Late yesterday, the Federal Circuit released s nonprecedential order dismissing an appeal. This morning, the Federal Circuit released s precedential opinion in a patent infringement case appealed from the Central District of California. The Federal Circuit also released two nonprecedential opinions, one in a case appealed from the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and one in a case appealed from the Court of Federal Claims. Finally, the Federal Circuit released four nonprecedential orders, two denying petitions for writs of mandamus, one remanding a settled case, and one dismissing an appeal. Here are the introductions to the opinions and orders and links to the dismissals.
Colibri Heart Valve LLC v. Medtronic Corevalve LLC (Precedential)
U.S. Patent No. 8,900,294, owned by Colibri Heart Valve LLC, claims a method, for use in trying to implant an artificial heart valve to replace a defective valve, that furnishes a do-over opportunity to the installer to get the positioning right. In the claimed method, the replacement valve is only partially deployed from the delivery apparatus but recaptured within the delivery apparatus before full deployment if it looks like the positioning will be off. Colibri sued Medtronic CoreValve, LLC, a manufacturer of replacement heart valves, for infringement—alleging, as now relevant, that Medtronic was inducing surgeons to perform the claimed method with Medtronic’s products. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
The ’294 patent, at the outset of prosecution, included two independent claims reciting the opportunity-for-doover method of partial deployment: one claimed pushing out the valve from an outer sheath of the delivery apparatus, and one claimed retracting the outer sheath to expose the valve. During prosecution, the examiner rejected the latter claim for lack of written description, see 35 U.S.C. § 112, and Colibri cancelled it. The patent issued with an independent claim reciting partial deployment by pushing, and no claims expressly reciting partial deployment by retracting.
In the district court, Medtronic contended that the accused use of its product involved partial deployment by retracting, not pushing. At trial, Colibri dropped its assertion of literal infringement, relying solely on the doctrine of equivalents to establish infringement by accused direct infringers using the accused method with Medtronic’s products. The jury, besides rejecting Medtronic’s invalidity challenge, found that Medtronic had induced infringement and awarded more than $106 million in damages to Colibri. Before and after the verdict, Medtronic sought judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on the ground, among others, that Colibri’s equivalents claim was barred by prosecution history estoppel, but the district court denied the motions.
On appeal, Medtronic argues, among other things, that the district court erred in denying JMOL of noninfringement. We now conclude that prosecution history estoppel, based on Colibri’s cancelling of a claim to “retraction” for partial deployment of the replacement valve and Colibri’s own recognition of the close linkage of the subject matter of the cancelled and retained claims, bars application of the doctrine of equivalents. We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of JMOL of noninfringement. That is all we need decide to resolve this dispute over the now-expired patent.
Davis v. Collins (Nonprecedential)
Stanley L. Davis appeals from a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”). His appeal challenges the Veterans Court’s determination that, for purposes of adjudicating Mr. Davis’s claim, the Department of Veterans Affairs did not constructively possess the evidence at issue. See Davis v. McDonough, 36 Vet. App. 142, 149–53 (2023). Mr. Davis’s challenge is to the application of law to fact—specifically, the application of the constructive-possession standard as articulated in, for example, Euzebio v. McDonough, 989 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2021), to the facts of this particular case. Because, in appeals from Veterans Court decisions, this court generally “may not review” “a challenge to a law . . . as applied to the facts of a particular case,” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2), we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Murray v. United States (Nonprecedential)
Spout Springs Mountain Resort (“Spout Springs”) and John Murray appeal from a decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims granting the government’s motion to dismiss their complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Murray v. United States, 165 Fed. Cl. 729 (2023) (“Decision”). The Court of Federal Claims held that Plaintiffs’ complaint was time-barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
FBA Operating Co. v. ETN Capital, LLC (Nonprecedential Order)
Upon consideration of the parties’ joint notice of settlement and motion to dismiss this appeal and remand for ETN Capital, LLC to withdraw its motion for attorneys’ fees and so the parties can move the district court to vacate its decisions dismissing the first and second complaints,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) The motion is granted to the extent that the case is remanded. In granting the motion, this court takes no position as to whether the district court should grant vacatur.
(2) Each party shall bear its own costs.
In re Jackson (Nonprecedential Order)
Richard Cornelius Jackson petitions this court for a writ of mandamus seeking to reassign his pending appeals before the Merit Systems Protection Board to a different administrative judge (AJ), to vacate certain rulings issued in his appeals, and for other relief, including granting him subpoenas, sanctions, an interim stay, and costs.
According to the petition, Mr. Jackson presently has two pending Individual Right of Action appeals before the same AJ. The AJ has to this point issued orders that, among other things, have denied Mr. Jackson’s motions for disqualification, ECF No. 2-2 at 318; denied his motion for certification of that ruling for interlocutory appeal to the Board, id. at 320; and addressed the Board’s jurisdiction, id. at 182. On June 17, 2025, the AJ denied Mr. Jackson’s motion to reconsider a prior jurisdictional ruling and set a hearing for both appeals for July 28, 2025. Id. at 346-47. Mr. Jackson then moved to certify the order for interlocutory review by the Board, which the AJ has taken under advisement. Id. at 372. This petition followed.
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and may only issue if, among other things, petitioner has shown a clear and indisputable right to relief and that there are no other adequate means to attain the relief desired—“a condition designed to ensure that the writ will not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals process.” Love v. McDonough, 100 F.4th 1388, 1393 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004)). Mr. Jackson has not met this demanding standard here, at least because he can raise his challenges to the orders concerning jurisdiction and disqualification either to the Board after an initial decision or to this court once there is a final decision. Because there is an adequate means to attain the requested relief by way of normal appeal, mandamus is unavailable.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
The petition is denied.
In re Micron Technology Inc. (Nonprecedential Order)
Micron Technology Inc. and Micron Semiconductor Products, Inc. (collectively, “Micron”) petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking to compel the district court to rule on Micron’s motion to transfer and stay all proceedings until that motion is resolved. BeSang Inc. opposes. For the following reasons, we deny the petition.