/26/2019	111	JUDGMENT entered, pursuant to Rule 58, in favor of defendant.	Appx261

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 16-912L and
No.16-1565L and No. 18-375 Consolidated
(Filed: August 13, 2018)

PERRY LOVERIDGE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

V.

THE UNITED STATES.

Defendant.

* * * * *

ALBRIGHT, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

V.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

Steven M. Wald, St. Louis, MO, for *Loveridge* plaintiffs. *Michael J. Smith*, St. Louis, MO and *Thomas S. Stewart* and *Elizabeth G. McCulley*, Kansas City, MO, of counsel.

Mark F. Hearne, II, Clayton, MO, for Albright plaintiffs. *Maghan S. Largent, Lindsay S.C. Brinton*, and *Stephen S. Davis*, Clayton, MO and *Abram J. Pafford*, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

Barbara M.R. Marvin, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., with whom was *Jeffrey H. Wood*, Acting Assistant Attorney General, for defendant. *Ragu-Jara Gregg*, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

OPINION

FIRESTONE, *Senior Judge*

I. Introduction

Pending before the court are cross-motions for partial summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) by the plaintiffs in *Loveridge v. United States* (“*Loveridge* plaintiffs”), the plaintiffs in *Albright v. United States* (“*Albright* plaintiffs”), and the United States (“the government”).¹

The *Loveridge* plaintiffs and the *Albright* plaintiffs claim in their motions that the government affected a taking of their reversionary interests in land within a dormant rail corridor when the government approved the conversion of an approximately eighty-one mile long portion of a dormant railroad line between Tillamook County and Washington County, Oregon to create a recreational trail pursuant to the National Trail System Act Amendments of 1983, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (“Trails Act”). The plaintiffs contend in their motions that the deeds from their predecessors-in-interest granted only easements to the railroad which terminated when the railroad became dormant. If the deeds granted easements, plaintiffs argue that after the rail line became dormant the property within the corridor reverted back to plaintiffs and that conversion of the rail corridor gave rise to a taking of their reversionary interests in the rail corridor.

¹ *Loveridge v. United States* and *Albright v. United States* both involve the same rail corridor in Oregon and overlapping deeds but the cases involve different plaintiffs and there is different counsel in each case. For these reasons, the cases have not been consolidated. Nonetheless, because the cases concern the same segment of railroad line and involve many of the same deeds the court is issuing a single opinion.

The government argues that the deeds at issue should be read to have conveyed the property within the rail corridor to the railroads in fee simple absolute. If the railroads received a fee interest in the corridor, the plaintiffs have no revisionary interest subject to a taking. In the alternative, the government contends that any easements granted to the railroad were broad enough to encompass trail use. In this opinion the court will only address whether the deeds in dispute conveyed an easement, as plaintiffs contend, or a fee, as the government contends.

II. The Rails to Trails Act

The statutory and legal backdrop to Rails-to-Trails cases was recently summarized by the Federal Circuit in *Chicago Coating Co., LLC v. United States*, 892 F.3d 1164, 1165-68 (Fed. Cir. 2018). As the Federal Circuit explains, under the Trails Act, the United States Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) has issued regulations regarding the abandonment and discontinuance of service over railroad lines. *See* 49 C.F.R. §§ 1152.1–1152.60. A railroad, to abandon or discontinue service over a rail line, must file an application for abandonment or discontinuance with the STB under 49 U.S.C. § 10903 or a notice of exemption under 49 U.S.C. § 10502 and 49 C.F.R. § 1152.50. Under either procedure, the STB will not approve the abandonment of the railroad line under either procedure if a “qualified trail provider” (“a state, political subdivision, or qualified private organization”) submits to the STB a request to use the rail corridor for interim trail use and railbanking under 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (“section 1247(d)"). *See* 49 U.S.C. § 1152.29. If the qualified trail provider submits a statement of willingness to assume financial and legal responsibility to the STB and the railroad carrier, the STB will, in

situations involving an operating railroad, issue a Certificate of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (“CITU”), which preserves the STB’s jurisdiction over the railroad corridor while the parties negotiate an interim trail use agreement. 49 U.S.C. § 1152.29(c). In situations involving the exemption procedure, the STB will issue a Notice of Interim Trail Use (“NITU”), which also preserves the STB’s jurisdiction over the railroad corridor, allows the railroad to discontinue its operations, permits the railroad to remove equipment and railroad track, and provides the railroad and the qualified trail provider 180 days to negotiate an interim trail use agreement. 49 U.S.C. § 1152.29(d). During this time, the railroad will also negotiate an agreement for the transfer of the rail corridor to the trail operator. If an agreement is reached, the CITU or NITU automatically authorizes the interim trail use. If the STB takes no further action, the trail sponsor may then assume management of the former railroad corridor, subject only to the right of a railroad to reassert control of the property for the restoration of rail service. If, on the other hand, an agreement is not reached, the railroad will be allowed to abandon the railroad line, at which time the STB’s jurisdiction over the railroad corridor terminates. Section 1247(d) provides that interim trail use “shall not be treated, for purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes.” 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). Thus, the property remains within the national rail system and available for reactivation of rail service for the duration of the interim trail use. *Chicago Coating*, at 1167. The Federal Circuit has explained that section 1247(d) of the Trails Act “prevents the operation of state laws that would otherwise come into effect upon abandonment—property laws that would ‘result in

extinguishment of easements for railroad purposes and reversion of rights of way to abutting landowners.” *Caldwell v. United States*, 391 F.3d 1226, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting *Rail Abandonments—Use of Rights-of-Way as Trails*, Ex Parte No. 274 (Sub-No. 13), 2 I.C.C.2d 591, 1986 WL 68617 (1986)).

Under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, private property cannot “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. Amend. V. According to the Federal Circuit, “[i]t is settled law that a Fifth Amendment taking occurs in Rails-to-Trails cases when government action destroys state-defined property rights by converting a railway easement to a recreational trail, if trail use is outside the scope of the original railway easement.” *Ladd v. United States*, 630 F.3d 1015, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2010), *reh’g denied*, 646 F.3d 910 (Fed. Circ. 2011). *See also Chicago Coating*, at 1167, 1170. A Fifth Amendment taking occurs when “the issuance of the CITU or NITU authorizing recreational trail use effectively extinguishes the state property rights of reversion of the right-of-way to the fee owner.” *Macy Elevator, Inc. v. United States*, 97 Fed. Cl. 708, 718 (2011). *See also Caldwell v. United States*, 391 F.3d 1226, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“a Fifth Amendment taking occurs when, pursuant to the Trails Act, state law reversionary interests are effectively eliminated in connection with a conversion of a railroad right-of-way to trail use.”); *Chicago Coating*, 1169-70 at *4 (“In order to prove a compensable taking based on the issuance of a NITU, a claimant must prove that ‘state law reversionary interests [in the property at issue] are effectively eliminated in connection with a conversion of a railroad right-of-way to trail use.’” (quoting *Caldwell*, 391 F.3d at 1228)). Determining whether taking liability arises in a Rails-to-Trails case involves

addressing a three-part inquiry: “(1) who owns the strip of land involved, specifically, whether the railroad acquired only an easement or obtained a fee simple estate; (2) if the railroad acquired only an easement, were the terms of the easement limited to use for railroad purposes, or did they include future use as a public recreational trail (scope of the easement); and (3) even if the grant of the railroad’s easement was broad enough to encompass a recreational trail, had this easement terminated prior to the alleged taking so that the property owner at the time held a fee simple unencumbered by the easement (abandonment of the easement).” *Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States*, 564 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing *Preseault v. United States*, 100 F.3d 1525, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“*Preseault II*”). See also *Chicago Coating*, 1169 at *4. Thus, in Rails-to-Trails cases, “the threshold question is whether the claimant has a compensable property interest in the land allegedly taken, which is often answered by analyzing the original deeds that conveyed the property to the railroad.” *Chicago Coating*, 1170 at *2.

III. Factual Background

At issue in these cases are 132 deeds that in the early 1900s transferred property interests to railroad companies in order to create the above-referenced 81.07 mile long portion of the railroad line located between milepost 775.01 near Banks, Oregon and milepost 856.08 near Tillamook, Oregon. Specifically, the interests were deeded to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and the Southern Pacific Company. Eventually, the Port of Tillamook Bay Railroad (“POTB”) obtained ownership of the relevant portion of the railroad line.

On May 26, 2016, the Port of Tillamook Bay Railroad filed a Notice of Intent to Partially Terminate (Abandon) Service for the railroad segment at issue here with the STB. On or about June 17, 2016, the Salmonberry Trail Intergovernmental Agency (“Salmonberry Trail”) filed with the STB a Statement of Willingness to Assume Financial Responsibility (“Statement”) regarding the relevant railroad segment at issue in this case. In its Statement, in addition to expressing its willingness to assume responsibility for the relevant railroad segment, the Salmonberry Trail stated that the relevant railroad segment “is suitable for railbanking” and requested that the STB find the railroad segment suitable for trail use and issue a Public Use Condition and a Certificate or Notice of Interim Trail Use under the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. §1247(d).

On July 1, 2016, the POTB filed with the STB its response to the Salmonberry Trail’s request and expressed its willingness to negotiate with the Salmonberry Trail regarding the acquisition of the relevant railroad segment. On July 26, 2016, the STB issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (“NITU”) for the relevant railroad segment. On January 19, 2017, the STB granted the Salmonberry Trail’s request for a 180-day extension of the NITU until July 21, 2017 for negotiating the trail use/railbanking agreement. Eventually, after another extension, the POTB and the Salmonberry Trail on October 27, 2017, notified the STB that they entered into a trail use/rail banking agreement regarding the relevant railroad segment.

IV. Procedural Posture

The present actions were filed by the *Loveridge* plaintiffs on August 1, 2016 and by the *Albright* plaintiffs on November 23, 2016. See *Loveridge v. United States*, No.

1:16-cv-00912-NBF, ECF No. 1; *Albright v. United States*, No. 1:16-cv-01565-NBF, ECF No. 1.

On September 22, 2017, the government and the *Loveridge* plaintiffs filed Joint Stipulations Regarding Title Matters (“*Loveridge* Joint Stipulations”). See *Loveridge*, ECF No. 24. The *Loveridge* plaintiffs filed their motion for partial summary judgment and their memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment on October 10, 2017. The *Albright* plaintiffs filed their motion for partial summary judgment and memorandum in support on November 2, 2017. On December 12, 2017, the government filed the same cross-motion and response for both cases.

Briefing on the motions was completed on April 9, 2018, and on April 19, 2018, the court, in an effort to help expedite resolution of the numerous legal issues raised regarding the 132 deeds at issue, filed, under seal, a statement of preliminary conclusions and findings for the parties to consider and address before the scheduled oral argument. See *Loveridge*, ECF No. 46; *Albright*, ECF No. 48. The court received the parties’ objections to the court’s preliminary conclusions and findings on May 3, 2018 and on May 7, 2018, the court filed under seal an order setting forth the points of agreement and disagreement between the parties. See *Loveridge*, ECF No. 49; *Albright*, ECF No. 51.

As set forth in that order, the parties agree that the following 18 deeds² granted fee simple interests to the railroad: Alderman 11/614 (Def.’s Ex. 2); Bryden 74/274 (Def.’s Ex. 13); Coates 5/486 (Def.’s Ex. 22); Cone 7/339 (Def.’s Ex. 23); Edner 35/282 (Def.’s

² Deeds are listed as Name Book/Page (Exhibit Number). Unless otherwise indicated, the exhibits are those attached to the Def.’s Brief.

Ex. 34); Erickson 36/557 (Def.'s Ex. 36); Fry 74/243 (Def.'s Ex. 38); Handley 21/99 (Def.'s Ex. 47); Hauxhurst 11/330 (Def.'s Ex. 55); Hobson 7/39 (Def.'s Ex. 57); Illingworth 7/164 (Def.'s Ex. 58); Johnson 11/353 (Def.'s Ex. 60); Kunze & Gubser 13/15 (Def.'s Ex. 68); Murphy 11/283 (Def.'s Ex. 78); Parks 11/329 (Def.'s Ex. 82); Pike (Pacific Lodge) 7/81 (Def.'s Ex. 84); Provoost 7/21 (Def.'s Ex. 89); and Seamon 11/285 (Def.'s Ex. 99). Eventually, plaintiffs claiming a taking based on these deeds will have to be dismissed from the case.

The parties also agree that the following 12 deeds conveyed only easements to the railroad: Alley 9/537 (Def.'s Ex. 4); Brighton Mills Co. 58/292 (Def.'s Ex. 10); Cummings 79/381 (Def.'s Ex. 26); Denni 75/372 (Def.'s Ex. 29); Hammond Lumber Co. 23/308 (Def.'s Ex. 46); Kilches River Co. 31/228 (Def.'s Ex. 64); Kinney 13/196 (Def.'s Ex. 65); Larsen 5/133 (Def.'s Ex. 70); Miami Lumber Co. 27/440 (Def.'s Ex. 77)³; Smith, Alfred 13/313 (Def.'s Ex. 102); Tucker 12/331 (Def.'s Ex. 112); and Whitney Co. Ltd. 7/84 (Def.'s Ex. 124). *See* Def.'s Br. at 23–24; Pls.' *Loveridge* Br. at 37–38; Oregon Landowners' Reply in Supp. Cross-Mot. Partial Summ. J. ("Pls.' *Albright* Reply") at 6–7, *Albright*, ECF No. 46. *See also* *Loveridge* Joint Stipulations. The government additionally agrees that the easements conveyed by eleven of these twelve source deeds (all except the Brighton Mills Co. 58/292 deed) "are limited to railroad purposes" and therefore "railbanking and trail use are outside the scope of the easements" that these eleven deeds conveyed to the railroad. The plaintiffs claiming a taking based on these deeds will continue in the litigation.

³ The parties do not address the deed in their motions.

Oral argument on the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment with regard to the 102 deeds remaining in contention was heard on May 9, 2018.

V. Summary Judgement Standards

Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." RCFC 56(a). A genuine dispute is one that could permit a reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party's favor, and a material fact is one that could affect the outcome of the lawsuit. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's case. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 331 (1986). To establish a genuine issue of material fact, a party "must point to an evidentiary conflict created on the record; mere denials or conclusory statements are insufficient." *Radar Indus., Inc. v. Cleveland Die & Mfg. Co.*, 424 Fed. App'x 931, 936 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting *SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am.*, 775 F.2d 1107, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). In evaluating motions for summary judgment, courts must draw any inferences from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and may not engage in credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 255; *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). If no rational trier of fact could find for the non-moving party, a genuine issue of material fact does not exist and the motion for summary judgment may be granted. *Matsushita Elec. Indus.*, 475 U.S. at 587. With respect to cross-motions for

summary judgment, courts must evaluate each motion on its own merits and resolve reasonable inferences against the party whose motion the court is considered. *Marriot Intern. Resorts, L.P. v. United States*, 586 F.3d 962, 968–69 (2009).

VI. Oregon Law

As discussed above, Rails-to-Trails takings cases arise from the application of section 8(d) of the National Trails System Act (the “Trails Act”) as amended by the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983 and codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) and liability for a taking occurs when “a claimant . . . prove[s] that ‘state law reversionary interests [in the property at issue] are effectively eliminated in connection with a conversion of a railroad right-of-way to trail use.’” *Chicago Coating*, 1170 at *4 (quoting *Caldwell*, 391 F.3d at 1228)). To determine whether there has been a taking requires the court “to apply the law of the state where the property interest arises.” *Id.* at *5 (citing *Bd. of Regents v. Roth*, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); *Preseault II*, 100 F.3d at 1536). In these cases, Oregon law applies.

Under Oregon law, the task of the court is to ascertain the intent of the original parties by considering the language of the deed in its entirety and the surrounding circumstances. *See, e.g., Bouche v. Wagner*, 293 P.2d 203, 208 (Or. 1956) (“Whether an instrument conveys ownership of land or only an easement depends upon the intention of the parties.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); *Doyle v. Gilbert*, 469 P.2d 624, 626 (Or. 1970) (“It is [the court’s] duty, therefore, to determine the intent of the parties from the language of the deed itself and from the surrounding circumstances.”); *U.S. Nat. Bank of La Grande v. Miller*, 258 P. 205, 209 (Or. 1927) (“it is the duty of the court to give

effect to the intention of the parties in a deed as to other contracts. This intention must be gathered from the entire instrument. In order to determine the intention of the parties, it is the duty of the court to consider ‘the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject of the instrument, and of the parties to it, * * * so that the judge be placed in the position of those whose language he is to interpret.’” (citations omitted)).

Oregon law provides that that “the intention to convey less than the full fee must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied from the words used in the conveyance.” *Bouche v. Wagner*, 293 P.2d 203, 208 (Or. 1956) (citing *Weniger v. Ripley*, 293 P. 425 (Or. 1930)). In *Bernards v. Link*, 284 P.2d 341 (Or. 1952) and *Bouche v. Wagner*, 293 P.3d 203 (Or. 1956), the Oregon Supreme Court has identified eight factors to examine in determining whether a deed which does not expressly state the nature of the interest conveyed should be read to have conveyed an easement or a fee simple interest to a railroad. These factors are: (1) whether the deed is entitled “Right of Way Deed” or uses “right of way” in the title of the deed, which would imply that only a “right” or easement was granted to the railroad; (2) whether the phrase “right of way” is used in the body of the deed to describe the interest being conveyed, which would indicate only a “right” rather than a fee was conveyed; (3) whether the consideration paid for the interest was nominal, which if nominal would suggest that an easement was conveyed; (4) whether the deed contains a reverter clause; (5) whether the deed uses the phrase “over and across” (or “over and across and out”) the lands of the grantors, which would indicate that a right to cross the land or an easement was conveyed; (6) whether the property

interest conveyed is described with without precision, which if described without precision would weigh in favor of construing the deed as an easement; (7) whether the deed contains a commitment by the railroad to build structures, such as fences, cattle guards, or crossings, which would favor finding an easement; and (8) whether the deed uses the phrase “strip of land” to describe the interest being conveyed, which would indicate that the deed conveyed an easement to the railroad. *See Bernards v. Link*, 248 P.2d 341, 343 (Or. 1952); *Bouche v. Wagner*, 293 P.2d 203, 209 (Or. 1956). This court has previously applied these criteria in another Rails-to-Trails case involving Oregon property owners. *See Boyer v. United States*, 123 Fed. Cl. 430, 437 (2015).

The government argues that two of the factors taken from the *Bernards* opinion regarding the construction of structures such as fences, crossings, or cattle guards and referencing the interest being conveyed as a “strip of land” may no longer be relevant to determining whether a fee or easement was granted because the Oregon Supreme Court in the later issued *Bouche* decision “failed to mention” those two factors, even though it “specifically reiterated” the other six factors identified in *Bernards*. The court has read *Bouche* and *Bernards* and concludes that *Bouche* cannot be read to have rejected the relevance of those two factors in all situations. Rather, the issue of fencing did not appear to be relevant in relation to the particular deeds examined in the *Bouche* case. As for use of the phrase “strip of land,” the court agrees with the government that the phrase standing alone will not be sufficient to establish the intent to convey only an easement, as the Oregon Supreme Court stated that “[c]onveyances to railroads, which purport to grant and convey a strip, piece, parcel, or tract of land, and which do not contain

additional language relating to the use or purpose to which the land is to be put or in other ways cutting down or limiting, directly or indirectly, the estate conveyed, are usually construed as passing an estate in fee.” *Bouche*, 293 P.2d at 209 (quoting 132 A.L.R. 145).⁴

In examining the deeds remaining in dispute, the court recognized that virtually all of the 102 disputed deeds, like most of the ones agreed upon by the parties, used phrases like “strip of land” and “through the land” in the body of the deed and also described the property conveyed with similar degrees of specificity. As such, the court has determined that these factors are of limited value in discerning intent. Rather, as the *Bouche* court stated, the court has focused its analysis on whether the deed contains language that can be fairly read as limiting the railroad’s use of the estate conveyed to only a “right.” Thus, in deciding whether the deed conveyed only an easement for a right of way and not a fee, the court has focused on whether the deed uses the phrase “right of way” in the title or text to describe the estate granted, contains language limiting the railroad’s use of the property for only a railroad purpose or requiring the property to be returned if no longer used for railroad purposes, provides for only nominal consideration, and requires the railroad to provide and maintain crossings, fences or other edifices which would also indicate that only an easement was conveyed.

VII. Deeds

⁴ Indeed, the plaintiffs have agreed that 18 deeds with the phrase “strip of land” and use the words similar to “across” or “through” when describing property conveyed a fee interest in the rail corridor. The government has also agreed that deeds which describe the property with a degree of precision convey an easement.

1. The Alley 5/475 Deed

The **Alley 5/475 deed (Def.'s Ex. 3)** provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by These Presents : [sic] That for and in consideration of the sum of \$15.00 to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged[,] Olivia Alley and Lee M. Alley, her husband, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, that portion, triangular in shape, of the lands owned by them in Lot 2, Sec. 21, T.1 N.R. 10 West W. M., included in a strip 100 ft. in width being 50 ft. on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's Railway, as now surveyed and located thru the lands owned by them, and being that portion thereof north of the north line of the County Road, as said County Road is now situate and located, said center line of said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's railway being more particularly described as follows:

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in any way appertaining:

To Have and to Hold unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors and assigns forever; together with the right to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway and telegraph line.

The plaintiffs contend that this deed conveyed only an easement on the grounds that the deed specifically references a purpose—"the right to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway and telegraph line" and because it references "thru the lands" owned by the grantor. The plaintiffs argue that under the *Bernards/Bouche* criteria these phrases establish that an easement for railroad purposes was granted.

The government argues that the deed should not be construed as granting an easement simply because it uses the phrase "thru the lands" and confirms the railroad's right to build a railroad on the property. The government argues that where, as here, the deed does not reference a right of way either in the title or body of the deed the phrase "thru the lands" simply describes the location of the property conveyed. The government

further argues that the language authorizing the “right to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway. . . line,” does not limit the railroad’s use of the conveyance but instead confirms the rights inherent in the fee conveyance. For these reasons, the government argues the court should read the deed as conveying a fee simple interest to the railroad.

First, the court finds that the phrase “together with the right to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway and telegraph line” while identifying a railroad purpose does not limit the railroad’s use. As will be discussed *infra* in this opinion, there are deeds where the language “together with the right to build a railroad” is preceded with language clearly stating that a “fee simple absolute” interest was granted. Moreover, the quoted language does not limit the railroad’s rights to only construction and operation a railway line. Rather, the subject language confirms the railroad’s right to construct a rail line without limitation.

Therefore, based on the court’s understanding of the language discussed above, and because the consideration payed was not nominal (\$15), the court finds that without any mention of the phrase “right of way”, nor any commitment by the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the **Alley 5/475 deed (Def.’s Ex. 3)** conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.⁵

2. The Batterson 12/163 Deed

⁵ Having concluded that the phrase “through the property” or “strip of land” are not helpful where all deeds include that language, the court will not address that language in connection with any of the disputed deeds unless the language is critical to its analysis. Similarly, the court will not address whether the property conveyed is described with precision, because all of the deeds describe the property conveyed with some degree of precision.

The **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.'s Ex. 5)** provides in pertinent part:

S. M. Batterson et al Railway Deed.
to NO. 7948.
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.

KNOWN ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of Eight [sic] Hundred & 00 DOLLARS, [sic] the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, S M. Batterson [sic] and Harriet E. McMaine, sole heirs at law of William Batterson, deceased, and Pauline O. Batterson wife of said S. M. Batterson, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant[,] convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (500 [sic] feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee, as the same is surveyed and located through Lots 4, 6 and 7 and the North West quarter of South East quarter of Section 34 and LOt [sic] 6 of Section 35, in Township 3 North of Range nine West of Willamette Meridian.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The *Albright* plaintiffs argue that this court should consider the **Batterson 12/163 deed** and similar deeds entitled “Railway Deeds” to have conveyed easements under *Bouche/Bernards* criteria because the title indicates that the property is to be used for a railway purpose. The plaintiffs also contend that the subject deed meets three other *Bouche/Bernards* criteria that suggest the conveyance of an easement. Specifically, the *Albright* plaintiffs argue that the language in the deeds stating “as surveyed and located [through/across/on the grantor’s land]” language or similar language confirms that only

an easement was granted to the railroad because this language indicates that the railroad had begun the condemnation process to acquire the property for the rail line. According to the plaintiffs, since these deeds were executed under the “threat of condemnation[,]” the deeds do not represent “arms-length” transactions between the parties. In addition the plaintiffs argue that the deeds can only be for an “easement,” because railroads could only obtain easements using their condemnation authority under Oregon law. Oregon law at the time, the *Albright* plaintiffs assert, “limited the interest the railroad could obtain by exercising [its eminent domain] power to an easement.” Pls.’ *Albright* Resp. at 21 (citing *Oregon Railway and Navigation Co. v. Oregon Real Estate Co.*, 10 Or. 444 (1882); *Redfield on Railways* § 61, ¶ 5, p. 221).

The government responds that there are no Oregon cases to suggest that a deed entitled “Railway Deed” cannot convey a fee or cases to suggest that only an easement was intended where the deed indicates that the railroad had likely begun condemnation proceedings by surveying the subject property. The government emphasizes that courts in Oregon have previously examined deeds that contained “surveyed” language and did not find that such language indicated that only an easement was conveyed. To the contrary, the Oregon Supreme Court determined that a deed which conveyed, for \$650, property on which the railroad’s track had already been “located and established” conveyed a fee simple title to the railroad, when the language of the deed as a whole indicated the parties’ intent to convey a fee. *See Bouche*, 293 P.2d at 206, 210.

The court agrees with the government. In *Bouche*, the Supreme Court of Oregon determined that a railroad can acquire fee simple title to narrow strips of land that had

been surveyed by the railroad. The Oregon Supreme Court in *Bernards* examined a deed conveying a strip of land that stated that “[s]aid strip of land shall be taken substantially along the line as now surveyed and staked as a line for a railroad by said grantee or its agents and servants, over and across said land” and never suggested that this language meant that only an easement was intended. *Bernards*, 199 Or. at 248 P.2d at 342 (emphasis added). For all of these reasons the court finds that the term “Railway Deed” and the fact that the subject property was surveyed and staked does not indicate that an easement rather than a fee was conveyed.

The court finds with regard to this deed that that the absence of any “right of way” language or language indicating that the interest conveyed is limited to railroad purposes, the fact that the railroad is not required to build fencing or crossings, and that \$800 in consideration was paid by the railroad all weigh in favor of finding that the parties intended to convey a fee interest to the railroad. The court thus holds that the **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.’s Ex. 5)** granted fee simple title to the railroad.

3. The Bay City Land Co. 3/629 Deed

The **Bay City Land Co. 33/629 deed (Def.’s Ex. 6)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of \$1.00 to it in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and other valuable consideration moving to it, Bay City Land Company, hereinafter called the grantor, does bargain, sell, grant and convey to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

Block 12 of First Water Front Addition to Bay City; also

A strip of land one hundred feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the grantee’s railway running, or

to run, from Hillsboro to Tillamook, as constructed through the following described real property in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

* * * [Describing the property through which the strip conveyed runs] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the grantee and to its successors and assigns forever; confirming to the grantee likewise the right to build, maintain and operate a railroad over the property granted as aforesaid, and to construct a freight and passenger station on Block 12, of the First Water Front Addition to Bay City.

For the reasons previously discussed in connection with the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming the right to build a railroad does not limit the railroad's use to only railroad purposes. Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1.00), the deed does not contain the phrase "right of way" in the title or body of the deed nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds the language of the deed as a whole, the court finds that the **Bay City Land Co. 33/629 deed (Def.'s Ex. 6)** granted fee simple title to the railroad.

4. The Beals (Tr.) 18/40 Deed

The **Beals (Tr.) 18/40 deed (Def.'s Ex. 7)** provides in pertinent part:

F.R. Beals, Trustee

to

11135 Railway Deed

Pacific Railway + Navigation Co

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of One and 00/100 Dollars, [sic] the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, F R. Beals, Trustee, hereinafter called the grantors, [sic] do [sic] bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors

and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

“A strip of land sixty (60) feet wide being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lot three of Section thirty two in Township two North of Range ten West of the Willamette Meridian.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To have and to hold unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

As discussed above in the court’s analysis of the **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.’s Ex. 5)**, the court does not find that the term “Railway Deed” indicates an easement in the same way that a deed entitled “Right of Way Deed” does. Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Beals (Tr.) 18/40 deed (Def.’s Ex. 7)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

5. The Beals Land Co. 18/41 Deed

The **Beals Land Co. 18/41 deed (Def.’s Ex. 8)** provides in pertinent part:

Beals Land Company

to

11136 Right of Way Deed

Pacific Railway + Navigation Co

Know All Men by These Presents: that for and in consideration of the sum of One [sic] + 00/100 Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Beals Land Company, a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Oregon, hereinafter called the grantors, [sic] do [sic] hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

“A strip of land sixty (60) feet wide being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lot two of Section thirty two in Township two North of Range ten West of the Willamette Meridian, save and except a certain tract heretofore conveyed by Beals Land Company to Security Savings and Trust Company.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold unto the above named grantee and to its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seized of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all incumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

Although the language in the two Beals deeds are not identical, the parties make similar arguments. This deed, however, is labeled as a “Right of Way Deed” and in such circumstances it is treated differently under the *Bouche* and *Bernards* cases than if it was entitled “Railway Deed”. The court recognizes that use of the phrase “Right of Way Deed” is not dispositive on discerning the parties’ intention; however, it weighs in favor of finding an easement if other indicia are present in the deed. Here the only indicia is that there was only nominal consideration (\$1) paid by the railroad. The deed does not mention any railroad purpose nor does it require the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle gaurds, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that the **Beals Land Co. 18/41 deed (Def.’s Ex. 8)** conveyed a fee to the railroad.

6. The Bigelow 13/321 Deed

The **Bigelow 13/312 deed (Def.’s Ex. 9)** provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of \$1.00 to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Mary M. Bigelow and Jay W. Bigelow, her husband,

hereinafter called the grantors, do bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

A strip of land 100 feet in width, being 50 feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the grantee's railway as the same is surveyed, located and staked out through the Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 32, in Township 3 North of Range 9 West of Willamette Meridian, and containing eighty-four hundredths of an acre[.]

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining

To Have and to Hold to the grantee and to its successors and assigns forever.

This deed is executed for the purpose of correcting an informality in a previous deed executed by the above named grantor, Mary M. Bigelow, without the joinder of her husband.

Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Bigelow 13/312 deed (Def.'s Ex. 9)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

7. The Brinn 6/328 Deed

The **Brinn 6/328 deed (Def.'s Ex. 11)** provides in pertinent part

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That foR [sic] and in consideration of the sum of \$150.00 to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, G. A. Brinn and Annie Brinn, his wife, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, all that portion of the land owned by them embraced in a strip of land 100 ft. wide, being 50 ft. on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's Railway, as now surveyed, located and adopted thru the lands of the aforesaid G. A. and Annie Brinn, in Lots 1- 2- 3- 4- 5- 6- 7- and 8, [sic] Block "A", [sic] Plat of East Garibaldi, Sec. 21, T. 1 N. R. 10 W., W.M., said center line being more particularly described as follows:

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with the tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining;

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successor[sic] and assigns forever; together with the right to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway and telegraph line.

For the same reasons as discussed above regarding the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the right to build a railroad does not limit the railroad's use to only railroad purposes. Here, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$250), there is no "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds **Brinn 6/328 deed (Def.'s Ex. 11)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

8. The Bryden 74/273 Deed

The **Bryden 74/273 deed (Def.'s Ex. 12)** is a form deed that provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by these Presents, *That*
James Bryden and Addie Bryden , [sic] his wife and John Stewart and Clara Stewart, his wife
of xxxxxxxx *State of Oregon, in consideration of*
Twenty Two [sic] and 05/100 (\$22.05) DOLLARS,
to them *paid by* Pacific Railway and Navigation Company
of Portland , Multnomah [sic] *County xx State of Oregon * * **
** * * * have bargained and sold, and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell and convey unto said*
Pacific Railway Navigation Company[,] its successors
** * * and assigns, all the following bounded and described real property, situated in the County of Washington and State of Oregon:*
A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side[]of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's Railway as surveyed, located and adopted across W $\frac{1}{2}$ [sic] of N. W [sic] $\frac{1}{4}$ Sec. 29, T. P. 3 N. R. 4 W. W. M. described as follows:

Beginning at a point on the east line of $W\frac{1}{2}$ of $NW\frac{1}{4}$ 685 feet north of the Southeast corner thereof, said point being at the intersection of said east line with the west line of said Right of Way; running thence North 7 degrees and 59 minutes west along said west line of Right of Way 820 feet; thence by a spiral to the left 60 feet; thence * * * [describing property] * * *; containing four and 58/100 (4.58) acres.

* * * [Blank space] * * *

Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging or in anywise appertaining and also all their estate, right, title and interest in and to the same, including dower and claim of dower.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described and granted premises unto the said

PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY[,] its successors xxx and assigns forever. And

James Bryden and Addie Bryden, his wife, and John Stewart and Clara Stewart[,] his wife, grantors above named do covenant to and with

Pacific Railway and Navigation Company the above named grantee[,] its successors and assigns that[]it is lawfully seized in fee simple of the above granted premises, that the above granted premises are free from all incumbrances

* * *

and that they will and their heirs, executors and administrators shall warrant and forever defend the above granted premises, and ever part and parcel thereof, against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.
(italics in original).

The court finds that the language of this deed viewed as a whole weighs in favor of finding that a fee was granted. Here, the court finds that the deed’s use of the phrase “right of way” is not meant to describe the property interest but provides a geographic location. Furthermore, the consideration provided is not nominal (\$22.05), there is no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that the **Bryden 74/273 deed (Def.’s Ex. 12)** granted fee simple title to the railroad.

9. The Burgholzer 83/99 Deed

The **Burgholzer 83/99 deed (Def.'s Ex. 14)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That Joseph Burgholzer and Vina A. Burgholzer, his wife for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar, to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and[]to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as the same is surveyed and located through the East one half of the Northeast quarter of Section thirty (30) in Township three (3) North of Range four (4) West W. M.

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances [,] thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining. TO HAVE[]AND TO HOLD to the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever.

The aforesaid grantors Joseph Burgholzer and Vina A. Burgholzer do hereby covenant that they are the owners in fee simple of the aforesaid premises, and that they will forever warrant and defend the same unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns, against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of railroad purposes, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Burgholzer 83/99 deed (Def.'s Ex. 14)** conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

10. The Burgholzer 87/71 Deed

The **Burgholzer 87/71 deed (Def.'s Ex. 15)** in pertain part provides:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That I, Max Burgholzer (unmarried) of Lane County, Oregon, in consideration of the sum of \$1.00, to me paid by the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a

Corporation, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged[,] do hereby remise, release and forever quitclaim unto the said Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, its successors and assigns, all my right, title and interest in and to the following described parcel of real estate situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit: A strip of land 100 ft. in width, being 50 ft. on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, as the same is surveyed and located through the west half of the northwest quarter of Section 36, T 3 N. R. 5 W. of the Will. Mer., containing 2.84 acres[.] TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same, together with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging[.] or in anywise appertaining, to the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, a Corporation, its successors and assigns forever. This Conveyance is made to confirm title to said right of way in the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, its successors and[] assigns.

Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Burgholzer 87/71 deed (Def.’s Ex. 15)** conveyed a fee to the railroad.

11. The Byrom 5/310 Deed

The **Byrom 5/310 deed (Def.’s Ex. 16)** provides in pertinent part:

Peter Byrom et ux	No. 2820
to	Right of Way
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	\$5.00

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of \$5.00, to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Peter Bryom and Bergtha [sic] Byrom, his wife, do bargain, sell, grant and convey to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, a strip of land 100 ft. wide, being 50 ft. on each side of the center line of the railway of the Pacific Railway and Navigation[]Company, as now surveyed and located thru lands of the aforesaid Peter Byrom and Bergtha [sic] Byrom in Sections 21 and 22, in Township 1 North of Range 10 West of the Willamette Meridian, more particularly described as follows, to wit:

All tide lands fronting and abutting on Lots 3[]and 4 in Section 21, and Lots 1, 2 and 3 in Section 22, in Township 22, in Township 1 North of Range 10 West of the Willamette Meridian; together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining. To Have and to Hold unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever; together with the right to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway and telegraph line[.]

The court recognizes the fact that use of the phrase “Right of Way Deed” is not dispositive on discerning the parties’ intention; however, it weighs in favor of finding an easement. Additionally, for the same reasons as discussed in this court’s review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad’s use to only railroad purposes. The court notes that the deed does not use the term “right of way” in the body of the deed to suggest that the interest being conveyed was limited to an easement, consideration was not nominal (\$5), nor does the deed contain any language requiring the railroad to build structure such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, based on review of the language of the deed as a whole, the court finds that the **Byrom 5/310 deed (Def.’s Ex. 16)** conveyed a fee to the railroad.

12. The Byrom 5/312 Deed

The **Byrom 5/312 deed (Def.’s Ex. 17)** provides in pertinent part:

Bergtha [sic] and Peter Byrom	No. 2821
to	Right of Way
Pacific Railway + Navigation Co.	\$400.00

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of \$400.00, to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Bergtha [sic] Byrom and Peter Bryom, her husband, do bargain, sell, grant and convey to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, a strip of land 100 ft. wide, being 50 ft. on each side of the center line of the railway of the

Pacific Railway and Navigation[]Company, as now surveyed and located thru lands of the aforesaid Peter Byrom and Bergtha [sic] Byrom in Sections 21 and 22, in Township 1 North of Range 10 West of the Willamette Meridian, more particularly described as follows, to wit:

* * * * [Describing the property through which the strip conveyed runs]
* * * *

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors and assigns forever; together with the right to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway and telegraph line[.]

The court recognizes the fact that use of the phrase “Right of Way Deed” is not dispositive on discerning the parties’ intention; however, it weighs in favor of finding an easement. Additionally, for the same reasons as discussed in this court’s review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad’s use to only railroad purposes. Here, the consideration paid was not nominal (\$400), there is no reference to the term “right of way” in the body of the deed to suggest that the interest being conveyed was limited to an easement, nor any language requiring the railroad to build structure such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, based on review of the language of the deed as a whole, the court finds that the **Byrom 5/312 deed (Def.’s Ex. 17)** conveyed a fee to the railroad.

13. The Campbell 85/208 Deed

The **Campbell 85/208 deed (Def.’s Ex. 18)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That D. F. Campbell and Cecily C. Campbell, his wife, for and in consideration[]of the sum of One Dollar (\$1.00), to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns

forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit: A strip of land one hundred feet [sic] in width, being fifty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as the same is now surveyed [sic] and located through the West half of the Northwest quarter of Section Thirty six (36) Township Three (3) North Range Five West, containing 2.84 acres. Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors and assigns forever. The aforesaid D. F. Campbell and Cecily C. Campbell, his wife, do hereby covenant that they are the owners in fee simple of the above granted premises, and that they will forever warrant and defend the same unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns, against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Campbell 85/208 deed (Def.’s Ex. 18)** conveyed a fee to the railroad.

14. The Carstens 72/527 Deed

The **Carstens 72/527 deed (Def.’s Ex. 19)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 22nd day of August 1906, between A. C. Carstens, and Sarah E. Carstens, his wife, of Washington County, Oregon, parties of the first part, and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, party of the Second [sic] part, WITNESSETH:

That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of \$250.00 to them in hand paid, by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged[,] have granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns, all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and particularly described as a portion of Section 25, T [sic] 2 N. R. 4 W., a strip of land 80 feet wide, being 40 feet on each on each side of the center line of the

Pacific Railway & Navigation Company's Railway as now surveyed and located on said land and described as follows:

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders,[]rents, issues, and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and unto its successors and assigns forever. And the parties of the first part hereby covenant to and with the party of the second part, its successors and assigns, that the parties of the first part, [sic] are the owners in fee simple of the tract of land above described, and the whole thereof; That [sic] said premises are free from all incumbrances, and that the parties of the first part, their heirs, executors and administrators, shall warrant and forever defend the above described and granted premises and every part and parcel thereof against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

Here, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$250), there is no reference to a "right of way" in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. The court thus finds that the **Carstens 72/527 deed (Def.'s Ex. 19)** granted fee simple title to the railroad.

15. The Carstens 72/530 Deed

The **Carstens 72/530 deed (Def.'s Ex. 20)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 25th day of August 1906, between John F. Carstens and Netta Carstens, his wife, of Washington County, Oregon, parties of the first part, and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, party of the second part, WITNESSETH:

That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar (\$1) and other valuable consideration, to them in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns, all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in

Washington County, Oregon, and particularly described as a portion of Sec. 25, T. 2 N. R. 4 W., a strip of land 80 feet wide, being 40 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's Railway, as now surveyed and located on said lands and described as follows:-

* * * [Description] * * *

A strip of land 60 feet wide, being 30 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company's Railway, as now surveyed and located on said land and described as follows:-

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and unto its successors and assigns as long as used and operated for railway and transportation purposes. And the parties of the first part hereby covenant to and with the party of the second part, its successors and assigns, that the parties of the first part, [sic] are the owners in fee simple of the tract of land above described, and the whole thereof, [and] that said premises are free from all incumbrances, [sic]

This deed contains the following language “as long as used and operated for railway and transportation purposes.” The *Albright* plaintiffs argue that this language establishes an easement because it directly limits the estate being conveyed. *See* Pls.’ *Albright* Resp. at 29. *See also* Transcript of Oral Argument (“Arg. Tr.”) 53:7-18, May 9, 2018. The government argues that the deed conveys a fee simple determinable interest under Oregon law, citing *State By & Through Dep’t of Transp., Highway Div. v. Tolke*, 586 P.2d 791, 795 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) and *Kilpatrick v. Snow Mountain Pine Co.*, 80 P.2d 137, 139 n.2 (Or. Ct. App. 1991). Arg. Tr. 49:20-50:21. *See also* Def.’s Br. at 21–22. In *Tolke*, the Oregon Court of Appeals determined that a deed that had, for substantial consideration (\$1098.70), granted a strip of land to a railroad ““so long as said

property herein granted shall be possessed, used and occupied as a railroad right of way and be used and occupied for the purposes of construction, maintenance and operation thereon and thereover, railroads and railroad trains,” conveyed a “fee simple determinable estate” to the railroad. *Tolke*, 586 P.2d at 794, 796. The *Tolke* court also stated that the deed further provided that the land conveyed under the terms of the deed if the property is no longer used for a railroad it “shall immediately revert to the grantors.” *Tolke*, 586 P.2d at 795.

The court finds that this case is different from *Tolke* because (1) this deed involves only \$1 in consideration and (2) it does not contain the revisionary language the Oregon Court of Appeals found to be significant. *Tolke* at 586 P.2d at 793 n.3. In such circumstances, the court finds that the language is more consistent with language the Oregon courts have found to have granted only an easement. *Bernards*, 248 P.2d 342, 352. Accordingly, the court finds that the **Carstens 72/530 deed (Def.’s Ex. 20)** conveyed an easement to the railroad.

16. The Chance 5/449 Deed

The **Chance 5/449 deed (Def.’s Ex. 21)** provides in pertinent part

Know all Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of \$50 to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Marion T. Chance and Laura I. Chance, his wife, do hereby grant, bargain, sell, and convey to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, all that portion of the land owned by them, embraced in a strip of land 100 feet wide, being 50 ft. on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company’s Railway, as surveyed, located and adopted thru the lands of the aforesaid Marion T. Chance, in Lots 1- 2- 3- 4- 5- and six, [sic] Block 10, original Townsite of Garibaldi, Sec. 21, T. 1[N. R. 10 W., W.M. said center line being more particularly described as follows:

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors and assigns forever, together with the right to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway and telegraph line.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court's review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes is not dispositive on the question of whether an easement was granted. Here, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$50), there is no "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that **Chance 5/449 deed (Def.'s Ex. 21)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

17. The Cook 15/83 Deed

The **Cook 15/83 deed (Def.'s Ex. 24)** pertains in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That Vincent Cook and Martha G. Cook, his wife, hereinafter called the grantors, in consideration of the sum of Ten (\$10.00) Dollars, to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and other valuable considerations moving to them, do * * * bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns[]forever, a one half interest in the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet in width, being fifty (50) feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the tract of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's railway as the same is now located, adopted, and constructed across the Northwest quarter[]of the Southwest quarter and the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section eighteen (18) in Township one (1) South of Range nine (9) West of the Willamette Meridian, containing 5.07 acres,

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining,

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the above named grantee and to its successors and assigns forever.

The court finds that this deed's conveyance of "a one half interest in the following described real property" is indicative of the original parties' intent to have conveyed a fee interest to the railroad. Here, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$10), there is no reference to a "right of way" in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that the **Cook 15/83 deed (Def.'s Ex. 24)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

18. The Cummings 77/262 Deed

The **Cummings 77/262 deed (Def.'s Ex. 25)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That for and in consideration of the sum of \$217.00 to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, James Cummings and Ann Cummings[,] his wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit:-

A strip of land one hundred feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through the West half of the Southeast quarter of Section 29 in Township 3 North of Range 4 West of the Willamette Meridian, containing 7.70 acres more or less.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the above named grantee and to its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors do further covenant that the grantee may operate a railway line over the properties above described and also do all things convenient or useful to be done in connection therewith. The grantors do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple; that their estate therein is free from all liens and encumbrances, and that they will and their heirs, executors and administrators shall forever warrant and

defend the above granted premises unto the grantee herein and unto its successors and assigns forever against the lawful claims and demands of all persons.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court’s review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad’s use to only railroad purposes. Here, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$217), there is no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that the **Cummings 77/262 deed (Def.’s Ex. 25)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

19. The Davidson 11/509 Deed

The **Davidson 11/509 deed (Def.’s Ex. 27)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One and 00/100 Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we F. M. Davidson and Alvie Davidson, husband and wife[,] hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant[,] convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A strip of land one hundred (100) Feet [sic] wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through our undivided one third interest in the North East quarter of North East quarter of Section thirteen Township one South of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian; also a strip of land six rods wide off of the North side of South East quarter of North East quarter of Section thirteen, Township one South of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

And * * * grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Davidson 11/509 deed (Def.’s Ex. 27)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

20. The Davis 72/546 Deed

The **Davis 72/546 deed (Def.’s Ex. 28)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 21st day of August 1906, between A. B. Davis and Eva Davis, his wife, F. M. Davis and B. J. Davis, of Washington County, Oregon, parties of the first part,[]and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, party of the second part, WITNESSETH:

That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar (\$1) and other valuable considerations, to them in hand paid, by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns, all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and particularly described as a portion of Section 4, T. 2. N. R. 4.W. [sic] a strip of land 80 feet wide, being 40 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company’s Railway, as now surveyed and located on said lands and described as follows:-

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and unto its successors and assigns forever. And the parties of the first part hereby covenant to and with the party of the second part, its successors and assigns, that the parties of the first part, [sic] are the owners in fee simple of the tract of land above described, and the whole thereof, that said premises are free from all incumbrances, and that the parties of the first part, their heirs, executors and administrators, shall warrant and forever defend the above described and granted premises and every part and parcel thereof against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Davis 72/546 deed (Def.’s Ex. 28)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

21. The Detroit Trust 77/44 Deed

The **Detroit Trust 77/44 deed (Def.’s Ex. 30)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That Detroit Trust Company, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Michigan, for and in consideration of the sum of Fifty [sic] (\$50.00) Dollars, to it paid,[]the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, does hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, a corporation and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington, State of Oregon, to-wit:-

“A strip of land one hundred feet in width being fifty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of[]the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation ComPany [sic] as the same is surveyed, located and adopted through the southeast quarter of section twenty eight (28), Township Three (3) North, Range five (5) West of the Willamette Meridian, said center line being describe[d] as follows:

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever.

Here, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$50), there is no reference to a “right of way” in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Detroit Trust 77/44 deed (Def.’s Ex. 30)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

22. The Du Bois Lumber Co. 23/298 Deed

The **Du Bois Lumber Co. 23/298 deed (Def.’s Ex. 31)** provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of Ten (\$10.00) Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and other valuable considerations moving to it, Du Bois Lumber Co., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Oregon, hereinafter called the grantor, subject to the conditions and reservations hereinafter made, does bargain, sell, grant,[]and convey to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, a corporation, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

A strip of land 100 feet in width, being 50 feet on each side of the center line of the grantee’s railway as the same is now surveyed and located through the following described real property, to wit:

The north half of the northwest quarter of Section 14, Township 3 North, Range 8 West; The northwest quarter of Section 28, Township 3 North, Range 7 West; The north half of the southwest quarter of Section 13 and the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 14, Township 3 North, Range 8 West; Also Lots one, two, three, four and six of Section 22, Township 3 North, Range 9 West; Also the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter and the southwest quarter of the southwest quarter of Section 18; the north half of Section 19; the northwest quarter of Section 20 and the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 20 in Township 3 North, Range 7 West of the Willamette Meridian, in said county and state.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining; giving and granting unto the grantee also the right to operate a railway line thereover.

This deed is made subject to the following conditions and reservations:

The grantor reserves the right to construct across the land above conveyed and across the railway track of the grantee to be constructed thereon, a logging railroad at some suitable point, the point of crossing and the manner of crossing to be subject to the approval of the chief engineer of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and of an engineer to be selected by Du Bois Lumber Co.; the operation of said logging road, however, at no time to interfere with the operation by the grantee of its railway over the above described lands.

The grantor also reserves the right to lay water pipes of any size and kind under the right of way of the grantee, either across or along the same, in any part of Section 22, in Township 3 North, Range 9 West of the Willamette Meridian in said County and State, provided that where said pipes cross under the track of the grantee, the manner of laying the same shall be subject to the approval of two engineers, one to be selected by the grantor and one by the grantee, and the grantor reserves the right to go upon said right of way of the grantee, at any time, in order to lay and repair said water pipes, or to examine the condition thereof.

In consideration of the rights and easements and grants herein contained, the grantee agrees that the grantor shall not be held responsible for injury to the railroad and property of the grantee, its successors and assigns, or to the structures standing thereon, by falling or sliding timber or logs, provided the grantor uses due care to prevent such injury, and the grantor agrees that at all times when it is cutting timber on its lands adjoining said right of way of the grantee, which is in danger of falling or sliding on the railway track of the grantee, it will keep a man employed for the purpose of flagging the trains of the grantee, to the end that accidents shall be prevented.

To Have and to Hold unto the grantee[,] its successors and assigns forever. And the grantor does hereby covenant to and with the grantee, its successors and assigns, that it is seized in fee simple of the above described premises, and that it will warrant and defend the same unto the grantee, its successors and assigns against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

The court finds that the language of this deed viewed as a whole weighs in favor of finding that only an easement was granted. The deed uses the phrase “right of way”

in the body of the deed to refer to the interest being conveyed repeatedly. Indeed, the deed itself uses the word “easement” (“In consideration of the rights and easements and grants herein contained, . . .”). Although the deed contains language similar to that in the **Alley 5/475 deed**, because the deed expressly uses the word “easement” and uses the phrase “right of way” to refer to the interest being conveyed, the court finds that the **Du Bois Lumber Co. 23/298 deed (Def.’s Ex. 31)**, conveyed an easement to the railroad.

23. The Du Bois 24/40 Deed

The **DuBois 24/40 deed (Def.’s Ex. 32)** provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar[](\$1.00), the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Willie G. Du Bois and John E. Du Bois, her husband, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situated in the county of Tillamook and state of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land sixty feet in width being thirty feet on each side of the center line of grantee’s railway as the same is last located, staked out, surveyed and being constructed through the following described tract, to-wit:

* * * [Describing the tract through which the strip being conveyed runs] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold to the above named grantee and to its successors and assigns forever; the grantors confirming also to the grantee, its successors and assigns, the right to build, maintain and operate a line of railway thereover.

The aforesaid grantors do hereby covenant that they are the owners in fee simple of the above granted premises and that they will forever Warrant and Defend the same unto the said grantee, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court’s review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad’s use to only railroad purposes. Here, although the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), there is no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that the **Du Bois 24/40 deed (Def.’s Ex. 32)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

24. The Easom 11/515 Deed

The **Easom 11/515 deed (Def.’s Ex. 33)** provides in pertinent part:

Elnora [sic] F. Easement et vir.	Railway Deed.
to	No. 7463.
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE[]PRESENTS : [sic] That for and in consideration of the sum of Eight Hundred & 00/100 DOLLARS, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, Elnora [sic] F. Easom and Chas. E. Easom, wife and husband[,] do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lots One, two, six and seven in Section thirty six, in Township three North of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian, except a certain three acre tract in said Lot One [sic] heretofore sold to Felix Roy.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seized of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein

granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

As discussed above in the court’s analysis of the **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.’s Ex. 5)**, the court does not find that the term “Railway Deed” indicates an easement in the same way that a deed entitled “Right of Way Deed” does. Here, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$800), there is no reference to a “right of way” in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds the **Easom 11/515 deed (Def.’s Ex. 33)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

25. The Edwards 5/453 Deed

The **Edwards 5/453 deed (Def.’s Ex. 35)** provides in pertinent part:

Know all men by these Presents: that we, John D. Edwards and Celana [sic] C. Edwards, his wife, of Multnomah County, Oregon, in consideration of one dollar to us paid by The Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Oregon, do hereby bargain, sell and quitclaim unto the said corporation all that portion of the lands owned by said John D. Edwards in lot one (1) of Sec. 22 of T. 1 N. of R. 10 W. of the Willamette Meridian in Tillamook County, Oregon embraced in a strip of land 100 feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of the center line of the said corporation’s line of railway as now surveyed and located through all the land owned by said John D. Edwards in lot one aforesaid, being described as follows:

* * * [Description] * * *

To have and to hold unto the said corporation and its successors in interest in fee simple forever. Conveying hereby also a right to construct, operate and maintain a railway line along and upon said land.

By its express terms this deed conveyed the property “in fee simple forever.” The court therefore finds that the original parties’ intent is clear and that the **Edwards 5/453 deed (Def.’s Ex. 35)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.⁶

26. The Friday 72/526 Deed

The **Friday 72/526 deed (Def.’s Ex. 37)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 7th day of May 1906, between John W. Friday and Pearl Friday his wife, of Washington County, Oregon, parties of the first part, and the PACIFIC RAILWAY & NAVIGATION COMPANY, a Corporation, party of the se[con]d part, WITNESSETH:

That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of Twenty Five Dollars (\$25) to them in hand paid, by the party of the second [p]art, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged , [sic] have granted, bargained and sold[,] conveyed and confirmed and by these presents do grant , [sic] bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns , [sic] all that certain lot, piece, parcel and track of land, lying[,]being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and particularly described as a part of the South East Quarter of Sec. 25, T 2 N. R. 4 W., Will. Mer., to-wit:-

A strip of land 160 feet wide being 120 feet on the East side and 40 feet on the West side of the center line of the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company’s railway as now surveyed and located on said lands, and described as follows:

Beginning at a point where the center line of said Railroad Survey intersects the c enter [sic] of Dairy Creek, * * * Thence down the center of said Creek South 22 degree and 40 minutes East 170 feet and thence South 13 degree and 15 minutes west 93 feet to the West line of Right of Way; Thence South 32 degree and 18 minutes East along said Right of Way 96 feet to the center of Dairy Creek; thence North 80 degree and 22 minutes East 955 feet to the place of beginning and containing 0.96 acres.

Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.

⁶ As discussed in this court’s review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted “includes” the right to construct a railway does not limit the railroad use of the property to only railroad purposes.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said[]party of the second part and unto its successors and assigns forever.

Although this deed, has “incidental” uses of the phrase “right of way,” the court finds that the phrase “right of way” is not used to refer to the interest being conveyed, but only to describe the geographic location of the rail line. The deed also provides more than nominal consideration (\$25), lacks any railroad purpose language, and does not contain any commitment by the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Friday 72/526 deed (Def.’s Ex. 37)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

27. The Galvani 77/37 Deed

The **Galvani 77/37 deed (Def.’s Ex. 39)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE made this 11th day of April A. D. 1907, between W. H. Galvani, a single man[]of Portland, Multnomah, Oregon, party of the first part, and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, party of the second part[,] WITNESSETH:

That the said party of the first part for and in consideration of the sum of \$1 to him in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged[,] has granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell [sic] convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part and its successors and assigns, all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and being a portion of the Southwest quarter of Section 30, T. 3 N. R. 4 W. of the Will. Mer., being a strip of land 100 feet wide, being 50 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company’s railway as now surveyed, located and adopted across said lands, said center line being described as follows,[]to-wit

* * * [Description] * * * and containing 11.31 acres, reserving grade farm crossings at two points to be selected by the party of the first part.

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining and the

reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all and singular, the said premises, together with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and unto its successors and assigns forever. And the party of the first part does hereby covenant to and with the party of the second part, its successors and assigns, forever, that the party of the first part is the owner in fee simple of the tract of land hereinbefore described; That [sic] said tract of land is free from all incumbrances and that the party of the first part shall warrant and forever defend said tract of land against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

This deed provided nominal consideration (\$1) and the grantor reserved farm crossings. These are factors that weigh in favor of construing the deed as granting an easement. However, this deed precisely describes the land being conveyed with an express reference to the amount of acreage, does not contain any “right of way” language or any railroad purpose language. Thus, when viewing the deed as a whole, the court finds that the grantor reserved certain crossing rights but granted a fee to the railroad. Therefore, this court finds that the **Galvani 77/37 deed (Def.’s Ex. 39)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

28. The Gattrell 13/311 Deed

The **Gattrell 13/311 deed (Def.’s Ex. 40)** provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of One (\$1.00), to him in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, F.J. Gattrell an unmarried man, hereinafter called the grantor, does bargain, sell, grant[,] convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, a strip of land sixty (60) feet in width, being thirty (30) feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is now located, surveyed and staked out through lot two (2) of section twenty nine (29) in township two (2) North of range ten (10) West of the Willamette Meridian, in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To have and to hold unto the [above named] grantee and to its successors and assigns forever, confirming to the grantee likewise the right to build, maintain and operate a railway line thereover.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court's review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad's use to only railroad purposes.. Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1.00), without any "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Gattrell 13/311 deed (Def.'s Ex. 40)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

29. The Goodspeed 16/487 Deed

The **Goodspeed 16/487 deed (Def.'s Ex. 41)** provides in pertinent part:

D. R. Goodspeed and wife	RAILWAY DEED.
to	NO. 5802.
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	

KNOWN ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One & 00/100 DOLLARS[,] the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, We, [sic] D. E. Goodspeed and M. J. Goodspeed, husband and wife, of Tillamook County, Oregon, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit; [sic]

"A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is now surveyed and located through

The [sic] South East quarter of the North East quarter of Section thirteen in Township one South of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian[.]

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

As discussed above in the court's analysis of the **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.'s Ex. 5)**, the court does not find that the term "Railway Deed" indicates an easement in the same way that a deed entitled "Right of Way Deed" does. Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Goodspeed 16/487 deed (Def.'s Ex. 41)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

30. The Goodspeed 9/200 Deed

The **Goodspeed 9/200 deed (Def.'s Ex. 42)** and provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of Thirty four Hundred and sixteen and 60/100 Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, H. F. Goodspeed and Lillian A Goodspeed, husband and wife, of Tillamook City, Tillamook County, Oregon: [sic] hereinafter called the grantors, do bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

A strip of land fifty[(50) feet wide being twenty five (25) [feet] on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through the South East quarter of the North West quarter and that part of Lot seven lying West of a certain right of way formerly conveyed by said Goodspeed to said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, all lying in Section thirty, in Township one South of

Range nine West of Willamette Meridian, the center line of the right of way hereby conveyed being more particularly described as follows, to wit: Beginning at a point which is identical with Station 18 plus 84.5 on the main line of said P.R.+N. Co., which point is located by beginning at Sta. 00 plus 00 on said main line, 4407.8 feet South and 281.5 East of the ¼ Section corner between Secs [sic] 19 and 30, T 1 S R 9 W, and running thence N 1° 00' East 1884.5 feet to said Station 18 plus 84.5 which is the initial point of the right of way hereby intended to be described and conveyed, thence following a spiral to the left a distance of 120 feet and consuming 7° 30' of the angle, thence following a 12° 30' curve to the left a distance of 609.3 feet, thence following a spiral to the left a distance of 120 feet and consuming 7° 30' of angle, to Sta. 8 plus 49.3; thence South 89° 50' West 1142 feet more or less to the East line of Lot two in said Section 30.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To have and to hold unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all incumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court finds that the language of this deed viewed as a whole weighs in favor of finding that a fee was granted. This deed uses the phrase “right of way” three different times. As explained above, the use of the phrase “right of way” to describe the interest conveyed and not the geographic location of the land conveyed is an indication of intent to convey an easement. The deed first uses the phrase “right of way” when describing the strip of land being conveyed as being “located through . . . that part of Lot seven lying West of a certain right of way formerly conveyed by said Goodspeed to said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company.” This use of the phrase “right of way” is clearly referencing an interest other than the interest being conveyed and thus the deed’s first use of the phrase “right of way” is “incidental.” However, this deed uses the phrase “right of

way” twice more. The deed grants and conveys to the railroad “[a] strip of land [of a certain width] . . . , the center line of the **right of way** hereby conveyed being more particularly described as follows, to wit: . . .” (emphasis added). As used here, the language “the right of way hereby conveyed” supports a finding that the phrase “right of way” is being used to describe the interest being conveyed. The deed’s final use of the phrase “right of way” occurs in the context of its precise description of the land conveyed, when the deed refers to “Station 18 plus 84.5” as being “the initial point of the **right of way** *hereby intended to be described and conveyed*” (emphasis added). Here too this language is using the phrase “right of way” to describe the interest being conveyed by the deed.

However, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$3,416.60), there is no mention of a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Based on these factors read in combination with the mixed use of the term “right of way,” the court finds that the **Goodspeed 9/200 deed (Def.’s Ex. 42)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

31. The Goodwin 81/147 Deed

The **Goodwin 81/147 deed (Def.’s Ex. 43)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of Three Hundred and [Fifty] Dollars, to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Nathan J. Goodwin and M. M. Goodwin his wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property, situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit: A strip of land One hundred feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of the center line of the track of the

grantee, as the same is surveyed and located through the east half of the southwest quarter of section twenty seven in township three north of range five west, together with the appurtenances[,] tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, together also with the right to maintain and operate a railroad thereover. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever. The grantors, above named, do covenant with the grantee, and with its successors and assigns, that they are seized of the said premises in fee simple, and that they will, and their heirs, executors and administrators shall, warrant and defend the same against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court’s review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad does not limit the railroad’s use to only railroad purposes. Here, the consideration is not nominal (\$350), there is no reference to a “right of way” in the title or body of the deed, nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Goodwin 81/147 deed (Def.’s Ex. 43)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

32. The Hagen 75/279 Deed

The **Hagen 75/279 deed (Def.’s Ex. 44)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 22 day of April, 1907, between Bridget Hagen (a [sic] single woman) of Portland Multnomah County, Oregon, party of the first part, and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, party of the second part, WITNESSETH:

That the said party[]of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar (\$1) and other good and valuable considerations, to her in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, h[]ave [sic] granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed, and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns, all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in Washington County,[]Oregon, to-wit:

Being a portion of Section 30, T. 3 N. R. 4 W. of the Will. Mer. described as follows:

A strip of land 100 feet wide being 50 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's railway, as surveyed, located and adopted across said lands, said center line being described as follows:

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders[,] rents, issues and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said party of the[]second part and unto its successors and assigns forever. And the party of the first part does hereby covenant to and with the party of the second part, its successors and assigns forever, that the party of the first part is the owner in fee simple of the tract of land hereinbefore described; that said tract of land is free from all incumbrances and that the party of the first part shall warrant and forever defend said tract of land against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Hagen 75/279 deed (Def.’s Ex. 44)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

33. The Hamblin 85/284 Deed

The **Hamblin 85/284 deed (Def.’s Ex. 45)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That J.M. Hamblin, an unmarried man for and in consideration of the[]sum of One Dollars, to him in hand[]paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged[,] does bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit: A strip of land one hundred feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific

Railway and[]NavigaTion [sic] Company, as the same is surveyed and located through the Northwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section thirty two (32) Township Three(3) [sic] North range [sic] five (5) West Willamette Meridian.

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to successors and assigns forever.

The aforesaid grantor J. M. Hamblin does hereby covenant that he is the owner in fee simple of[]the above granted premises, and that he will forever warrant and defend the same unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns, against the lawful claims of all parties whomsoever.

Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Hamblin 85/284 deed (Def.’s Ex. 45)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

34. The Handley 13/34 Deed

The **Handley 13/34 deed (Def.’s Ex. 48)** provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by these Presents That for and in consideration of the sum of Four Hundred and 00/100 Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I, Lola L. Handley, a widow, of Tillamook, Tillamook County, Oregon, hereinafter called the grantor, do bargain, sell, grant and convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through a certain tract of land lying between the lands of Maire Murphy and the meander line of Tillamook Bay in Lot four of Section 21 Township 1 North Range 10 West. also [sic] through Block '21' in the Town of East Garibaldi and the Tide land fronting and abutting upon that portion of said Town of East Garibaldi which lies in Lot 2 of said

Section 21. Also through the Tide land fronting and abutting upon that certain tract in said Section 21 known as the Ralston five acre tract [sic] also through a certain four acre tract in Lot four of Section twenty all in Township one North of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian [sic] the intention being to convey unto the said grantee[,] its successors and assigns all that portion of any and all lands now owned by me in said Sections[]twenty and twenty one Township one North of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian which lies within the right of way limits of the railway of the grantee, as the same is now surveyed and located through my said lands.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To have and to hold unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The court finds that the language of this deed viewed as a whole weighs in favor of finding that a fee was granted. Although the deed uses the phrase “right of way,” the court finds that the phrase is used in this deed to describe the location of the property and not the property interest being conveyed. Additionally, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$400), there is no mention of railroad purposes and the deed does not contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Handley 13/34 deed (Def.’s Ex. 48)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

35. The Hannan 72/548 Deed

The **Hannan 72/548 deed (Def.’s Ex. 49)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 21st day of August 1906, between Henry Hannon and Ella Hannon, his wife, of Washington County, Oregon, parties of the first part, and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, party of the first part, WITNESSETH:

That said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar (\$1) and other good and valuable considerations to them in hand paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed and by these presents do

grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns, all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and particularly described as a portion of Sec. 4 and 5, T 2 N. R. 4 W., a strip of land 80 feet wide, being 40 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company's Railway, as now surveyed and located on said land and described as follows:-

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said[]party of the second part and unto its successors and assigns forever. And the parties of the first part hereby covenant to and with the party of the second part, its successors and assigns forever, that the parties of the first part, [sic] are the owners in fee simple of the tract of land above described, and the whole thereof, that said premises are free from all incumbrances, and that the parties of the first part, their heirs, executors and administrators, shall warrant and forever defend the above described and granted premises and every part and parcel thereof against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Hannan 72/548 deed (Def.’s Ex. 49)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

36. The Hannan 72/549 Deed

The **Hannan 72/549 deed (Def.’s Ex. 50)**, which is very similar to the above analyzed Hannan deed, provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 21st day of August 1906, between Henry Hannon and Ella Hannon, his wife, of Washington County, Oregon, parties of the first part, and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, parties of the first part, WITNESSETH:

THAT the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of \$1.00, to them in hand paid, by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed, and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns, all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and particularly described as a portion of Section 4, T. 2 N. R. 4 W., a strip of land 60 feet wide, and 680 feet long, adjoining the right of Way [sic] of the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company's Railway, on the Right, [sic] and described as follows:-

Beginning at a point 526 5/10 feet South of and 66 5/10 feet East of the North West corner of the South West quarter of the North West quarter of said Sec. 4; Running thence South 2 degrees and 38 minutes West along Right of Way, 242 5/10 feet; thence in a Southerly direction by a spiral to left, 90 feet; thence by a 4 degree curve to the left, 355 feet; thence East parallel to the North line of said Section 4, 61 5/10 feet; thence in a Northerly direction on a 4 degree curve to the Right 355 feet, thence by a spiral to right, 90 feet; thence North 2 degrees and 30 minutes East, 264 3/10 to the North line of said Hannan's land; thence South 72 degrees and 40 minutes West, 61 1/10 feet to place of beginning and containing 0.96 acres.

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said[]party of the second part and unto its successors and assigns forever. And the parties of the * * * first part hereby covenant to and with the party of the second part[,] its successors and assigns forever, that the parties of the first part, [sic] are the owners in fee simple of the tract of land a bove [sic] described, and the whole thereof, that said premises are fee from all incumbrances, and that the parties of the first part, their heirs, executors and administrators shall warrant and forever defend the above described and granted premises and every part and parcel thereof against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or

fences, the court finds that the **Hannan 72/549 deed (Def.'s Ex. 50)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

37. The Hannan 99/354 Deed

The **Hannan 99/354 deed (Def.'s Ex. 51)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That Ella Hannan widow, of the County of Washington State of Oregon, in consideration of the sum of Five Hundred (\$500.00) Dollars to her paid by Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, a corporation, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, has bargained and sold and by these[]presents does grant, bargain[,] sell and convey unto said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company[,] its successors and assigns all of the following describe premises located in Washington County, Oregon. [sic] Beginning[at a point on the east line of the right of way of said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, 1020 feet south and 135 feet east of the northwest corner of the southwest quarter of Section 4, Township 2 North range [sic] 4, Willamette Meridian, said point being 100 feet distant from main line and 30 feet distant from the north leg of the wye track as now located; running thence easterly and 30 feet distant from said wye track on 18° 30' curve, 360 feet; thence easterly and 30 feet distant from wye track extended 260 feet; thence southerly at right angles, 60 feet; thence westerly[at right angles and 30 feet distant from said wye track extend 275 feet; thence southerly and 30 feet distance from south leg of said wye track, 510 feet to the east of said right of way, which point is 40 feet from the main line[;] thence northerly along the said right of way on a 40° curve 400 feet; then north 62 feet; thence northerly along the right of way on a 4° curve parallel to the main line and 100 feet distant therefrom, 215 feet to the place of beginning containing[]1.9 acres, together with all and singular the tenements , [sic] hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining. The grantee herein agrees to fence said tract herein conveyed with a hog-tight fence. Grantor reserves the right to one private crossing at grade with gates[]over the tract above described at a point to be mutually agreed upon.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD[]said premises unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns forever, and the grantor herein does covenant to and with the above named grantee that she is lawfully seised in fee simple of said granted premises that the same are free from all incumbrances and that she will warrant and forever defend the said premises, and every part and parcel thereof, against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

The court finds that the language of this deed viewed as a whole weighs in favor of finding that a fee was granted. First, the court has examined the “right of way” language in this deed which is used throughout the deed four times. In each instance, the phrase “right of way” is not being used to describe the property interest being conveyed but to describe a location. Thus, as explained above, this deed’s use of the phrase “right of way” does not indicate that an easement was conveyed. Although this deed contains a commitment by the railroad to build fences, the deed provides for substantial consideration (\$500) and has no mention of railroad purposes. Accordingly for all of these reasons this court finds that the **Hannan 99/354 deed (Def.’s Ex. 51)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

38. The Hardman 5/451 Deed

The **Hardman 5/451 deed (Def.’s Ex. 52)** provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by These Presents[:] That for and in consideration of the sum of \$250 to me in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I[,] Florence A. Hardman, do hereby grant, sell and convey to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors and assigns forever: all that portion of the land owned by me embraced in a strip of land 100 ft. wide, being 50 ft. on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company’s railway, as now surveyed, located and adopted thru the lands of the aforesaid Florence Hardman, in Lot 2, Sec. 21., T. 1 N. R. 10 W., W. M. said center line being more particularly described as follows:

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and its successors and assigns forever; together with the right to build to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway and telegraph line.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court’s review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad’s use to only railroad purposes. Here, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$250), there is no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that **Hardman 5/451 deed (Def.’s Ex. 52)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

39. The Harter 29/115 Deed

The **Harter 29/115 deed (Def.’s Ex. 53)** is entitled “Warranty Deed. No. 21042.” and provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That [sic] we John R. Harter, his wife, of the County of Tillamook in the State of Oregon, in consideration of the sum of Three Hundred Seventy-Five (\$375.00) Dollars, paid by Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of Oregon, having its principal office at the City of Portland in said State, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained, sold and conveyed, and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns, the following described parcel of land, situate in Tillamook County, in the State of Oregon, to-wit:

Our undivided two-thirds (2/3) interest in and to that certain tract or parcel of land in Tillamook County, Oregon, more particularly described as follows:-

All of a strip of land one hundred feet in width, being fifty feet in width on each side of the center line of the P. R. & N. CO. as the same is now located and constructed across the Northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of section 13, Township 1 South Range 10 West, Willamette Mariden, [sic], and also across the north six rods (Ninety-nine feet of the southeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 13. [sic] Said center line being more particularly described as follows:-

* * * [Description] * * *

The above described strip of land containing 3.80 acres more or less.

It being the intention to convey our undivided two-thirds (2/3) interest in the right-of-way of said railroad Company [sic] as now used and which was acquired by us [the grantors] through deeds from Monta Davidson and Josie A. Deeter, together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and also all our estate, right, title and interest in and to the same, including dower and claim of dower.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD The [sic] above described and granted premises unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company[,] its successors and assigns forever. And we the grantors above named do covenant to and with the above named grantee, its successors and assigns, that we are lawfully seized in fee simple of the above granted premises, that the above granted premises are free from all incumbrances, and that we will and our heirs, executors and administrators, shall warrant and defend the above granted[]premises, and every part and parcel thereof, against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

The court finds that the language of this deed viewed as a whole weighs in favor of finding that a fee was granted. Although the deed uses the phrase “right of way” in the body of the deed, from context, it is clear that this deed’s “right-of-way” language does not refer to a property interest but is being used to describe the geographic location of the land being conveyed. Here, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$375), there is no mention of a railroad purpose, nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Harter 29/115 deed (Def.’s Ex. 53)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

40. The Haugen 9/204 Deed

The **Haugen 9/204 deed (Def.’s Ex. 54)** provides in pertinent part:

Thore [sic] Hagen.

to

Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.

RAILWAY DEED.

NO. 5806.

KNOWN ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One & 00/100 DOLLARS[,] the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, Thore [sic] Hagen and Evia Jane Hagen, husband and wife, of Tillamook County, Oregon, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee, as the same is surveyed and located through the following described tract, to-wit:

* * * [Describing the tract through which the strip being conveyed runs] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

As discussed above in the court’s analysis of the **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.’s Ex. 5)**, the court does not find that the term “Railway Deed” indicates an easement in the same way that a deed entitled “Right of Way Deed” does. Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Haugen 9/204 deed (Def.’s Ex. 54)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

41. The Hobson 13/331 Deed

The **Hobson 13/331 deed (Def.’s Ex. 56)** provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of Three Hundred and 00/100 Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, We, Joanna Hobson and Frank P. Hobson, wife and husband, of Tillamook County, Oregon hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lots three and that part of Lot two lying East of a certain tract in Lot two owned by Theodore Parks, all in Section twenty-two, Township one North of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian, on what is known and designated as the Coast Line Route.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining. It is hereby understood and agreed that this deed shall not convey to said Railway Company any right of way on any lands of the grantor lying East of the curve now staked out and located to connect said Coast Line Route with the right of way heretofore conveyed by the grantors herein to said Grantee.

To Have and to Hold unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court finds that the language of this deed viewed as a whole weighs in favor of finding that a fee was granted. Here the use of the term “right of way” is used twice in the body of the deed. In both instances the term “right of way” is used to describe a property interest being conveyed. However, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$300), there is no mention of a railroad purpose, nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that the **Hobson 13/331 deed (Def.’s Ex. 56)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

42. The Jeffries 85/70 Deed

The **Jeffries 85/70 deed (Def.'s Ex. 59)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That Minnie Jeffries and George H.[]Jeffries her husband for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby bargain, sell[,] grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit: A strip of land one hundred feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as the same is surveyed and located through the North half of the Northwest quarter of Section Thirty (30) Township three (3) North, Range Four (4) West of W.M.

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances, thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever.

The aforesaid grantors Minnie Jeffries and George H. Jeffries do hereby covenant that they are the owners in fee simple of the above granted premises, and that they will forever warrant and defend the same unto the Pacific Railway and[]Navigation Company, its successors and assigns, against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Jeffries 85/70 deed (Def.'s Ex. 59)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

43. The Johnson 9/610 Deed

The **Johnson 9/610 deed (Def.'s Ex. 61)** provides in pertinent part:

Samuel Johnson
to
Pacific Railway and Navigation Company.

RAILWAY DEED.
NO. 6636.

* * * [EMPTY SPACE] * * *

-----MAP-----

-----Showing RightofWay [sic] across-----

-----A Tract of land 209½ ft sq. Sec 22 T1N.R10W -----

-----Scale “1400ft”-----

* * * [Drawing or map] * * *

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of Twenty five and 00/100 DOLLARS, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I, Samuel Johnson, widower, and sole heir at law of Annie Johnson, deceased, of Tillamook County, Oregon, hereinafter called the grantnrs [sic] do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through a certain tract of land in Lot eight of section twenty two, Township one North of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian, more particularly described as follows;- [sic] Commencing at a stake on the meander line marked with a cross, running thence in a Southerly direction 209½ feet, thence Westerly 209½ feet, thence Northerly 209½ feet, thence Easterly 209½ feet to the place of beginning. Together with the appurtenances, tenements,[]and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors [sic] above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court finds that the language of this deed viewed as a whole weighs in favor of finding that a fee was granted. Here, although the deed at the outset uses the phrase “right of way” it is unclear if it is in reference to the interest being conveyed or is a referencing the geographic description of the drawing that was included which is labeled “MAP Showing Right[]of[]Way[]across A Tract of land

209 ½ ft. sq. Sec. 22 T1N.R.10W[.]” Additionally, as discussed above in the court’s analysis of the **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.’s Ex. 5)**, the court does not find that the term “Railway Deed” indicates an easement in the same way that a deed entitled “Right of Way Deed” does. Furthermore, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$25), there is no mention of a railroad purpose, nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Looking at the whole of the deed, the court finds that the **Johnson 9/610 deed (Def.’s Ex. 61)**, conveyed a fee to the railroad.

44. The Jones 105/456 Deed

The **Jones 105/456 deed (Def.’s Ex. 62)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That B.H. Jones and Angie C. Jones,[]his wife, of Forest Grove, Oreg. [sic] in consideration of One Dollars, [sic] to them paid by Southern Pacific Company, a corporation duly organized & existing under & by virtue of the[]laws of the State of Kentucky[,] do hereby remise, release and forever QUITCLAIM unto the said Southern Pacific Company and unto its successors and assigns all their right , [sic] title and interest in and to the following describes parcel of real estate, situate in County of Washington[,] State of Oregon,[]to-wit:

A strip of land 17 feet in width, being 8.5 feet on each side of that portion of the center line of a spur track now constructed at Wolcott in Sec.[]36,[]T. 3 North ,[]R. [sic] 5 West. W.M., which lies outside the[]100 foot right of way of the Southern Pacific Company’s Tillamook branch as constructed through said Sec. 36,[]said center line being more particularly described as follows: Beginning at the[]intersection of the West line of Sec 36, Township 3 North, Range 5 West, W.M., with the center line[]of Southern Pacific Company’s main track as now constructed: thence North 88° 31’ East on said center line 419.3; thence * * * ; thence southwesterly on a 15° curve to the left 109 feet to a point in Southern Pacific Company’s Southerly line of 100 foot right of way, which point is the point of beginning of description of center line of 17 foot strip; thence continuing * * * : said strip of land containing 0.071 acres, more or less, all in Washington County , [sic] Oregon. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, the same, together with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances

thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining to the said Southern Pacific Company and to its successors and assigns forever.

The court finds that the language of this deed viewed as a whole weighs in favor of finding that a fee was granted. Here, the court finds that the deed's use of the phrase "right of way" is not a description of the interest being conveyed but provides a geographic location. Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Jones 105/456 deed (Def.'s Ex. 62)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

45. The Jones 94/225 Deed

The **Jones 94/225 deed (Def.'s Ex. 63)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That we , B. H. Jones & Angie C. Jones, his wife, of the County of Washington, in the State of Oregon, in consideration of the sum of One Dollar paid by Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of Oregon, having its principal office at the City of Portland, in said state, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained, sold and conveyed and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns, the following described parcel of land, situate in Washington County, State of Oregon, to-wit: Commencing at a point in Section thirty-six (36) Township three (3) North Range five (5) West of Willamette Meridian, on the southerly right of way line of Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, said point being fifty (50) feet distant [sic] at right angles from Engineer Station 1275+38 of the said railroad, which point is 740 feet, more or less, east of and 295 feet, more or less, south of the northwest corner of said Section thirty six (36) and the initial point of the following described land; thence in a southwesterly direction along said right of way line a distance of 88 feet, more or less, to a point fifty (50) feet distant at right angles to Engineer Station 1276+20; thence * * * * . Said described land contains an area of 0.2 o[f] [sic] an acre, more or less. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said descri bed [sic] premises unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns

forever, for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a spur track thereon, and if the said spur track shall be taken up or abandoned, then the above described and granted premises shall revert to and become the property of the grantors, their successors and assigns.

The court finds that the language of this deed viewed as a whole weighs in favor of finding that only an easement was granted. First, the deed makes clear that the purpose of the deed is to grant an easement for the purposes of allowing the railroad to build spur track and that if that track is taken up or abandoned the property shall revert to the grantors. Specifically, the deed provides that “TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said descri bed [sic] premises unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns forever, for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a spur track thereon, and if the said spur track shall be taken up or abandoned, then the above described and granted premises shall revert to and become the property of the grantors, their successors and assigns.”⁷ This language, together with the nominal consideration paid (\$1), indicates that only an easement was granted. Additionally, the deed uses the phrase “right of way” twice to describe the interest that is being conveyed to the railroad. Therefore, the court finds that the **Jones 94/225 deed (Def.’s Ex. 63)**, conveyed an easement to the railroad.

46. The Kostur 72/458 Deed

The **Kostur 72/458 deed (Def.’s Ex. 66)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 1st day of December 1906, between
A. Kostur and Anna Kostur, his wife, of Washington County, Oregon,

⁷ At oral argument, the government itself “concede[d]” that this language “that imposes and suggests a limitation on the use of the property means that [the deed] likely conveyed an easement.” Arg. Tr. 52:4-10.

parties of the first part, and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, party of the second part,

WITNESSETH: That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of \$20.00 to them in hand paid, by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns, all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying,[]being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and particularly described as a portion of Section 4, T 2 N. R. 4 W., a strip of land 60 feet wide, by 526 5/10 feet long, adjoining the right of Way [sic] of the Pacific Railway + Navigation Railway, on the right, and described as follows:-

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof- [sic]

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part[]and unto its successors and assigns forever. And the parties of the first part, hereby covenant to and with the party of the second part, its successors and assigns, that the parties of the first part, [sic] are the owners in fee simple of the tract of land above described, and the whole thereof, That [sic] said premises are free from all incumbrances, and that the parties of the first part, their heirs, executors and administrators, shall warrant and forever defend the above described and granted premises and every part and parcel thereof against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

The court finds that the language of this deed viewed as a whole weighs in favor of finding that a fee was granted. Here, the court finds that the deed’s use of the phrase “right of way” is not a description of the interest being conveyed but provides a geographic location. Additionally, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$20), there is no mention of a railroad purpose, and there is not any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that the **Kostur 72/458 deed (Def.’s Ex. 66)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

47. The Kostur 72/459 Deed

The **Kostur 72/459 deed (Def.'s Ex. 67)** is practically identical to the above analyzed Kostur deed and provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 1st day of December 1906, between A. Kostur, and Anna Kostur, his wife, of Washington County, Oregon, parties of the first part, and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, party of the second part,

WITNESSETH: That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of \$30.00 to them in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns, all that certain lot, piece, parcel and track of land, lying, being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and particularly described as a portion of Section 4 and 5, T. 2 N. R. 4 W., a strip of land 80 feet wide, being 40 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company's Railway, as now surveyed and located on said lands and described as follows:-

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining , [sic] and the reversion[]and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part[]and unto its successors and assigns forever. And the parties of the first part, hereby covenant to and with the party of the se[c]ond part, its successors and assigns, that the parties of the first part, [sic] are the owners in fee simple of the tract of land above described, and the whole thereof, That said premises are free from all incumbrances, and that the parties of the first part, their heirs, executors and administrators, shall warrant and forever defend the above described and granted premises and every part and parcel thereof against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

Here, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$30), there is no reference to a "right of way" in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures

such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Kostur 72/459 deed (Def.'s Ex. 67)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

48. The Large 5/536 Deed

The **Large 5/536 deed (Def.'s Ex. 69)** provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men By These Presents:

That for and in consideration of the sum of \$250.00 to her in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Mrs. J. Large does hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever: a strip of land 100 ft. wide, being 50 ft. on each side of the center line of the railway of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as now surveyed and located thru this land of the aforesaid Mrs. J. Large in Lots 3 and 4, Sec. 21, T. 1 N. R. 10 W., W.M. said center line being more particularly described as follows, to wit:

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining;

To Have and to Hold unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors and assigns forever; together with the right to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway and telegraph line.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court's review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad's use to only railroad purposes.. Here, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$250), there is no "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds the **Large 5/536 deed (Def.'s Ex. 69)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

49. The Latimer 6/429 Deed

The **Latimer 6/429 deed (Def.'s Ex. 71)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOWN ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That I, Permelia [sic] A. Latimer, widow, of Tillamook County, Oregon, in consideration of Six Hundred and Forty (640.00) Dollars to me paid by the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, a corporation organized and doing business within the State of Oregon, have and do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said corporation, its successors and assigns, a strip of land across my farm now occupied by my son, William Latimer, being parts of Section Eighteen (18) and Nineteen (19) in Township One (1) South Range Nine (9) [sic] West of the Willamette Meridian, Tillamook County, Oregon, said strip being One Hundred feet wide and lying fifty feet wide on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee, which center line is described so far as it affects our land, as follows:

* * * [Description] * * *

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns forever, also hereby granting to such corporation and its assigns the right to build, maintain and operate over said lands a rail way [sic] and telegraph line.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court’s review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad’s use to only railroad purposes. Here, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$250), there is no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds the **Latimer 6/429 deed (Def.’s Ex. 71)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

50. The Marey 5/477 Deed

The **Marey 5/477 deed (Def.’s Ex. 72)** provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by These Presents: That I, Frank Marey, unmarried, of Garibaldi, Tillamook County, State of Oregon, in consideration of the sum of \$100.00, to me in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, all that portion owned by me of the Ralston track, in Sec. 21, T. 1 N. R.10 W., W. M. embraced in a **strip of land** 76 ft. wide, being 50 ft[.] on the south side of the center line of the Pacific Railway

and Navigation Company's railway, as now surveyed and located **thru my premises**, and 26 ft. on the north side of said center line, said center line being more particularly described as follows:

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold the above described and granted premises unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever; together with the right to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway and telegraph line, and I Frank Marey, the grantor above named, do covenant to and with the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, the above named grantee, its successors and assigns that the above granted premises are free from all incumbrances, and that I will, and my heirs, executors and administrators, shall warrant and forever defend the above granted premises, and every part and parcel thereof against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court's review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad's use to only railroad purposes. Here, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$100), there is no "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that the **Marey 5/477 deed (Def.'s Ex. 72)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

51. The Maroney 11/513 Deed

The **Maroney 11/513 deed (Def.'s Ex. 73)** provides in pertinent part:

Matt Maroney	RAILWAY DEED.
to	NO. 7461
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	

KNOWN ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One & 00/100 DOLLARS, [sic] the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I Matt Maroney, unmarried, of Garibaldi, in Tillamook County, Oregon, hereinafter called the grantors, [sic] do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its

successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A strip of land sixty (60) feet wide being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lot three (3) of Section twenty nine , [sic] in Township two North of Range ten West of the Willamette Meridian. Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever. The grantors [sic] above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

As discussed above in the court’s analysis of the **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.’s Ex. 5)**, the court does not find that the term “Railway Deed” indicates an easement in the same way that a deed entitled “Right of Way Deed” does. Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Maroney 11/513 deed (Def.’s Ex. 73)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

52. The McDonald 5/473 Deed

The **McDonald 5/473 deed (Def.’s Ex. 74)** provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by These Presents : [sic] That for and in consideration of the sum of \$50.00 to him in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, J.S. McDonald unmarried, does grant, bargain, sell, and convey to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, a strip of land 100 ft. wide, being 50 ft. on each side of the center line of the railway of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as now surveyed and located thru the lands of the aforesaid J.S. McDonald, in Lot 2, Sec. 22, T. 1 N.R. 10 W., W. M., said center line being more particularly described as follows, to wit:

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining;

To Have and to Hold unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors and assigns forever : [sic] together with the right to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway and telegraph line[.]

For the same reasons as discussed in this court’s review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad’s use to only railroad purposes. Here, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$50), there is no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that the **McDonald 5/473 deed (Def.’s Ex. 74)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

53. The McMillan 11/328 Deed

The **McMillan 11/328 deed (Def.’s Ex. 75)** provides in pertinent part:

Nillus McMillan and wife	Railway Deed.
to	No. 7181.
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That for and in consideration of the sum of Three Hundred & 00/100 DOLLARS , the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, We, Nillus McMillan and Sarah McMillan, husband and wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell[,] grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property, situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A strip of land Sixty [sic] (60) feet wide, being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through

Beginning at the mouth of a certain water ditch in Lot three of Section twenty Township two North of Range ten west, running hence in a South easterly direction following said ditch to its intersection with a small lake, thence out South across said lake to its South Bank, thence in an

Easterly direction following the foot of the hill to the East line of said Lot three, thence North on said line to the Nehalem Riven, thence Southerly on line of ordinary high water mark to point of beginning, containing 10 acres more or less, all in Sec. 20, T. 2 N. R. 10 W. Also the north half of South East quarter and West half of North East quarter of Section 20, T. 2 N. R. 10 W. all being situated in Tillamook County, Oregon.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever. The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

As discussed above in the court’s analysis of the **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.’s Ex. 5)**, the court does not find that the term “Railway Deed” indicates an easement in the same way that a deed entitled “Right of Way Deed” does. Here, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$300), there is no mention of “right of way” in the title or body of the deed, no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that the **McMillan 11/328 deed (Def.’s Ex. 75)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

54. The McMillan 11/83 Deed

The **McMillan 11/83 deed (Def.’s Ex. 76)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That for and in consideration of the sum of Three Hundred no/100 Dollars to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Nillus McMillan and Sarah McMillan, his wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

Beginning at Stone “A” the initial point in the survey of the Townsite of Garibaldi in Section Twenty-one, [sic], Township One [sic]

North of Range Ten [sic] West of the Willamette Meridian and running thence north sixteen degrees 0' West twenty-five feet; thence East along the right-of-way line on a curve to the left with a radius of 714.5 feet a distance of 62.5 feet; thence on a spiral to the left 57.5 feet; thence North sixty-four degrees thirty minute east seventy feet to the east line of said McMillan's land; thence South sixteen degrees 0' east 46.5 feet to the southeast corner of said McMillan's land; thence South seventy-four degrees 0' west[]along said McMillian's south line 187 feet to the place of beginning and containing 14/100ths. acres.

Together with all the appurtenances, hereditaments, and tenements thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the above named grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, together with the right to build, maintain and operate a railway line thereover. The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever, except only the Astoria & Columbia River Railroad Company under a certain contract or option given by the grantors to said last named corporation.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court's review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad's use to only railroad purposes. Additionally, the court finds that the use of the phrase "right of way" in this deed is not describing the interest conveyed but rather the geographic location. Additionally, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$300), and there is no requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that the **McMillan 11/83 deed (Def.'s Ex. 76)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

55. The Mendenhall 72/550 Deed

The **Mendenhall 72/550 deed (Albright, Def.'s Ex. 78)** provides in pertinent part:

Exhibit A

[Map or drawing]
Plat of Right of Way across Lands of
C. J. Mendenhall

* * * *

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That We, C. J. Mendenhall, unmarried of Washington County, Oregon, and Edward [M]endenhall, of Portland, Multnomah County, Oregon, in consideration of the sum of One Hundred and Thirty Dollars (\$130) to us paid, and in consideration of the conditions hereinafter imposed, do hereby bargain, sell, and convey unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, a Corporation, and unto its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property, lying, being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and described as follows: to-wit:- [sic]

A part of Section 4, T 2 N. R. 4 W., a strip of land 80 feet wide being 40 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, as now surveyed and located on said lands,[]and described as follows:-

* * * [Description] * * *

A plat of which Right of Way is hereto attached, marked “A” and made a part hereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said land unto the said Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, and unto unto [sic] its successors and assigns, as a Right of Way for it and its successors, with the agreement and providing that said Grantee, [sic] its successors a[n]d assigns , [sic] shall perpetually maintain lawful fences on each side of the said Right of Way hereinbefore described, and one cattle guard crossing at such point upon said Right of Way as the Grantors or their heirs or assigns shall designate, within thirty (30) days from the date of the delivery of this deed. And the Grantee , [sic] C. J. Mendenhall does for himself[,] his heirs and assigns, covenant to and with said Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, its successo[r]s and assigns, that said tract of land hereinbefore described is free from all incumbrances, save and except a lease in favor of one A. B. Davis, for whom said Davis clears [sic] the lands hereby conveyed but which if it does cover such land is to that extend and in some other respects is at least the result of carelessness on part of lessee and mistake and from which lease the grantee must secure a release at its own expense and that C. J. Mendenhall will forever warrant and defend the title to said premises unto the said Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, it successors and assigns forever.

The court finds that the language of this deed viewed as a whole weighs in favor of finding that only an easement was granted. This deed uses the phrase “right of way”

several different times. The deed includes a drawing which it labels “Exhibit A” and describes as “Plat of Right of Way across Lands of C. J. Mendenhall.” In this context, this deed, like the **Johnson 9/610 deed (Def.’s Ex. 61)** previously discussed, is using the label “Right of Way” in a way that is akin to the way in which a deed entitled “Right of Way” deed uses the phrase “Right of Way” in its title to indicate an interest in property. This is further confirmed when the deed states “A plat of which Right of Way is hereto attached, marked ‘A’ and made a part hereof.”

The deed also contains the following language “TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said land unto the said Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, and unto unto [sic] its successors and assigns, as a Right of Way for it and its successors,” The government agrees that this “deed’s use of the phrase ‘right of way’ in the habendum clause, rather than as part of the geographic description of the land conveyed, makes clear that it is imposing a limitation on the use of the land.” Def.’s Objs. at 4 n.1 (quoting *Bouche*, 293 P.2d at 209). This deed grants the estate to the railroad “as a Right of Way.” This language indicates the purpose for which the land is to be used and limits the estate being conveyed. The deed also contains the phrases “said Right of Way hereinbefore described” and “upon said Right of Way[.]” both of which are using the phrase “Right of Way” to refer to the interest being conveyed. Furthermore, the deed contains a commitment by the railroad to build and maintain fences and a cattle guard crossing.

Although this deed has substantial consideration (\$130), viewed in light of the deed as a whole, the factors weighs in favor of construing this deed to have conveyed

only an easement. Therefore, the court finds that the **Mendenhall 72/550 deed (Def.'s, Ex. 78)**, conveyed an easement to the railroad.⁸

56. The Noland 74/108 Deed

The **Noland 74/108 deed (Def.'s Ex. 79)** provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by these Presents, *That*
Mrs Lena Noland
of Portland xxxxxxxx *State of Oregon, in consideration of*
Seventy nine and twenty, one Hundredths (\$79.20/100) DOLLARS,
to me paid by Pacific Railway and Navigation Company
of Portland xxxxxx *State of Oregon, * * **
** * * * has bargained and sold, and by these presents does grant,*
bargain, sell and convey unto said
Pacific Railway Navigation Company[,] is [sic] successors
** * * and assigns, all the following bounded and described real property,*
situated in the County of Washington and State of Oregon:
A strip of land 100 feet wide being 50 feet on each side of the center
line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's Railway, as
surveyed, located and adopted across the south 1/2 of N W $\frac{1}{4}$ of Sec. 30.
[sic] T [sic] 3 N. R. 4 W- [sic] W. M. said center line being described as
follows: ** * * [Description] * * ** and containing 7.89 acres.
Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and
appurtenances thereto belonging or in anywise appertaining and also all
her estate, right, title and interest in and to the same,
including dower and claim of dower.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described and granted premises
unto the said
PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY[,] its
successors ** * * and assigns forever. And*
Mrs. Lena Noland[,]
grantor above named do es [sic] *covenant to and with Pacific Railway and*
Navigation Company
the above named grantee[,] is [sic] successors and assigns that she is
lawfully seized in fee simple of the above granted premises, that they are
free from all incumbrances
** * * * [Blank Space] * * **

⁸ The government also later agreed this deed conveyed an easement to the railroad. See Def.'s Objs. at 4 n.1.

and that she will and her heirs, executors and administrators shall warrant and forever defend the above granted premises, and ever part and parcel thereof, against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.
(italics in original).

Here, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$79.20), there is no reference to a “right of way” in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Noland 74/108 deed (Def.’s Ex. 79)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

57. The Ostrander 9/205 Deed

The **Ostrander 9/205 deed (Def.’s Ex. 80)** provides in pertinent part:

Chas. [sic] Ostrander and wife	Railway Deed.
to	No. 5807.
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That for and in consideration of the sum of Five Hundred Fifty & 00/100 DOLLARS[,] the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, Charles R. Ostrander and Frances A. Ostrander, husband and wife, of Bay City, in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property, situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide, being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through that certain tract of land described as follows:- * * * [Describing the tract through which the strip being conveyed runs] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all

encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

As discussed above in the court’s analysis of the **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.’s Ex. 5)**, the court does not find that the term “Railway Deed” indicates an easement in the same way that a deed entitled “Right of Way Deed” does. Here, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$550), there is not any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, there is no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that the **Ostrander 9/205 deed (Def.’s Ex. 80)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

58. The Paquet 5/316 Deed

The **Paquet 5/316 deed (Def.’s Ex. 81)** provides in pertinent part:

Fred Paquet	No. 2853
to	Right of Way
Pacific Railway + Navigation Company	\$202.60

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of \$202.60/100 to me in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I, Fred Paquet, unmarried, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, all those portions of the land owned by me, embraced in a strip of land 100 ft. wide, being 50 ft. on each side of the center line of the railway to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as now surveyed, located and adopted thru the lands of the aforesaid Fred Paquet, in Lot 1, Sec. 22 T 1 N.R.10 W., W. M. said center line being more particularly described as follows: * * * [Description] * * *

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors and assigns forever, together with the right to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway and telegraph line.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court’s review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad’s use to only railroad purposes. The deed does use the term “Right of Way” in its title but not in the text of the deed. In addition, the deed provides for substantial consideration (\$202.60) and does not contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Taken all of these factors into consideration, the court finds that the **Paquet 5/316 deed (Def.’s Ex. 81)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

59. The Petrzilka 72/203 Deed

The **Petrzilka 72/203 deed (Def.’s Ex. 83)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 1st day of August 1906, between Frank Petrzilka and Mary Petrzilka, his wife, of Washington County, parties of the first [sic] part, and the PACIFIC RAILWAY & NAVIGATION COMPANY, a Corporation, party of the second part, WITNESSETH:

That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of One Hundred Dollars (\$100) to them in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns,[]forever, all that certain Lot, [sic] piece, parcel and track of land, lying, being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and particularly described as follows, to-wit:- A strip of land 80 feet wide, being 40 feet on each side of the center line of the PACIFIC RAILWAY & NAVIGATION COMPANY’S railway as now surveyed, located, and established across the following described lands; The North West quarter of the North West Quar ter [sic] of Section 4 T.2.N.R.4 W. of the Will.Mer. [sic] and also the following described tract of land, to-wit;-Beginning at the south [sic] West corner of Section 33, T.3.N.R.4.W. and running thence East 14 rods; thence Northwesterly 42 rods to a point 4 rods East of the west line of said section [sic] 33; thence Northeasterly 42 rods to a point 14 rods East of the west line of said Section 33,;[]thence [sic] West 14 rods;

thence South 80 rods to the place of beginning, said strip of land containing 4.31 acres.

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents,[]issues and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all and singular the said premises together with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part and unto its successors and assigns forever. And the said parties of the first part, for themselves, their heirs, executors and administrators do covenant to and with the party of the second part, its successors and assigns forever, that the parties of the first part are the owners in fee simple of the above described and granted premises; That [sic] said premises and t he [sic] whole thereof are fee from all incumbrances, and that said parties of the first part, their heirs, executors and administrators shall warrant and forever defend said premises and the whole thereof against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

Here, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$100), there is no reference to a “right of way” in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Petrzilka 72/203 deed (Def.’s Ex. 83)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

60. The Pongratz 72/547 Deed

The **Pongratz 72/547 deed (Def.’s Ex. 85)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 30 [sic] day of June 1906, between Joseph Pongratz and Monika Pongratz, his wife, of Washington County, Oregon, parties of the first part, and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, party of the second part, WITNESSETH:

That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of \$85.00 to them in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed, and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns, all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land,

lying, being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and particularly described as a part of Sec. 4, T. 2 N. R. 4 W.,[]to-wit:

A strip of land 80 feet wide, being 40 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company as now surveyed and located on said lands, and described as follows

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and unto its successors and assigns forever. And the parties of the first part do hereby covenant that they are the owners in fee simple of the tract of land above described; That [sic] tract of land is free from all incumbrances and that they will and their heirs, executors and administrators [sic] shall warrant and forever defend said tract of land and every part and parcel thereof against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

Here, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$85), there is no reference to a “right of way” in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Pongratz 72/547 deed (Def.’s Ex. 85)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

61. The Portland Timber Co. 107/610 Deed

The **Portland Timber Co. 107/610 deed (Def.’s Ex. 86)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of Ten Dollars to it in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and other valuable considerations moving to it, PORTLAND TIMBER COMPANY, hereinafter calleD [sic] the grantor, does bargain, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway And [sic] Navigation Company, hereinafter called the GRANTEE, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to wit: A strip of

land one hundred feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of the center line of the grantee's railway as the same is surveyed, staked out and located through the northwest quarter of section 34; the west half of the northwest quarter; the northeast quarter[]of the northwest quarter, and the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter of section 32; also the north half of the north half of section 31, all in township three north of range six west of the Willamette Meridian.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging, or in any wise [sic] appertaining, with the right to construct, maintain and operate a railway thereover.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the grantee and to its successors and assigns forever. And the grAntor [sic] does covenant with the grantee that it will warrant and defend the premises above granted unto the grantee, and to its successors and assigns against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever claiming or to claim under the grantor.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court's review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad's use to only railroad purposes. Here, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$10.00), there is no "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that the **Portland Timber Co. 107/610 deed (Def.'s Ex. 86)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

62. The Portland Timber Co. 90/50 Deed

The **Portland Timber Co. 90/50 deed (Def.'s Ex. 87)** provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents, That the Portland Timber Company, an Oregon corporation, in consideration of the sum of Nine Hundred and Four Dollars and twenty cents (\$904.20) ,[]paid [sic] by the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, the grantee herein, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, does grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm to the grantee herein, Pacific Railway and Navigation [C]ompany,

its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real estate, situate in the County of Tillamook, State of Oregon, to-wit:

Beginning at a point where the East line of Section 3, Township 3 North, Range 6 West W. M. , [sic] interests the center line of Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's railroad, said point being 756 feet south of the northeast corner of said Section 35, and being identical with Station 1749+65 of said company's railway survey numbers, running thence along said center line in a southwesterly direction * * * [description] * * * thence north along said east line, a distance of 50 feet to the place of beginning, saving and excepting a right of way 100 feet in width through the above des[c]ribed land granted by deed of the grantor herein to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, dated June 30, 1909, and containing exclusive of said right of way,[]6 acres.

Same being hereby granted for all proper railroad, depot and station ground purposes, the intent of this provision to prevent the grantee herein from platting a townsite on the said land. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described premises unto said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever. It is understood,[]however, that the grantor herein reserves to itself all of the line trees situate upon the exterior lines of the above described premises.

This deed specifically states that the land being conveyed in the deed is “hereby granted for all proper railroad, depot and station ground purposes, the intention of this provision to prevent the grantee herein from platting a townsite on said land.” This language specifies the purpose for which the land is being granted and for which the land is to be used and thus indicates that only an easement was granted. The deed also provides that “the grantor herein reserves to itself all of the line trees situate upon the exterior lines of the above described premises[,]” which further indicates that an easement was granted. *See First Nat’l Bank v. Townsend*, 555 P.2d 477 (Or. App. 1976) These express provisions establish the original parties’ intent to convey an easement. As such, although the deed provides for substantial consideration (\$904.20), the court finds

that the **Portland Timber Co. 90/50 deed (Def.'s Ex. 87)**, conveyed an easement to the railroad.

63. Prickett 72/538 Deed

The **Prickett 72/538 deed (Def.'s Ex. 88)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 18th day of May 1906, between J. L. Prickett and Belle Prickett his wife, of Washington County, Oregon, parties of the first part, and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, party of the second part, WITNESSETH:

That the parties of the first part for and in consideration of the sum of Two Hundred Dollars (\$200) to them in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed, and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns, all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in Washington County, Oregon , [sic] and particularly described as a portion of Section 25, T. 2 N. R. 4 W. Will. Mer., to-wit:-

A strip of land 80 feet wide, being 40 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's Railroad, as now surveyed and located on said land, and described as follows:-

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD aLL [sic] and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and u[n]to its successors and assigns forever.

Here, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$200), there is no reference to a "right of way" in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Prickett 72/538 deed (Def.'s Ex. 88)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

64. The Rinck 77/454 Deed

The **Rinck 77/454 deed (Def.'s Ex. 90)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar to him in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and other valuable considerations moving to him, J. H. Rinck, an unmarried man, hereinafter called the grantor, does hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forevEr, [sic] all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to wit:

“A strip of land 100 feet wide, being 50 feet on each side of the centerline [sic] of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company as the same is constructed through the North half of the northeast quarter of Section 32, in township 3 North of range 4 west of the Willamette Meridian containing 3.17 acres.”

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, granting also the grantee the right to operate a railway line thereover as well as the fee of the aforesaid premises. The grantor does covenant that he is seased [sic] of the aforesaid premises in fee simple and that the same are free from all liens and encumbrances, and that he will and his heirs, executors and administrators shall forever warrant and defend the same against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court's review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad's use to only railroad purposes. Additionally, the deed provides that it grants “the right to operate a railway line thereover as well as the fee of the aforesaid premises.” Clearly the parties intended to convey fee simple, even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1.00), the deed does not contain the phrase “right of way” in the title or body of the deed nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that the **Rinck 77/454 deed (Def.'s Ex. 90)**, granted a fee to the railroad.

65. The Rockaway Beach 12/342 Deed

The **Rockaway Beach 12/342 deed (Def.'s Ex. 91)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One & 00/100 DOLLARS, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Rockaway Beach Company, a Corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Oregon and First Bank Trust Company, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Oregon, hereinafter called the grantors, [sic] do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A strip of land sixty (60) feet wide being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through

Lot four of Section thirty two in Township two North of Range ten West and a strip of land twenty feet wide off the North end of Lot one of Section five, Township One North of Range two West of Willamette Meridian.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors [sic] above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all incumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Rockaway Beach 12/342 deed (Def.'s Ex. 91)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

66. The Rowntree 11/618 Deed; The Sampson 11/617 Deed;
The Sampson 11/619 Deed; and The Sampson 11/620 Deed

The **Rowntree 11/618 deed (Def.'s Ex. 92)**; the **Sampson 11/617 deed (Def.'s Ex. 95)**; the **Sampson 11/619 deed (Def.'s Ex. 96)**; the **Sampson 11/620 deed (Def.'s Ex. No. 97)** are virtually identically and thus the court will analyze these deeds together.

Each of these four deeds contains, with minor variations, the following language:

[Name of grantor(s)]

to

Deed.

Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.

No. #####.

Know All Men By these Presents, That Whereas [name of grantor] is the owner in fee simple of the following described real proper, situated in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

* * * [Description of grantor's *entire* property, not just strip being conveyed] * * *

NOw [sic] Therefore, in consideration of the sum of Seventy five and 00/100 Dollars, to [pronoun] in hand paid by the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, [pronoun], the said [name of grantor(s)], do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns, so much of said above described tract of land as lies within the right of way limits of said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, said right of way being a strip of land sixty feet wide, to-wit: thirty feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee, as the same is surveyed, staked out and located through said tract, and said center line running on a tangent North six degrees and fifty eight minutes East from a point which is fifty four feet West of the corner common to Section 5, 6, 7 and 8 in TOWnship [sic] one North of Range ten West, through and beyond the land described herein.

To have and to hold the above described and granted premises unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns forever.

And [pronoun], the said [name of grantors] The grantors above named do covenant to and with said Pacific Railway Company, its successors and assigns, that [pronoun] [is] the owner in fee simple of said premises, that they are free from all incumbrances, and that [pronoun] will and [possessive pronoun] heirs, executors, administrators and assigns shall warrant and forever the same against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

The court finds that the language of these deeds viewed as a whole weighs in favor of finding that the parties intended to grant a fee to the railroad. These deeds use the phrase “right of way” twice. It is clear from the context of these deeds that the phrase “right of way” is not intended to describe the interest granted but rather the geographic location of the land. Additionally, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$75), there is no mention of a railroad purpose, and the deed does not contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Rowntree 11/618 deed (Def.’s Ex. 92)**, the **Sampson 11/617 deed (Def.’s Ex. 95)**, the **Sampson 11/619 deed (Def.’s Ex. 96)**, and the **Sampson 11/620 deed (Def.’s Ex. No. 97)**, all granted fee simple title to the railroad.

67. The Roy 11/516 Deed

The **Roy 11/516 deed (Def.’s Ex. 93)** provides in pertinent part:

Felix Roy	Railway Deed.
to	No. 7464.
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	

KNOWN ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One Thousand & 00/100 DOLLARS, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I Felix Roy, a bachelor of Tillamook County, Oregon, hereinafter called the grantors, [sic] do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide, being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lot three of Section 36 Township 3 North of Range 9 West of W. M. Lots two, three and thirteen of Section 31, Township 3 North of Range 9 West of W. M. Also through a certain tract described as follows:- Beginning at the meander post on the North bank of Nehalem River on the line between Section 31 Tp. 3 N. Range 9 West and

Section 36 Tp. 3 North Range 10 West, running thence North 30 rods, thence West 208 feet, thence South to Nehalem River, thence in an Easterly direction following the North bank of Nehalem River to place of beginning in Sec. 36 Tp. 3 N. R. 10 W. of W.M.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors [sic] above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they [sic] will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

As discussed above in the court's analysis of the **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.'s Ex. 5)**, the court does not find that the term "Railway Deed" indicates an easement in the same way that a deed entitled "Right of Way Deed" does. Here, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$1,000), there is no use of the "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Roy 11/516 deed (Def.'s Ex. 93)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

68. The Rupp 13/245 Deed

The **Rupp 13/245 deed (Def.'s Ex. 94)** provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of Ten Dollars (\$10.00), the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and other valuable considerations moving to them, John J. Rupp and Betty N. Rupp, of Saginaw, Michigan, hereinafter called the grantor, does bargain, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, a strip of land one hundred (100) feet in width, being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee, as the same is surveyed and located

through the following described real property, situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

* * * [Describing the property through which the strip conveyed runs] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging, or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold to the grantee and to its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors covenant with the grantee that they will warrant and defend the premises herby granted against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever claiming the same by, through or under the grantor. [sic]

Here, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$10), there is no reference to a “right of way” in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Rupp 13/245 deed (Def.’s Ex. 94)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

69. The Schrader & Groat 11/354 Deed

The **Schrader & Groat 11/354 deed (Def.’s Ex. 98)** provides in pertinent part:

Paul Schrader et ux	
& John Groat et ux	Railway Deed.
to	No. 7235.
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	

KNOWN ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That for and in consideration of Two Hundred & 00 DOLLARS, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, Paul Schrader and Lillie R. Schrader[,] husband and wife, and John Groat and Lillian A. Groat , [sic] husband and wife, hereinafter called the grantors[,] do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee[,] and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A strip of land sixty feet wide being thirty feet on each side of the center line of railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lot one of Section five, in Township One North of range ten West of Willamette Meridian,

save and except seven acres off the South[]and a strip of land twenty feet wide off the North end of said Lot one.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

As discussed above in the court’s analysis of the **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.’s Ex. 5)**, the court does not find the term “Railway Deed” indicates an easement in the same way that a deed entitled “Right of Way Deed” does. Here, the deed provides for consideration that is not nominal (\$200), does not use the phrase “right of way” in the title or body of the deed, and does not mention a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Schrader & Groat 11/354 deed (Def.’s Ex. 96)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

70. The Sibley 23/301 Deed

The **Sibley 23/301 deed (Def.’s Ex. 100)** is entitled “14999 Warranty Deed” and provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of Four Hundred Ninety Four (\$495.00) Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Hiram W. Sibley and Margaret D. Sibley, his wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

A strip of land one hundred feet wide, being fifty feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's railway as located and staked out over the south half of the southeast quarter and lot 2 of section 9, lot 1 of section 15 and lots 1 and 2 of section 16, all of Township 3 North, range 8 West, Willamette Meridian, containing nine and seventeen one hundredths (9.17) acres, said center line being more particularly described as follows:-

* * * [Description] * * *

Also a strip of land one hundred feet wide, being fifty feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's railway as located and staked out over the northeast quarter of section 14, township 3 North range 8 West, Willamette Meridian, containing four and seventy six one hundredths (4.76) acres, said center line being more particularly described as follows:-

* * * [Description] * * *

Also a strip of land one hundred feet wide, being fifty feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's railway as located and staked out over lot 1 of section 8 and lots 1 and 2 of section 17, all of township 3 North, range 8 West, Willamette Meridian, containing seven and seventy eight one hundredths (7.78) acres, said center line being more particularly described as follows:-

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, confirming to the grantee specifically the right to build, maintain and operate a railway line thereover.

To Have and to Hold unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors do warrant with the grantee that they will warrant and defend the premises hereby granted against the lawful claims and demands of all persons claiming under the grantors.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court's review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes is not dispositive on the question of whether an easement was granted. Here, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$495), there is no "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such

as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that **Sibley 23/301 deed (Def.'s Ex. 100)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

71. The Slattery 94/161 Deed

The **Slattery 94/161 deed (Def.'s Ex. 101)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of Ten Dollars to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and other valuable considerations moving to them, W. C. Slattery and Delia Slattery, his wife, hereinafter called the grantors , do bargain, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State[]of Oregon, to-wit: A strip of land one hundred feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of the center line of the grantee's railway as the same is surveyed, staked out and located through the northwest quArter [sic] of Section 32 in Township 3 North of Range 5 West of the Willamette Meridian. Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging, or in any wise [sic] appertaining, with the right to construct, maintain and operate a railway thereover. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the grantee and to its successors and assigns forever. And the grantors do covenant with the grantee that they will warrant and defend the premises above granted unto the grantee, and to its successors and assigns against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever claiming or to claim under the grantors.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court's review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad's use to only railroad purposes. Here, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$10), there is no "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that **Slattery 94/161 deed (Def.'s Ex. 101)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

72. The Smith, Loyd 16/515 Deed

The **Smith, Loyd 16/515 deed (Def.'s Ex. 103)** provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of One Hundred Fifty and $\frac{00}{100}$ Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I, Lloyd C Smith a widower, of Garibaldi, Tillamook County[,] Oregon[,] hereinafter called the grantor, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

A strip of land one hundred(100) [sic] feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lot 3 of Section 8, Lot 4 of Section 7, Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 and North-West [sic] quarter of South-West[]quarter of Section 17, Lot 3 of Section 20 and Tide Land fronting and abutting upon Lots 3 and 4 of Section 20, all in Township 1 North of Range 10 West of Willamette Meridian; save and except that from Station No 651 to Station No. 677 said right of way hereby conveyed shall be only 65 feet wide being 50 feet on the Easterly side and 15 feet on the Westerly side of said center line.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantor above named does covenant that he is seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all incumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court finds that the language of this deed viewed as a whole weighs in favor of finding that a fee was granted. Here, the court finds that the deed's use of the phrase "right of way" is not a description of the interest being conveyed but provides a geographic location. Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures

such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Smith, Loyd 16/515 deed (Def.'s Ex. 103)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

73. The Stanley 11/113 Deed

The **Stanley 11/113 deed (Def.'s Ex. 104)** provides in pertinent part:

F. S; [sic] Stanley et al	Railway Deed.
to	NO. 6844.
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One DOLLARS, [sic] the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, F. S. Stanley and Ruth M. Stanley, his wife, Robert Smith, a single man; W. D. Wheelwright, a single man; - [sic] E. E. Lytle and Lizzie M Lytle, his wife, and May Enright, a single woman, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm, to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property, situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide, being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee, as the same is surveyed and located through the East half of the South East [sic] quarter of Section Twenty [sic] (20) in Township Three [sic] (3) North, [sic] of Range Seven [sic] (7) West, W. M.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

As discussed above in the court's analysis of the **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.'s Ex. 5)**, the court does not find that the term “Railway Deed” indicates an easement in the same way that a deed entitled “Right of Way Deed” does. Here, even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body

of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Stanley 11/113 deed (Def.'s Ex. 104)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

74. The State of Oregon 70/76 Deed

The **State of Oregon 70/76 deed (Loveridge, ECF No. 28, Ex. J-54)** provides in pertinent part:

State of Oregon, by and through
the State Highway Commission No. 63061 Bargain and Sale Deed.
To
Southern Pacific Company, a corp.

BARGAIN AND SALE DEED

THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH, that the STATE OF OREGON, by and through its State Highway Commission, for the consideration of the sum of One and no/100 Dollars (\$1.00) and other valuable considerations to it paid, has bargained and sold and by these presents does bargain, sell and convey unto the SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, a corporation, the following described premises, to-wit:

A parcel of land in Lots 5 and 6 of Section 22, Twp. 1 North, Range 10 West, W. M., Tillamook County, Oregon, said parcel being a strip of land of varying width lying on the westerly side of and contiguous to the present right of way of the Tillamook Brach of the Southern Pacific Company; said parcel of land being more particularly described as follows:

Commencing at a point in the original center line of the Tillamook Brach of the Southern Pacific Company as it is now laid out, owned and operated over and across Section 22, Twp. 1, Range 10 West, W. M., County of Tillamook, State of Oregon, said point being known as Engineer's Station 497+19.8 E. C. of the said center line; thence North 24° 25' West at right angles to said center line a distance of 50.0 feet to a point in the original northwesterly right of way line of said Branch railroad; said point being the actual point of beginning of this description; thence along said original right of way line in a southwesterly direction on the arc of a taper curve to the left parallel to and always 50 feet northwesterly from the center line of the original location of said railroad, (the long cord of said taper curve bears South 64° 35' West) a distance of 122.6 feet to a point, said point being 50.0 feet northwesterly from Engineer's Station 495+99.8 C. C. T 2 of the center line of the original constructed line; thence * * * *, containing 0.32 acres.

This deed is an exchange deed given under terms of Section 44-118, Oregon Code 1930.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with their appurtenances, unto the said Southern Pacific Company, a corporation, its successors and assigns forever.

This deed is entitled “BARGAIN AND SALE DEED” and specifies that the deed “is an exchange deed given under terms of Section 44-118, Oregon Code 1930.”

According to the Oregon Court of Appeals, it is “the settled common-law understanding of the purpose and effect of a bargain and sale deed” that “[t]he essential purpose of a bargain and sale deed is to convey whatever title the seller has, without providing a warranty on the seller's part of the nature or quality of that title.” *Winters v. Cty. of Clatsop*, 150 P.3d 1104, 1107 (Or. App. 2007) (citing *City of Bend v. Title & Trust Co.*, 289 P. 1044 (Or. 1930) (a bargain and sale deed “contain[]no warranties” and only “act as an instrument of conveyance.

Although this deed uses the phrase “right of way” in the body of the deed it is not describing the interest being conveyed by the deed but rather the geographic location. In addition, although the deed provides for only \$1 in consideration it does not contain any railroad purpose language. The court finds that the **State of Oregon 70/76 deed (Loveridge, ECF No. 28, Ex. J-54)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

75. The Stowell 75/32 Deed

The **Stowell 75/32 deed (Def.’s Ex. 105)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 8th day of February A.D.1907, between S. H. Stowell and Josephine Stowell, his wife, of Washington County, Oregon, parties of the first part, and the PACIFIC RAILWAY & NAVIGATION COMPANY, party of the second part, WITNESSETH:

That the parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of \$50.00 and other good and valuable consideration to them in hand paid, by the party of the second part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in t[h]e County of Washington, State of Oregon and being more particularly described as follows:-

Being in the S. W. [1/4] of Sec.[33 and in the N. E. [1/4] of Sec 32, all in[T. 3 N R. 4. W. Will. Mer. a strip of land 100 feet wide being 50 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's Railway, as surveyed, located and adopted across said lands and described as follows:-

Beginning at a point where the East line of said Right of Way intersects the West line of said Stowells [sic] land, 475 feet North and 109 feet East of the Southwest corner of said Section 33; Running [sic] thence in a Northwesterly direction along said West line, 180 feet; thence in a North Easterly direction along said West line, 520 feet to its intersection with the West line of said Right of Way; thence in a Northeasterly dire[c]tion along said Right of way, [sic] on a spiral to the Right, 170 feet; thence * * * *; Also Beginning [sic] at a point where the West line of said Right of Way intersects the East line of said N. E. $\frac{1}{4}$ of said Sec. 32, 390 feet North of the Southeast corner thereof; Running * * * *, and containing 6.96 acres.

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, its successors and assigns forever,[And [sic] We, [sic] S. H., Stowell and Josephine Stowell, his wife, grantors above named, do covenant to and with the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, the above n[a]med grantee, its successors and assigns, that the above granted premises are free from all incumbrances, and that we will and our heirs, executors and administrators, shall warrant and forever defend the above granted premises and every part and parcel thereof against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

The court finds that the phrase "right of way" is being used to describe the geographic location of the preexisting railway line, rather than to refer to the interest

being conveyed by the deed. Additionally, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$50), there is no mention of a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that the **Stowell 75/32 deed (Def.'s Ex. 105)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

76. The Surman 6/40 Deed

The **Surman 6/40 deed (Def.'s Ex. 106)** provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men By These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of \$150.00 to him in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, James Surman, unmarried, does hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever: all that portion of the land owned by him embraced in a strip of land 100 ft. wide, being 50 ft. on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's railway as now surveyed, located and adopted thru the lands of the aforesaid James Surman, in Lot 2 Section 22, T. 1 N., R. 10 W., W. M., said center line being more particularly described as follows:

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining;

To Have and to Hold unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors and assigns forever; together with the right to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway and telegraph line.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court's review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad's use to only railroad purposes. Here, the amount of consideration is not nominal (\$150), there is no "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as

crossings, cattle guards, or fences. Therefore, the court finds that the **Surman 6/40 deed (Def.'s Ex. 106)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

77. The Thayer 11/355

The **Thayer 11/355 deed (Def.'s Ex. 107)** provides in pertinent part:

Claude Thayer and wife	Railway Deed.
to	No. 7236.
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	

KNOW ALL MEN By [sic] THESE PRESENTS; That for and in consideration of the sum of One & 00 DOLLARS, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, Claude Thayer and Estelle Thayer, husband and wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY [sic] AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, [sic] hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A strip of land one hundred (100) [sic] feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is now surveyed and located through; [sic]

Tide Land fronting and abutting on Lot 1 of Sec. 21, T. 1 N. R. 10 W. except Town of Garibaldi.

Also beginning at a point at ordinary high water line South 84° West 24 links dist. from the meander corner between Sections 20 and 21, T. 1 N. R. 10 W. thence South 65° East on ordinary high water line 3.21 chains, thence North 17.89 chains, thence West 2.91 chains, thence South 16.53 chains to point of beginning.

Also through an undivided one half interest in the following tracts;-

Beginning at a point on ordinary high water line 34 links South and 320 links West of the meander corner between Sections 20 and 21 T. 3 N. R. 10 W. thence N. 84° East 3.02 chains on ordinary high water line, thence North 16.53 chains, thence West 3.00 chains, thence South 16.84 chains to place of beginning; also through an undivided one half interest in Lots 5, 6, 7, and 8 in Block 3 and Lots 4, [sic] and 5 in Block 4, all in the Town of Garibaldi.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all

en[c]umbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

As discussed above in the court’s analysis of the **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.’s Ex. 5)**, the court does not find that the term “Railway Deed” indicates an easement in the same way that a deed entitled “Right of Way Deed” does. Here, even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Thayer 11/355 deed (Def.’s Ex. 107)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

78. The Thayer 18/39 Deed

The **Thayer 18/39 deed (Def.’s Ex. 108)** is entitled “1134 Railway Deed” and provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of One & 00/100 Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, We, Claude Thayer and Estelle Thayer[,] husband and wife, of Tillamook, Oregon, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A strip of land one hundred(100) [sic] feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lot eight of Section twenty two, in Township one North of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian, save and except a certain one acre tract heretofore conveyed out of said Lot eight;

Also through the tide lands fronting and abutting upon Lots seven and eight in said Section twenty two, in Township one North of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To have and to hold unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seized of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

As discussed above in the court’s analysis of the **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.’s Ex. 5)**, the court does not find that the term “Railway Deed” indicates an easement in the same way that a deed entitled “Right of Way Deed” does. Here, even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Thayer 18/39 deed (Def.’s Ex. 108)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

79. The Thornburgh 72/531 Deed

The **Thornburgh 72/531 deed (Def.’s Ex. 109)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE , [sic] made this 12th day of October 1906, between A. Thornburgh, widower, and O. C. Thornburgh, of Washington County, Oregon, parties of the first part, and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, party of the second part, WITNESSETH:

That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of Three hundred dollars (\$300) to them in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns, all that certain, [sic] lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and particularly described as a portion of Sec. 24, T. 2. N. R. W., Will. Mer., a strip of land 80 feet wide, being 40 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company’s Railway, as now surveyed and located on said land and described as follows:

* * * [Description] * * * and containing 4.11 acres, and also

A part of Sections 14 and 15, T. 2. N. R. 4 W. ; [sic] a strip of land 80 feet wide, being 40 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific

Railway & Navigation Company's Railway, as now surveyed and located on said land, and described as follows:

* * * [Description] * * *, and containing 6.45 acres.

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and[]remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and unto its successors and assigns forever. And the parties of the first part hereby covenant to and with the party of the second part, its successors and assigns, that the parties of the first part, [sic] are the owners in fee simple of the tract of land above described, and the whole thereof; That [sic] said premises are free from all incumbrances, and that the parties of the first part, their heirs, executors and administrators, shall warrant and forever defend the above described and granted premises and every part and parcel thereof against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

Here, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$300), there is no reference to a "right of way" in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Thornburgh 72/531 deed (Def.'s Ex. 109)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

80. The Thurnheer 114/339 Deed

The **Thurnheer 114/339 deed (Def.'s Ex. 110)** is a form deed and provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by these Presents, that Lawrence Thurnheer and Alice Thurnheer, husband and wife
of Washington County xxxxxx *State of Oregon, in consideration of*
Fifty (\$50.00) DOLLARS,
to them paid by Southern Pacific ComPany, [sic] a corporation
of the State of Kentucky, * * *
* * * have bargained and sold, and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell
and convey unto said Southern Pacific ComPany, [sic] its successors and

* * * assigns, all the following bounded and described real property,
situated in the County of Washington and State of Oregon

A strIP [sic] of land 20 feet in width adjoining the 100 foot right-of-way of the Tillamook Brach of said Railroad ComPany [sic] through section 30, townshiP [sic] 3 N, range 4 W, WM, on its northerly side and extending from the east line of section 30 westerly adjacent to said 100 foot right-of-way a distance of 930 feet, more or less, to the northerly line of County Road through said section 30, said parcel of land containing 0.43 acres, more or less, all in section 30, T 3 N. R 4 W. WM. [sic]

* * * * * [Blank Space] * * * * *

Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances there to [sic] belonging or in anywise appertaining, and also all their estate, right, title and interest in and to the same, including dower and claim of dower.

To Have and to Hold the above described and granted premises unto the said Southern Pacific Company[,] its successors

*** and assigns forever. And Lawrence Thurnheer and Alice Thurnhere,

grantors above named do covenant to and with Southern Pacific Company[,]

the above named grantee[,] its successors * * * and assigns that they are lawfully seized in fee simple of the above granted premises[,] that the above granted premises are free from all incumbrances

* * *

and that they will and their heirs, executors and administrators shall warrant and forever defend the above granted premises, and ever part and parcel thereof, against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.
(italics in original).

The court finds that the language of this deed viewed as a whole weighs in favor of finding that a fee was granted. Here, the court finds that the deed's use of the phrase "right of way" is not a description of the interest being conveyed but provides a geographic location. Additionally, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$50) and there is no reference to a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences.

As such, the court finds that the **Thurnheer 114/339 deed (Def.'s Ex. 110)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

81. The Tillamook Beach Realty 11/599 Deed

The **Tillamook Beach Realty 11/599 deed (Def.'s Ex. 111)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that for and in consideration of the covenants and agreements entered into between the PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, a corporation[,] and the TILLAMOOK BEACH REALTY COMPANY, a corporation[,] by agreement dated this 27th. day of July, 1909, said TILLAMOOK BEACH REALTY COMPANY, a corporation, does hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situated in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land sixty (60) feet wide, being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the Pacific Railway and Navigation, as the same is surveyed and located through the following described premises, situated in Tillamook County, Oregon, to-wit:

* * * [Description of the premises through which the strip runs, not the strip itself] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold unto the above named Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns.

Although this deed does not list any money as consideration, there are other indicia that the parties intended to convey fee simple title. The deed lacks any “right of way” language in the title or body, there is no mention of railroad purposes, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Tillamook Beach Realty 11/599 deed (Def.'s Ex. 111)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

82. The Turner 72/538 Deed

The **Turner 72/528 deed (Def.'s Ex. 113)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 21st day of August 1906, between Montgomery Turner and Bessie Turner, his wife, of Washington County, parties of the first part, and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, a Corporation, party of the second part, WITNESSETH:

That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of Fifteen Dollars (\$15) to them in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns, all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and particularly described as a portion of Sec. 25, T. 2 N. R. 4 W. Will. Mer. a strip of land 60 feet wide, being 30 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's Railway, as now surveyed and located on said land, and described as follows:-

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.

[T]O HAVE aND [sic] TO HOLD, all and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and unto its successors and assigns as long as used and operated for Railway and Transportation purposes.

And the parties of the first part hereby covenant to and with the party of the second part, its successors and assigns, that the parties of the first part, [sic] are the owners in fee simple of the tract of land above described, and the whole thereof. That said premises are free from all incumbrances,

This deed states that the railroad shall have the property "as long as used and operated for Railway and Transportation purposes." The government argues that this language indicates that the parties intended to convey a fee simple determinable.

However, for the same reasons as discussed in the court's analysis of the **Carstens**

72/530 deed (Def.'s Ex. 20), this deed is different from the deed in *Tolke*, in which the

Oregon court found a fee simple determinable interest, because the deed does not provide for an express reversion back to the grantor. Therefore, the court finds that the **Turner 72/528 deed (Def.'s Ex. 113)**, grants an easement the railroad.

83. The Twin Rocks Land Co. 13/450 Deed

The **Twin Rocks Land Co. 13/450 deed (Def.'s Ex. 114)** provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by These Presents that for an[d] in consideration of the covenants and agreements entered into between the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, a corporation, and the Twin Rocks Land Company, a corporation, by agreement dated this 6th day of November, 1909, said Twin Rocks Land Company, a corporation, does hereby bargain, grant, sell and convey to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situated in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land sixty (60) feet wide being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, as the same is surveyed and located through the following described premises, situated in Tillamook County, Oregon, to-wit:

* * * [Description of the premises through which the strip runs, not the strip itself] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, its successors and assigns.

Although this deed does not list any money as consideration, there are other indicia that the parties intended to convey a fee simple. The deed lacks any “right of way” language in the title or body, there is no mention of railroad purposes, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such the court finds that the **Twin Rocks Land Co. 13/450 deed (Def.'s Ex. 114)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

84. The Vantress 13/98 Deed

The **Vantress 13/98 deed (Def.'s Ex. 115)**, which the parties in *Loveridge* stipulated as having granted a fee simple to the railroad, but the *Albright* plaintiffs did not, and provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by These Presents[:] That for and in consideration of the sum of Five Hundred and 00/100 Dollars[,] the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, We[,] P.B. Vantress and Bessie Vantress[,] husband and wife, hereinafter called the grantors[,] do hereby bargain, sell[,] grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet in each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same [is] surveyed and located through Lots one and two and 1044 acres off the East side of Lot three, all in Section five, Township two North of Range nine West of the Willamette Meridian, said strip containing seven acres and center line being more particularly described as follows:-

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining[.]

To Have and to Hold unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

Here, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$500), there is no reference to a “right of way” in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures

such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Vantress 13/98 deed (Def.'s Ex. 115)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

85. The Watt 12/343 Deed

The **Watt 12/343 deed (Def.'s Ex. 116)** is entitled “No. 8225. Railway Deed.” and provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One and 00/100 DOLLARS , [sic] The [sic] receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, George Watt and Helen Watt, his wife[,] and Robert Watt and Lois A. Watt, his wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and * * * to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A strip of land sixty (60) feet wide being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway o f [sic] the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lots One, two and three of Section Seven and Lot one of Section eight, all in Township One North of Range ten Wes t [sic] of Willamette Meridian.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

As discussed above in the court’s analysis of the **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.’s Ex. 5)**, the court does not find that the term “Railway Deed” indicates an easement in the same way that a deed entitled “Right of Way Deed” does. Here, even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to

build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Watt 12/343 deed (Def.'s Ex. 116)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

86. The Watt 12/344 Deed

The **Watt 12/344 deed (Def.'s Ex. 117)** is entitled “No. 8226. Railway Deed.” and provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One and 00/100 DOLLARS, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, George Watt and Helen Watt, husband and wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do bargain, sell, grant, convey and confir, [sic] to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side * * * of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same in [sic] surveyed and located through Lot one of Section nine and also through the tide land fronting and abutting upon Lots One [sic] and Four [sic] of said Section nine; also through Lot one of Section sixteen and the tide fronting and abutting upon said Lot one of Section sixteen, all in Township two North of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian. Save and except a tract 105 feet by 210 feet in Lot 1 of Section 9, Township 2 North Range 10 West reserved by G. M. Lock.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and[]unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

As discussed above in the court’s analysis of the **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.’s Ex. 5)**, the court does not find that the term “Railway Deed” indicates an easement in the same way that a deed entitled “Right of Way Deed” does. Here, even though the amount

of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Watt 12/344 deed (Def.’s Ex. 117)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

87. The Watt 12/345 Deed

The **Watt 12/345 deed (Def.’s Ex. 118)** is entitled “No. 8227. Railway Deed.” and provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One and 00/100 DOLLARS, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, John Watt and Sarah M. Watt[,] husband and wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm [sic] to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

“A **strip of land** one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same in [sic] surveyed and located **through** Lots two, three and four of Section nine, in Township two North of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian[.]

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and[]unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

As discussed above in the court’s analysis of the **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.’s Ex. 5)**, the court does not find that the term “Railway Deed” indicates an easement in the same way that a deed entitled “Right of Way Deed” does. Here, even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body

of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Watt 12/345 deed (Def.'s Ex. 118)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

88. The Western Timber 77/108 Deed

The **Western Timber 77/108 deed (Def.'s Ex. 119)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, ThAt [sic] the Western Timber Co., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Washington, for and in consideration of the sum of the sum of One Dollar (\$1.00) and other valuable considerations to it paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, does hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, a Corporation, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County Washington, State of Oregon, to-wit:-

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet in width, being fifty (50) feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as the same is surveyed, located and adopted through the northeast quarter of Section Twenty seven (27) and the southeast quarter of Section Twenty two (22), in Township Three (3) North, Range Five (5) West of the Willamette Meridian, said center line being described as follows:

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining. Reserving, however, unto the said Western Timber Co. , [sic] its successors and assigns, the right to cross said right of way at any point or points where such crossing is desired. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever.

The aforesaid grantor, the Western Timber Co., does here covenant that it is the owner in fee simple of the above granted premises and that it will forever warrant and defend the same unto the grantee, its successors and assigns forever, against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

Here, the court finds that the deed's use of the phrase "right of way" is a description of the interest being conveyed. Additionally, the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1) and the grantor retained a right to cross the right of way at any points it

desired. Therefore, the court finds that the **Western Timber 77/108 deed (Def.'s Ex. 119)**, conveyed an easement to the railroad.

89. The Westinghouse 84/54 Deed

The **Westinghouse 84/54 deed (Def.'s Ex. 120)** is a form deed and provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by these Presents, *THAT*
 We, G. E. Westinghouse and Ida C. Westinghouse[,] his wife
 of Timber * * * *State of Oregon, in consideration of*
 Six hundred and seventy five DOLLARS,
 to us *paid by Pacific Railway and Navigation Company[,]*
 its successors and assigns
*of * * * * State of Oregon * * **
** * * * * ha[ve] bargained and sold, and by these presents do grant,*
bargain, sell and convey unto said
 Pacific Railway Navigation Company[,]
heirs and assigns, all the following bounded and described real property,
situated in the County of Washington and State of Oregon
 A strip of land one hundred feet [sic] in width, being fifty feet on each
 side of and parallel with the center line of the tracks of the Pacific Railway
 and Navigation Company on the Nehalem line and also on the Salmonberry
 line as the same are surveyed and located through the North West quarter of
 Section, [sic] twenty seven (27) in Township three (3) North of Range five
 (5) West W. M. and containing seven and one tenth (7 1/10) acres no more
 and no less
 * * * * * [Empty space] * * * *
Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and
appurtenances thereto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and also all
 our estate, right, title and interest in and to the same,
including dower and claim of dower.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described and granted premises
unto the said
 Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors
 * * * *and assigns forever. And*
 G. E. Westinghouse and Ida C. Westinghouse
 grantor s [sic] *above named do covenant to and with*
 the Pacific Railway and Navigation Co

the above named grantee[,] its succe[ssors][]and assigns that we are lawfully seized in fee simple of the above granted premises, that the above granted premises are free from all incumbrances

* * * [Empty space] * * *

and that we will and our heirs, executors and administrators shall warrant and forever defend the above granted premises, and ever part and parcel thereof, against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.
(italics in original).

Here, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$665), there is no reference to a “right of way” in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Westinghouse 84/54 deed (Def.’s Ex. 120)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

90. The Westinghouse 85/39 Deed

The **Westinghouse 85/39 deed (Def.’s Ex. 121)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That I, John F. Westinghouse, a single man[,] for and in consi deration [sic] of the sum of One Dollars, [sic] to me in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby bargain, sell, grant,[]convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet in width, being fifty (50) feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as the same is surveyed and located through a strip of land more particularly described as the West one half of Southwest one quarter and the Southwest one quarter of Northwest one quarter of Northwest one quarter [of] Sec.[]26, T 3 N. R. 5 W., Willamette Meridian and containing four and forty two hundredths (4.42) acres more or less. Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever.

The aforesaid grantor John F. Westinghouse does hereby he is the owner in fee simple of the ab[o]ve grante[d] premises, and that he will forever qarrant [sic] and defend the same unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

Even though the amount of consideration paid was nominal (\$1), there is no reference to a “right of way” in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Westinghouse 85/39 deed (Def.’s Ex. 121)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

91. The Wheeler 16/2 Deed

The **Wheeler 16/2 deed (Def.’s Ex. 122)** provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That Coleman H. Wheeler and Cora E. Wheeler, hereinafter called the grantors, for and in consideration of the sum of \$1.00 to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, does [sic] hereby release, remit and forever quit claim [sic] unto Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit: A right of way 60 feet in width, being 30 feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the grantee’s railway as the same is surveyed, staked out, located and adopted through the following described real property, to-wit:

All that tract or parcel of land in Lots Four (4) and Five (5) of Section Two (2), Township Two (2) North of Range Ten (10) West of the Willamette Meridian

Beginning at the Northeast corner of Charles Seaman’s four acre tract on the meander line of the Nehalem River; thence Easterly along and up said River sixteen (16) rods; thence South twenty (20) rods parallel with Charles Seaman’s line; thence West to Charles Seaman’s East line; thence North to the Nehalem River to the place of beginning and containing two acres more or less.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold to the above named grantee and to its successors and assigns forever.

This deed uses the phrase “right of way” in the granting clause to describe the geographic location of the interest being conveyed. Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Wheeler 16/2 deed (Def.’s Ex. 122)**, granted fee simple title to the railroad.

92. The Wheeler Lumber 16/3 Deed

The **Wheeler Lumber 16/3 deed (Albright, ECF No. 34, Ex. 82)** provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of \$1.00 to it in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, The Wheeler Lumber Company, hereinafter called the grantor, does hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the county of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land 60 feet in width, being thirty 30 feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the grantee's railway as the same is located, staked out, and surveyed through the following described three parcels of real property, to-wit:

* * * * [Describing the three parcels through which the strip being conveyed runs] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold to the above named grantee and to its successors and assigns forever; the grantors confirming also to the grantee, its successors and assigns, the right to build, maintain and operate a line of railway thereover.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court's review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad's use to only railroad purposes. Here, even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1.00), without any "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Wheeler Lumber 16/3 deed (Albright, ECF No. 35, Ex. 82)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

93. The Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/5 Deed

The **Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/5 deed (Def.'s Ex. 123)**, which is very similar to the above-analyzed Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/3 deed, provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents, that for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar (\$1.00) to it in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, The Wheeler Lumber Company, hereinafter called the grantor, does hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the county of Tillamook and state of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land sixty feet in width being thirty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the grantee's railway as the same is last located, staked out, surveyed and being constructed through Lots Four (4), Five[] (5), Six[] (6) and that part of Lot Three (3) lying west of the lands in said lot heretofore conveyed by said grantor to Willie G. Du Bois, all in Section Three (3) and the East Half (E ½) of Lot One (1) in Section Four (4) and through all tide lands fronting and abutting on all of the above described lands, all in Township Two[] (2), North Range Ten (10) West Willamette Meridian.

Also, a strip of land sixty feet in width being thirty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the grantee's railway as the same is last located, staked out, surveyed and being constructed through all the tide lands fronting and abutting on that part of said Lot Three (3) in said Section Three (3) in said Township Two[] (2) North, Range Ten (20) West, Willamette Meridian, described as follows: * * * * [Describing the land through which the strip being conveyed runs] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold to the above named grantee and to its successors and assigns forever; the grantors confirming also to the grantee, its successors and assigns, the right to build, maintain and operate a line of railway thereover.

The aforesaid grantor does hereby covenant that it is the owner in fee simple of the above granted premises, and that it will warrant and defend same unto the said grantee aforesaid, its successors and assigns, against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

For the same reasons as discussed in this court’s review of the **Alley 5/475 deed**, the court finds that the language confirming that the land granted can be used for railroad purposes does not limit the railroad’s use to only railroad purposes. Here, even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/5 deed (Def.’s Ex. 123)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

94. The Williams 6/607 Deed

The **Williams 6/607 deed (Def.’s Ex. 125)** provides in pertinent part:

George H. Willaims et ux	RAILWAY DED
-to-	No. 4113.
P. R. and N. Co.	

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That for and in consideration of the sum of Ten 00/100 DOLLARS[,] the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and other valuable consideration moving to them[,] George H. Williams and Bessie Williams, his wife,, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

“A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is

surveyed and located through Lots Three, [sic] Four, [sic] Five [sic] and Six [sic] of Block Eleven [sic] in Cone and McCoy's Addition to Bay City, according to the plat thereof of record in Tillamook County, Oregon.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seized of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

Here, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$10), there is no reference to a "right of way" in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Williams 6/607 deed (Def.'s Ex. 125)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

95. The Wilson 75/244 Deed

The **Wilson 75/244 deed (Def.'s Ex. 126)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That we Brice Wilson and Sarah E. Wilson[,] husband and wife, for and in consideration of the sum[]of One Dollars, [sic] to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate, in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one Hundred [sic] feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as the same is surveyed and located through the East half of the Northeast quarter of Section twenty eight (28) in Township three (3) North Range five (5) West of the Willamette Meridian.

The said center line enters said land about 1185 feet south of the Northeast corner and runs southwesterly across the same to a point about 105 feet west of the South east [sic] corner thereof.

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances, thereunto belon[g]ing or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever.

The aforesaid Brice Wilson and Sarah E. Wilson do hereby covenant that they are the owners in fee simple of the above granted premises, and that they will forever warrant and defend the same unto the Pacific Railway Company, its successors and assigns, against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$1), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Wilson 75/244 deed (Def.’s Ex. 126)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

96. The Woodbury 16/481 Deed

The **Woodbury 16/481 deed (Def.’s Ex. 127)** is entitled “No. 10888 Warranty Deed” and provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of Ten (\$10.00) Dollars, to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and of other valuable considerations, E. D. Woodbury and Maude Woodbury, his wife,, hereinafter called the grantors, do bargain, sell[,] grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

A strip of land sixty (60) feet in width, being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the grantee’s railway as the same is surveyed and located through the following described real property, to wit:

* * * [Describing the property through which the strip conveyed runs] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining,

To Have and to Hold to the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors covenant with the grantee that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever claiming by, through or under the grantors or either of them.

Here, the amount of consideration paid was not nominal (\$10), there is no reference to a “right of way” in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose nor does the deed contain any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences. As such, the court finds that the **Woodbury 16/481 deed (Def.’s Ex. 127)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

97. The Woodbury 23/399 Deed

The **Woodbury 23/399 deed (Def.’s Ex. 128)** provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That we, E.E. Woodbury and Maude Woodbury, his wife, the grantors, in consideration of the sum of Two + $\frac{00}{100}$ Dollars, paid by Pacific Railway and Navigation, the grantee herein, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have bargained and sold, and by these presents do bargain, sell, transfer and convey unto said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, an Oregon Corporation, and to its successors and assigns forever, a strip of land sixty (60) feet in width, being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of said Company as the same is now located, staked out, and operated through Section Twenty-Nine (29), Township Two (2) North, Range Ten (10) West of the Willamette Meridian. Which strip lies between the line between Sections 29 and 32 on the South and the North boundary of North Street of said Lake Lytle Tract, as the same is platted in and by Lake Lytle Plat and between Blks. [sic] 1, 7 and 3 of Lake Lytle on the East and Blks [sic] 4, 8 and 14 of Lake Lytle on the West.

To Have and to Hold the above described premises unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors and assigns forever.

Even though the amount of consideration is nominal (\$2), without any “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, and no mention of a railroad purpose, nor

any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, the court finds that the **Woodbury 23/399 deed (Def.'s Ex. 128)**, conveyed fee simple title to the railroad.

98. The Wright-Blodgett Co. 15/493 Deed

The **Wright-Blodgett Co. 15/493 deed (Def.'s Ex. 129)** is entitled "Right of Way Deed. NO. 10598" and provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That , [sic] in consideration of the sum of[]Ten (10) Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and other valuable considerations moving to it, WRIGHT-BLODGETT COMPANY , [sic] LIMITED, hereinafter [sic] called the grantor, does bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, a strip of land one hundred (100) feet in width, being fifty (50) feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the railway of the grantee, as the same is surveyed, staked out and located through the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit :- [sic]

* * * [Describing the property through which the strip conveyed runs] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the grantee and to its successors and assigns forever.

Provided, however, and this conveyance is made upon the express understanding and condition that the grantor reserves to itself, its successors and assigns, the right to construct across the strip of land herein conveyed and across the railway of the grantee constructed thereon, a logging railroad, without compensation to the grantee, its successors and assigns, said crossing to be at grade and at some suitable point, the point of crossing and the manner of its construction to be subject to the approval of the chief engineer of the grantee and an engineer to be selected by the grantor; the said logging railroad to be operated at all times in such a manner as not to interfere with the operation by the[]grantee of its railway over said strip of land.

And further provided that the grantee dur ing [sic] the construction of its railway upon the right of way herein granted shall indemnify and save harmless the grantor from loss or damage by fire to its remaining timber

upon the land across which right of way is herein granted, and its acceptance to this grant may be deemed its obligation so to do.

The grantor covenants with the grantee that it will warrant and defend the premises herein granted against all lawful claims and demands of all persons claiming the same, by, through or under the grantor.

This deed is entitled “Right of Way Deed” and contains “language relating to the use or purpose to which the land is to be put or in other ways cutting down or limiting, directly or indirectly, the estate conveyed[.]” *Bouche*, 293 P.2d at 209 (quoting 132 A.L.R. 145). The deed specifically states that “this conveyance is made upon the express understanding and condition that the grantor reserves to itself, its successors and assigns, the right to construct across the strip of land herein conveyed and across the railway of the grantee constructed thereon, a logging railroad, without compensation to the grantee, its successors and assigns, said crossing to be at grade and at some suitable point, the point of crossing and the manner of its construction to be subject to the approval of the chief engineer of the grantee and an engineer to be selected by the grantor; the said logging railroad to be operated at all times in such a manner as not to interfere with the operation by the[]grantee of its railway over said strip of land.” The fact that the grantor reserved to itself the right to construct a logging railroad across the lands conveyed in the deed is inconsistent with the grant of a fee to the railroad and thus indicates the original parties’ intent to only grant an easement. The deed also provides that “the grantee during [sic] the construction of its railway upon the right of way herein granted shall indemnify and save harmless the grantor from loss or damage by fire to its remaining timber upon the land across which right of way is herein granted, and its acceptance to this grant may be deemed its obligation so to do.” This language also suggests the grant

of only an easement. The court finds that the **Wright-Blodgett Co. 15/493 deed (Def.'s Ex. 129)**, conveyed an easement to the railroad.

99. The Wright-Blodgett Co. 105/393 Deed

The **Wright-Blodgett Co. 105/393 deed (Def.'s Ex. 130)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That , [sic] in consideration of the sum of Ten (10) Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and other valuable considerations moving to it, WRIGHT-BLODGETT COMPANY, LIMITED, hereinafter called the grantor, does hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee , [sic] and to its successors and assigns , [sic] a **strip of land** one hundred (100) feet in width, being fifty (50) feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the railway of the grantee, as the same is surveyed, staked out nad [sic] located through the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon,[] to-wit:-

* * * [Describing the property through which the strip conveyed runs] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the grantee and to its successors and assigns forever. Provided, however , [sic] and this conveyance is made upon the express understanding and condition that the grantor resreves [sic] to itself, its successors and assigns, the right to construct across the strip of land herein conveyed and across the railway of the grantee constructed thereon, a logging railroad, without compensation to the grantee, its successors and assigns, said crossing to be at grade and at some suitable point, the point of crossing and the manner of its construction to be subject to the approval of the chief engineer of the[]grantee and an engineer to be selected by the grantor; the said logging railroad to be operated at all times in such a manner as not to interfere with the operation by the[]grantee of its railway over said strip of land. And further provided, that the grantee during the construction of its railway upon the right of way herein granted shall indemnify and save harmless the grantor from loss or damage by fire to its remaining timber upon the land across which right of way is herein granted, and its acceptance to this grant may be deemed its obligation so to do.

The grantor covenants with the grantee that it will warrant and defend the premises herein granted against all lawful claims and demands of all persons claiming the same by ,[]through [sic] or under the grantor.

As described above in the courts analysis of **Wright-Blodgett Co. 15/493 deed (Def.'s Ex.139)**, this includes purpose language or limiting language establishing that an easement and not fee was intended to be conveyed. Therefore, the court finds that the **Wright-Blodgett Co. 105/393 deed (Def.'s Ex. 130)**, conveyed an easement to the railroad.

VIII. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons the court **GRANTS-IN-PART** and **DENIES-IN-PART** the parties' motions for partial summary judgment. The parties shall have until **September 7, 2018**, to file a proposed schedule for resolving the remaining issues in these cases. The court will thereafter schedule a status conference to finalize the parties' next steps.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Nancy B. Firestone
NANCY B. FIRESTONE
Senior Judge

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 16-912L and
No. 16-1565L and No. 18-375L Consolidated
(Filed: February 8, 2019)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

_____)	
PERRY LOVERIDGE, et al.,)	
)	
Plaintiffs,)	
)	
v.)	
)	Motion for Reconsideration; Rails-to-
THE UNITED STATES,)	Trails; Oregon Law; Easement; Fee
)	Simple
Defendant.)	
)	
_____)	
ALBRIGHT, et al.,)	
)	
Plaintiffs,)	
)	
and)	
)	
THE UNITED STATES,)	
)	
Defendant.)	
_____)	

OPINION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR RECONSDIERATION

Steven M. Wald, St. Louis, MO, for *Loveridge* plainitffs. *Michael J. Smith*, St. Louis, MO and *Thomas S. Stewart* and *Elizabeth G. McCulley*, Kansas City, MO, of counsel.

Mark F. Hearne, II, Clayton, MO, for *Albright* plaintiffs. *Maghan S. Largent*, *Lindsay S.C. Brinton*, and *Stephen S. Davis*, Clayton, MO and *Abram J. Pafford*, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

Barbara M.R. Marvin, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., with whom was *Jeffrey H. Wood*, Acting Assistant Attorney General, for defendant. *Ragu-Jara Gregg*, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

I. INTRODUCTION

The *Albright* and *Loveridge* plaintiffs have asked this court to reconsider its rulings in its August 13, 2018 Opinion regarding 57 of the 132 deeds at issue in this case.¹ The plaintiffs dispute the court's findings that under Oregon law, certain deeds conveyed fee title to the railroad in these rails-to-trails cases as opposed to an easement. The *Albright* plaintiffs ask the court to reconsider its rulings as to 44 deeds while the *Loveridge* plaintiffs request reconsideration with respect to 25 deeds of which 12 are also included in the *Albright* plaintiffs' motion. In total the plaintiffs in these cases are seeking reconsideration on 57 deeds that the court determined conveyed a fee to the railroad.

The *Albright* and *Loveridge* plaintiffs move for reconsideration under Rule 59(a)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims. Under that Rule, this court, "in its discretion, 'may grant a motion for reconsideration [,]'" but only if "'there has been an intervening change in the controlling law, newly discovered evidence, or a need to correct clear factual or legal error or prevent manifest injustice.'" *Biery v. United States*, 818 F.3d 704, 711 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting *Young v. United States*, 94 Fed. Cl. 671, 674 (2010)). Accordingly, "[a] motion for reconsideration must also be supported 'by a showing of extraordinary circumstances which justify relief.'" *Id.* (citing *Caldwell v. United States*, 391 F.3d 1226, 1235

¹ Prior to the court issuing its August 13, 2018 decision, the parties agreed as to whether 30 of the deeds conveyed a fee or an easement. Additionally, the parties do not challenge the court's legal conclusions regarding 45 of the deeds. At issue on reconsideration are certain deeds which the court determined conveyed a fee to the railroad and which plaintiffs argue should have been determined to have conveyed an easement.

(Fed. Cir. 2004)). The Supreme Court has held that motions for reconsideration “may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” *Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker*, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995)). See also *Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. United States*, 111 Fed. Cl. 257, 259 (2013) (“A Rule 59 motion ‘must be based upon manifest error of law, or mistake of fact, and is not intended to give an unhappy litigant an additional chance to sway the court.’” (quoting *Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. United States*, 44 Fed. Cl. 298, 300 (1999))). “A court . . . will *not* grant a motion for reconsideration if the movant ‘merely reasserts . . . arguments previously made . . . all of which were carefully considered by the Court.’” *Ammex, Inc. v. United States*, 52 Fed. Cl. 555, 557 (2002) (quoting *Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States*, 29 Fed. Cl. 157, 164 (1993)). Rather, “the movant must point to a manifest (i.e., clearly apparent or obvious) error of law or a mistake of fact.” *Id.* (citing *Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co.*, 29 Fed. Cl. at 164); *Lucier v. United States*, 138 Fed. Cl. 793, 798-99 (2018). “‘Manifest,’ as in ‘manifest injustice,’ is defined as clearly apparent or obvious,” *Lucier*, 138 Fed. Cl. at 799 (quoting *Ammex*, 52 Fed. Cl. at 557), and therefore, as the court recently explained, a party “seek[ing] reconsideration on the ground of manifest injustice, . . . cannot prevail unless it demonstrates that any injustice is apparent to the point of being almost indisputable.” *Id.* (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs contend that there has been a manifest injustice on the grounds that the court misapplied Oregon law and that its rulings are inconsistent with this court’s prior rulings

in *Boyer v. United States*, 123 Fed. Cl. 430 (2015), a different rails to trails case arising in Oregon.²

II. THE COURT’S RULINGS ARE CONSISTENT WITH OREGON LAW.

Both the *Albright* and *Loveridge* plaintiffs argue that in its August 13, 2018 Opinion, the court did not properly consider the factors the Oregon Supreme Court laid out in *Bernards v. Link*, 248 P.2d 341 (Or. 1952), *opinion adhered to on reh’g*, 263 P.2d 794 (Or. 1953) (Mem.), and *Bouche v. Wagner*, 293 P.2d 203 (Or. 1956) when seeking to determine whether a conveyance of a strip of land to a railroad conveyed an easement or a fee simple interest. In *Bernards* the Oregon Supreme Court, in finding that an easement had been conveyed to a railroad, identified eight factors courts have looked at to determine the intent of the parties to convey an easement or a fee when the intent is not clear from the face of the deed. The factors examined include: 1) whether the deed is entitled a right of way; 2) whether the interest conveyed is described as a strip of land for use as a right of way; 3) whether the deed contains a reverter clause that makes clear that the property will be returned to the grantor if it no longer will be used as a right of way; 4) whether the consideration is nominal; 5) whether the grantees have to provide crossings; 6) whether the phrase “strip of land” is used repeatedly to describe

² The *Loveridge* plaintiffs also seek reconsideration with regard to the Goodspeed 16/487 and Goodspeed 9/200 deeds and the Smith, Lloyd 16/515 deed under Rule 60(a) for clerical errors. Rule 60(a) provides that “[t]he court may correct a clerical mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record.” First, the *Loveridge* plaintiffs argue that the court switched the text of the deed and analyses of the Goodspeed 16/487 and Goodspeed 9/200 in its August 13, 2018 opinion. Upon careful review the court agrees with the plaintiffs and the discussion of the Goodspeed 16/487 and Goodspeed 9/200 deeds in this opinion are consistent with this correction. Second the *Loveridge* plaintiffs argue that the court committed a clerical error when it recited the consideration of the Smith, Lloyd 16/515 deed as \$1 rather than \$150. The court agrees and the court’s analysis of the effect of this correction is reflected in the court’s analysis of the plaintiffs’ Rule 59 motion for reconsideration of the Smith, Lloyd 16/515 deed. Therefore, the *Loveridge* plaintiffs Rule 60(a) motion for reconsideration is **GRANTED**.

the interest being conveyed; 7) whether the property conveyed is described with precision (if not it is more likely an easement); and 8) whether fencing is required to be maintained by the railroad. *Bernards* 248 P.2d at 343. In *Bernards*, the Oregon Supreme Court found that a deed conveyed only an easement when the deed was labeled a right of way deed, nominal consideration was paid, the grant was for a strip of land to be used as a right of way for a railroad, the right of way was not described with precision, the grant was by its terms for the construction of a railroad and the property would revert back to the grantors if a railroad line was not built. *Id.*

Later in *Bouche* the Oregon Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a different deed conveyed an easement or fee to the railroad. In that decision, the Oregon Supreme Court explained that courts, in endeavoring to ascertain the intent of parties where the intent is not express, but the phrase “right of way” is used, will generally find an easement when the grant references the use to be made of the property in the granting or habendum clause. *Bouche*, 293 P.2d at 209. Thus in *Bouche*, the Oregon Supreme Court held that a deed conveyed a fee to the railroad where the deed: 1) described the conveyance as a strip of land without identifying the grant as only a right; 2) did not include a statement of purpose; 3) described the land to be conveyed with precision; and 4) used language in the habendum clause consistent with the grant of fee. In reaching this conclusion, the *Bouche* court explained that the fundamental task of a court in deciding whether a deed conveys a fee or an easement to the railroad is “to ascertain the intent of the original parties *by considering the language of the deed in its entirety* and the surrounding circumstances.” *Bouche*, 293 P.2d at 208. *See also Doyle v. Gilbert*, 469 P.2d 624, 626 (Or. 1970); *U.S. Nat’l Bank of LaGrande v. Miller*, 258 P.2d 205, 209 (Or. 1927)).

In this case, after looking at the language of all of the deeds, including the ones not in dispute, the court found that certain of the *Bernards/Bouche* factors were not very helpful in discerning whether a deed conveyed a fee or easement because the parties had agreed that deeds with these factors conveyed both fees and easements. For example, the Alderman 11/614, Bryden 74/274, Cone 7/339, Handley 21/99, Hobson 7/39, and Illingworth 7/164 deeds, which the parties stipulated conveyed a fee to the railroad, all contained the phrase “strip of land” and language such as “through” and “across”. Relying on the parties stipulations and comparing the language of the deeds that the parties agreed conveyed either an easement or a fee, the court concluded that although it would consider the phrase “strip of land” as an indication of an intent to convey an easement under Oregon law, the phrase “strip of land” without more was not very helpful in determining the parties’ intent in most instances. The court also found that use of the word “through,” which the *Albright* plaintiffs contend is interchangeable with “over and across,” was also of limited value in discerning the original parties’ intent because virtually all of the fee and easement deeds used “through” to describe the location of the “strip of land” conveyed on the grantor’s property. Furthermore, the court also found that the precision used to describe fee interest conveyed was not consistent between the properties the parties agreed were conveyed in fee and thus the court did not give that factor much weight. The Alderman 11/614 deed contained a far more precise description of the land being conveyed which included specific references to boundary markers and precise metes and bounds description

while the Cone 7/339 deed only described the land being conveyed as a land which runs through certain parcels.³

In the court's view limiting the use of certain factors that were not helpful in discerning the parties' intent was in keeping with the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in *Bouche*. In that case, the Oregon Supreme Court explained that under Oregon law, ORS 93.120, "any conveyance of real estate passes all the estate of the grantor, unless the intent to pass a lesser estate appears by express terms, or is necessarily implied in the terms of the grant." Thus, the Oregon Supreme Court went on to explain that in deciding what was conveyed to a railroad, courts must pay special attention to whether the deed limits the railroad's use of the property to only a right:

[deeds] which purport to grant and convey a strip, piece, parcel, or tract of land, [but] which do not contain additional language *relating to the use or purpose to which the land is to be put or in other ways cutting down or limiting, directly or indirectly, the estate conveyed . . .* [convey a fee]. *Id.* (quoting Annotation, *Deed to Railroad Co. as Conveying Fee or Easement*, 132 A.L.R. 142 (1941)).

In view of the foregoing, the court does not find that reconsideration is warranted solely on the grounds that the court did not give equal weight or sufficient weight to all of the eight *Bernards/Bouche* factors in deciding whether the original grantor conveyed a fee or easement to the railroad. This court examined each deed and applied the *Bernards/Bouche* factors as appropriate. Only to the extent that plaintiffs can show that these factors were misapplied will the court consider whether reconsideration is warranted.

III. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE COURT'S AUGUST 13 OPINION AND THE

³ The government notes that the Restatement (First) of Property §471, cmt. c. (1944) provides that references to "an area to be located by survey with reference to a known point or points" or an "area to be determined by survey" may be sufficient to indicate the intent to convey a fee. The more precise the more likely the deed conveys a fee.

RULING IN *BOYER* DO NOT WARRANT RECONSIDERATION.

Both the *Loveridge and Albright* plaintiffs also argue that this court's rulings in the August 13 Opinion are contrary to, and inconsistent with, the court's rulings three years ago in *Boyer v. United States*, 123 Fed. Cl. 430 (2015) and for this reason the court's rulings must be reconsidered. As discussed below, the court finds that any inconsistencies between the decisions do not warrant reconsideration of any ruling.

First, the *Boyer* and *Loveridge and Albright* cases involve different railroad lines and deeds and therefore the *Boyer* decision is of limited value in discerning the intent of the original parties to the deeds in this case.⁴ While non-binding decisions may provide persuasive authority in certain circumstances, this is ordinarily only true, "when the facts at issue are substantially similar." *Tamerlane, Ltd. V. United States*, 81 Fed. Cl. 752, 759 (2008) (citing *Kerr-McGee Corp. v. United States*, 77 Fed. Cl. 309, 317 n. 10 (2007)). Here, the facts are not "substantially similar" to those in *Boyer*. The deeds and rail line are not the same. Second, in this case, the parties stipulated to certain deeds and the court relied on those stipulations in deciding the original parties' intent when considering the other deeds at issue. It is not appropriate to reconsider the court's ruling on the deeds in this case based on the court's ruling in *Boyer* regarding different rail lines and different deeds. The court applied the same Oregon law in both cases. Reconsideration, as noted above, is only appropriate if the court misapplied Oregon law.

IV. THE INDIVIDUAL DEEDS

⁴ In its decision in *Boyer* the court considered several deeds in connection with the Portland, Eugene, and Eastern Railway. In the above-captioned cases the relevant rail line was the Port of Tillamook Bay Railroad.

Plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration of specific deeds are divided into the five categories the court asked the parties to use on reconsideration. *See* Oct. 22, 2018 Order. In its order, the court noted that the five categories may overlap and in that instance, the court explained that all of a plaintiffs' objections to the court's determination should "be addressed in the first category where the deed appears." *Id.*

A. Category I: Deeds that contain the language "together with the right to build, maintain, and operate thereover a railway" or other similar language.

Category I includes 10 deeds: Brinn 6/328; Cummings 77/262; DuBois 22/40; Gattrel 13/311; Goodwin 81/147; Large 5/536; Rinck 77/454; Slattery 94/161; Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/3; and Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/5.

For each of these 10 deeds in Category I, the *Albright* plaintiffs argue based on the language quoted above ("right to build, maintain, and operate language") that although the deeds do not include any right of way language that under *Bouche* these deeds must be read to convey only an easement. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that under the standard set forth in *Bouche* any deed containing language relating to the use of the property being conveyed for railroad use must be construed to convey an easement.

The government argues in support of the court's previous ruling that the subject deeds in Category I convey a fee that plaintiffs have mis-read *Bouche*. *Bouche* states that

[c]ourts have little difficulty, where a railroad company is grantee, in declaring that the instrument creates only an easement whenever the grant is a use to be made of the property, usually, but not invariably, describe as for the use as a right of way in the grant. . . . The courts, however, seem to express a divergence of opinion when the conveyance merely has a reference to the use or purpose to which the land is to be put, and which is contained in either the granting or habendum clause,

and, except for the reference, would uniformly be construed as passing title in fee.

The government argues that because the right to build, maintain, and operate language does not appear in either the granting or habendum clauses of the 10 deeds and because there is no right of way language in any of the deeds, the court was correct in determining that the right to build, maintain, and operate language does not indicate an intent by the original parties to grant an easement.

The court agrees with the government and sees no reason to re-examine its holding concerning the relevance of the right to build, maintain, and operate language unless that language appears in connection with the grant of the property interest being conveyed. In other words, if the right to build, maintain, and operate language does not appear to affect the interest being conveyed, the court sees no reason to change its holding that such language indicates that the original parties intended to convey a fee to the railroad. However, the court will reevaluate each of these deeds to determine if the right to build, maintain, and operate language can be read in connection with the grant of the property interest and thus is better read as a limitation of that interest.

In further support of their motion for reconsideration of eight of the ten deeds⁵ in Category I, the plaintiffs argue that the court incorrectly determined that the deeds described the strip of land conveyed with precision and thus the court should have determined that the deeds conveyed an easement and not a fee.⁶ As stated above, the

⁵ These deeds are Cummings 77/262; Du Bois 22/40; Gattrel 13/311; Goodwin 81/147; Rinck 77/454; Slattery 94/161; Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/3; and Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/5.

⁶ Additionally, the plaintiffs argue that the Du Bois 22/40; Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/3; and Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/5 deeds also contain nominal consideration which also indicates that the parties intended to convey only an easement and not a fee to the railroad.

court will examine whether it correctly applied the *Bernards/Bouche* factors. The court’s review of each of the deeds for which plaintiffs seek reconsideration in Category I are set forth below.

1. Brinn 6/328 Deed

The **Brinn 6/328 deed (Def.’s Ex. 11)** provides in pertinent part

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That foR [sic] and in consideration of the sum of \$150.00 to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, G. A. Brinn and Annie Brinn, his wife, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, all that portion of the land owned by them embraced in a strip of land 100 ft. wide, being 50 ft. on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company’s Railway, as now surveyed, located and adopted thru the lands of the aforesaid G. A. and Annie Brinn, in Lots 1- 2- 3- 4- 5- 6- 7- and 8, [sic] Block “A”, [sic] Plat of East Garibaldi, Sec. 21, T. 1 N. R. 10 W., W.M., said center line being more particularly described as follows:

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with the tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining;

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successoRs [sic] and assigns forever; together with the right to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway and telegraph line.

The court had found that the Brinn 6/328 deed conveyed fee simple title to the railroad because the language confirming the right to build a railroad did not limit the railroad’s use of the grant to only railroad purposes, the amount of consideration was substantial (\$150), there was no “right of way” language used in the title or body of the deed nor any right of reverter if

the railroad discontinued railroad use, and there was no requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor's interest.⁷

Given these findings, which are not disputed, the court rejects plaintiffs' contention that the right to build, maintain, and operate language in the final portion of the Brinn 6/328 deed mandates that the court find the Brinn 6/328 deed conveyed an easement. The Brinn 6/328 deed does not contain any of the other factors to suggest that the original parties intended to convey an easement. Therefore, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

2. Cummings 77/262 Deed

The **Cummings 77/262 deed (Def.'s Ex. 25)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That for and in consideration of the sum of \$217.00 to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, James Cummings and Ann Cummings[,] his wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit:-

A strip of land one hundred feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through the West half of the Southeast quarter of Section 29 in Township 3 North of Range 4 West of the Willamette Meridian, containing 7.70 acres more or less.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the above named grantee and to its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors do further covenant that the grantee may operate a

⁷ The court compared the Brinn 6/328 deed as well as the other nine deeds in Category I with the Alley 5/475 deed which was the first deed analyzed by this court to contain the right to build, maintain, and operate language. The court notes that although the plaintiffs are challenging the court's legal conclusion about the significance of the right to build, maintain, and operate language in determining whether a fee or an easement was conveyed, they are not challenging the court's determination that the Alley 5/475 deed conveyed a fee and not an easement.

railway line over the properties above described and also do all things convenient or useful to be done in connection therewith. The grantors do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple; that their estate therein is free from all liens and encumbrances, and that they will and their heirs, executors and administrators shall forever warrant and defend the above granted premises unto the grantee herein and unto its successors and assigns forever against the lawful claims and demands of all persons.

The court had found that the Cummings 77/262 deed conveyed fee simple title to the railroad because the language confirming that the right to build a railroad did not limit the railroad's use of the grant to only railroad purposes, the amount of consideration was substantial (\$217), there was no "right of way" language used in the title or body of the deed nor any right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor's interest.

Given these findings, which are not disputed, the court rejects plaintiffs' contention that the right to build, maintain, and operate language in the final portion of the deed mandates that the court find the Cummings 77/262 deed conveyed an easement.

The plaintiffs also argue that the description of the property conveyed is not precise and thus the court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the description of the location of the land being conveyed to the railroad is sufficient to determine where that land was and the deed specifically states how many acres of land was conveyed to the railroad. Additionally, the description of the land is nearly identical to the description provided for in several other deeds that both the plaintiffs and the government

agreed conveyed a fee to the railroad. *See* Cone 7/339⁸, Handley 21/99⁹, Hobson 7/39¹⁰, Illingworth 7/164¹¹. Furthermore, in the description of the location of the property interest being conveyed the parties indicate that the land had already been surveyed which when read in conjunction with Restatement (First) of Property §471, cmt. c. (1944) (*See*, n. 3 *supra*) shows sufficient precision in the description of the location of the conveyed land to conclude that the parties intended to convey a fee. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouce* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Cummings 77/262 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.

3. Du Bois 24/40 Deed

The **Du Bois 24/40 deed (Def.'s Ex. 32)** provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar[](\$1.00), the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Willie G. Du Bois and John E. Du Bois, her husband, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situated in the county of Tillamook and state of Oregon, to-wit:

⁸ The Cone 7/339 deed states in relevant part: "A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the centerline of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lot One of Block ten in Cone & McCoy's Addition to Bay City, according to the recorded plat thereof; Also through Lots twenty eight, thirty, and thirty one in J.J. McCoy's Addition to Bay City, according to the recorded plat thereof."

⁹ Handley 21/99 deed states in relevant part "A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the centerline of the railway of the grantee as the same is now surveyed and located through the south half (1/2) of block "B" in East Garfald Oregon, all being in Tillamook County State of Oregon"

¹⁰ Hobson 7/39 deed states in relevant part "A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the centerline of the railway grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lots three, four and seven of section twenty-two, in Township of North of Range Ten West of Willamette Meridian."

¹¹ Illingworth 7/164 deed states in relevant part "A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being (50) feet on each side of the centerline of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lot five of section 22, in Township One North of Range ten west of Willamette Meridian."

A strip of land sixty feet in width being thirty feet on each side of the center line of grantee's railway as the same is last located, staked out, surveyed and being constructed through the following described tract, to-wit:

Beginning at the [...] corner on the south bank of the Nehalen Bay on the section line between sections two (2) and three (3) in township two (2) north. Range ten (10) west in said county and state and running thence south on said section line 5.26 chains to a post: thence south $55^{\circ} 30'$ West 5.88 chains to post at the Southeast corner of the tract of land hereby described: thence South $55^{\circ} 33'$ West 6.46 chains to the southwest corner: thence north $34^{\circ} 30'$ West 6.38 chains to the south bank of Nehalen Bay: thence easterly up said Nehaluen Bay following the meanderings thereof to appoint and post north $34^{\circ} 30'$ West 5.55 chains from the said southeast corner of the lands hereby described; thence south $34^{\circ} 30'$ east 5.55 chains to the said southeast corner and place of beginning.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold to the above named grantee and to its successors and assigns forever; the grantors confirming also to the grantee, its successors and assigns, the right to build, maintain and operate a line of railway thereover.

The aforesaid grantors do hereby covenant that they are the owners in fee simple of the above granted premises and that they will forever Warrant and Defend the same unto the said grantee, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Du Bois 24/40 deed conveyed fee simple title to the railroad despite the nominal consideration (\$1) because the language confirming the right to build a railroad did not limit the railroad's use to only railroad purposes, there was no "right of way" language used in the title or body of the deed nor any right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor's interest.

Given these findings, which are not disputed, the court rejects plaintiffs' contention that the right to build, maintain, and operate language in the final portion of the deed mandates that the court find the Du Bois 24/40 deed conveyed an easement.

The plaintiffs also argue that the description of the property conveyed is not precise and thus the court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the description of the location of the land being conveyed to the railroad is sufficient to determine its precise location. Additionally, the description of the land is nearly identical to the description provided for in several other deeds that both the plaintiffs and the government agreed conveyed a fee to the railroad. *See* Cone 7/339, Handley 21/99, Hobson 7/39, Illingworth 7/164. Furthermore, in the description of the location of the property interest being conveyed the parties indicate that the land had already been surveyed which when read in conjunction with Restatement (First) of Property §471, cmt. c. (1944) shows sufficient precision in the description of the location of the conveyed land to conclude that the parties intended to convey a fee. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Du Bois 24/40 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.¹²

4. Gattrell 13/311 Deed

The **Gattrell 13/311 deed (Def.'s Ex. 40)** provides in pertinent part:

¹² The plaintiffs also argue that because the consideration in the deed was nominal (\$1) the court improperly determined that the Du Bois 24/40 deed conveyed a fee rather than an easement. However, the plaintiffs and the government stipulated that that Johnson 11/353 deed and the Parks 11/329 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad despite the amount of consideration only being \$1.00 and the deed containing "strip of land" and "through". Thus given the parties stipulations, the court finds that the fact that the consideration in the deed was nominal is not determinative in concluding that the deed conveyed an easement rather than a fee.

Know all Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of One (\$1.00), to him in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, F.J. Gattrell an unmarried man, hereinafter called the grantor, does bargain, sell, grant[,] convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, a strip of land sixty (60) feet in width, being thirty (30) feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is now located, surveyed and staked out through lot two (2) of section twenty nine (29) in township two (2) North of range ten (10) West of the Willamette Meridian, in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To have and to hold unto the [above named] grantee and to its successors and assigns forever, confirming to the grantee likewise the right to build, maintain and operate a railway line thereover.

The court had found that the Gattrell 13/311 deed conveyed fee simple title to the railroad despite the nominal consideration (\$1) because the language confirming the right to build a railroad did not limit the railroad’s use to only railroad purposes, there was no “right of way” language used in the title or body of the deed nor any right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Given these findings, which are not disputed, the court rejects plaintiffs’ contention that the right to build, maintain, and operate language in the final portion of the deed mandates that the court find the Gattrell 13/311 deed conveyed an easement.

The plaintiffs also argue that the description of the property conveyed is not precise and thus the court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the description of the location of the land being conveyed to the railroad is sufficient to determine its precise location. Additionally, the description of the land is nearly identical to the description provided for in several other deeds that both the plaintiffs and the

government agreed conveyed a fee to the railroad. *See* Cone 7/339, Handley 21/99, Hobson 7/39, Illingworth 7/164. Furthermore, in the description of the location of the property interest being conveyed the parties indicate that the land had already been surveyed which when read in conjunction with Restatement (First) of Property §471, cmt. c. (1944) shows sufficient precision in the description of the location of the conveyed land to conclude that the parties intended to convey a fee. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouce* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Gattrell 13/311 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.¹³

5. Goodwin 81/147 Deed

The **Goodwin 81/147 deed (Def.'s Ex. 43)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of Three Hundred and [Fifty] Dollars, to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Nathan J. Goodwin and M. M. Goodwin his wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property, situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit: A strip of land One hundred feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of the center line of the track of the grantee, as the same is surveyed and located through the east half of the southwest quarter of section twenty seven in township three north of range five west, together with the appurtenances[,] tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, together also with the right to maintain and operate a railroad thereover. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever. The grantors, above named, do covenant with the grantee, and with its successors and assigns, that they are seized of the said premises

¹³ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provide only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court's discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase "strip of land" and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Gattrell 13/311 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

in fee simple, and that they will, and their heirs, executors and administrators shall, warrant and defend the same against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Goodwin 81/147 deed conveyed fee simple title to the railroad because the language confirming the right to build a railroad did not limit the railroad's use to only railroad purposes, the amount of consideration was substantial (\$350), there was no "right of way" language used in the title or body of the deed nor any right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor's interest.

Given these findings, which are not disputed, the court rejects plaintiffs' contention that the right to build, maintain, and operate language in the final portion of the deed mandates that the court find the Goodwin 81/147 deed conveyed an easement.

The plaintiffs also argue that the description of the property conveyed is not precise and thus the court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the description of the location of the land being conveyed to the railroad is sufficient to determine its precise location. Additionally, the description of the land is nearly identical to the description provided for in several other deeds that both the plaintiffs and the government agreed conveyed a fee to the railroad. *See* Cone 7/339, Handley 21/99, Hobson 7/39, Illingworth 7/164. Furthermore, in the description of the location of the property interest being conveyed the parties indicate that the land had already been surveyed which when read in conjunction with Restatement (First) of Property §471, cmt. c. (1944) shows sufficient precision in the description of the location of the conveyed land to conclude that the parties intended to convey a fee. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors

weighed in favor of finding that the Goodwin 81/147 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.

6. Large 5/536 Deed

The **Large 5/536 deed (Def.'s Ex. 69)** provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men By These Presents:

That for and in consideration of the sum of \$250.00 to her in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Mrs. J. Large does hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever: a strip of land 100 ft. wide, being 50 ft. on each side of the center line of the railway of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as now surveyed and located thru this land of the aforesaid Mrs. J. Large in Lots 3 and 4, Sec. 21, T. 1 N. R. 10 W., W.M. said center line being more particularly described as follows, to wit:

[Description]

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining;

To Have and to Hold unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors and assigns forever; together with the right to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway and telegraph line.

The court had found that the Large 5/536 deed conveyed fee simple title to the railroad because the language confirming the right to build a railroad did not limit the railroad's use to only railroad purposes, the amount of consideration was substantial (\$250), there was no "right of way" language used in the title or body of the deed nor any right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor's interest.

Given these findings, which are not disputed, the court rejects plaintiffs' contention that the right to build, maintain, and operate language in the final portion of the Large 5/536 deed

mandates that the court find the Large 5/536 deed conveyed an easement. Therefore, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

7. Rinck 77/454 Deed

The **Rinck 77/454 deed (Def.'s Ex. 90)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar to him in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and other valuable considerations moving to him, J. H. Rinck, an unmarried man, hereinafter called the grantor, does hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, [sic] all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to wit:

A strip of land 100 feet wide, being 50 feet on each side of the centerline [sic] of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company as the same is constructed through the North half of the northeast quarter of Section 32, in township 3 North of range 4 west of the Willamette Meridian containing 3.17 acres.”

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, granting also the grantee the right to operate a railway line thereover as well as the fee of the aforesaid premises. The grantor does covenant that he is seased [sic] of the aforesaid premises in fee simple and that the same are free from all liens and encumbrances, and that he will and his heirs, executors and administrators shall forever warrant and defend the same against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Rinck 77/454 deed conveyed fee simple title to the railroad despite the nominal consideration (\$1) because the language confirming the right to build a railroad did not limit the railroad’s use to only railroad purposes, there was no “right of way” language used in the title or body of the deed nor any right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Given these findings, which are not disputed, the court rejects plaintiffs' contention that the right to build, maintain, and operate language in the final portion of the deed mandates that the court find the Rinck 77/454 deed conveyed an easement.

The plaintiffs also argue that the description of the property conveyed is not precise and thus the court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the description of the location of the land being conveyed to the railroad is sufficient to determine its precise location. Additionally, the description of the land is nearly identical to the description provided for in several other deeds that both the plaintiffs and the government agreed conveyed a fee to the railroad. *See* Cone 7/339, Handley 21/99, Hobson 7/39, Illingworth 7/164. Furthermore, in the description of the location of the property interest being conveyed the parties indicate that the land had already been surveyed which when read in conjunction with Restatement (First) of Property §471, cmt. c. (1944) shows sufficient precision in the description of the location of the conveyed land to conclude that the parties intended to convey a fee. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that Rinck 77/454 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.¹⁴

8. Slattery 94/161 Deed

The **Slattery 94/161 deed (Def.'s Ex. 101)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of Ten Dollars to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and other valuable considerations moving to them,

¹⁴ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provide only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court's discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase "strip of land" and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Rinck 77/454 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

W. C. Slattery and Delia Slattery, his wife, hereinafter called the grantors , do bargain, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State[]of Oregon, to-wit: A strip of land one hundred feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of the center line of the grantee's railway as the same is surveyed, staked out and located through the northwest quArter [sic] of Section 32 in Township 3 North of Range 5 West of the Willamette Meridian. Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging, or in any wise [sic] appertaining, with the right to construct, maintain and operate a railway thereover. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the grantee and to its successors and assigns forever. And the grantors do covenant with the grantee that they will warrant and defend the premises above granted unto the grantee, and to its successors and assigns against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever claiming or to claim under the grantors.

The court had found that the Slattery 94/161 deed conveyed fee simple title to the railroad because the language confirming the right to build a railroad did not limit the railroad's use to only railroad purposes, the amount of consideration was substantial (\$10), there was no "right of way" language used in the title or body of the deed nor any right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor's interest.

Given these findings, which are not disputed, the court rejects plaintiffs' contention that the right to build, maintain, and operate language in the final portion of the deed mandates that the court find the Slattery 94/161 deed conveyed an easement.

The plaintiffs also argue that the description of the property conveyed is not precise and thus the court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the description of the location of the land being conveyed to the railroad is sufficient to determine its precise location. Additionally, the description of the land is nearly identical to the description provided for in several other deeds that both the plaintiffs and the

government agreed conveyed a fee to the railroad. *See* Cone 7/339, Handley 21/99, Hobson 7/39, Illingworth 7/164. Furthermore, in the description of the location of the property interest being conveyed the parties indicate that the land had already been surveyed which when read in conjunction with Restatement (First) of Property §471, cmt. c. (1944) shows sufficient precision in the description of the location of the conveyed land to conclude that the parties intended to convey a fee. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Slattery 94/161 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.

9. Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/3 Deed

The **Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/3 deed (Albright, ECF No. 34, Ex. 82)** provides in part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of \$1.00 to it in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, The Wheeler Lumber Company, hereinafter called the grantor, does hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the county of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land 60 feet in width, being thirty 30 feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the grantee's railway as the same is located, staked out, and surveyed through the following described three parcels of real property, to-wit:

* * * * [Describing the three parcels through which the strip being conveyed runs] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold to the above named grantee and to its successors and assigns forever; the grantors confirming also to the grantee, its successors and assigns, the right to build, maintain and operate a line of railway thereover.

The court had found that the Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/3 deed conveyed fee simple title to the railroad despite the nominal consideration (\$1) because the language confirming that the

right to build a railroad did not limit the railroad's use to only railroad purposes, there was no "right of way" language used in the title or body of the deed nor any right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor's interest.

Given these findings, which are not disputed, the court rejects plaintiffs' contention that the right to build, maintain, and operate language in the final portion of the deed mandates that the court find the Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/3 deed conveyed an easement.

The plaintiffs also argue that the description of the property conveyed is not precise and thus the court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the description of the location of the land being conveyed to the railroad is sufficient to determine its precise location. Additionally, the description of the land is nearly identical to the description provided for in several other deeds that both the plaintiffs and the government agreed conveyed a fee to the railroad. *See* Cone 7/339, Handley 21/99, Hobson 7/39, Illingworth 7/164. Furthermore, in the description of the location of the property interest being conveyed the parties indicate that the land had already been surveyed which when read in conjunction with Restatement (First) of Property §471, cmt. c. (1944) shows sufficient precision in the description of the location of the conveyed land to conclude that the parties intended to convey a fee. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/3 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.¹⁵

¹⁵ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provide only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court's discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase "strip of land" and used the word through

10. Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/5 Deed

The **Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/5 deed (Def.'s Ex. 123)**, provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents, that for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar (\$1.00) to it in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, The Wheeler Lumber Company, hereinafter called the grantor, does hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the county of Tillamook and state of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land sixty feet in width being thirty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the grantee's railway as the same is last located, staked out, surveyed and being constructed through Lots Four (4), Five[] (5), Six[] (6) and that part of Lot Three (3) lying west of the lands in said lot heretofore conveyed by said grantor to Willie G. Du Bois, all in Section Three (3) and the East Half (E ½) of Lot One (1) in Section Four (4) and through all tide lands fronting and abutting on all of the above described lands, all in Township Two[] (2), North Range Ten (10) West Willamette Meridian.

Also, a strip of land sixty feet in width being thirty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the grantee's railway as the same is last located, staked out, surveyed and being constructed through all the tide lands fronting and abutting on that part of said Lot Three (3) in said Section Three (3) in said Township Two[] (2) North, Range Ten (20) West, Willamette Meridian, described as follows: * * * * [Describing the land through which the strip being conveyed runs] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold to the above named grantee and to its successors and assigns forever; the grantors confirming also to the grantee, its successors and assigns, the right to build, maintain and operate a line of railway thereover.

The aforesaid grantor does hereby covenant that it is the owner in fee simple of the above granted premises, and that it will warrant and defend same unto the said grantee aforesaid, its successors and assigns, against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/3 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

The court had found that the Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/5 deed conveyed fee simple title to the railroad despite the nominal consideration (\$1) because the language confirming that the right to build a railroad did not limit the railroad's use to only railroad purposes, there was no "right of way" language used in the title or body of the deed nor any right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor's interest.

Given these findings, which are not disputed, the court rejects plaintiffs' contention that the right to build, maintain, and operate language in the final portion of the deed mandates that the court find the Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/5 deed conveyed an easement.

The plaintiffs also argue that the description of the property conveyed is not precise and thus the court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the description of the location of the land being conveyed to the railroad is sufficient to determine its precise location. Additionally, the description of the land is nearly identical to the description provided for in several other deeds that both the plaintiffs and the government agreed conveyed a fee to the railroad. *See* Cone 7/339, Handley 21/99, Hobson 7/39, Illingworth 7/164. Furthermore, in the description of the location of the property interest being conveyed the parties indicate that the land had already been surveyed which when read in conjunction with Restatement (First) of Property §471, cmt. c. (1944) shows sufficient precision in the description of the location of the conveyed land to conclude that the parties intended to convey a fee. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards* factors

weighed in favor of finding that the Wheeler Lumber 16/5 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.¹⁶

B. Category II: Deeds titled “Railway Deeds.”

Category II includes the following deeds: Batterson 12/163, Easom 11/515, McMillan 11/328, Ostrander 9/205, Roy 11/516, and Shrader & Groat 11/354. The *Albright* plaintiffs make two separate legal arguments as to why the court should reconsider its determination that these six deeds conveyed a fee to the railroad. Each of these legal arguments will be addressed in turn.

i. Deeds Entitled “Railway Deed” Do Not Automatically Convey An Easement To The Railroad.

The *Albright* plaintiffs contend that these six deeds should be interpreted as having conveyed only easements. Plaintiffs argue that “railway” in the title of a deed, is the same as, or interchangeable with, “right of way,” *Albright* Mot. at 8, and that the title of the deed alone, regardless of whether “Right-of Way Deed” or “Railway Deed,” is “enough under Oregon law to find an easement.” *Id.* at 9.

The *Albright* plaintiffs did not raise this argument in their summary judgment motion or reply, but rather raised the issue for the first time in their objections to the Court’s Preliminary Findings on summary judgment, ECF No. 49. The United States therefore maintains, as it did in oral argument, Oral Arg. Tr. 99:11-20, that the *Albright* plaintiffs have waived this argument.

¹⁶ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provide only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court’s discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase “strip of land” and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Wheeler Lumber Co. 16/5 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court’s conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

Plaintiffs cite no Oregon law or other controlling authority in support of their argument, and the court is aware of no Oregon cases that hold, or even suggest, that a deed entitled “Railway Deed” cannot convey a fee. Indeed, to the contrary, as the United States previously noted, Def.’s XMSJ at 14-15, Oregon law is clear that railroads can own strips of land in fee. *See Bouche*, 293 P.2d at 206, 210. And the Oregon Supreme Court has held that, in conveyances to railroads, the phrase “right of way” can refer to the land itself and not be an indication of the estate being conveyed. *Id.* at 209. In this case, the Category II deeds do not use either the terms “right-of way” or “railway” in the body of the deed, but only in the title. Thus, because railroads can hold either fee title or easements in strips of land on which they construct a right of way, the title, “Railway Deed,” does not dictate that the property interest being conveyed is an easement, rather it merely indicates that the deed is a form that can be used when a railroad is a party to a land conveyance.

In sum, as to this issue, particularly in light of the substantial consideration for each of the six conveyances (Batterson - \$800; Easom - \$800; McMillan - \$300; Ostrander - \$550; Roy - \$1,000; Shrader & Groat - \$200),¹⁷ and based on the absence of any “right of way” or other limiting language, the court finds that reconsideration is not needed.

ii. Strip of land, through, and lack of precision

The *Albright* plaintiffs also challenge each of the Category II deeds on other grounds the deeds’ use of “strip of land,” and “through,” and the lack of precision in their descriptions of the property being conveyed, which they claim are “additional indicia” indicating that the deeds

¹⁷ In *Boyer*, this Court recognized that “where consideration is substantial, the balance tips in favor of finding a fee” 123 Fed. Cl. at 439.

were intended to convey easements and not fees as the court had previously determined. The court will review each deed in turn for reconsideration.

1. Batterson 12/163

The **Batterson 12/163 deed (Def.'s Ex. 5)** provides in pertinent part:

S. M. Batterson et al to Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	Railway Deed. NO. 7948.
---	----------------------------

KNOWN ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of Eight [sic] Hundred & 00 DOLLARS, [sic] the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, S M. Batterson [sic] and Harriet E. McMaine, sole heirs at law of William Batterson, deceased, and Pauline O. Batterson wife of said S. M. Matterson, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant[,] convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (500 [sic] feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee, as the same is surveyed and located through Lots 4, 6 and 7 and the North West quarter of South East quarter of Section 34 and LOt [sic] 6 of Section 35, in Township 3 North of Range nine West of Willamette Meridian.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court found that the Batterson 12/163 deed granted fee simple title to the railroad because “Railway Deed” on its own did not indicate an intent to convey an easement, the amount of consideration was substantial (\$800), there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right

of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor's interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category I deeds the Batterson 12/163 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a "strip of land" and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Batterson 12/163 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. First "strip of land" only indicates an intent to convey an easement when it is used in connection with language limiting its use. In this instance it is clear that "strip of land" is describing the property being conveyed. Similarly, deeds which contain the word "through" when describing the location of the "strip of land" does not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. The use of the word "through" is not the same as "over and across" which the Oregon Supreme Court found indicated an intent to convey an easement, and the use of "through" not in connection with a right to cross does not indicate an intent to convey an easement but rather is a description of the location of the property interest being conveyed. As such, the use of "through" in the Batterson 12/163 deed is not used in connection with a right and as such does not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the

Bernards/Bouche factors weighed in favor of finding that the Batterson 12/163 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.

2. Easom 11/515 Deed

The **Easom 11/515 deed (Def.’s Ex. 33)** provides in pertinent part:

Elnora [sic] F. Easement et vir.	Railway Deed.
to	No. 7463.
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE[]PRESENTS : [sic] That for and in consideration of the sum of Eight Hundred & 00/100 DOLLARS, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, Elnora [sic] F. Easom and Chas. E. Easom, wife and husband[,] do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lots One, two, six and seven in Section thirty six, in Township three North of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian, except a certain three acre tract in said Lot One [sic] heretofore sold to Felix Roy.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seized of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court found that the Easom 11/515 deed granted fee simple title to the railroad because “Railway Deed” on its own did not indicate an intent to convey an easement, the amount of consideration was substantial (\$800), there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right

of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor's interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category I deeds the Easom 11/515 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a "strip of land" and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Easom 11/515 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the courts analysis of the Batterson 12/163 deed in Category II, the use of "strip of land" and through in the Easom 11/515 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Easom 11/515 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.

3. McMillan 11/328 Deed

The **McMillan 11/328 deed (Def.'s Ex. 75)** provides in pertinent part:

Nillus McMillan and wife
to
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.

Railway Deed.
No. 7181.

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That for and in consideration of the sum of Three Hundred & 00/100 DOLLARS , the

receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, We, Nillus McMillan and Sarah McMillan, husband and wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell[,] grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property, situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land Sixty [sic] (60) feet wide, being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through

Beginning at the mouth of a certain water ditch in Lot three of Section twenty Township two North of Range ten west, running hence in a South easterly direction following said ditch to its intersection with a small lake, thence out South across said lake to its South Bank, thence in an Easterly direction following the foot of the hill to the East line of said Lot three, thence North on said line to the Nehalem Riven, thence Southerly on line of ordinary high water mark to point of beginning, containing 10 acres more or less, all in Sec. 20, T. 2 N. R. 10 W. Also the north half of South East quarter and West half of North East quarter of Section 20, T. 2 N. R. 10 W. all being situated in Tillamook County, Oregon.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever. The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court found that the McMillan 11/328 deed granted fee simple title to the railroad because “Railway Deed” on its own did not indicate an intent to convey an easement, the amount of consideration was substantial (\$300), there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I deeds the McMillan 11/328 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the McMillan 11/328 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the courts analysis of the Batterson 12/163 deed in Category II, the use of “strip of land” and through in the McMillan 11/328 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the McMillan 11/328 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.

4. Ostrander 9/205 Deed

The **Ostrander 9/205 deed (Def.’s Ex. 80)** provides in pertinent part:

Chas. [sic] Ostrander and wife	Railway Deed.
to	No. 5807.
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That for and in consideration of the sum of Five Hundred Fifty & 00/100 DOLLARS[,] the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, Charles R. Ostrander and Frances A. Ostrander, husband and wife, of Bay City, in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to

its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property, situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide, being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through that certain tract of land described as follows: Beginning at the North East corner of Bar View Addition to Bay City, in Tillamook County, State of Oregon, and running thence East thirteen hundred (1300) feet, thence South to the South line of the Hiram Smith Donation Land Claim, thence West to the South East corner of a seven and one half acre tract formerly owned by Peter Morgan, thence North thirty seven rods more or less to a slough and being the North East corner of said seven and one half acre tract, thence following down said slough in a South Westerly direction to appoint which would be in line with the Ease line of Bar View addition aforesaid, thence North to the place of beginning.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court found that the Ostrander 9/205 deed granted fee simple title to the railroad because “Railway Deed” on its own did not indicate an intent to convey an easement, the amount of consideration was substantial (\$550), there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the

Category I deeds that the Ostrander 9/205 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Ostrander 9/205 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the courts analysis of the Batterson 12/163 deed in Category II, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Ostrander 9/205 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Ostrander 9/205 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.

5. Roy 11/516 Deed

The **Roy 11/516 deed (Def.’s Ex. 93)** provides in pertinent part:

Felix Roy to Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	Railway Deed. No. 7464.
---	----------------------------

KNOWN ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One Thousand & 00/100 DOLLARS, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I Felix Roy, a bachelor of Tillamook County, Oregon, hereinafter called the grantors, [sic] do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide, being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lot three of Section 36 Township 3 North of Range 9 West of W. M. Lots two, three and thirteen of Section 31, Township 3 North of Range 9 West of W. M. Also through a certain tract described as follows:- Beginning at the

meander post on the North bank of Nehalem River on the line between Section 31 Tp. 3 N. Range 9 West and Section 36 Tp. 3 North Range 10 West, running thence North 30 rods, thence West 208 feet, thence South to Nehalem River, thence in an Easterly direction following the North bank of Nehalem River to place of beginning in Sec. 36 Tp. 3 N. R. 10 W. of W.M.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors [sic] above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they [sic] will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court found that the Roy 11/516 deed granted fee simple title to the railroad because “Railway Deed” on its own did not indicate an intent to convey an easement, the amount of consideration was substantial (\$1000), there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I deeds the Roy 11/516 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that Roy 11/516 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the courts analysis of the Batterson 12/163 deed in Category II, the use of “strip of land” and

through in the Roy 11/516 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Roy 11/516 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.

6. Schrader & Groat 11/354 Deed

The **Schrader & Groat 11/354 deed (Def.'s Ex. 98)** provides in pertinent part:

Paul Schrader et ux
 & John Groat et ux
 to
 Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.

Railway Deed.
 No. 7235.

KNOWN ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That for and in consideration of Two Hundred & 00 DOLLARS, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, Paul Schrader and Lillie R. Schrader[,] husband and wife, and John Groat and Lillian A. Groat , [sic] husband and wife, hereinafter called the grantors[,] do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee[,] and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land sixty feet wide being thirty feet on each side of the center line of railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lot one of Section five, in Township One North of range ten West of Willamette Meridian, save and except seven acres off the South[]and a strip of land twenty feet wide off the North end of said Lot one.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court found that the Schrader & Groat 11/354 deed granted fee simple title to the railroad because "Railway Deed" on its own did not indicate an intent to convey an easement,

the amount of consideration was substantial (\$200), there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest. .

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I deeds the Schrader & Groat 11/254 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Schrader & Groat 11/354 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the courts analysis of the Batterson 12/163 deed in Category II, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Schrader & Groat 11/354 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Schrader & Groat 11/354 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.

C. Category III: Deeds that conveyed a “strip of land” and used either “across”, “through”, “over” or “over and across” a grantor’s land, without “right of way” language.

With respect to the twenty-eight deeds in Category III, plaintiffs argue that under Oregon law, this court should have determined that deeds which contained the phrase “strip of land” and the words “through,” “over,” “on,” or “across” convey an easement. These are the same arguments made for the deeds in Category II except that the Category II deeds were all entitled “Railway Deed”. As explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds the phrase “strip of land” when not used in connection with limiting language does not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Additionally, the court’s analysis of the deeds use of the word through also applies to similar words offered by the plaintiffs including “over,” “on,” and “across”. Applying these standards, the court will review each deed in Category III in turn for reconsideration.

1. Beals 18/40 Deed

The **Beals (Tr.) 18/40 deed (Def.’s Ex. 7)** provides in pertinent part:

F.R. Beals, Trustee

to

11135 Railway Deed

Pacific Railway + Navigation Co

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of One and 00/100 Dollars, [sic] the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, F R. Beals, Trustee, hereinafter called the grantors, [sic] do [sic] bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

A strip of land sixty (60) feet wide being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lot three of Section thirty two in Township two North of Range ten West of the Willamette Meridian.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To have and to hold unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The court had found that the Beals 18/40 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I and II deeds that the Beals 18/40 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Beals 18/40 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Beals 18/40 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Beals 18/40 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.¹⁸

¹⁸ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provide only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court’s discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase “strip of land” and used the word through

2. Bigelow 13/312 Deed

The **Bigelow 13/312 deed (Def.'s Ex. 9)** provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of \$1.00 to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Mary M. Bigelow and Jay W. Bigelow, her husband, hereinafter called the grantors, do bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

A strip of land 100 feet in width, being 50 feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the grantee's railway as the same is surveyed, located and staked out through the Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 32, in Township 3 North of Range 9 West of Willamette Meridian, and containing eighty-four hundredths of an acre[.]

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining

To Have and to Hold to the grantee and to its successors and assigns forever.

This deed is executed for the purpose of correcting an informality in a previous deed executed by the above named grantor, Mary M. Bigelow, without the joinder of her husband.

The court had found that the Bigelow 13/312 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor's interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The

conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Beals 18/40 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category I and II deeds that the Bigelow 13/312 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a "strip of land" and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Bigelow 13/312 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of "strip of land" and through in the Bigelow 13/312 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Bigelow 13/312 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.¹⁹

3. Burgholzer 83/99 Deed

The **Burgholzer 83/99 deed (Def.'s Ex. 14)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That Joseph Burgholzer and Vina A. Burgholzer, his wife for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar, to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and[]to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific Railway

¹⁹ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provide only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court's discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase "strip of land" and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Bigelow 13/312 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

and Navigation Company, as the same is surveyed and located through the East one half of the Northeast quarter of Section thirty (30) in Township three (3) North of Range four (4) West W. M.

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances [,] thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining. TO HAVE[]AND TO HOLD to the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever.

The aforesaid grantors Joseph Burgholzer and Vina A. Burgholzer do hereby covenant that they are the owners in fee simple of the aforesaid premises, and that they will forever warrant and defend the same unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns, against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Burgholzer 83/99 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s land.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I and II deeds that the Burgholzer 83/99 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Burgholzer 83/99 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as

explained in the court's analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of "strip of land" and through in the Burgholzer 83/99 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Burgholzer 83/99 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.²⁰

4. Campbell 85/208

The **Campbell 85/208 deed (Def.'s Ex. 18)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That D. F. Campbell and Cecily C. Campbell, his wife, for and in consideration[]of the sum of One Dollar (\$1.00), to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit: A strip of land one hundred feEt [sic] in width, being fifty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as the same is now surverye d[]and [sic] located through the West half of the Northwest quarter of Section Thirty six (36) Township Three [sic] (3) North Range Five West, containing 2.84 acres. Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the sAid [sic] Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors and assigns forever. The aforesaid D. F. Campbell and Cecily C. Campbell, his wife, do hereby covenant that they are the owners in fee simple of the above granted premises, and that they will forever warrant and defend the same unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns, against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

²⁰ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court's discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase "strip of land" and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Burgholzer 83/99 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

The court had found that the Campbell 85/208 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s land.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I and II deeds that the Campbell 85/208 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Campbell 85/208 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Campbell 85/208 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of

finding that the Campbell 85/208 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.²¹

5. Cook 15/83 Deed

The **Cook 15/83 deed (Def.'s Ex. 24)** pertains in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That Vincent Cook and Martha G. Cook, his wife, hereinafter called the grantors, in consideration of the sum of Ten (\$10.00) Dollars, to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and other valuable considerations moving to them, do * * * bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns[]forever, a one half interest in the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet in width, being fifty (50) feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the tract of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's railway as the same is now located, adopted, and constructed across the Northwest quarter[]of the Southwest quarter and the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section eighteen (18) in Township one (1) South of Range nine (9) West of the Willamette Meridian, containing 5.07 acres,

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining,

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the above named grantee and to its successors and assigns forever.

The court had found that the Cook 15/83 deed conveyed fee simple title because the amount of consideration was substantial (\$10), there was no "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of

²¹ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court's discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase "strip of land" and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Campbell 85/208 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor's interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category I and II deeds that the Cook 15/183 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a "strip of land" and describes it as passing across the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Cook 15/83 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of "strip of land" and across in the Cook 15/83 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Cook 15/83 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.

6. Davidson 11/509 Deed

The **Davidson 11/509 deed (Def.'s Ex. 27)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One and 00/100 Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we F. M. Davidson and Alvie Davidson, husband and wife[,] hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant[,] convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND

NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) Feet [sic] wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through our undivided one third interest in the North East quarter of North East quarter of Section thirteen Township one South of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian; also a strip of land six rods wide off of the North side of South East quarter of North East quarter of Section thirteen, Township one South of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

And * * * grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Davidson 11/509 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I and II deeds that the Davidson 11/509 deed describes the location of the land being

conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that Davidson 11/509 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Davidson 11/509 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Davidson 11/509 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.²²

7. Galvani 77/37 Deed

The **Galvani 77/37 deed (Def.’s Ex. 39)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE made this 11th day of April A. D. 1907, between W. H. Galvani, a single man[]of Portland, Multnomah, Oregon, party of the first part, and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, party of the second part[,] WITNESSETH:

That the said party of the first part for and in consideration of the sum of \$1 to him in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged[,] has granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell [sic] convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part and its successors and assigns, all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and being a portion of the Southwest quarter of Section 30, T. 3 N. R. 4 W. of the Will. Mer., being a strip of land 100 feet wide, being 50 feet on each side

²² The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court’s discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase “strip of land” and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Davidson 11/509 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court’s conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

of the center line of the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company's railway as now surveyed, located and adopted across said lands, said center line being described as follows,[]to-wit

* * * [Description] * * * and containing 11.31 acres, reserving grade farm crossings at two points to be selected by the party of the first part.

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all and singular, the said premises, together with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and unto its successors and assigns forever. And the party of the first part does hereby covenant to and with the party of the second part, its successors and assigns, forever, that the party of the first part is the owner in fee simple of the tract of land hereinbefore described; That [sic] said tract of land is free from all incumbrances and that the party of the first part shall warrant and forever defend said tract of land against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Galvani 77/37 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) and the grantor reserved the right to two farm crossings because there was no "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, and no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use.

Plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a "strip of land" and describes it as across the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Galvani 77/37 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of "strip of land" and across in the Galvani 77/37 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its

original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Galvani 77/37 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.²³

8. Goodspeed 9/200 Deed

The **Goodspeed 9/200 deed (Def.’s Ex. 42)** and provides in pertinent part:

K D. R. Goodspeed and wife	RAILWAY DEED.
to	NO. 5802.
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	

KNOWN ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One & 00/100 DOLLARS[,] the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, We, [sic] D. E. Goodspeed and M. J. Goodspeed, husband and wife, of Tillamook County, Oregon, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit; [sic]

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is now surveyed and located through

The [sic] South East quarter of the North East quarter of Section thirteen in Township one South of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian[.]

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Goodspeed 9/200 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right

²³ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court’s discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase “strip of land” and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Galvani 77/37 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court’s conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I and II deeds that the Goodspeed 9/200 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Goodspeed 9/200 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Goodspeed 9/200 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Goodspeed 9/200 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied.²⁴

²⁴ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court’s discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase “strip of land” and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Goodspeed 9/200 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court’s conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

9. Hagen 75/279 Deed

The **Hagen 75/279 deed (Def.'s Ex. 44)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 22 day of April, 1907, between Bridget Hagen (a [sic] single woman) of Portland Multnomah County, Oregon, party of the first part, and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, party of the second part, WITNESSETH:

That the said party[]of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar (\$1) and other good and valuable considerations, to her in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, h[]ave [sic] granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed, and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns, all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in Washington County,[]Oregon, to-wit:

Being a portion of Section 30, T. 3 N. R. 4 W. of the Will. Mer. described as follows:

A strip of land 100 feet wide being 50 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's railway, as surveyed, located and adopted across said lands, said center line being described as follows:

* * * [Description] * * *

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders[,] rents, issues and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said party of the[]second part and unto its successors and assigns forever. And the party of the first part does hereby covenant to and with the party of the second part, its successors and assigns forever, that the party of the first part is the owner in fee simple of the tract of land hereinbefore described; that said tract of land is free from all incumbrances and that the party of the first part shall warrant and forever defend said tract of land against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Hagen 75/279 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no

right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor's interest.

Plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a "strip of land" and describes it as passing across the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Hagen 75/279 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of "strip of land" and across in the Hagen 75/279 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Hagen 75/279 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.²⁵

10. The Hamblin 85/284 Deed

The **Hamblin 85/284 deed (Def.'s Ex. 45)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That J.M. Hamblin, an unmarried man for and in consideration of the[]sum of One Dollars, to him in hand[]paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged[,] does bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit: A strip of land one hundred feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific Railway and[]NaviGaTion [sic] Company, as the same is surveyed and located through the Northwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section thirty two (32) Township Three(3) [sic] North range [sic] five (5) West Willamette Meridian.

²⁵ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court's discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase "strip of land" and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Hagen 75/279 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to successors and assigns forever.

The aforesaid grantor J. M. Hamblin does hereby covenant that he is the owner in fee simple of[]the above granted premises, and that he will forever warrant and defend the same unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns, against the lawful claims of all parties whomsoever.

The court had found that the Hamblin 85/284 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I and II deeds that the Hamblin 85/284 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Hamblin 85/284 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Hamblin 85/284 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds

that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Hamblin 85/284 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.²⁶

11. Haugen 9/204 Deed

The **Haugen 9/204 deed (Def.’s Ex. 54)** provides in pertinent part:

Thore [sic] Hagen. RAILWAY DEED.
to NO. 5806.
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.

KNOWN ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One & 00/100 DOLLARS[,] the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, Thore [sic] Hagen and Evia Jane Hagen, husband and wife, of Tillamook County, Oregon, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee, as the same is surveyed and located through the following described tract, to-wit:

* * * [Describing the tract through which the strip being conveyed runs] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

²⁶ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court’s discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase “strip of land” and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Hamblin 85/284 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court’s conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

The court had found that the Haugen 9/204 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I and II deeds that the Haugen 9/204 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Haugen 9/204 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Haugen 9/204 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Haugen 9/204 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.²⁷

²⁷ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court’s discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase “strip of land” and used the word through

12. The Jeffries 85/70 Deed

The **Jeffries 85/70 deed (Def.'s Ex. 59)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That Minnie Jeffries and George H.[]Jeffries her husband for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby bargain, sell[,] grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit: A strip of land one hundred feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as the same is surveyed and located through the North half of the Northwest quarter of Section Thirty (30) Township three (3) North, Range Four (4) West of W.M.

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances, thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever.

The aforesaid grantors Minnie Jeffries and George H. Jeffries do hereby covenant that they are the owners in fee simple of the above granted premises, and that they will forever warrant and defend the same unto the Pacific Railway and[]Navigation Company, its successors and assigns, against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Jeffries 85/70 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The

conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Haugen 9/204 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court’s conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category I and II deeds that the Jeffries 85/70 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a "strip of land" and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Jeffries 85/70 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of "strip of land" and through in the Jeffries 85/70 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Jeffries 85/70 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.²⁸

13. Maroney 11/513 Deed

The **Maroney 11/513 deed (Def.'s Ex. 73)** provides in pertinent part:

Matt Maroney	RAILWAY DEED.
to	NO. 7461
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	

KNOWN ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One & 00/100 DOLLARS, [sic] the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I Matt Maroney, unmarried, of Garibaldi, in Tillamook County, Oregon, hereinafter called the grantors, [sic] do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns

²⁸ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court's discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase "strip of land" and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Jeffries 85/70 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement

forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land sixty (60) feet wide being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lot three (3) of Section twenty nine , [sic] in Township two North of Range ten West of the Willamette Meridian.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever. The grantors [sic] above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Maroney 11/513 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I and II deeds that the Maroney 11/523 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Maroney 11/513 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through

in the Maroney 11/513 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Maroney 11/513 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.²⁹

14. Noland 74/108 Deed

The **Noland 74/108 deed (Def.'s Ex. 79)** provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by these Presents, *That*

Mrs Lena Noland

of Portland xxxxxxxx *State of Oregon, in consideration of*
Seventy nine and twenty, one Hundredths (\$79.20/100) DOLLARS,
to me paid by Pacific Railway and Navigation Company
of Portland xxxxxx *State of Oregon, * * **
** * * * has bargained and sold, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell*
and convey unto said
Pacific Railway Navigation Company[,] is [sic] successors
** * * and assigns, all the following bounded and described real property, situated*
in the County of Washington and State of Oregon:

A strip of land 100 feet wide being 50 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company's Railway, as surveyed, located and adopted across the south 1/2 of N W $\frac{1}{4}$ of Sec. 30. [sic] T [sic] 3 N. R. 4 W- [sic] W. M. said center line being described as follows: * * *[Description] * * * and containing 7.89 acres.

Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging or in anywise appertaining and also all
her *estate, right, title and interest in and to the same, including dower and claim of dower.*

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described and granted premises unto the said

PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY[,] its
successors ** * * and assigns forever. And*

²⁹ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court's discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase "strip of land" and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Maroney 11/513 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

Mrs. Lena Noland[,]
*grantor above named do es [sic] covenant to and with Pacific Railway and
 Navigation Company
 the above named grantee[,]* is [sic] successors *and assigns that she is lawfully
 seized in fee simple of the above granted premises, that they are free from all
 incumbrances*

* * * * [Blank Space] * * *

*and that she will and her heirs, executors and administrators
 shall warrant and forever defend the above granted premises, and ever part and
 parcel thereof, against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.*
 (italics in original).

The court had found that the Noland 74/108 deed conveyed fee simple title because the consideration was substantial (\$79.20), there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest

Plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing across the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Noland 74/108 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and across in the Noland 74/108 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Noland 74/108 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.

15. Petrzilka 72/203 Deed

The **Petrzilka 72/203 deed (Def.’s Ex. 83)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 1st day of August 1906, between Frank Petrzilka and Mary Petrzilka, his wife, of Washington County, parties of the first [sic] part, and the PACIFIC RAILWAY & NAVIGATION COMPANY, a Corporation, party of the second part, WITNESSETH:

That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of One Hundred Dollars (\$100) to them in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns, [] forever, all that certain Lot, [sic] piece, parcel and track of land, lying, being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and particularly described as follows, to-wit:- A strip of land 80 feet wide, being 40 feet on each side of the center line of the PACIFIC RAILWAY & NAVIGATION COMPANY'S railway as now surveyed, located, and established across the following described lands,;

The North West quarter of the North West Quarter [sic] of Section 4 T.2.N.R.4 W. of the Will.Mer. [sic]

and also the following described tract of land, to-wit;-Beginning at the south [sic] West corner of Section 33, T.3.N.R.4.W. and running thence East 14 rods; thence Northwesterly 42 rods to a point 4 rods East of the west line of said section [sic] 33; thence Northeasterly 42 rods to a point 14 rods East of the west line of said Section 33,; [] thence [sic] West 14 rods; thence South 80 rods to the place of beginning, said strip of land containing 4.31 acres.

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, [] issues and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all and singular the said premises together with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part and unto its successors and assigns forever. And the said parties of the first part, for themselves, their heirs, executors and administrators do covenant to and with the party of the second part, its successors and assigns forever, that the parties of the first part are the owners in fee simple of the above described and granted premises; That [sic] said premises and the [sic] whole thereof are free from all incumbrances, and that said parties of the first part, their heirs, executors and administrators shall warrant and forever defend said premises and the whole thereof against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Petrzilka 72/203 deed conveyed fee simple because the consideration was substantial (\$100), there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s land.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I and II deeds that the Petrzilka 72/203 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing across the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Petrzilka 72/203 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and across in the Petrzilka 72/203 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Petrzilka 72/203 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.

16. Rockaway Beach 12/342 Deed

The **Rockaway Beach 12/342 deed (Def.’s Ex. 91)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One & 00/100 DOLLARS, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Rockaway Beach Company, a Corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Oregon and First Bank Trust Company, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Oregon, hereinafter called the grantors, [sic] do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land sixty (60) feet wide being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through

Lot four of Section thirty two in Township two North of Range ten West and a strip of land twenty feet wide off the North end of Lot one of Section five, Township One North of Range two West of Willamette Meridian.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors [sic] above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all incumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Rockaway Beach 12/342 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The

court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category I and II deeds the Rockaway Beach 12/342 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a "strip of land" and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Rockaway Beach 12/342 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of "strip of land" and through in the Rockaway Beach 12/342 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Rockaway Beach 12/342 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.³⁰

17. Rupp 13/245 Deed

The **Rupp 13/245 deed (Def.'s Ex. 94)** provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of Ten Dollars (\$10.00), the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and other valuable considerations moving to them, John J. Rupp and Betty N. Rupp, of Saginaw, Michigan, hereinafter called the grantor, does bargain, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, a strip of land one hundred (100) feet in width, being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee, as the same is surveyed and located through the following described real property, situate in the

³⁰ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provide only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court's discussion of the DuBois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase "strip of land" and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Rockaway Beach 12/342 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

The South Half of the Southeast quarter (S1/2, SE1/4) and Lots Four (4), Five (5), Six (6), Eight (8), and Nine (9) of Section Ten (10), Township Three (3) North Range Eight (8) West, Willamette Meridian.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging, or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold to the grantee and to its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors covenant with the grantee that they will warrant and defend the premises hereby granted against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever claiming the same by, through or under the grantor. [sic]

The court had found that the Rupp 13/245 deed conveyed fee simple title because the amount of consideration was substantial (\$10), there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I and II deeds the Rupp 13/245 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Rupp 13/245 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through

in the Rupp 13/245 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Rupp 13/245 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.

18. The Stanley 11/113 Deed

The **Stanley 11/113 deed (Def.'s Ex. 104)** provides in pertinent part:

F. S; [sic] Stanley et al to Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	Railway Deed. NO. 6844.
---	----------------------------

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One DOLLARS, [sic] the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, F. S. Stanley and Ruth M. Stanley, his wife, Robert Smith, a single man; W. D. Wheelwright, a single man; - [sic] E. E. Lytle and Lizzie M Lytle, his wife, and May Enright, a single woman, hereinafter called the grantors, do herby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm, to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property, situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide, being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee, as the same is surveyed and located through the East half of the South East [sic] quarter of Section Twenty [sic] (20) in Township Three [sic] (3) North, [sic] of Range Seven [sic] (7) West, W. M.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Stanley 11/113 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I and II deeds that the Stanley 11/113 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Stanley 11/113 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Stanley 11/113 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Stanley 11/113 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.³¹

³¹ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court’s discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase “strip of land” and used the word through

19. Thayer 11/355

The **Thayer 11/355 deed (Def.'s Ex. 107)** provides in pertinent part:

Claude Thayer and wife
to

Railway Deed.
No. 7236.

Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.

KNOW ALL MEN By [sic] THESE PRESENTS; That for and in consideration of the sum of One & 00 DOLLARS, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, Claude Thayer and Estelle Thayer, husband and wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY [sic] AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, [sic] hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) [sic] feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is now surveyed and located through; [sic]

Tide Land fronting and abutting on Lot 1 of Sec. 21, T. 1 N. R. 10 W. except Town of Garibaldi.

Also beginning at a point at ordinary high water line South 84° West 24 links dist. from the meander corner between Sections 20 and 21, T. 1 N. R. 10 W. thence South 65° East on ordinary high water line 3.21 chains, thence North 17.89 chains, thence West 2.91 chains, thence South 16.53 chains to point of beginning.

Also through an undivided one half interest in the following tracts:-

Beginning at a point on ordinary high water line 34 links South and 320 links West of the meander corner between Sections 20 and 21 T. 3 N. R. 10 W. thence N. 84° East 3.02 chains on ordinary high water line, thence North 16.53 chains, thence West 3.00 chains, thence South 16.84 chains to place of beginning; also through an undivided one half interest in Lots 5, 6, 7, and 8 in Block 3 and Lots 4, [sic] and 5 in Block 4, all in the Town of Garibaldi.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the

conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Stanley 11/113 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all en[c]umbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Thayer 11/355 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I and II deeds that the Thayer 11/355 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Thayer 11/355 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Thayer 11/355 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding

that the Thayer 11/355 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.³²

20. The Thayer 18/39 Deed

The **Thayer 18/39 deed (Def.'s Ex. 108)** is entitled "1134 Railway Deed" and provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of One & 00/100 Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, We, Claude Thayer and Estelle Thayer[,] husband and wife, of Tillamook, Oregon, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred(100) [sic] feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lot eight of Section twenty two, in Township one North of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian, save and except a certain one acre tract heretofore conveyed out of said Lot eight;

Also through the tide lands fronting and abutting upon Lots seven and eight in said Section twenty two, in Township one North of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anyway appertaining.

To have and to hold unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seized of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

³² The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court's discussion of the DuBois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase "strip of land" and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Thayer 11/355 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

The court had found that the Thayer 18/39 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I and II deeds that the Thayer 18/39 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Thayer 18/39 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Thayer 18/39 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Thayer 18/39 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.³³

³³ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court’s discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase “strip of land” and used the word through

21. Watt 12/343 Deed

The **Watt 12/343 deed (Def.'s Ex. 116)** is entitled “No. 8225. Railway Deed.” and provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One and 00/100 DOLLARS , [sic] The [sic] receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, George Watt and Helen Watt, his wife[,], and Robert Watt and Lois A. Watt, his wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and * * * to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land sixty (60) feet wide being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway o f [sic] the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lots One, two and three of Section Seven and Lot one of Section eight, all in Township One North of Range ten Wes t [sic] of Willamette Meridian.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Watt 12/343 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Thayer 18/39 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court’s conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category I and II deeds the Watt 12/343 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a "strip of land" and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Watt 12/343 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of "strip of land" and through in the Watt 12/343 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Watt 12/343 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.³⁴

22. The Watt 12/344 Deed

The **Watt 12/344 deed (Def.'s Ex. 117)** is entitled "No. 8226. Railway Deed." and provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One and 00/100 DOLLARS, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, George Watt and Helen Watt,

³⁴ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court's discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase "strip of land" and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Watt 12/343 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

husband and wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do bargain, sell, grant, convey and confir, [sic] to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side * * * of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same in [sic] surveyed and located through Lot one of Section nine and also through the tide land fronting and abutting upon Lots One [sic] and Four [sic] of said Section nine; also through Lot one of Section sixteen and the tide fronting and abutting upon said Lot one of Section sixteen, all in Township two North of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian. Save and except a tract 105 feet by 210 feet in Lot 1 of Section 9, Township 2 North Range 10 West reserved by G. M. Lock.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and[]unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Watt 12/344 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I and II deeds the Watt 12/344 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed

by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Watt 12/344 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Watt 12/344 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Watt 12/344 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.³⁵

23. The Watt 12/345 Deed

The **Watt 12/345 deed (Def.’s Ex. 118)** is entitled “No. 8227. Railway Deed.” and provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of One and 00/100 DOLLARS, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, John Watt and Sarah M. Watt[,] husband and wife, hereinafter called the grantors, do bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm [sic] to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same in [sic] surveyed and located through Lots two, three and four of Section nine, in Township two

³⁵ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court’s discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase “strip of land” and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Watt 12/344 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court’s conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

North of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian[.]

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee, and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and[]unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Watt 12/345 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I and II deeds that the Watt 12/345 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Watt 12/345 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Watt 12/345 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land

and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Watt 12/345 deed conveyed a fee as correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.³⁶

24. Westinghouse 85/39 Deed

The **Westinghouse 85/39 deed (Def.'s Ex. 121)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That I, John F. Westinghouse, a single man[,] for and in consi deration [sic] of the sum of One Dollars, [sic] to me in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby bargain, sell, grant,[]convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet in width, being fifty (50) feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as the same is surveyed and located through a strip of land more particularly described as the West one half of Southwest one quarter and the Southwest one quarter of Northwest one quarter of Northwest one quarter [of] Sec.[]26, T 3 N. R. 5 W., Willamette Meridian and containing four and forty two hundredths (4.42) acres more or less. Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever.

The aforesaid grantor John F. Westinghouse does hereby he is the owner in fee simple of the ab[o]ve grante[d] premises, and that he will forever qarrant [sic] and defend the same unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

³⁶ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court's discussion of the DuBois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase "strip of land" and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Watt 12/345 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

The court had found that the Westinghouse 85/39 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I and II deeds the Westinghouse 85/39 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Westinghouse 85/39 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Westinghouse 85/39 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Westinghouse 85/39 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.³⁷

³⁷ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court’s discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated

25. Williams 6/607 Deed

The **Williams 6/607 deed (Def.'s Ex. 125)** provides in pertinent part:

George H. Willaims et ux

RAILWAY DED

-to-

No. 4113.

P. R. and N. Co.

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That for and in consideration of the sum of Ten 00/100 DOLLARS[,] the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and other valuable consideration moving to them[,] George H. Williams and Bessie Williams, his wife,, hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lots Three, [sic] Four, [sic] Five [sic] and Six [sic] of Block Eleven [sic] in Cone and McCoy's Addition to Bay City, according to the plat thereof of record in Tillamook County, Oregon.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seized of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Williams 6/607 deed conveyed fee simple title because the amount of consideration was substantial (\$10), there was no "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of

that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase "strip of land" and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Westinghouse 85/39 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor's interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category I and II deeds the Williams 6/607 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a "strip of land" and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Williams 6/607 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of "strip of land" and through in the Williams 6/607 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Williams 6/607 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.³⁸

26. Wilson 75/244 Deed

The **Wilson 75/244 deed (Def.'s Ex. 126)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That we Brice

³⁸ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$10) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court's discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase "strip of land" and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Williams 6/607 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

Wilson and Sarah E. Wilson[,] husband and wife, for and in consideration of the sum[]of One Dollars, [sic] to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate, in the County of Washington and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one Hundred [sic] feet in width, being fifty feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the track of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as the same is surveyed and located through the East half of the Northeast quarter of Section twenty eight (28) in Township three (3) North Range five (5) West of the Willamette Meridian.

The said center line enters said land about 1185 feet south of the Northeast corner and runs southwesterly across the same to a point about 105 feet west of the South east [sic] corner thereof.

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances, thereunto belon[g]ing or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD to the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever.

The aforesaid Brice Wilson and Sarah E. Wilson do hereby covenant that they are the owners in fee simple of the above granted premises, and that they will forever warrant and defend the same unto the Pacific Railway Company, its successors and assigns, against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Wilson 75/244 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because there was no “right of way” language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the

Category I and II deeds the Wilson 75/244 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a “strip of land” and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Wilson 75/244 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Wilson 75/244 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Wilson 75/244 deed conveyed a fee esd correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.³⁹

27. Woodbury 16/481 Deed

The **Woodbury 16/481 deed (Def.’s Ex. 127)** is entitled “No. 10888 Warranty Deed” and provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of Ten (\$10.00) Dollars, to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and of other valuable considerations, E. D. Woodbury and Maude Woodbury, his wife,, hereinafter called the grantors, do bargain, sell[,] grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

A strip of land sixty (60) feet in width, being thirty (30) feet on

³⁹ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court’s discussion of the Du Bois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase “strip of land” and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Wilson 75/244 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court’s conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

each side of the center line of the grantee's railway as the same is surveyed and located through the following described real property, to wit:

* * * [Describing the property through which the strip conveyed runs] * * *

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining,

To Have and to Hold to the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors covenant with the grantee that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever claiming by, through or under the grantors or either of them.

The court had found that the Woodbury 16/481 deed conveyed a fee simple title because the amount of consideration was substantial (\$10), there was no "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor's interest.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category I and II deeds the Woodbury 16/481 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a "strip of land" and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Woodbury 16/481 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as

explained in the court's analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of "strip of land" and through in the Woodbury 16/481 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Woodbury 16/481 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.

28. The Woodbury 23/399 Deed

The **Woodbury 23/399 deed (Def.'s Ex. 128)** provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That we, E.E. Woodbury and Maude Woodbury, his wife, the grantors, in consideration of the sum of Two + $\frac{00}{100}$ Dollars, paid by Pacific Railway and Navigation, the grantee herein, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have bargained and sold, and by these presents do bargain, sell, transfer and convey unto said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, an Oregon Corporation, and to its successors and assigns forever, a strip of land sixty (60) feet in width, being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of said Company as the same is now located, staked out, and operated through Section Twenty-Nine (29), Township Two (2) North, Range Ten (10) West of the Willamette Meridian. Which strip lies between the line between Sections 29 and 32 on the South and the North boundary of North Street of said Lake Lytle Tract, as the same is platted in and by Lake Lytle Plat and between Blks. [sic] 1, 7 and 3 of Lake Lytle on the East and Blks [sic] 4, 8 and 14 of Lake Lytle on the West.

To Have and to Hold the above described premises unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors and assigns forever.

The court had found that the Woodbury 23/399 deed conveyed a fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$2) because there was no "right of way" language in the title or body of the deed, no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only, no right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, nor any requirement

for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences, nor any revert language.

Plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category I and II deeds the Woodbury 23/399 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed refers to the property as a "strip of land" and describes it as passing through the land, the court incorrectly concluded that the Woodbury 23/399 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad. The court disagrees. For the same reasons as explained in the court's analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of "strip of land" and through in the Woodbury 23/399 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Woodbury 23/399 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.⁴⁰

D. Category IV: Deeds that conveyed a "strip of land" "across", "through", or "over" a grantor's land and contained "right of way" language.

⁴⁰ The plaintiffs also argue that because the deed provides for only nominal consideration (\$1) the court should have found an easement. As explained in the footnote in the court's discussion of the DuBois 22/40 deed, the plaintiffs had stipulated that at least two deeds which had nominal consideration and contained the phrase "strip of land" and used the word through conveyed a fee. As such, the court finds that the fact that the Woodbury 23/399 deed contained only nominal consideration does not change the court's conclusion that it conveyed a fee rather than an easement.

The nine deeds identified in Category IV, like the deeds in Category III above, conveyed a “strip of land” and used either the words “across”, “through”, or “over” in reference to that strip of land. Unlike the Category III deeds, however, the deeds in this category do use the term “right of way” either in the body or title of the deed. Again, however, as the United States has previously argued the significance of the term “right of way” in a deed conveying a property interest to a railroad is not *that* the term is used, but *how* it is used. Def’s XMSJ 27-29, Def’s Obj. Prelim. Findings 1-6, Oral Arg. Tr. 7-9. As the Oregon Supreme Court explained in *Bouche*, if a deed to a railroad grants “a use to be made of the property, usually, but not invariably, described . . . as a right of way *in the grant*,” courts then have “little difficulty” in determining that the deed conveyed an easement. *Bouche*, 293 P. at 209. In *Bernards*, the deed the court determined conveyed an easement used “right of way” in the granting clause, stating that the grantors “do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said grantee and . . . its successors, *for its use as a right of way, a strip of land . . .*” *Bernards*, 248 P.2d at 342 (emphasis added). The Category IV deeds use the term “right-of-way” within the bodies of the deeds, but not in the granting clauses. As the court has done in the previous three Categories, the court will examine the *Bernards/Bouche* factors again.

1. Beals Land Co. 18/41

The **Beals Land Co. 18/41 deed (Def.’s Ex. 8)** provides in pertinent part:

Beals Land Company
to

11136 Right of Way Deed

Pacific Railway + Navigation Co

Know All Men by These Presents: that for and in consideration of the sum of One [sic] + 00/100 Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Beals Land Company, a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Oregon, hereinafter called the grantors, [sic] do [sic] hereby bargain, sell, grant,

convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

A strip of land sixty (60) feet wide being thirty (30) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lot two of Section thirty two in Township two North of Range ten West of the Willamette Meridian, save and except a certain tract heretofore conveyed by Beals Land Company to Security Savings and Trust Company.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold unto the above named grantee and to its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seized of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all incumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Beals Land Co. 18/41 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because the “right of way” language in the title of the deed described the geographic location of the property and not the nature of the interest being conveyed, there was no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only nor a right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, and there was no requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

The plaintiffs argue that the court was incorrect in determining that the Beals Land Co. 18/41 deed conveyed a fee to the railroad because in part this court improperly discounted the importance of the deed being entitled “Right of Way Deed”. As support for their argument concerning this deed, the *Albright* plaintiffs cite on a case decided under Kansas law support that the title is an *indication* that the railroad received only an easement. *Albright* Mot. 13 n.5

(citing *Biery v. United States*, 753 F.3d 1279, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). The *Loveridge* plaintiffs make similar arguments and they compare the Beals Land Company 18/41 deed to the Wilhelm deed in *Boyer* where this court found that a deed entitled right of way, that used the phrase “over and across” and strip of land, that requires the railroad to build and maintain fences and crossings, and the reflects only nominal consideration as paid conveyed an easement to the railroad and not a fee. Additionally, the plaintiffs argue that the consideration provided is nominal and the deed contains the phrases “strip of land” and “through”, the property being conveyed is not described with precision, each of which is a factor that weighs into concluding that the Beals Land Co. 18/41 deed conveyed an easement and not a fee.

In response, the government argues that the standards set forth in *Bernards* and *Bouche* do not suggest that because the deed is entitled “Right of Way Deed” it must be construed as conveying an easement without other indicia to suggest that the original parties intended to convey an easement. The government maintains that because the deed does not mention any railroad purpose or contain any language limiting the use of the land to only railroad purposes the court was correct in determining that a fee was conveyed to the railroad.

The court agrees with the plaintiffs that the court was incorrect when it previously determined that the deed conveyed a fee to the railroad rather than an easement. Although the issue of the nature of the conveyance is a close call, the court agrees with the plaintiffs that the balance of the *Bernards/Bouche* factors indicate that the original parties intended to convey an easement to the railroad. The combination of the use of “right of way” in the title of the deed as well as the nominal consideration indicate that the original parties intended to convey an easement to the railroad. Additionally, although as explained above, the singular use of the

Document: 60 Page: 281

Filed: 11/06/2019

Document 70-54164-0

93

James Bryden and Addie Bryden, his wife, and John Stewart and Clara Stewart[,] his wife, *grantors above named do covenant to and with Pacific Railway and Navigation Company the above named grantee[,] its successors and assigns that*[it is lawfully seized in fee simple of the above granted premises, that the above granted premises are free from all incumbrances

* * *

and that they will and their heirs, executors and administrators shall warrant and forever defend the above granted premises, and ever part and parcel thereof, against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever. (italics in original).

The court had found that the Bryden 74/273 deed conveyed fee simple title because the amount of consideration was substantial (\$22.05), the “right of way” language in the body of the deed described the geographic location of the property and not the nature of the interest being conveyed, there was no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only nor a right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, and there was no requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

The plaintiffs argue that the court incorrectly determined that the phrase “right of way” did not indicate the original parties’ intention to convey an easement because it described the land being conveyed and not the nature of the property interest. Instead, plaintiffs argue the court should have determined that the use of the term “right of way” in this deed referenced the interest being conveyed and thus indicated an intention to convey an easement. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed contains the phrase “strip of land” and uses the word across, the court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the court finds that it was correct when it determined that the use of the phrase “right of way” in this deed described the geographic location of the property and not the property interest itself. Second, for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the

Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and across in the Bryden 74/273 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Bryden 74/273 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.

3. Friday 72/526 Deed

The **Friday 72/526 deed (Def.’s Ex. 37)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 7th day of May 1906, between John W. Friday and Pearl Friday his wife, of Washington County, Oregon, parties of the first part, and the PACIFIC RAILWAY & NAVIGATION COMPANY, a Corporation, party of the se[con]d part, WITNESSETH:

That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of Twenty Five Dollars (\$25) to them in hand paid, by the party of the second [p]art, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged , [sic] have granted, bargained and sold[,] conveyed and confirmed and by these presents do grant , [sic] bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns , [sic] all that certain lot, piece, parcel and track of land, lying,[]being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and particularly described as a part of the South East Quarter of Sec. 25, T 2 N. R. 4 W., Will. Mer., to-wit:-

A strip of land 160 feet wide being 120 feet on the East side and 40 feet on the West side of the center line of the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company’s railway as now surveyed and located on said lands, and described as follows:

Beginning at a point where the center line of said Railroad Survey intersects the c enter [sic] of Dairy Creek, * * * Thence down the center of said Creek South 22 degree and 40 minutes East 170 feet and thence South 13 degree and 15 minutes west 93 feet to the West line of Right of Way; Thence South 32 degree and 18 minutes East along said Right of Way 96 feet to the center of Dairy Creek; thence North 80 degree and 22 minutes East 955 feet to the place of beginning and containing 0.96 acres.

Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and

profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said[]party of the second part and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The court had found that the Friday 72/526 deed conveyed fee simple title because the amount of consideration was substantial (\$25), the “right of way” language in the body of the deed described the geographic location of the property and not the nature of the interest being conveyed, there was no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only nor a right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, and there was no requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

The plaintiffs argue that the court incorrectly determined that the phrase “right of way” did not indicate the original parties’ intention to convey an easement because it described the land being conveyed and not the nature of the property interest. Instead, plaintiffs argue the court should have determined that the use of the term “right of way” in this deed referenced the interest being conveyed and thus indicated an intention to convey an easement. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed contains the phrases “strip of land” and “located on” the court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the court finds that it was correct that the use of the phrase “right of way” was describing the geographic location of the property and not the property interest itself. Second, for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Friday 72/526 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards* factors weighed in

favor of finding that the Friday 72/526 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.

4. Hannan 99/354 Deed

The **Hannan 99/354 deed (Def.'s Ex. 51)** provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That Ella Hannan widow, of the County of Washington State of Oregon, in consideration of the sum of Five Hundred (\$500.00) Dollars to her paid by Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, a corporation, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, has bargained and sold and by these[]presents does grant, bargain[,] sell and convey unto said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company[,] its successors and assigns all of the following describe premises located in Washington County, Oregon. [sic] Beginning[at a point on the east line of the right of way of said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, 1020 feet south and 135 feet east of the northwest corner of the southwest quarter of Section 4, Township 2 North range [sic] 4, Willamette Meridian, said point being 100 feet distant from main line and 30 feet distant from the north leg of the wye track as now located; running thence easterly and 30 feet distant from said wye track on 18° 30' curve, 360 feet; thence easterly and 30 feet distant from wye track extended 260 feet; thence southerly at right angles, 60 feet; thence westerly[at right angles and 30 feet distant from said wye track extend 275 feet; thence southerly and 30 feet distance from south leg of said wye track, 510 feet to the east of said right of way, which point is 40 feet from the main line[;] thence northerly along the said right of way on a 40° curve 400 feet; then north 62 feet; thence northerly along the right of way on a 4° curve parallel to the main line and 100 feet distant therefrom, 215 feet to the place of beginning containing[]1.9 acres, together with all and singular the tenements , [sic] hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining. The grantee herein agrees to fence said tract herein conveyed with a hog-tight fence. Grantor reserves the right to one private crossing at grade with gates[]over the tract above described at a point to be mutually agreed upon.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD[]said premises unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns forever, and the grantor herein does covenant to and with the above named grantee that she is lawfully seised in fee simple of said granted premises that the same are free from all incumbrances and that she will warrant and forever defend the said premises, and every part and parcel thereof,

against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Hannan 99/354 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the grantee was required to build a hog-tied fence because the amount of consideration was substantial (\$500), the “right of way” language in the body of the deed described the geographic location of the property and not the nature of the interest being conveyed, and there was no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only nor a right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use.

The plaintiffs argue that the court incorrectly determined that the phrase “right of way” did not indicate the original parties’ intention to convey an easement because it described the land being conveyed and not the nature of the property interest. Instead, plaintiffs argue the court should have determined that the use of the term “right of way” in this deed referenced the interest being conveyed and thus indicated an intention to convey an easement. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed contains the phrases “strip of land” and “across”, the court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the court finds that it was correct that the use of the phrase “right of way” was describing the geographic location of the property and not the property interest itself. This is further supported by an inclusion of a specific amount of acreage that is being conveyed which indicates that the use of the term “right of way” was describing the geographic location of the interest being conveyed. Second, for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Hannan 99/354 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion

that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Hannan 99/354 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.

5. Hannan 72/549 Deed

The **Hannan 72/549 deed (Def.'s Ex. 50)**, which is very similar to the above analyzed Hannan deed, provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 21st day of August 1906, between Henry Hannon and Ella Hannon, his wife, of Washington County, Oregon, parties of the first part, and the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, a Corporation, parties of the first part, WITNESSETH:

THAT the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of \$1.00, to them in hand paid, by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed, and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns, all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in Washington County, Oregon, and particularly described as a portion of Section 4, T. 2 N. R. 4 W., a strip of land 60 feet wide, and 680 feet long, adjoining the right of Way [sic] of the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company's Railway, on the Right , [sic] and described as follows:-

Beginning at a point 526 5/10 feet South of and 66 5/10 feet East of the North West corner of the South West quarter of the North West quarter of said Sec. 4; Running thence South 2 degrees and 38 minutes West along Right of Way, 242 5/10 feet; thence in a Southerly direction by a spiral to left, 90 feet; thence by a 4 degree curve to the left, 355 feet; thence East parallel to the North line of said Section 4, 61 5/10 feet; thence in a Northerly direction on a 4 degree curve to the Right 355 feet, thence by a spiral to right, 90 feet; thence North 2 degrees and 30 minutes East, 264 3/10 to the North line of said Hannan's land; thence South 72 degrees and 40 minutes West, 61 1/10 feet to place of beginning and containing 0.96 acres.

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said[]party of the second part and unto its successors and assigns forever. And the parties of the * * *

first part hereby covenant to and with the party of the second part[,] its successors and assigns forever, that the parties of the first part, [sic] are the owners in fee simple of the tract of land a bove [sic] described, and the whole thereof, that said premises are free from all incumbrances, and that the parties of the first part, their heirs, executors and administrators shall warrant and forever defend the above described and granted premises and every part and parcel thereof against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Hannan 72/549 deed conveyed fee simple title even though the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1) because the “right of way” language in the body of the deed described the geographic location of the property and not of the interest being conveyed, there was no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only nor a right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, and there was no requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s land.

The plaintiffs argue that the court incorrectly determined that the phrase “right of way” did not indicate the original parties’ intention to convey an easement because it described the land being conveyed and not the nature of the property interest. Instead, plaintiffs argue the court should have determined that the use of the term “right of way” in this deed referenced the interest being conveyed and thus indicated an intention to convey an easement. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed contains the phrases “strip of land” and “across” the court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court agrees with the plaintiffs that the court was incorrect when it previously determined that the deed conveyed a fee to the railroad rather than an easement. Although the issue of the nature of the conveyance is a close call, the court agrees with the plaintiffs that the balance of the *Bernards/Bouche* factors indicate that the original parties intended to convey an easement to the railroad. The combination of the use of “right of way” in the title of the deed as well as the

nominal consideration indicate that the original parties intended to convey an easement to the railroad. Additionally, although as explained above, the singular use of the phrase “strip of land” and words such as through do not necessarily indicate in and of themselves an intent to convey an easement when read together with the use “right of way” in the B Hannan 72/549 deed, they do suggest an intent to convey an easement. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is granted on the Hannan 72/549 deed.

6. Harter 29/115 Deed

The **Harter 29/115 deed (Def.’s Ex. 53)** is entitled “Warranty Deed. No. 21042.” and provides in pertinent part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That [sic] we John R. Harter, his wife, of the County of Tillamook in the State of Oregon, in consideration of the sum of Three Hundred Seventy-Five (\$375.00) Dollars, paid by Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of Oregon, having its principal office at the City of Portland in said State, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained, sold and conveyed, and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, its successors and assigns, the following described parcel of land, situate in Tillamook County, in the State of Oregon, to-wit:

Our undivided two-thirds (2/3) interest in and to that certain tract or parcel of land in Tillamook County, Oregon, more particularly described as follows:-

All of a strip of land one hundred feet in width, being fifty feet in width on each side of the center line of the P. R. & N. CO. as the same is now located and constructed across the Northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of section 13, Township 1 South Range 10 West, Willamette Mariden, [sic], and also across the north six rods (Ninety-nine feet of the southeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 13. [sic] Said center line being more particularly described as follows:-

* * * [Description] * * *

The above described strip of land containing 3.80 acres more or less.

It being the intention to convey our undivided two-thirds (2/3) interest in the right-of-way of said railroad Company [sic] as now used and which was acquired by us [the grantors] through deeds from Monta Davidson and Josie A. Deeter, together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging or in anywise appertaining, and also all our estate, right, title and interest in and to the same, including dower and claim of dower.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD The [sic] above described and granted premises unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company[,] its successors and assigns forever. And we the grantors above named do covenant to and with the above named grantee, its successors and assigns, that we are lawfully seized in fee simple of the above granted premises, that the above granted premises are free from all incumbrances, and that we will and our heirs, executors and administrators, shall warrant and defend the above granted[]premises, and every part and parcel thereof, against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Harter 29/115 deed conveyed fee simple title because the amount of consideration was substantial (\$375), the “right of way” language in body of the deed described the geographic location of the property and not the nature of the interest being conveyed, there was no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only nor a right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, and there was no requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s interest.

The plaintiffs argue that the court incorrectly determined that the phrase “right of way” did not indicate the original parties’ intention to convey an easement because it described the land being conveyed and not the nature of the property interest. Instead, plaintiffs argue the court should have determined that the use of the term “right of way” in this deed referenced the interest being conveyed and thus indicated an intention to convey an easement. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed contains the phrases “strip of land” and across the court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the court finds that it was correct that the use of the phrase “right of way” was describing

the geographic location of the property and not the property interest itself. This is further supported by an inclusion of a specific amount of acreage that is being conveyed which indicates that the use of the term “right of way” was describing the geographic location of the interest being conveyed. Second, for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Harter 29/115 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Harter 29/115 deed conveyed a fee were correct and therefore the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied.

7. Stowell 75/32 Deed

The **Stowell 75/32 deed (Def.’s Ex. 105)** provides in pertinent part:

THIS INDENTURE, made this 8th day of February A.D.1907, between S. H. Stowell and Josephine Stowell, his wife, of Washington County, Oregon, parties of the first part, and the PACIFIC RAILWAY & NAVIGATION COMPANY, party of the second part, WITNESSETH:

That the parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of \$50.00 and other good and valuable consideration to them in hand paid, by the party of the second part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained and sold, conveyed and confirmed and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the second part, and its successors and assigns all that certain lot, piece, parcel and tract of land, lying, being and situate in t[h]e County of Washington, State of Oregon and being more particularly described as follows:-

Being in the S. W. [1/4] of Sec.[33 and in the N. E. [1/4] of Sec 32, all in[T. 3 N R. 4. W. Will. Mer. a strip of land 100 feet wide being 50 feet on each side of the center line of the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company’s Railway, as surveyed, located and adopted across said lands and described as follows:-

Beginning at a point where the East line of said Right of Way intersects the West line of said Stowells [sic] land, 475 feet North and 109 feet East of the Southwest corner of said Section 33; Running [sic]

thence in a Northwesterly direction along said West line, 180 feet; thence in a North Easterly direction along said West line, 520 feet to its intersection with the West line of said Right of Way; thence in a Northeasterly dire[c]tion along said Right of way, [sic] on a spiral to the Right, 170 feet; thence * * * *; Also Beginning [sic] at a point where the West line of said Right of Way intersects the East line of said N. E. $\frac{1}{4}$ of said Sec. 32, 390 feet North of the Southeast corner thereof; Running * * * *, and containing 6.96 acres.

Together with all and singular, the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all and singular, the said premises together with the appurtenances unto the said Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, its successors and assigns forever,[]And [sic] We, [sic] S. H., Stowell and Josephine Stowell, his wife, grantors above named, do covenant to and with the Pacific Railway & Navigation Company, the above n[a]med grantee, its successors and assigns, that the above granted premises are free from all incumbrances, and that we will and our heirs, executors and administrators, shall warrant and forever defend the above granted premises and every part and parcel thereof against the lawful claims and demands of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Stowell 75/32 deed conveyed fee simple title because the amount of consideration was substantial (\$50), the “right of way” language in the body of the deed described the geographic location of the property and not of the nature of the interest being conveyed, there was no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only nor a right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, and there was no requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s land.

The plaintiffs argue that the court incorrectly determined that the phrase “right of way” did not indicate the original parties’ intention to convey an easement because it described the land being conveyed and not the nature of the property interest. Instead, plaintiffs argue the court should have determined that the use of the term “right of way” in this deed referenced the

interest being conveyed and thus indicated an intention to convey an easement. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed contains the phrases “strip of land” and across the court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the court finds that it was correct that the use of the phrase “right of way” was describing the geographic location of the property and not the property interest itself. This is further supported by an inclusion of a specific amount of acreage that is being conveyed which indicates that the use of the term “right of way” was describing the geographic location of the interest being conveyed. Second, for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and across in the Stowell 75/32 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Stowell 75/32 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.

7. Smith, Lloyd 16/515 Deed

The **Smith, Loyd 16/515 deed (Def.’s Ex. 103)** provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of One Hundred Fifty and $\frac{00}{100}$ Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I, Lloyd C Smith a widower, of Garibaldi, Tillamook County[,] Oregon[,] hereinafter called the grantor, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

A strip of land one hundred(100) [sic] feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lot 3 of Section 8, Lot 4 of Section 7, Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 and North-West [sic] quarter of South-West[]quarter of Section 17, Lot 3 of Section 20 and Tide Land fronting and abutting

upon Lots 3 and 4 of Section 20, all in Township 1 North of Range 10 West of Willamette Meridian; save and except that from Station No 651 to Station No. 677 said right of way hereby conveyed shall be only 65 feet wide being 50 feet on the Easterly side and 15 feet on the Westerly side of said center line.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantor above named does covenant that he is seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all incumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Smith, Lloyd 16/515 deed conveyed fee simple title because the amount of consideration was substantial (\$150)⁴¹, the “right of way” language in body of the deed described the geographic location of the property and not of the nature of the interest being conveyed, there was no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only nor a right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, and there was no requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s land.

The plaintiffs argue that the court incorrectly determined that the phrase “right of way” did not indicate the original parties’ intention to convey an easement because it described the land being conveyed and not the nature of the property interest. Instead, plaintiffs argue the court should have determined that the use of the term “right of way” in this deed referenced the interest being conveyed and thus indicated an intention to convey an easement. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed contains the phrases “strip of land” and through this

⁴¹ As noted above, the court in its August 13, 2018 Opinion had incorrectly identified the consideration in the Smith/Lloyd deed as \$1 rather than \$150.

court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the court finds that it was correct that the use of the phrase “right of way” was describing the geographic location of the property and not the property interest itself. Second, for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Smith, Lloyd 16/515 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Finally, plaintiffs argue that the description of the property conveyed by this deed is not precise and thus this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees and finds for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category I and II deeds that the Smith, Lloyd 16,515 deed describes the location of the land being conveyed by the grantor with sufficient precision to conclude that the original parties intended to convey a fee. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Smith, Lloyd 16/515 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.

8. Wheeler 16/2 Deed

The **Wheeler 16/2 deed (Def.’s Ex. 122)** provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That Coleman H. Wheeler and Cora E. Wheeler, hereinafter called the grantors, for and in consideration of the sum of \$1.00 to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, does [sic] hereby release, remit and forever quit claim [sic] unto Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit: A right of way 60 feet in width, being 30 feet on each side of and parallel with the center line of the grantee’s railway as the same is surveyed, staked out, located and adopted through the following described real property, to-wit:

All that tract or parcel of land in Lots Four (4) and Five (5) of

Section Two (2), Township Two (2) North of Range Ten (10) West of the Willamette Meridian

Beginning at the Northeast corner of Charles Seaman's four acre tract on the meander line of the Nehalem River; thence Easterly along and up said River sixteen (16) rods; thence South twenty (20) rods parallel with Charles Seaman's line; thence West to Charles Seaman's East line; thence North to the Nehalem River to the place of beginning and containing two acres more or less.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold to the above named grantee and to its successors and assigns forever.

The court had found that the Wheeler 16/2 deed conveyed fee simple title although the amount of consideration was nominal (\$1), the "right of way" language in the body of the deed described the geographic location of the property and not of the nature of the interest being conveyed, there was no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only nor a right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, and there was no requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor's land.

The plaintiffs argue that the court incorrectly determined that the phrase "right of way" did not indicate the original parties' intention to convey an easement because it described the land being conveyed and not the nature of the property interest. Instead, plaintiffs argue the court should have determined that the use of the term "right of way" in this deed referenced the interest being conveyed and thus indicated an intention to convey an easement. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed contains the phrases "strip of land" and "across" at least three of the eight *Bernards/Bouche* factors are present and thus the court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee.

The court agrees with the plaintiffs that the court was incorrect when it previously determined that the deed conveyed a fee to the railroad rather than an easement. Although the

issue of nature of the conveyance is a close call, the court agrees with the plaintiffs that the balance of the *Bernards/Bouche* factors indicate that the original parties intended to only convey a fee to the railroad. The combination of the use of “right of way” in the granting clause of the deed as well as the nominal consideration indicate that the original parties intended to convey an easement to the railroad. Additionally, although as explained above, the singular use of the phrase “strip of land” and words such as through do not necessarily indicate in and of themselves an intent to convey an easement when read together with the use of “right of way” in the Wheeler 16/2 deed, they do suggest an intent to convey an easement to the railroad. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is granted on the Wheeler 16/2 deed.

E. Category V: Deeds which contain “right of way” language in the body or the title

Category V deeds consist of five deeds which only the *Loveridge* plaintiffs are seeking reconsideration. The arguments for reconsideration are nearly identical to the arguments made concerning the Category IV except that the *Loveridge* plaintiffs’ primary arguments as to why reconsideration is warranted is that the court misconstrued the use of the phrase “right of way” and should have found that “right of way” was describing the interest being conveyed and that the deeds conveyed an easement to the railroad rather than a fee. As the court has done in the previous four Categories, the court will examine the *Bernards/Bouche* factors again.

1. The Byrom 5/310 Deed

The **Byrom 5/310 deed (Def.’s Ex. 16)** provides in pertinent part:

Peter Byrom et ux	No. 2820
to	Right of Way
Pacific Railway and Navigation Co.	\$5.00

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the

sum of \$5.00, to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Peter Bryom and Bergtha [sic] Byrom, his wife, do bargain, sell, grant and convey to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, a strip of land 100 ft. wide, being 50 ft. on each side of the center line of the railway of the Pacific Railway and Navigation[]Company, as now surveyed and located thru lands of the aforesaid Peter Byrom and Bergtha [sic] Byrom in Sections 21 and 22, in Township 1 North of Range 10 West of the Willamette Meridian, more particularly described as follows, to wit:

All tide lands fronting and abutting on Lots 3[]and 4 in Section 21, and Lots 1, 2 and 3 in Section 22, in Township 22, in Township 1 North of Range 10 West of the Willamette Meridian; together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining. To Have and to Hold unto the said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever; together with the right to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway and telegraph line[.]

The court had found that the Byrom 5/310 deed conveyed fee simple title although the amount of consideration was nominal (\$5), because the “right of way” language in the body of the deed described the geographic location of the property and not of the nature of the interest being conveyed, there was no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only nor a right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, and there was no requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s land.

The plaintiffs argue that the court incorrectly determined that the phrase “right of way” did not indicate the original parties’ intention to convey an easement because it described the land being conveyed and not the nature of the property interest. Instead, plaintiffs argue the court should have determined that the use of the term “right of way” in this deed referenced the interest being conveyed and thus indicated an intention to convey an easement. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed contains only nominal consideration the court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement rather than a fee.

The court agrees with the plaintiffs that the court was incorrect when it previously determined that the deed conveyed a fee to the railroad rather than an easement. Although the issue of nature of the conveyance is a close call, the court agrees with the plaintiffs that the balance of the *Bernards/Bouche* factors indicate that the original parties intended to only convey an easement to the railroad. The combination of the use of “right of way” in the granting clause of the deed as well as the nominal consideration indicate that the original parties intended to convey an easement to the railroad. Additionally, although as explained above, the singular use of the phrase “strip of land” and words such as through do not necessarily indicate in and of themselves an intent to convey an easement when read together with the use of “right of way” in the Byrom 5/310 deed, they do suggest an intent to convey an easement. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is granted on the Byrom 5/310 deed.

2. The Goodspeed 16/487 Deed

The **Goodspeed 16/487 deed (Def.’s Ex. 41)** provides in pertinent part:

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of Thirty four Hundred and sixteen and 60/100 Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we, H. F. Goodspeed and Lillian A Goodspeed, husband and wife, of Tillamook City, Tillamook County, Oregon: [sic] hereinafter called the grantors, do bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to wit:

A strip of land fifty[(50) feet wide being twenty five (25) [feet] on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through the South East quarter of the North West quarter and that part of Lot seven lying West of a certain right of way formerly conveyed by said Goodspeed to said Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, all lying in Section thirty, in Township one South of Range nine West of Willamette Meridian, the center line of the right of way hereby conveyed being more particularly described as follows, to wit: Beginning at a point which is identical with Station 18 plus 84.5 on

the main line of said P.R.+N. Co., which point is located by beginning at Sta. 00 plus 00 on said main line, 4407.8 feet South and 281.5 East of the ¼ Section corner between Secs [sic] 19 and 30, T 1 S R 9 W, and running thence N 1° 00' East 1884.5 feet to said Station 18 plus 84.5 which is the initial point of the right of way hereby intended to be described and conveyed, thence following a spiral to the left a distance of 120 feet and consuming 7° 30' of the angle, thence following a 12° 30' curve to the left a distance of 609.3 feet, thence following a spiral to the left a distance of 120 feet and consuming 7° 30' of angle, to Sta. 8 plus 49.3; thence South 89° 50' West 1142 feet more or less to the East line of Lot two in said Section 30.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To have and to hold unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all incumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Goodspeed 16/487 deed conveyed fee simple title because the amount of consideration was substantial (\$3416.60), the “right of way” language in body of the deed described the geographic location of the property and not of the nature of the interest being conveyed, there was no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only nor a right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, and there was no requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s land.

The plaintiffs argue that the court incorrectly determined that the phrase “right of way” did not indicate the original parties’ intention to convey an easement because it described the land being conveyed and not the nature of the property interest. Instead, plaintiffs argue the court should have determined that the use of the term “right of way” in this deed referenced the interest being conveyed and thus indicated an intention to convey an easement. Furthermore,

the plaintiffs argue that because the deed contains the phrases “strip of land” and through this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the court finds that it was correct that the use of the phrase “right of way” was describing the geographic location of the property and not the property interest itself. Second, for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Goodspeed 16/487 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Goodspeed 16/487 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.

3. Hobson 13/331 Deed

The **Hobson 13/331 deed (Def.’s Ex. 56)** provides in pertinent part:

Know all Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of Three Hundred and 00/100 Dollars, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, We, Joanna Hobson and Frank P. Hobson, wife and husband, of Tillamook County, Oregon hereinafter called the grantors, do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through Lots three and that part of Lot two lying East of a certain tract in Lot two owned by Theodore Parks, all in Section twenty-two, Township one North of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian, on what is known and designated as the Coast Line Route.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining. It is hereby understood and agreed that this deed shall not convey to said Railway Company any right of way on any lands of the grantor lying East of the curve now staked out and located to connect said Coast Line Route with the right of way heretofore conveyed by the grantors herein to said Grantee.

To Have and to Hold unto the above named grantee and unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Hobson 13/331 deed conveyed fee simple title because the amount of consideration was substantial (\$300), the “right of way” language in body of the deed described the geographic location of the property and not of the nature of the interest being conveyed, z there was no requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s land.

The plaintiffs argue that the court incorrectly determined that the phrase “right of way” did not indicate the original parties’ intention to convey an easement because it described the land being conveyed and not the nature of the property interest. Instead, plaintiffs argue the court should have determined that the use of the term “right of way” in this deed referenced the interest being conveyed and thus indicated an intention to convey an easement. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed contains the phrases “strip of land” and through this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the court finds that it was correct that the use of the phrase “right of way” was describing the geographic location of the property and not the property interest itself. This is further supported by an inclusion of a specific amount of acreage that is being conveyed which indicates that the use of the term “right of way” was describing the geographic location of the interest being conveyed. Second, for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Hobson 13/331 deed are not

made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Hobson 13/331 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.

4. The Johnson 9/610 Deed

The **Johnson 9/610 deed (Def.'s Ex. 61)** provides in pertinent part:

Samuel Johnson
to
Pacific Railway and Navigation Company.

RAILWAY DEED.
NO. 6636.

* * * [EMPTY SPACE] * * *

-----MAP-----

-----Showing RightofWay [sic] across-----

-----A Tract of land 209½ ft sq. Sec 22 T1N.R10W -----

-----Scale "1400ft"-----

* * * [Drawing or map] * * *

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That for and in consideration of the sum of Twenty five and 00/100 DOLLARS, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I, Samuel Johnson, widower, and sole heir at law of Annie Johnson, deceased, of Tillamook County, Oregon, hereinafter called the grantrs [sic] do hereby bargain, sell, grant, convey and confirm to PACIFIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, hereinafter called the grantee, and to its successors and assigns forever, all of the following described real property situate in the County of Tillamook and State of Oregon, to-wit:

A strip of land one hundred (100) feet wide being fifty (50) feet on each side of the center line of the railway of the grantee as the same is surveyed and located through a certain tract of land in Lot eight of section twenty two, Township one North of Range ten West of Willamette Meridian, more particularly described as follows;- [sic]

Commencing at a stake on the meander line marked with a cross, running thence in a Southerly direction 209½ feet, thence Westerly 209½ feet, thence Northerly 209½ feet, thence Easterly 209½ feet to the place of beginning.

Together with the appurtenances, tenements,[]and hereditaments thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the above named grantee and

unto its successors and assigns forever.

The grantors [sic] above named do covenant that they are seised of the aforesaid premises in fee simple, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, and that they will warrant and defend the premises herein granted unto the grantee aforesaid, and unto its successors and assigns against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.

The court had found that the Johnson 9/610 deed conveyed fee simple title because the amount of consideration was substantial (\$25), the “right of way” language in body of the deed described the geographic location of the property and not of the nature of the interest being conveyed, there was no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only nor a right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, and there was no requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor’s land.

The plaintiffs argue that the court incorrectly determined that the phrase “right of way” did not indicate the original parties’ intention to convey an easement because it described the land being conveyed and not the nature of the property interest. Instead, plaintiffs argue the court should have determined that the use of the term “right of way” in this deed referenced the interest being conveyed and thus indicated an intention to convey an easement. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed contains the phrases “strip of land” and through this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the court finds that it was correct that the use of the phrase “right of way” was describing the geographic location of the property and not the property interest itself. Second, for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Johnson 9/610 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards/Bouche* factors weighed in

favor of finding that the Johnson 9/610 deed conveyed a fee were correct and therefore the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is denied.

5. The Paquet 5/316 Deed

The **Paquet 5/316 deed (Def.'s Ex. 81)** provides in pertinent part:

Fred Paquet	No. 2853
to	Right of Way
Pacific Railway + Navigation Company	\$202.60

Know All Men by These Presents: That for and in consideration of the sum of \$202.60/100 to me in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I, Fred Paquet, unmarried, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, all those portions of the land owned by me, embraced in a strip of land 100 ft. wide, being 50 ft. on each side of the center line of the railway to the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company, as now surveyed, located and adopted thru the lands of the aforesaid Fred Paquet, in Lot 1, Sec. 22 T 1 N.R.10 W., W. M. said center line being more particularly described as follows: * * *
[Description] * * *

Together with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

To Have and to Hold unto the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company and to its successors and assigns forever, together with the right to build, maintain and operate thereover a railway and telegraph line.

The court had found that the Paquet 5/316 deed conveyed fee simple title because the amount of consideration was substantial (\$202.60), the "right of way" language in the body of the deed described the geographic location of the property and not of the nature of the interest being conveyed, there was no limitation on the use of the land for railroad purposes only nor a right of reverter if the railroad discontinued railroad use, and there was no requirement for the railroad to build structures such as crossings, cattle guards, or fences to protect the grantor's land.

The plaintiffs argue that the court incorrectly determined that the phrase “right of way” did not indicate the original parties’ intention to convey an easement because it described the land being conveyed and not the nature of the property interest. Instead, plaintiffs argue the court should have determined that the use of the term “right of way” in this deed referenced the interest being conveyed and thus indicated an intention to convey an easement. Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that because the deed contains the phrases “strip of land” and through this court should have found that the deed conveyed an easement and not a fee. The court disagrees. First, the court finds that it was correct that the use of the phrase “right of way” was describing the geographic location of the property and not the property interest itself. This is further supported by an inclusion of a specific amount of acreage that is being conveyed which indicates that the use of the term “right of way” was describing the geographic location of the interest being conveyed. Second, for the same reasons as explained in the court’s analysis of the Category II deeds, the use of “strip of land” and through in the Paquet 5/316 deed are not made in reference to any language limiting the use of the land and thus do not indicate an intent by the original parties to convey an easement. Thus, the court finds that its original conclusion that the *Bernards* factors weighed in favor of finding that the Paquet 5/316 deed conveyed a fee was correct and therefore the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the *Albright* and *Loveridge* plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is hereby **GRANTED-in-PART and DENIED-in-PART**. Reconsideration is granted for the Beals Land Co. 18/41 deed, Wheeler 16/2 deed, Byrom 5/310 deed and Hannan 72/549 deed. The parties shall have until **February 25, 2019** to file a proposed schedule for

resolving the remaining issues in these cases. The court will thereafter schedule a status conference to finalize the parties' next steps.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Nancy B. Firestone
NANCY B. FIRESTONE
Senior Judge

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

Nos. 16-1565 L and 18-375 L (consolidated)

Filed: April 29, 2019

GARY E. ALBRIGHT, et al.
and MICHELE S. AEDER, et al.

RULE 54(b) JUDGMENT

v.

THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to the court's Opinion, filed August 13, 2018, granting-in-part, defendant's motion for summary judgment, Opinion, filed February 8, 2019, granting-in-part and denying-in-part, the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, and the court's Order of Dismissal, filed April 26, 2019, directing the entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), there being no just reason for delay,

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this date, pursuant to Rule 58, that judgment is entered in favor of defendant, and the plaintiffs listed in the attached Exhibit A, and claims listed in the attached Exhibits A and B, are dismissed.

Lisa L. Reyes
Clerk of Court

By: s/ Debra L. Samler

Deputy Clerk

NOTE: As to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 60 days from this date, see RCFC 58.1, re number of copies and listing of all plaintiffs. Filing fee is \$505.00.

EXHIBIT A**1. *Albright v. United States***

Map ID#s	Full Name	Parcel Numbers
1155	Gary E. and Karla C. Albright	1N1017CB05600
724, 725	Carole J. Bellisario	2N1032BB05800, 2N1032BB06100
1177	Todd A. and Rebecca A. Bridge	1N1017CD01400
736	Martha Bush, Trustee	2N1032BB06800
344	Loretta J. Haliski & Jan C. and Kristi R. Christopherson	3N10360001700
1115	George DeGeer and Tracy Keegan	1N1007AD00701
705, 704	Howard N. Dietrich, Sr. (Trustee)	2N1029CC07900, 2N1029CC05700
326, 328	Andrew M. Donowho	3N09310000700, 3N10360000100
1111, 1112	Lardner Family Revocable Trust (Barbara Dunn Lardner)	1N1007AD00500, 1N1007AD00600
256	Erickson Realty, Ltd.	3N0810DC00200
1256, 1257	Garibaldi's Hook, Line N' Sinker	1N1021AC12900, 1N1021AC13000
456	Jason and Christy Hitz & Mark and Carol Beer	2N1009BB00500
1509	Stuart Dean Hoffman	1S0930BD00300
1190	David L. Hubbell	1N1020AB01900
773	Gail M. Kessinger	2N1032BC06600

Map ID#s	Full Name	Parcel Numbers
594	James A. and Susan M. Kliewer	2N1029BD04102
595	James A. and Susan M. Kliewer & Patrick R. and Dominique M. Toews	2N1029BD04101
807	Dmitri Kosten	2N1032CB04100
909	Ronald P. and Susan L. Anderson Krueger	1N1005BB05500
463	Kurt and Linda Langeberg	2N1009BB02900
1154	James E. and Rita J. McConnell	1N1017CB05700
1116	James and Diane Miller, Daniel Foeller and Thomas C. Foeller	1N1007AD00204
529	Barbara J . Nurmi	2N1020AB05000
823	Barbara Reimers Family Trust c/o Roger Reimers	2N1032CB11700
824	Schwietert Enterprises II, LLC	2N1032CB11600
327, 329	Odon P. Skupen, Trustee	3N09310000900, 3N10360002500
555	Franc Sloan	2N1020DB00500
508, 507	Brady A. Smith	2N1009CC03500, 2N1009CC03400
916, 917	Robert A. and Barbara A. Stewart	1N1005BB05100, 1N1005BB05000
755	Switzer Family Trust	2N1032BC02501
594, 595	Patrick R. and Dominique M. Toews	2N1029BD04101, 2N1029BD04201

Map ID#s	Full Name	Parcel Numbers
679	Steven M. and Linda A. Van Doren and Willa Worley	2N1029CC01000
680, 681 682	Eric P. and Karen J. Williams	2N1029CC01100, 2N1029CC01200, 2N1029CC01400, 2N1029CC01300
155	Edward J. and Judith A. Bates	3N5270001500
89, 90	Brad (Bradford) Congdon	2N4040001201, 2N4040001203
62, 19, 20	Joseph A. and Beverly J. Evers	2N415A000200 2N4250000700, 2N4250000801
201	Roderick Michael Gordon Living Trust	3N528AD01900
84	David W. and Sarah J.B. Gregory	2N404DC00802
96	Robert C. and Donna J. Herinckx	2N404BB00500
144	Gregory K. Hulbert Trust	3N5350000300
124, 120	JC Purinton Group, LLC	3N400C005200; 3N400C004400
125	Little Family Trust	3N400C004900
97	M> Land Management LLC	3N400C009800
799, 800, 801	Upper Crust Real Estate LLC	2N1032CB03500 2N1032CB03400 2N 1032CB03300
23	Robert C. Vandehey Living Trust	2N4240000600
116	Richard John Vidler, Jr.	3N429B000400
199	Charles Winders	3N528AD01600

Map ID#s	Full Name	Parcel Numbers
108	Arlene Frances Wolever Trust	3N400C006804
1452	Clarence W. and Dolores F. Boquist	1S1013A000300
1249	Douglas Creasy	1N1021AC12300
426	Bradley C. Donohue	2N1003DA01200
214	Sherry D. Crocker	3N5320000602
11	Evers Family Farms, Inc.	2N4250000400
123, 122	Jamieson Land and Timber, LLC	3N400C005300, 3N400C005400
93	Debra K. Wyckoff	2N4050000700
121, 126	Lyal T. and Sandra K. Purinton	3N400C004600, 3N400C004901

2. **Aeder v. United States - Plaintiffs to Be Dismissed Based on the Court's Rulings in Albright**

Map ID #	Full Name	Parcel Numbers
744	Michele S. Aeder	2N1032BC00100
467	James P. Calpin Trust	2N1009BB03400
338, 323	James W. and Ella L. Markham and John C. Markham	3N10360001100, 3N09310000300

EXHIBIT B

Map ID#s	Full Name	Parcel Numbers
1148	Marguerita H. Miller	1N1017CB06500
1277	Oregon Coast Hospitality Investments LLC	1N1021AD09700
562	Estate of Delores Stover	2N1020DB01300
102	Rinck Living Trust, Thomas J. Rinck and Kathryn M.	3N400C009100
1416	Tillamook County Pioneer Museum	1S1002CD01100

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 16-1565 L & 18-375 L
CONSOLIDATED
(Filed: June 26, 2019)

GARY E. ALBRIGHT, ET AL
Plaintiffs

RULE 54(b)
JUDGMENT

v

THE UNITED STATES
Defendant

Pursuant to the court's Order, filed June 24, 2019, directing the entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), there being no just reason for delay,

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this date, pursuant to Rule 58, the following claims are dismissed:

Map ID No.	Name	Parcel No.
330	Three Bridges, LLC (Jack S. Thayer)	3N10360002400
331	Wade J. Dillenburg	3N10360000300
103	Rinck Living Trust, Thomas J. Rinck and Kathryn M.	3N400C008800
563	Estate of Delores Stover	2N1020DB01400
1198	Daniel E.Higgins, III	1N1020A000901
1210	Michael J. and Zelda L. Opoka	1N1021BC02100
1212	Michael J. and Zelda L. Opoka	1N1021BC02201

Lisa L. Reyes
Clerk of Court

By: s/ Anthony Curry

Deputy Clerk

NOTE: As to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 60 days from this date, see RCFC 58.1, re number of copies and listing of all plaintiffs. Filing fee is \$505.00.

APPX000261

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
Albright v. US, 2019-2080

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Meghan S. Largent, being duly sworn according to law and being over the age of 18, upon my oath depose and say that:

On **November 6, 2019**, I electronically filed the foregoing **Corrected Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants** with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF System, which will serve via e-mail notice of such filing to all counsel registered as CM/ECF users, including the following principal counsel for the other parties:

Anna T. Katselas
U.S. Department of Justice
Environment & Natural Resources Division
PO Box 7415
Washington, DC 20044
202-514-2772
anna.katselas@usdoj.gov
Counsel for the Appellee

James Hulme
Arent Fox LLP
1717 K Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20006
202-857-6144
james.hulme@arentfox.com
Counsel for Arent Fox Albright/Aeder Appellants

Thomas S. Stewart
Stewart, Wald & McCulley L.L.C.
2100 Central, Suite 22
Kansas City, MO 64108
816-303-1500

stewart@swm.legal

Counsel for Loveridge/Abrahamson Appellants

Six paper copies will be filed with the Court within the time provided in the Court's rules.

November 6, 2019

/s/ Meghan S. Largent

Meghan S. Largent

Lewis Rice LLC

Counsel for Appellants in Case

No. 19-2078

**CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME
LIMITATION, TYPEFACE REQUIREMENTS AND TYPE STYLE
REQUIREMENTS**

1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B) or Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.1(e)

 X The brief contains 11,184 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B)(iii), or

 The brief uses a monospaced typeface and contains _____ lines of text, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).

2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) or Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.1(e) and the type style requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(6)

 X The brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using MS Word 2013 in a 14 point Century Schoolbook font or

 The brief has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using _____ in a _____ characters per inch _____ font.

November 6, 2019

/s/ Meghan S. Largent
Meghan S. Largent
Lewis Rice LLC
Counsel for Appellants in Case
No. 19-2078