

**United States Court Of Appeals
For The Federal Circuit**

PERSONAL AUDIO, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CBS CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Case No. 2:13-cv-00270, Judge Gilstrap.

**APPELLANT’S COMBINED PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING AND
REHEARING *EN BANC***

Jeremy S. Pitcock
THE PITCOCK LAW GROUP
1501 Broadway, 12th Floor
New York, New York 10036
(646) 571-2237
jpitcock@pitcocklawgroup.com

Papool S. Chaudhari
CHAUDHARI LAW, PLLC
P.O. Box 1863
Wylie, Texas 75098
(214) 702-1150
papool@chaudharilaw.com

Counsel for Appellant

February 10, 2020

CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST

Counsel for Appellant Personal Audio, LLC certifies the following:

1. The full name of every party represented by me is:

Personal Audio, LLC

2. The names of the real parties in interest (if the party named in the caption is not the real party in interest) represented by me are:

None.

3. All parent corporations and any publicly held companies that own 10% or more of the stock of the party or amicus curiae represented by me are:

None.

4. The names of all law firms and the partners or associates that appeared for the party or amicus now represented by us in the trial court or agency or are expected to appear in this Court are:

THE PITCOCK LAW GROUP: Jeremy S. Pitcock

CHAUDHARI LAW, PLLC: Papool S. Chaudhari

5. The title and number of any case known to counsel to be pending in this or any other court or agency that will directly affect or be directly affected by this court's decision in the pending appeal.

None.

Dated: February 10, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jeremy S. Pitcock

Jeremy S. Pitcock
THE PITCOCK LAW GROUP
1501 Broadway, 12th Floor
New York, New York 10036

Attorney for Appellant Personal Audio, LLC

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF COUNSEL – FEDERAL CIRCUIT RULE 35(b).....v

I. INTRODUCTION1

II. ARGUMENT.....1

 I. The Panel’s Decision That Estoppel Issues Must Be Raised In The
 Appeal of the IPR Violates Supreme Court Precedent.....1

 II. The Panel’s Decision to Give Collateral Estoppel Effect to An
 Unconstitutional Procedure Was Erroneous2

 III. Overturning the Previous Jury Verdict With The Later IPR Violates
 the Reexamination Clause4

CONCLUSION5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019).....4

Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
313 (1971)1, 2

Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc., 321 F.3d 1098, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2003)4

Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 33 S.Ct. 523, 57 L.Ed. 879 (1913)
.....5

Other Authorities

Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 28–29.....2, 3

STATEMENT OF COUNSEL – FEDERAL CIRCUIT RULE 35(b)

Based on my professional judgment, I believe this appeal requires an answer to the following precedent-setting questions of exceptional importance:

Must the collateral estoppel effect of an IPR be raised and litigated in the appeal of the IPR, rather than in the court in which estoppel is sought?

Should an IPR that violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution be given collateral estoppel effect over a prior jury verdict?

Does using the outcome of an IPR to overturn a prior jury verdict of infringement and validity violate the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment?

Based on my professional judgment, I believe the panel’s decision is contrary to the following decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States or precedent of this Court: *Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation*, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); *Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co.*, 228 U.S. 364 (1913); *Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc.*, 321 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Dated: February 10, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jeremy S. Pitcock

Attorney for Appellant Personal Audio, LLC

I. INTRODUCTION

Personal Audio respectfully petitions this Court for rehearing *en banc* and for panel rehearing, concerning the issues raised in this petition.

First, the Supreme Court has made it clear that estoppel of a suit is subject to a balancing test that the entity claiming estoppel should raise in the case. Here, the Panel has made two errors: (1) requiring estoppel arguments to be raised in the appeal of the action that supposedly creates an estoppel in the second; and (2) applying a rule of estoppel, instead of using a balancing test. Moreover, if the proper balancing test were used, it is clear that an IPR decision found to be unconstitutional should not be used to overturn a prior jury verdict.

Second, an IPR cannot be used to attack a prior jury verdict under the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment. As this Court previously decided, issues which are not raised prior to the jury verdict cannot be used to overturn it after the fact. There was no decision in the IPR prior to the jury verdict, and it cannot be used *ex post facto* to overturn it.

II. ARGUMENT

I. The Panel's Decision That Estoppel Issues Must Be Raised In The Appeal of the IPR Violates Supreme Court Precedent

In the seminal case of *Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation*, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), which overturned the long standing rule

that collateral estoppel would not bar subsequent litigation between two different parties to previous litigation, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the position “that a plea of estoppel by an infringement or royalty suit defendant must automatically be accepted once the defendant in support of his plea identified the issue in suit as the identical question finally decided against the patentee or one of his privies in previous litigation.” *Id.* at 332–33. Nevertheless, this is exactly what the panel has decided in this case.

Estoppel must be raised in the subsequent litigation, not the appeal of the IPR argued by a different party to create the estoppel, and it was clear legal error for the panel to determine otherwise.

II. The Panel’s Decision to Give Collateral Estoppel Effect to An Unconstitutional Procedure Was Erroneous

The *Restatement (Second) of Judgments* §§ 28–29 collects the many “Exceptions to the General Rule of Issue Preclusion.” Section 28 recites circumstances in which relitigation of an issue has been held not to be precluded in a subsequent action between the same parties. Section 29 recites additional circumstances negating issue preclusion when there is non-mutuality of parties:

- (1) Treating the issue as conclusively determined would be incompatible with an applicable scheme of administering the remedies in the actions involved;
- (2) The forum in the second action affords the party against whom preclusion is asserted procedural opportunities in the presentation and determination of the issue that were not

available in the first action and could likely result in the issue being differently determined;

(3) The person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or to avoid unfavorable preclusion, could have effected joinder in the first action between himself and his present adversary;

(4) The determination relied on as preclusive was itself inconsistent with another determination of the same issue;

(5) The prior determination may have been affected by relationships among the parties to the first action that are not present in the subsequent action, or apparently was based on a compromise verdict or finding;

(6) Treating the issue as conclusively determined may complicate determination of issues in the subsequent action or prejudice the interests of another party thereto;

(7) The issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively determined would inappropriately foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule upon which it was based;

(8) Other compelling circumstances make it appropriate that the party be permitted to relitigate the issue.

Restatement § 29 (citing cases).

Applying these principles, there are many factors which weigh against estoppel. For example, the current application of estoppel violates factor (1) because it disrupts the federal system of determining patent infringement and validity in front of a jury. Factor (2) weighs against estoppel because federal litigation has many more procedural and substantive safeguards than AIA reviews. Factor (4) obviously weighs heavily against estoppel, because a jury previously found the patent valid over similar (almost identical) art.

However, an almost dispositive factor is that the appointment of administrative patent judges (APJs) by the Secretary of Commerce under Title 35 violates the

Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution. *See Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.*, 941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019). While the panel applied no balancing test at all, the fact that the IPR violates the Constitution should have been weighed, and there is little chance here that overturning a prior general jury verdict by estoppel was appropriate without analysis under factors (6) (7) and (8), which all weigh heavily against the application of estoppel once the IPR process used was found to violate the Constitution.

III. Overturning the Previous Jury Verdict With The Later IPR Violates the Reexamination Clause

The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States declares: “In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”

On September 15, 2014, a jury found the ‘504 Patent valid and infringed. Seven months later, on April 10, 2015, the Board found the ‘504 Patent invalid. However, nothing that occurs after a jury verdict can possibly be the grounds for overturning a jury verdict, since it is “constitutionally impermissible for the district court to re-examine the jury’s verdict and to enter JMOL [judgment as a matter of law] on grounds not raised in the pre-verdict [motion for] JMOL.” *Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc.*, 321 F.3d 1098, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Here, CBS never argued

that it had somehow raised the IPR outcome as a JMOL, thus the precedent in *Duro-Last* requires reinstatement of the jury verdict.

Moreover, *Duro-Last* relies upon a body of Supreme Court decisions such as *Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co.*, 228 U.S. 364, 33 S.Ct. 523, 57 L.Ed. 879 (1913). In *Slocum*, it was determined that a federal appellate court could not simply reverse a general verdict of a jury, since the court would essentially be overturning the factual determinations made by the jury given the instructions on the law given by the Court as to those issues. Here, the jury found a general verdict on infringement and validity under the facts presented to it. A court cannot simply substitute the facts in the IPR for those found by the jury without violating the Seventh Amendment.

The Panel, thus, respectfully erred in failing to apply these unequivocal precedents of the Supreme Court of the United States and this Court to this case in its opinion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should respectfully grant Appellant's Petition for Rehearing *En Banc* or, alternatively, grant Appellant's Petition for Panel Rehearing.

Dated: February 10, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Papool S. Chaudhari

Jeremy S. Pitcock
THE PITCOCK LAW GROUP

1501 Broadway, 12th Floor
New York, New York 10036

Papool S. Chaudhari
CHAUDHARI LAW, PLLC
P.O. Box 1863
Wylie, Texas 75098
(214) 702-1150
papool@chaudharilaw.com

Attorneys for Appellant Personal Audio, LLC

ADDENDUM

**United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit**

PERSONAL AUDIO, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

CBS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee

2018-2256

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in No. 2:13-cv-00270-JRG, Judge J. Rodney Gilstrap.

Decided: January 10, 2020

JEREMY SETH PITCOCK, The Pitcock Law Group, New York, NY, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by JENNIFER ISHIMOTO, Banie & Ishimoto LLP, Menlo Park, CA; PAPOOL SUBHASH CHAUDHARI, Chaudhari Law, PLLC, Wylie, TX.

STEVEN M. LIEBERMAN, Rothwell, Figg, Ernst & Manbeck, PC, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by SHARON DAVIS, JENNIFER MAISEL, DANIEL MCCALLUM, BRIAN S. ROSENBLOOM.

Before MOORE, REYNA, and TARANTO, *Circuit Judges*.

TARANTO, *Circuit Judge*.

Personal Audio, LLC brought this case against CBS Corporation, alleging that CBS infringed a Personal Audio patent. A jury found for Personal Audio on infringement and invalidity as to three claims of the patent. When the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issued a final written decision determining that those claims are unpatentable, the district court, with the parties' consent, stayed entry of its judgment in this case until completion of direct review of the Board's decision in our court. We eventually affirmed the Board's final written decision. The district court then asked Personal Audio and CBS how they wished to proceed, and they agreed that, under governing precedent, CBS was entitled to entry of final judgment in its favor. The district court entered such a judgment.

Personal Audio appeals. To the extent that Personal Audio challenges the Board's final written decision, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the challenges, and we have no jurisdiction to review them on appeal from the district court's judgment. The exclusive avenue for review was a direct appeal from the final written decision. To the extent that Personal Audio challenges the district court's determination of the consequences of the affirmed final written decision for the proper disposition of this case, Personal Audio conceded that governing precedent required judgment for CBS. We therefore affirm the district court's judgment.

I

Personal Audio owns U.S. Patent No. 8,112,504, which describes a system for organizing audio files, by subject matter, into "program segments." '504 patent, Abstract. The system arranges the segments through a "session schedule" and allows a user to navigate through the

schedule in various ways, such as skipping the remainder of a segment, restarting a segment from its beginning, listening to predetermined “highlight passages” within a segment, or jumping to a “cross-referenced position” within another segment. *Id.*, col. 2, lines 21–56.

In 2013, Personal Audio sued CBS, alleging infringement of the ’504 patent. Later that year, a third party (the Electronic Frontier Foundation) petitioned for an inter partes review (IPR) of claims 31–35 of the ’504 patent under 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319. The Board instituted a review in April 2014, but the district court case proceeded to trial, with the issues limited to infringement and invalidity of claims 31–34. On September 14, 2014, a jury found that CBS had infringed claims 31–34 and that CBS had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that those claims were invalid. The jury awarded Personal Audio \$1,300,000 as damages for CBS’s infringement.

On April 10, 2015, the Board issued a final written decision in the IPR under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a), concluding that claims 31–35 are unpatentable. *Electronic Frontier Foundation v. Personal Audio, LLC*, No. IPR2014-00070, 2015 WL 13685137 (P.T.A.B.). Personal Audio and CBS agreed to stay proceedings in the district court case pending this court’s review of the Board’s decision pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 141(c) and 319 and 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A). Before pressing the appeal of the Board’s decision in this court, Personal Audio sought rehearing with the Board, making two arguments that are relevant to this appeal: (1) that the Board, through its final written decision, violated the Seventh Amendment by reexamining jury findings and (2) that the final written decision was unlawful because the inter partes review scheme violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. J.A. 583–85. After the Board denied rehearing, Personal Audio appealed to this court. In its opening brief in this court, Personal Audio continued to assert that the Board’s final written decision violated the Seventh Amendment. J.A. 2118.

On August 7, 2017, this court affirmed the Board’s final written decision. *Personal Audio, LLC v. Electronic Frontier Foundation*, 867 F.3d 1246, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court denied Personal Audio’s petition for a writ of certiorari on May 14, 2018. *Personal Audio, LLC v. Electronic Frontier Foundation*, 138 S. Ct. 1989 (2018).

In December 2017, based on our decision affirming the Board, the district court asked Personal Audio and CBS to submit a joint status report. They did so on May 29, 2018, after the Supreme Court denied certiorari from our decision. In the joint status report, Personal Audio stated that it “continue[d] to believe that overturning the verdict of the jury with a later IPR proceeding violates the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution” and that “the outcome of the IPR should not be given collateral estoppel effect, since it was filed by a third party under a different standard.” J.A. 423. But Personal Audio agreed to judgment against it because “current authority supports rendering a judgment in favor of the Defendant CBS.” *Id.*

The district court entered judgment for CBS on July 11, 2018. One week later, on July 18, 2018, the PTO performed the ministerial act, under 35 U.S.C. § 318(b), of issuing a certificate that cancelled claims 31–35. Personal Audio timely appealed to this court.

II

Personal Audio does not challenge the IPR scheme or even a particular provision of that scheme, or regulation under the scheme, on its face. It alleges injury only from the particular final written decision of the Board that ruled claims 31–35 of its ’504 patent unpatentable. Personal Audio presents challenges of two types involving the Board decision, while invoking four constitutional bases and one non-constitutional basis. First, Personal Audio presents various challenges to the lawfulness of the Board’s final written decision itself. Second, Personal Audio challenges the district court’s ruling on the consequence of the

affirmed Board decision for this case—namely, that termination of Personal Audio’s assertion of the patent claims in this still-live patent case is a required result of the affirmed Board decision, even though the jury rendered a verdict in Personal Audio’s favor.

We do not have jurisdiction to hear challenges of the first type, which squarely attack the validity of the Board’s final written decision. The exclusive vehicle for bringing such challenges is a direct appeal to this court from the final written decision. As to challenges of the second type, Personal Audio forfeited any argument that existing precedent allows this panel to do anything but reject them. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment for CBS.

A

Personal Audio contends that the Board, by issuing its final written decision, violated the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment, the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.¹ Of those grounds, Personal Audio mentioned in the district court only the Seventh Amendment ground. J.A. 423–24. We consider the other grounds to be forfeited. *Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.*, 582 F.3d 1288, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“If a party fails to raise an argument before the trial court, or presents only a skeletal or undeveloped argument

¹ After briefing was complete, Personal Audio submitted a supplemental letter asserting an Appointments Clause challenge to the Board’s decision. We have held that any such challenge, even when made in a direct appeal from the Board, is forfeited when not made in, or prior to the filing of, the opening brief in this court. *Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp.*, 941 F.3d 1173, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The challenge is also, in any event, subject to the exclusive-jurisdiction bar discussed *infra*.

to the trial court, we may deem that argument waived on appeal.”). But even if those grounds were not forfeited, they would fail for the same reason that the Seventh Amendment challenge to the Board decision fails: the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the Board decision. We so conclude in fulfilling our “independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists.” *Hertz Corp. v. Friend*, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010).

The Constitution gives Congress a broad power to define the jurisdiction of particular lower federal courts. Article III vests the “judicial power of the United States . . . in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” Art. III § 1. In turn, Article I grants Congress the power to “constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme court.” Art. I § 8, cl. 9. The Supreme Court long ago held that the power to create the lower federal courts includes a lesser power—to define the jurisdiction of lower federal courts it creates. *Sheldon v. Sill*, 49 U.S. 441, 448 (1850) (explaining that “Congress, having the power to establish the courts, must define their respective jurisdiction”); *id.* at 449 (“[H]aving a right to prescribe, Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies.”); *see Keene v. United States*, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993).

Congress has exercised this power to channel judicial review of certain agency actions to specified lower federal courts. The Administrative Procedure Act confirms this fact when it commands that “[t]he form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter *in a court specified by statute* or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action . . . in a court of competent jurisdiction.” 5 U.S.C. § 703 (emphasis added). Congress has made different choices in different contexts about the channeling of judicial review of agency action. *Compare, e.g.*, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(b)(1) (providing for review of certain Environmental Protection Agency decisions “only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia”) *with, e.g.*, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (providing for review of certain Federal Trade Commission orders “within any circuit where the method of competition or the act or practice in question was used or where such person, partnership, or corporation resides or carries on business”).

While there is a “strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action,” *Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians*, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986), that review may be exclusively routed to a specified court of appeals. Where Congress has provided for decision by an administrative body followed by appellate review in a court of appeals, we must ask whether it is “fairly discernible in the statutory scheme” that Congress has “precluded district court jurisdiction.” *Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich*, 510 U.S. 200, 207 (1994) (quoting *Block v. Community Nutrition Institute*, 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984)). To make that determination, we assess “the statute’s language, structure, and purpose, its legislative history, . . . and whether the claims can be afforded meaningful review.” *Id.*

In *Elgin v. Department of Treasury*, the Supreme Court considered whether the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) precludes district court review of an agency’s final adverse action. 567 U.S. 1, 6 (2012). When an agency takes a final adverse action against an employee, the employee is “entitled to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board.” 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d). In turn, the CSRA gives our court “exclusive jurisdiction” of, among other things, “an appeal from a final order or final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, pursuant to sections 7703(b)(1) and 7703(d) of title 5.” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9); *see also* 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (“[A] petition to review a final order or final decision of the Board shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”). Interpreting these provisions

together, the Supreme Court determined that “extrastatutory review is not available to those employees to whom the CSRA grants administrative and judicial review.” *Elgin*, 567 U.S. at 11. The Court summarized the CSRA’s procedural protections and explained that “[g]iven the painstaking detail with which the CSRA sets out the method for covered employees to obtain review of adverse employment actions, it is fairly discernible that Congress intended to deny such employees an additional avenue of review in district court.” *Id.* at 11–12.

We draw a comparable conclusion about the exclusivity of appeal to this court as the mechanism for judicial review of Personal Audio’s challenge to the final written decision of the Board in the IPR here. Congress has provided that a “party dissatisfied with the final written decision . . . under section 318(a) may appeal the decision pursuant to sections 141 through 144.” 35 U.S.C. § 319. Under section 141(c), a “party to an inter partes review . . . who is dissatisfied with the final written decision of the [Board] under section 318(a) . . . may appeal the Board’s decision *only* to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) (emphasis added). Sections 142–144 detail how this appeal must proceed, with each provision expressly referring to this court only. 35 U.S.C. § 142 (“When an appeal is taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the appellant shall file . . . a written notice of appeal” within a prescribed time”); *id.* § 143 (providing that “the Director shall transmit to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit a certified list of the documents comprising the record” and “shall have the right to intervene in an appeal”); *id.* § 144 (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall review the decision . . . [and] [u]pon its determination the court shall issue . . . its mandate and opinion”). Finally, Congress has expressly given this court “*exclusive* jurisdiction” to hear “an appeal from a decision of . . . the

[Board] with respect to a[n] . . . inter partes review under title 35.” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added).

Those provisions make it more than “fairly discernible,” *Elgin*, 567 U.S. at 10, that judicial review of the lawfulness of the Board’s final written decision here was limited to an appeal to this court under the just-recited provisions. That is enough in a case like this, where Congress has provided an adequate channel for review rather than foreclosed judicial review altogether or of particular constitutional or other claims. *See id.* at 8–10. As described above, Personal Audio took such an appeal, and there is no basis for any conclusion that the opportunity provided in that appeal was inadequate for the assertion and adjudication of any properly preserved challenge to the final written decision as unlawful. We conclude that Congress’s affirmative grant of an exclusive, direct-review procedure for final written decisions deprives the district court of jurisdiction to hear Personal Audio’s collateral attack on the final written decision in this case.

B

Personal Audio also challenges the district court’s holding that the necessary consequence of the affirmed final written decision was termination of this case in favor of CBS. This challenge is not to the final written decision, but to the application of the decision, once affirmed, to dispose of the patent infringement and invalidity assertions in this case—and, now, to the application of the PTO’s ministerial cancellation of the claims at issue a week after the district court’s judgment was entered. This challenge was not jurisdictionally foreclosed to the district court by the exclusive review scheme we have discussed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) to hear Personal Audio’s appeal on this point.

Personal Audio, however, forfeited any argument that our existing precedent is not determinative against it. In the status report submitted to the district court, Personal

Audio made no argument at all for distinguishing this case from the cases in which we held that district court actions had to terminate when a Board unpatentability ruling as to the relevant patent claims was affirmed on appeal. *See, e.g., XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics*, 890 F.3d 1282, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2018); *Dow Chemical Co. v. Nova Chemicals Corp. (Canada)*, 803 F.3d 620, 628 (Fed. Cir. 2015); *ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc.*, 789 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015); *Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.*, 721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013). To the contrary, in the joint status report, Personal Audio agreed that “current authority supports rendering a judgment in favor of the Defendant CBS” and that “there is no current precedent for doing otherwise at this time.” J.A. 423.

The panel lacks authority to reconsider the precedent that Personal Audio agrees was adverse and controlling. Only the en banc court may reconsider this precedent within this court. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

III

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on February 10, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing *En Banc* with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF System, which will send notice of such filing to all registered users.

I further certify that, upon acceptance and request from the Court, the required paper copies of the foregoing will be deposited with United Parcel Service for delivery to the Clerk, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, 717 Madison Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20439.

Date: February 10, 2020

/s/ Papool S. Chaudhari
Papool S. Chaudhari

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1. This combined petition complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 35(b)(2)(A) and Fed. R. App. P. 40(b)(1) because:

 this combined petition contains 1,374 words, excluding the parts of the combined petition exempted by Fed. Cir. R. 35(c)(2) and Fed. Cir. R. 40(c)(1).

2. This combined petition complies with the page limit requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 35(b)(2)(B) and Fed. R. App. P. 40(b)(2) because the brief is six pages long, excluding parts of the combined petition exempted by Fed. Cir. R. 35(c)(2) and Fed. Cir. R. 40(c)(1).

Dated: February 10, 2020

/s/ Papool S. Chaudhari
Papool S. Chaudhari